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This thesis aims to use general assertions of moral uncertainty as a perspective by 
which to explore and illuminate contemporary strands of liberal theory. It examines 
the work of the earlier contemporary liberal theorists, including John Rawls, Robert 
Nozick, Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, as well as the more recent accounts of 
liberalism that express ideas of pluralism (Michael Walzer, Joseph Raz, John Gray, 
William Galston, George Crowder), political liberalism (John Rawls, Charles 
Larmore), public reason (Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Gerald Gaus), 
multiculturalism (Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Brian Barry, James Tully, and 
Bikhu Parekh), and postmodernism (Richard Rorty). The development from the 
earlier to more recent liberal theories represents a fundamental shift in justificatory 
strategy: where earlier liberal conceptions aim at universality, and at overcoming or 
transcending uncertainty, later approaches make this uncertainty, usually in the form 
of pluralism or difference, central to the liberal project. In order to achieve this, these 
latter theories tended to presuppose the circumstances of western society, or western 
democratic values. Generally speaking, these approaches fail to respond adequately to 
moral uncertainty, and to meet their own justificatory aims. This manifests, in the 
earlier theories, as plausible but contestable central conceptions, and, in the more 
recent theories, as the inability to justify particular liberal conceptions in the face of 
persistence difference. This is an important result, and suggests the need for further 
developments in liberal justificatory strategies. I suggest that one viable approach 
would be for liberal theory to accept moral uncertainty, and work from a model of 
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1. Moral uncertainty 
 
1.1 Protagoras and relativism 
 
The concept of moral uncertainty represents a number of ideas about and perspectives 
on moral theory. These vary in meaning and expression, and are potentially quite 
diverse, but what is common between them is the doubt they express as to the ability 
of a moral theory to provide a set of positive and absolute guidelines for action that 
are universal, knowable and expressible. This incorporates the group of ideas ascribed 
such names as relativism, subjectivism and scepticism. This doubt acts not only to 
criticise the grand moral theories that purport to set out some rationally incontestable 
truth, but also promotes alternative approaches to working out how we should act. 
These sorts of answers face considerable difficulties: having criticised absolutism in 
the moral theory of others, the challenge is then to arrive at some definite and useful 
result that does not suffer from the same ailment.  
 
One of the earliest proponents of this kind of moral uncertainty in the western 
tradition was Protagoras. He was the most successful member of the Sophists, a group 
of professional philosophers and teachers who lived in Greece in fifth century BC.1 
He was a contemporary of Socrates, and is best known for featuring in two Platonic 
dialogues, Protagoras and Theaetetus. He is famous for his oft-quotes assertion that: 
“Man is the measure of all things, of things that are as to how they are, and of things 
that are not as to how they are not.”2 This statement has been subject to a number of 
interpretations. In a relatively weak rendering, it can be understood as meaning that 
the characteristics of a thing depend on the perspective of each person; or in other 
words “if honey seems sweet to some and bitter to others, then it is sweet to those to 
                                                
1
 T Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995, p725 
2
 G B Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (1981), p85. 
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whom it seems sweet, and bitter to those to whom it seems bitter”.3 This is contrary to 
the more natural idea, that the honey is sweet regardless of who tastes it, and, so, is 
universally sweet. It seems, then, that Protagoras is saying more than simply that 
different people perceive things in different ways; rather, he is asserting that the 
natures of the things themselves are dependant upon these individual perceptions. To 
recapitulate this argument: since perceptions vary, the natures of things also vary, and 
are dependant on the identity and position of the person.  
 
This idea has broad and important implications, especially if the subjectivity of the 
characteristics of objects is extended to encompass the properties and nature of any 
moral situation or action. This would suggest that the correct moral analysis of a 
situation is dependant on the position, the context and beliefs, of the person sitting in 
judgment. This result is both important and startling, and it threatens to undermine 
attempts to apply any moral judgment generally, and, by extension, any judgment at 
all. The dramatic result of Protagoras’ arguments is that 
 
[t]ruth [is] relative, not absolute, and differ[s] from culture to culture, from person to person, 
and from situation to situation. Claims to the contrary, whether religious or philosophical, 
[can]not stand up to critical argument. The ultimate value of any belief or opinion [can] be 
judged only by its practical utility in serving the individual’s needs in life.4 
 
This position is sceptical of any moral theory based on a universal view of nature or 
reason, and leads to a number of theoretical difficulties. Probably the most striking of 
these is the argument of Plato that such a position is self-refuting: if all perceptions 
are true, then it is never possible that they be corrected or disproved, even by the same 
person at a later time.5 If this is extended to beliefs generally, then all beliefs must be 
true, including the belief that not all beliefs are true.6  
 
Neither Protagoras’ view nor Plato’s criticism of it have been expressed here 
sufficiently so as to allow the validity of either to be rigorously explored; but it does 
seem that Plato has identified a fundamental difficultly that could apply to any 
argument critical of absoluteness or universality. This difficulty is characterised by 
                                                
3
 Ibid p86. 
4
 R Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World 
View 1996), p27. 
5
 Kerferd, op cit, above note 2, p88. 
6
 Honderich, op cit, above note 1, p725. 
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the contradiction between an argument against absolutism and the absolute way in 
which that argument is made. In relation to this example, Protagoras’ argument 
against absolute judgment leads ultimately to the position that all beliefs are true. 
This, however, is contradicted by the (consequently true) belief to the contrary. By 
being applied universally, the idea that meaning is dependant on perception 
undermines itself; the relativistic consequences of the idea cannot sit easily with the 
absolute manner in which it is applied.  
 
Someone supporting Protagoras’ basic claim might argue against this conclusion. 
They might criticise the way that the ‘man as the measure’ idea has been extended so 
easily, and without qualification, to all beliefs. They might also argue that the beliefs 
of individuals are not ‘true’ in the same way as the more fundamental or general truth 
about beliefs; in other words, that the statement about the truth of all claims is a rule 
that defines how the system of beliefs works, while the actual beliefs of the 
individuals themselves are the workings of that system. Individuals, then, can believe 
that not all beliefs are true, and this belief can itself be true, within the bounds of that 
system.  
 
This sort of argument initially seems quite plausible. It allows that individuals have 
their own incontestable beliefs, yet it also allows some general statements to be made 
about the nature or structure of these beliefs. It simply asserts that these two operate 
within different spheres, so that their truth is not comparable. On further reflection, 
however, this position actually undermines the initial claim Protagoras was making, 
that truths are not universal, but relative, and, so, incapable of being disputed. This 
reply to Plato’s criticism sets up a type of truth that is capable of being universal and 
absolute, and then argues that the ‘man as a measure’ premise is one of these truths.  
 
In beginning to characterise the position of moral uncertainty, then, two fundamental 
problems can be recognised. The first refers to the approach of undermining any 
absolute claims in a manner that is itself absolute, or, in other words, being sceptical, 
but being certain in the manner of that scepticism. This is the sense in which such 
scepticism is self-refuting, and there is no obvious way to overcome this. When this 
approach is extended to assert some substantive moral theory, the second problem 
becomes apparent. Since few theorists are willing to embrace a moral free-for-all 
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where no meaningful judgment can be made about any action, they need to overcome 
their own sceptical approach and espouse a substantive moral position that is, in some 
sense, universal. The difficulty lies in achieving this without falling subject to the 
very criticism they have levelled at more ostensibly absolute theories. 
 
These two problems are closely related, and must be addressed by any sceptical moral 
theory. Consequently, if liberal theories are to adopt a position that recognises or 
adopts moral uncertainty, they must in some way overcome these problems. The 
possible approaches to achieving this vary, depending on the theories themselves. Not 
all moral criticisms are expressions of the same formulation set out by Protagoras.  
 
 
1.2 Russell and moral value 
 
An alternative approach to moral uncertainty can be found in the work of Bertrand 
Russell. In Religion and Science, he maps the historical conflicts between natural 
science and religion, and then uses these to build an understanding of the nature of 
moral value. He determines that rational and universal conceptions of the meaning of 
good and bad are always flawed: 
 
questions as to “values” lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we 
assume that this or that has “value,” we are giving expressions to our own emotions, not to a 
fact which would still be true if our personal feelings were different…. Ethics is an attempt – 
though not, I think a successful one – to escape from this subjectivity.7 
 
In this way, moral value cannot be knowable in the sense of this representing an 
objective truth. In addition, moral judgments are merely personal preferences, and are 
not congruent between people, so that “what one man calls ‘sin’ another may call 
‘virtue,’ and though they may dislike each other on account of this difference, neither 
can convict the other of intellectual error.”8 
 
This view is implicitly critical of any moral theory that claims to be universal or 
objective. Such theories assert that a particular moral judgment can be identified that 
                                                
7
 Russell, B A W, Religion and Science (1997), pp230-231. 
8
 Ibid, pp238-239. 
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is potentially recognisable by every person, and that such a judgment ought to be 
agreed with and followed by all. With Russell’s approach, each judgment is inherently 
personal; no general statement can be made about any judgment that transcends 
individual or group perception. In this sense he agrees with Protagoras that the 
perspective of each person is distinct and unable to be corrected or disproved.  
 
This is not to say that the views of the two are the same, however. Russell’s focus is 
not on the nature of individual perceptions and the characteristics of objects, but, 
rather, on the evaluation of the meaning of moral value. Protagoras asserts that moral 
(and, potentially, all) judgment is constructed by the individual who perceives the 
situation. An objective perspective is impossible since the nature of that which is 
being judged is dependant on the individual who judges it. In contrast, Russell says 
that we can judge a moral theory by its consistency with our own feelings, and can 
then determine whether or not to like it. This suggests that the nature of morality is 
such that no independent criteria can be applied to determine its universal value. An 
objective perspective is impossible because moral judgments can never have any 
meaning beyond the feelings or intuitions of the person or group perceiving them. 
 
Russell’s comments are narrower than those of Protagoras in that they apply only to 
moral theory. This approach means that an answer to the first of the two problems of 
moral uncertainty is more easily forthcoming. Because his assertion applies only to 
morality, he is capable of making general comments about moral judgments that are 
not self-refuting, since those comments are not themselves moral judgments. For this 
approach to be convincing, the actual nature of morality would have to be explicitly 
described and explored in such a way as to distinguish it from other spheres of 
knowledge or judgment that might themselves allow such comparison, e.g. scientific 
knowledge. This would involve overcoming the plausible view that meaningful 
comments can be made about the moral judgments of others, beyond a mere 
expression of dislike. While these tasks would not be easy, they suggest a method by 
which the first problem can be convincingly overcome. 
 
The second problem raises more difficulties in relation to Russell’s approach. If all we 
can say about the moral judgments of others is that we like or dislike them, then there 
is no independent way of choosing between alternative judgments or theories. The 
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only criteria we can apply are the feelings of the target individual or group. The result, 
that there is no means of justifying, or disapproving of, an ethical position, is quite 
disconcerting and, to many, would be deeply troubling. The attempt might be made to 
avoid this result by introducing some external criterion that acts as an independent 
measure. One approach would be to give some value to the common view of 
acceptable morality within a society or culture. This would mean championing the 
boundaries of common moral judgment, not as the correct ones, but as ones that we 
should, in the circumstances, follow.  
 
This idea breaks down once the argument is fully expanded. For it to succeed there 
would need to be some valid justification for promoting the common judgment. To 
achieve this, a single factor might be identified, say stability, that tends to be 
improved or maximised when the common judgment is accepted. The problem is that 
the decision to follow the stable judgment is itself a moral judgment, and, so, subject 
to Russell’s original criticism; consequently, we cannot comment on it other than to 
state our like or dislike for it. To say that any criterion should guide our moral 
judgment amounts to making a statement that is itself of a moral nature, and is 
morally contestable. Russell leaves us little way out of this, and little possibility of 
talking sensibly or rationally about our personal or group morals. The point could be 
made that our natures and upbringings do in fact predispose us to follow the norms 
and morals of the culture in which we live, but this in no way justifies the views of 
that culture, nor can it act to condemn the person whose views are in violent 
opposition. Although we might identify an actual moral status quo, moral theory has 
no power to comment on or validate this. 
 
Of course, the positions of both Protagoras and Russell have been described here in 
only the most superficial manner. Further enquiry would reveal new depths and 
complexities, which would lead to new discussions and arguments. The purpose of 
citing these philosophers, then, is not to fully explore their work, but, rather, to begin 
to characterise the nature of moral uncertainty. In making the comparison between 
Protagoras and Russell, what should be apparent are the variations in approach, both 
obvious and subtle, but also the common thread, that each is sceptical towards 





1.3 The postmodern condition 
 
This comparison can be extended by including a more contemporary view of moral 
uncertainty, and one that will be revisited in the context of recent liberal theory, 
namely postmodernism. It is difficult to attach any definite content to the postmodern 
movement; the adjective ‘postmodern’ can offer many different meanings, and the 
movement itself is diverse, both in understanding and in scope.9 Perhaps the most 
familiar attempt to characterise the postmodern was made by Jean-François Lyotard 
in his book The Postmodern Condition: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define 
postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.”10 These metanarratives are the 
“supposedly transcendent and universal truths that underpin western civilization and 
that function to give that civilization objective legitimation”.11 Lyotard’s 
postmodernism, then, involves scepticism towards the grand theories and truths of 
modernity, including the purportedly objective application of rationality to problems 
in order to achieve universal solutions. This general approach leads to a number of 
ideas: 
 
There is an appreciation of the plasticity and constant change of reality and knowledge, a 
stress on the priority of concrete experience over fixed abstract principles, and a conviction 
that no single a priori thought system should govern belief or investigation…. The critical 
search for truth is constrained to be tolerant of ambiguity and pluralism, and its outcome will 
necessarily be knowledge that is relative and fallible rather than absolute or certain.12 
 
Contracting the postmodern condition involves recognising the ‘objective truths’ for 
what they are, namely the subjective traditions of some group, culture or discipline. In 
addition to this recognition, postmodernism may also prescribe an appropriate 
response. This can involve an attitude of self-awareness or irony, and the acceptance 
of the validity of a pervasive value-pluralism. In the words of Lyotard, postmodern 
knowledge “refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate 
the incommensurable”.13 It is in this sense that postmodernism goes beyond criticism 
and achieves its own approach, attitude or, perhaps, style. A style that, being 
                                                
9
 T Mautner, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2000), p439; Honderich, op cit, above note 1, 
p708. 
10
 J F Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: a report on knowledge (1984), pxxiv.  
11
 J W Bertens, The Idea of the Postmodern: A History (1995), p124.  
12
 Tarnas, op cit, above note 4, pp395-396.  
13
 Lyotard, op cit, above note 10, pxxv.  
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necessarily divorced from usual methodologies and constraints, claims to be 
illuminating and liberating, yet often seems difficult, unapproachable and devoid of 
meaning. 
 
The approach of postmodernism can be applied to morality and moral theory. This 
would involve recognising that the inherited moral theories and judgments of western 
society posit a false objectivity, and an invalid process of legitimation. Instead of 
blind adherence to these judgments, one should be aware of their limitations, and of 
the potential for valid alternatives. Although the underlying message of this criticism 
is one that is, in some sense, shared by both Protagoras and Russell, there are obvious 
differences in focus and approach. Lyotard is concerned with questioning western 
beliefs and perspectives. This shares with Protagoras a belief in both the subjectivity 
and constructedness of moral judgment, but is concerned with the historical 
development and ossification of traditions and truths and their lack of true validity, 
rather than the necessarily individualistic nature of judgment. A deeper inquiry into 
postmodernism would reveal additional differences in focus, such as, the emphasis on 
the role of language in thought, and, even, a rejection of western rationalism. 
 
These differences are further illustrated by scrutinising Lyotard’s postmodernism in 
relation to the two identified problems of morally uncertain theories. The first of these 
sets postmodern theory a significant challenge. If it involves incredulity toward 
metanarratives, then the application of postmodernism generally threatens, itself, to 
become a metanarrative. The understanding, criticism and approach implied by the 
postmodern condition could itself qualify as a ‘supposedly transcendent and universal 
truth’, which is followed without valid legitimation. This would lead to the 
application of the postmodern approach to postmodernism itself, or, in other words, to 
the questioning the very approach of questioning. Some postmodernists might 
welcome this, coming from such a radically critical perspective, but it does raise the 
issue of whether there is any truth or validity in adopting this perspective in the first 
place. If this argument is carried through, postmodernism, ultimately, swallows its 
own tail, which some may argue is the whole point. As Richard Tarnas suggests: 
 
On its own terms, the assertion of the historical relativity and cultural-linguistic bondage of all 
truth and knowledge must itself be regarded as reflecting but one more local and temporal 
perspective having no necessarily universal, extrahistorical value…. Implicitly, the one 
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postmodern absolute is critical consciousness, which, by deconstructing all, seems compelled 
by its own logic to do so to itself as well. This is the unstable paradox that permeates the 
postmodern mind.14 
 
This first question, then, raises a valid criticism of postmodernism, and one that seems 
to be answerable only by denying the validity of the position itself. This result is 
mirrored in relation to the second question. Although there is no substantive moral 
position that is shared even weakly by postmodernists, what is relatively common is 
the general postmodern response: one of pluralism, ambiguity and sensitivity to 
difference. This kind of approach seems to be promoted as appropriate. 
Postmodernism, however, cannot easily explain why this is the case. Someone who 
recognises the incredulity of metanarratives need not necessarily adopt this 
postmodern approach. That person might decide, instead, to adopt the traditions and 
truths of western society to the exclusion of others for any number of reasons, or even 
for no reason at all. The recognition of the shortcomings of western truths does not 
dictate the adoption of a radical postmodern critique and a pluralist, ambiguous 
viewpoint; this being the case, postmodernism has no obvious mechanism by which to 
validate such a response.  
 
The positions of Protagoras and Lyotard contribute towards an understanding of 
moral uncertainty. This uncertainty encompasses a broad and potentially diverse 
group of ideas that have in common the scepticism of moral judgments or theories 
that claim to be objective and universal. These three views, together, allow the basic 
structure of moral uncertainty to be appreciated and, also, the most basic questions of 
its viability to be discerned. This uncertainty refers to a group of approaches or 
theories that are themselves complex, as are the relationships between them. They 
admit claims that can vary in scope, focus and effect, yet the common thread between 
them is a belief in the shortcomings of those alternative positions that assert an 
absoluteness or universality to morality, and a scepticism as to their confidence in 
being able to apply some valid process to arrive at the morally correct result. They 
represent moral understanding, instead, in a number of ways: as being in some way 
contestable, meaning that there is no rational or objective standard by which to judge 
moral value; as involving deep complexity, not adequately represented in moral 
theory; and, as being contingent on the specific situations, beliefs and traditions.  
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2. Liberal theory 
 
The beginnings of liberalism as a political ideology are nebulous, partly because the 
attitude of mind that it represents precedes the use of ‘liberal’ as a political label.15 
The promotion of toleration that followed the Wars of Religion is often identified as 
an important precursor to its development.16 The enlightenment also represents a 
significant period of growth, as public discussion about political liberties became 
prominent, and the liberal movement later drew inspiration and impetus from the 
revolutions in both America and France.17 
 
The liberal ideology evolved with a number of complementary focuses, the most 
important being a universal set of individual rights. These included the freedom of 
conscience and religion, and also economic freedom, as well as a system of private 
property.18 Also important was a constitutional government with a clear separation of 
powers.19 Together, these ideas champion the ability of the individual to be liberated 
from existing political and cultural power structures. “As a political movement 
everywhere liberalism emphasized the rights and the potential of the individual facing 
the forces of tradition and of the old Establishment.”20 
 
The political ideology of liberalism did not evolve in the absence of theorising about 
its foundations and content. The first liberal work can tentatively be identified as John 
Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, probably written around 1680. Liberal 
philosophy developed throughout the eighteenth century with contributions from Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine and Adam Smith. The nineteenth century saw 
utilitarianism grow to become a significant political and potentially liberal paradigm, 
as expressed in the works of Bentham and, probably to a lesser extent, John Stuart 
                                                
15
 E K Bramsted & K J Melhuish (eds.), Western Liberalism: A History of Documents from Locke to 
Croce (1978), p3.  
16
 Honderich, op cit, above note 1, p483. 
17
 Porter, R, Enlightenment (2000), p188; Bramsted & Melhuish, op cit, above note 15, p3. 
18
 Bramsted and Melhuish, op cit, above note 15, pp3-7; J G Merquior, J G, Liberalism, Old and New, 
(1991), pp15-23.  
19
 Bramsted and Melhuish, op cit, above note 15, pp29-31; Merquior, op cit, above note 18, pp23-25. 
20
 Bramsted and Melhuish, op cit, above note 15, p3. 
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Mill. Significant contributions to liberalism were made in the mid twentieth century 
by Benedetto Croce, Friedrich Hayek and Isaiah Berlin, but by that stage 
utilitarianism had taken a firm hold over political theory. 
 
The lack of fruitful speculation and development in this area led Berlin to ask, in 
1961: “does political theory still exist?” In addressing this question, he identified and 
described the common belief in the death of political theory: 
 
The principal symptom which seems to support this belief is that no commanding work of 
political philosophy has appeared in the twentieth century. By a commanding work in the field 
of general ideas I mean at the very least one that has in a large area converted paradoxes into 
platitudes or vice versa. This seems to me no more (but also no less) than an adequate 
criterion of the characteristic in question.21 
 
Berlin’s conclusion was optimistic: “So long as rational curiosity exists … political 
theory will not wholly perish from the earth.”22 He looked forward for new and 
unpredictable developments.23 He need not have looked far, for, just ten years later, 
John Rawls published what is probably the most important work of political 
philosophy of the century.24 
 
A Theory of Justice (1971) has the aim of building and justifying a liberal theory of 
justice on an explicitly non-utilitarian foundation. The theory, itself, is self-
consciously moral, and, because of its aim of being relatively complete and free-
standing, is quite complex. It deals with the values of liberty and equality, and the 
relationship between them. A Theory of Justice has had a profound impact on political 
philosophy. It stirred a great amount of interest and opinion, and set the agenda for all 
the liberal theory that was to follow. The discussion and criticism it spawned trace a 
thread through much of the liberal theory subsequent to its publication. Whether it 
satisfies Berlin’s criterion for a commanding work is arguable. What is clear is that it 
is the vanguard of contemporary liberal theory, and that any analysis of this area 
should not fail to take account of its importance as a formulation of a liberal theory of 
justice, and of its influence on all that has followed. 
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3.1 The perspective of moral uncertainty 
 
Having broadly discussed the meaning of moral uncertainty, and briefly located 
contemporary liberal theory within the liberal tradition, it is now necessary to set out 
how the former will be used to examine the latter. Moral uncertainty has been 
presented both as a criticism of absolute moral theory, and as an alternative, albeit 
difficult, approach to thinking about morality. Moral uncertainty presents a 
fundamental challenge to moral theory. Most theories involve justifying the 
application of a set of moral judgments generally, whether to one person at some later 
time, or to all people at all times. The nature of these claims and theories can be quite 
varied; they feature the same kind of complexity as did the approaches of Protagoras, 
Russell and Lyotard. As with those theories, moral theories can involve different 
claims, focuses and arguments, borne out of different methodologies and approaches. 
There is a complexity of universal positions, just as with positions of uncertainty, that 
has been explored over thousands of years through concerted intellectual effort, but 
never reduced to the straight-forward and transparent. 
 
The concern, then, is to analyse how liberal theories respond to moral uncertainty, 
having accepted the inherent complexity of both. It is not useful to look at liberal 
theory with a single specific argument or criticism in mind, nor is it possible to 
consider various forms of liberalism from all possible uncertain positions. Instead, the 
process will involve examining how a number of alternative liberal theories justify 
their liberal content, their reasoning from moral foundations to substantive content, in 
order to assess their attempts, whether explicit or implicit, to respond to moral 
uncertainty. If some sense, certainty or universality is the aim of a moral theory; 
viewing it from this perspective means nothing less than assessing its validity and 
value, albeit from a particular point of view.  
 
Given that moral uncertainty is a prominent criticism of moral theory that relates to its 
fundamental aims, some measure of recognition and response would be expected. The 
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complexity of moral theory allows for a complexity of response, and makes the 
perspective of uncertainty interesting and useful. The general approach this thesis will 
take is to examine the aims of a theory, its justification and its substance. In relation to 
uncertainty, the aims of such a theory will typically be to achieve some generally 
recognised moral value, or, in other words, some form of universality, objectivity or 
truth. The justification of a theory represents the strategy by which these aims are to 
be met, and lays the foundations upon which the substance of the theory is built, by 
setting out the source of the theory’s value. It is this aspect of a theory at which 
criticisms from moral uncertainty are often aimed, since both have a similar scope, i.e. 
one asserts an argument for some objective value while the other seeks to undermine 
that assertion.  
 
Finally, examinations of the substantive parts of each theory are required in order to 
give a more full and complex picture of each. The moral and political substance of a 
theory is not as directly relevant to the perspective of uncertainty, yet is essential to 
the analysis. A theory’s substance and principles are the expression of its justification; 
the two are contiguous, and, as such, an effective examination requires reference to 
them both. By considering the aims and justificatory strategy of a theory, a general 
position on it can be reached, but, it is only by considering how these are expressed 
and developed through the substance (the processes and prescriptions) of the theory, 
that the full picture is revealed.  
 
It is clear, then, that there are necessary links between each of the aspects of a liberal 
theory: the aims set the standard for the justification, which gives the reasons for its 
substantive processes, from which the prescription is derived. Since a theory’s 
justification sets out how the substance of the theory will function in order to achieve 
its aims, the latter must accord with this explanation in order for the theory to be 
internally consistent. This means that every aspect of the theory’s substantive 
structure must be within the boundaries set by the justification and, equally, that every 
essential part of this justification must find expression in the structure. The 
justification and substance of a theory, then, are not separate, but, rather, the latter 




The method of examining a liberal theory from the perspective of uncertainty, then, 
should involve identifying and exploring each of its different aspects. By doing this, a 
detailed view of that theory as a response to uncertainty can be developed. That 
response can then be brought into question, both, in terms of its internal consistency, 
and, with respect to its approach to achieving its own aims. In using this method, no 
single conception of moral uncertainty is required; rather, the analysis is responsive to 
the structure and substance of the theory itself, yet still challenges that theory from a 
morally sceptical standpoint. 
 
This method meets the aims of the thesis in that it allows recent liberal theory to be 
illuminated by a different and significant perspective, and should allow a general 
analysis of the development of this area of theory. As this process of analysis is 
applied to various works within the area of contemporary liberal theory, the method 
itself should develop. Analyses of new theories will add new complexities, and test 
similar and different approaches to theorising liberalism, leading to an understanding 
of common challenges and issues such theorising faces.  
 
 
3.2 Liberalism examined 
 
Firstly, the contemporary liberalism that is to be examined will be described 
uniformly as being theories of liberal justice. This label will be applied for 
convenience and for the sake of consistence, and follows Rawls’ description of his 
earlier work. This makes no comment on whether particular ideas or systems amount 
to theories, nor whether justice is their primary concern. ‘Theory of justice’ could be 
read, then, as being equivalent to ‘proposed system of socio-political organisation’. 
 
The subject matter of the thesis concerns contemporary liberal theories, beginning 
from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. The primary focus will be on significant examples 
of liberal theory; in those works that contain a novel and engaging theoretical 
structure, and that attempts to justify a recognisably liberal conception of justice. 
Most of the works considered represent mainstream or prominent works in this area. It 
is important to examine these particular works for a number of reasons: if the 
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development of the area is to be charted, then it is necessary to look at those theories 
that have been most influential on subsequent work; if it is to be examined as a whole, 
then the central works must be taken account of; and, not least of all, the most 
successful and well-recognised works are the most likely to be well structured and 
reasoned, and, so, provide the best place to start looking for well-developed and 
thought-provoking responses to uncertainty. Because of the inherent limitations of the 
approach, however, some prominent liberal theories have been excluded. This occurs 
on the basis that their conceptions of liberalism are either not fruitful, or are 
substantially reproduced in other examined works.  
 
The works of post-Rawlsian liberalism are typically written by Anglo-American 
philosophers. Certainly there is a strong non-English tradition throughout the history 
of liberal theory, but this is not well-represented by the thread of liberalism that is 
being examined. Some of the writers, either by self-conception or in the view of 
others, are not liberal, yet, they remain within this post-Rawlsian tradition, and their 
work contributes to the overall understanding of recent liberal theory.  
 
Problems associated with classifying and grouping different theories, and of locating 
particular theories within a tradition, are to be expected in such an undertaking. In 
addressing these challenges, use has been made of both chronology and theme as 
organising ideas. The former is useful in relation to charting the development of 
recent liberal thought, and the latter helps in the categorisation of the later chapters, 
where this liberalism has developed beyond its earlier preoccupations. Inevitably, 
such organisation cannot do justice to every theory, and must squeeze and truncate 
some in the name of the overall analysis. The important point is that these works are 
not so manhandled as to lose their original shape, and, that the overall scheme of an 
examination of contemporary liberal theory, from the perspective of moral 
uncertainty, is served.  
 
The idea is to map out the development of Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian liberal theory 
in relation to its response to liberal uncertainty; its aims at universal justification, and 
its successes and failures at achieving these. The ultimate aim of this process is to be 
able to characterise contemporary liberalism on these terms, and to identify the 
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directions in which liberal theory can develop, effective both as a moral theory and as 
a response to moral uncertainty. 
 
 
3.3 Summary of thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 will apply the methodology of A Theory of Justice itself. The significance 
of this work dictates a detailed analysis: from Rawls’ justificatory strategy, through 
his complex theoretical structure and process, to the liberal and egalitarian results.  
The following two chapters represent early reaction to and development of Rawls’ 
work. Robert Nozick’s, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, is often seen as the libertarian 
response to A Theory. Chapter 3 will examine Nozick’s approach to justifying his 
theory and the similarities and differences between the two, with the focus on this, 
rather than their respective political consequences.  
 
Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman both represent recognisably Rawlsian 
approaches to issues of liberal justice. Their approaches will be detailed in chapter 4, 
which will allow for examinations of neutrality and equality as conceptions of liberal 
theory. Chapter 5 will discuss the communitarian criticisms of liberalism, and looks at 
a major response to these criticisms, namely the use of pluralism as a foundation for 
liberalism. This will involve some early post-communitarian liberal conceptions, and 
the then the later and more thoroughgoing liberal pluralism.  
 
Chapter 6 examines Rawls’ shift from the idea of justice as fairness, as expressed in A 
Theory of Justice, to the separation between the political and the metaphysical, as 
expressed in Political Liberalism. This approach to liberalism contains a conception 
of public liberalism, which forms part of its own thread of liberal theory, and this will 
also be examined in this chapter. Chapter 7 will look at how demands for the 
recognition of minority cultures have affected liberal theory, and in particular, 
considers the possibility of culturally-sensitive forms of liberalism. The penultimate 
chapter concerns Richard Rorty’s attempts to build a clearly postmodern version of 
liberalism. This approach is unique among those surveyed, in that it incorporates a 
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radical form of moral uncertainty, and will prove interesting as a final substantive 
looks at liberalism as a response to uncertainty. 
 24






Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) is the vanguard of recent liberal theory, and as such 
is a useful starting place for a thorough analysis of the subject. It is difficult to 
understate its significance both as a political theory and as an academic text. It not 
only signalled the decline of utilitarianism as the dominant paradigm of political 
philosophy, but also spawned an entire field of political and moral theory. In addition 
to its scholarly virtues, A Theory drew significant attention and acclaim from the non-
academic press.1 
 
There have been a number of reasons given for the success of A Theory of Justice, 
which include: the way in which it reconciles liberty and equality2; the way in which 
it reconciles fairness and mutual advantage3; and, its use of a deontological ethic in 
relation to justice.4 All of these ideas offer some insight into its popularity: it is 
sufficiently complex and multi-faceted, and the response to it correspondingly so, to 
support these various interpretations. Inevitably any understanding of it will depend 
on the context of the reader: their reasons for reading it, and the aspect of it they wish 
to applaud or criticise.  
 
Rawls himself describes his aim as being to “present a conception of justice which 
generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social 
contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant.”5 The contract he uses is one 
that results from the, now well-known, original position. This involves a group of 
hypothetical people determining what is to be just and unjust in their society.6 The 
outcome of this discussion is Rawls’ two principles of justice, liberty and distribution, 
the former being morally prior to the latter. It is the fairness of the conditions and 
workings of the original position that lends these principles their legitimacy as 
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expressions of justice, and it is for this reason that he describes the main mechanism 
of the theory as justice as fairness.7 
 
These principles entail a position of egalitarianism that reflects many of the actual 
moral concerns of the era in which A Theory was published. It is true to say of Rawls, 
then, that: 
 
He wants to reveal the principles of justice which underlie the dominant moral and political 
views of our period. He wants to show that these principles can be viewed as the result of a 
selection procedure that all people can agree is fair…. And he wants to show that these 
principles describe a workable social arrangement, given everything we know from the social 
sciences.8 
 
Rawls first presented the idea of an agreement from the original position in 1958, and 
developed it substantially before publishing it in A Theory in 1971.9 Because of this, it 
is well developed, closely argued, and relatively complete as a political theory. It has 
the virtues of being both broad in scope and complex in detail. Much of the reasoning 
is multi-stranded, meaning that there are often several complementary or alternative 
reasons or explanations for a single argument. Brian Barry, for example, describes 
Rawls’ writings as containing “not one theory of justice, but several, of different 
levels of abstraction and different degrees of articulation.”10 This detail and 
complexity means that it can be difficult, in discussing the work, to ensure that its 
meaning has been usefully captured, without becoming mired in argument and detail. 
For the purpose of this analysis A Theory should be viewed in a manner conducive to 
the perspective of moral uncertainty, without compromising the clarity of the view of 
the work.  
 
It is significant that Rawls himself continued to believe in the correctness of the 
theory.11 He did, in fact, explain and develop it further following its publication, and 
defend it against criticism, culminating in a restatement of the central doctrines in 
2001.12 Given that this analysis is interested in the development of approaches to 
liberal thought, and in the main assertions of liberal moral value, the primary focus of 
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this chapter will be on Rawls’ theory as stated in A Theory of Justice. Some of the 
later developments in his thought will be considered in subsequent chapters, and in 
particular, the chapter concerning political liberalism. 
 
Rawls’ work has spawned a voluminous literature rarely matched by other subjects of 
academic criticism. There is, as would be imagined, a great deal of overlap between 
various criticisms, and much of the later material is in relation to more recent 
developments in liberal theory by Rawls and his critics. The focus here is on those 
arguments relevant to the view of A Theory as a response to uncertainty, and as a 
point on the timeline of liberal theory. Many of these arguments will be relevant, 
particularly those that criticise the justification and moral position implicit in the 
work, as will some of the more basic criticisms of the theory’s approach and 
substance. 
 
The main task in this chapter, then, is to explore and analyse A Theory of Justice in a 
way that is conducive to the perspective of uncertainty. This involves examining its 
method of justification and its substance processes and principles. A successful and 
morally valuable theory will apply a justificatory strategy that meets its aims and, 
then, is expressed cogently and consistently by its substance. However for Rawls’, as 
well as many other theories, the main focus is on the substance rather than its 
justification. Often their aims and justificatory strategies will need to be drawn from 
some oblique and brief comments, and implied from the other aspects of the theory. 
For this reason, the approach of working from aim and justification to the substance is 
problematic. This is exacerbated by the close link identified between these aspects: 
dealing with each separately and in turn makes it difficult to cross-reference to and 
connect with matters not yet discussed. 
 
The approach that will be taken in this and other chapters is to initially explore the 
theory’s basic structure – its justification, process and prescriptive principles – as it 
was originally presented. Here the theory and its reasoning will be taken on its own 
terms, without undue analysis or criticism. Subsequently, various criticisms of the 
theory, relevant the perspective of uncertainty, can be canvassed and explored, and 
the validity and power of the theory tested. This method will allow the analysis of the 
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2.1 Approach to justification 
 
 
By far the most prominent idea in A Theory of Justice is the original position. This 
mechanism is often identified as the whole of Rawls’ theory, and, while it is true to 
say that this is at its centre, the original position is incomplete as a strategy of 
justification; only a broader view can offer a proper explanation of the validity and 
power of Rawls’ notion of justice. This involves looking at the original position as 
part of a reflective equilibrium. 
 
As a justification of his theory, Rawls argues in favour of the necessary moral value 
of the original position, and the principles of justice it produces. The original position 
supposes that “one conception of justice is more reasonable than another, or 
justifiable with respect to it, if rational persons in the initial situation would choose its 
principles over those of the other for the role of justice.”13 It is clear, then, that Rawls 
is asserting that the outcome of the original position has moral value. The nature of 
the justification of the theory, then, is to show why this is the case.  
 
The original position can be defined by the conditions that constrain its decision-
making procedure and the principles it produces. The process of finding a reflective 
equilibrium involves reaching a set of initial conditions that will produce morally 
relevant results and, then, agreeing with the results that are actually produced. 
Reaching this equilibrium involves a process of tweaking conditions and results, as 
well as our own considered judgments relating to both, so that conditions and results 
are morally significant and one leads logically to the other. 
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In searching for the most favoured description of this situation we work from both ends. We 
begin by describing it so that it represents generally shared and preferably weak conditions. 
We then see if these conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, 
we look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and these principles match our 
considered convictions of justice, then so far well and good. But presumably there will be 
discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial 
situation or we can revise our existing judgments.… By going back and forth, sometimes 
altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments 
and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the 
initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match 
our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective 
equilibrium.14 
 
It is the reflective equilibrium then – this refining of the procedural setup, the 
principles it produces, and our own considered judgments – that justifies Rawls’ use 
of the original position. The success of this approach depends on the arguments that 
the conditions he places on the original position are actually morally reasonable, that 
the principles of justice can be derived from them, and that they plausibly conform to 
our considered judgments about justice. Much of A Theory is aimed at showing that 
Rawls’ theory does amount to such an equilibrium.  
 
The nature of the justification of A Theory, then, is one of agreement. This agreement 
appears to occur as part of the operation of the original position, but the truly 
justificatory agreement is actually external to it. This agreement is with Rawls’ 
assertion that his conception of the original position and the principles of justice 
amount to a reflective equilibrium: an appropriate moral process with which, upon 
reasonable reflection, we would all agree. The legitimacy of the theory, then, comes 
from the claim that every person would recognise it as a reflective equilibrium.  
 
 
2.2 Role of the original position 
 
Although the bulk of A Theory of Justice, and of the responses to it, is dedicated to 
characterising and exploring the original position, its justificatory structure maps the 
interplay between the conceptions of the original position and the reflective 
equilibrium. To demonstrate this structure it is useful to consider the role of each of 
these. The original position is undoubtedly central to Rawls’ theory, yet it would not 
be fatal for it to be removed entirely. What would remain is the process of comparing 
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the two suggested principles of justice with our considered judgments. Ronald 
Dworkin has grappled with the idea that the original position could be removed from 
the theory: 
 
If it has any role, it must be in the process of justification, because it takes its place in the 
body of theory we construct to bring our convictions into balance. But if the two principles of 
justice are themselves in reflective equilibrium with our convictions, it is unclear why we need 
the original position to supplement the two principles on the theoretical side of the balance. 
What can the idea contribute to a harmony already established?15 
 
The provisional answer he gives is that it is “one of the conditions we impose on a 
theoretical principle, before we allow it to figure as a justification of our 
convictions.”16 And this is essentially the role that the original position takes in the 
justificatory process. By requiring that the principles of justice conform to the original 
position, these are subjected to additional moral criteria, as manifested in the 
conditions and the workings of the position. This allows a more complex interplay 
between the conditions, principles and our considered judgments, and so contributes 
to the moral content of the theory.  
 
It is the actual working of the original position, through the mechanism of individual 
choice in a constrained situation, that produces the principles of justice. It is this 
mechanism that links the moral conditions to principles in an acceptable way. As 
Thomas Nagel has put it,  
 
[t]he aim is to provide a way of treating the basic problems of social choice, for which no 
generally recognized methods of precise solution exist, through the proxy of a specially 
constructed parallel problem of individual choice, which can be solved by the more reliable 
intuitions and decision procedures of rational choice.17 
 
The role of the original position, then, is to buttress the reflective equilibrium by 
adding several conditions and a closely defined procedure, all of which are 
recognisable, either morally or as rational choice. Because of this, much of A Theory 
of Justice is aimed at demonstrating the value of both of the conditions and the 
procedure of the original position. Without the original position, the process of 
working towards a reflective equilibrium would be deficient, and would suffer a 
corresponding fall in prescriptive moral power. In justificatory terms, then, the 
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original position is embedded in the content of the process of reflection. This process 
is itself the means by which the theory can assert moral value, and so has a necessary 
role as part of the justificatory structure. It is this process by which a theory can be 
found to be a reasonably acceptable conception of justice, and which Rawls is trying 
to persuade us is satisfied by the content of his theory. 
 
 
2.3 Conditions of the original position
 
 
The justification of A Theory of Justice, then, involves a reasonable agreement with 
Rawls’ assessment of the original position and its principles as a valid expression of 
justice. Having identified this, the next move is to examine its expression in the 
substance of the theory. Here, the two substantive aspects of process and prescription 
are readily met by the procedure of the original position and the two principles of 
justice respectively.18  
 
For the justification to be effective, there are two related requirements of the original 
position: its conditions must be morally relevant, and the procedure by which it 
functions must be fair. Rawls explicitly makes both of these arguments.19 The original 
position is a hypothetical contract formed between representative parties.20 This 
hypothetical situation is constrained in a number of ways, the most significant of 
which is the veil of ignorance. This means that the individual parties to the contract 
are unaware of their place in society, class position and social status, and their 
conception of the good, as well as their “fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, [their] intelligence, strength and the like”.21 In addition, they know not 
the circumstances of their society, economic or political details, or information about 
their civilization or culture.22 What they do know includes facts about human nature, 
and political and economic affairs generally.23 The idea is that matters that are not 
relevant to decisions about justice, such as those which would inform people’s self-
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interest or prejudice, are excluded from the decision-making process, while the 
individuals are acquainted with other, more relevant general information. Rawls 
argues that the exclusion of this personal information gives the deliberation of each 
person more moral significance; it means that people will not be inclined to reach 
political principles that privilege themselves, their class or conception of the good, 
and allows a widespread agreement between people on matters of justice. It is meant 
to exclude morally arbitrary factors and, so, force the parties to seek just and fair 
principles. It is this condition of the original position that carries the most justificatory 
weight, in that it has some intuitive moral force and attaches power to the result of the 
process. 
 
A second condition of the original position sets out the equality of all parties to the 
agreement. This means that each has an equal role, and equal rights, in engaging in 
the contracting process.24 However, the full sense in which the parties to that 
agreement are equal is more complex and subtle. The veil of ignorance is itself an 
equalising mechanism: it takes a diverse group of individuals with different 
backgrounds, beliefs and conceptions of the good and effectively removes these 
differences. The result is that each person applies to the agreement process their sense 
of justice, which is shared by all, since all are morally capable people.25 In fact, 
Dworkin identifies the implicit fundamental concept of the original position to be an 
equal concern and respect for all individuals.26 Thus, equal consideration should be 
recognised as a condition of the original position and must be acknowledged in the 
process of finding a reflective equilibrium. 
 
The final condition of the original position is that of the rationality of the 
representative parties. In explaining how they are rational, Rawls has recourse to a 
concept of ‘primary goods’. These are goods that, it is presumed, every rational 
person would want. They include social goods, such as rights, liberties, opportunities, 
income and wealth, as well as natural goods, such as health, intelligence and 
imagination.27 Individuals in the original position, despite the limits on their 
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knowledge, are able to make rational decisions. The obvious such decision is to prefer 
more of a primary good to less.  
 
The use of a conception of rationality is necessary in order to predict how the parties 
to the original position would act and the content of the agreement they would reach, 
and to argue that this would indeed be common between all the parties. As a condition 
of the original position, however, this rationality must be shown to be morally 
acceptable, and must fit with the veil of ignorance in the sense that each party must 
act rationally given the nature of the information that they are permitted. Also, the 
rationality must satisfy the assertion that the contracting process will lead to a fair 
result. One particular concern might be that people in the original position will act in a 
self-interested manner and, so, undermine the resulting principles. In fact, this 
rationality does imply that each person acts to further their own purposes.28 But, the 
restrictions implied by the veil of ignorance suggest that individuals are incapable of 
being ruthlessly egoistic, for they are not aware of which principles would particularly 
favour them.29 This means that they are forced, instead, to view the good of society as 
some complete whole and to consider the positions of each possible individual, for 
they cannot be sure which of these they will turn out to be. This rather elegant result – 
that the moral weakness of rationality is cancelled out by restrictions on knowledge – 
shows the mechanism by which individual choice is used as a proxy for social choice, 




2.4 Outcome of the original position
 
 
The principles of justice that Rawls uses must be the logical outcome of the original 
position. In other words, “given the circumstances of the parties, and their knowledge, 
beliefs, and interests, an agreement on these principles is the best way for each person 
to secure his ends in view of the alternatives available”.31 Rawls argues that his two 
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principles would be chosen over a number of possible alternative political principles, 
including utilitarian and perfectionist principles.32 This does not indicate that they are 
correct or true principles, but, rather, that they are the best expressions of justice 
among the list of reasonable alternatives, and, so, are a potential part of a reflective 
equilibrium. Thus, the process of comparing principles from the perspective of the 
original position “moves us closer to the philosophical ideal; it does not, of course, 
achieve it.”33 
 
The approach of deriving Rawls’ principles from the original position involves two 
steps, setting out the reasoning that leads to each principle in turn. Rawls argues that 
the principle of liberty is the first assertion any rational person in the original position 
would make, and reflects the equality of individuals once personal concerns are 
removed. 
 
Since it is not reasonable for him to expect more than an equal share in the division of social 
primary goods, and since it is not rational for him to agree to less, the sensible thing is to 
acknowledge as the first step a principle of justice requiring an equal distribution. Indeed, this 
principle is so obvious given the symmetry of the parties that it would occur to everyone 
immediately. Thus the parties start with a principle requiring equal basic liberties for all, as well 
as fair equality of opportunity and equal division of income and wealth.34 
 
This principle of liberal equality, then, is argued to be the basic and obvious response 
to the conditions of the original position and, as such, necessarily embodies the virtue 
of fairness, and, so, is just. This principle entails that “each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others.”35 Rawls offers no precise or comprehensive list of 
such rights, but does explore the kinds of rights that might be covered, including 
looking at the equal liberty of conscience and of the person.36 
 
The second step in arguing from the original position begins where the first left off. 
The principle of equal social primary goods is the most sensible initial move, but it is 
inherently static. It sets out a position of distribution and right that can be met at a 
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particular point in time, but does not set out how later actual agreements or moves that 
take the position away from this equality are to be treated. Rawls reasons that 
 
[s]ociety should take into account economic efficiencies and the requirements of organization 
and technology. If there are inequalities in income and wealth, and differences in authority and 
degrees of responsibility, that work to make everyone better off in comparison to the benchmark 
of equality, why not permit them? … Thus the basic structure should allow these inequalities so 
long as these improve everyone’s situation, including that of the least advantaged, provided they 
are consistent with equal liberty and fair opportunity.37  
 
The result Rawls calls the difference principle. This is an outcome of the original 
position subsequent to the first principle of liberal equality, since “[t]aking equality as 
the basis of comparison, those who have gained more must do so on terms that are 
justifiable to those who have gained the least.”38 The reasoning behind the difference 
principle emphasises that it does not depend on any person knowing how an 
inequality will affect his or her own interests; the contractors agree to the principle 
because, irrespective of how the inequality affects them, it can make them no worse 
off relative to the baseline of equality. This allows that the obvious and significant 
gains from, say, allocating a task, position or role to a person to whom it is suited by 
reason of talent or experience, can be realised. Everyone can agree to this from behind 
the veil of ignorance since no-one will be made worse off relative to the position of 
equality, and all will have a fair opportunity to attain this special status, or to benefit 
from this inequality.39 
 
However, the effect of the difference principle also extends to voluntary market 
transactions. In most cases these will benefit all affected parties, and so are potentially 
sanctioned by the difference principle. Nevertheless, the action of the market must 
remain within “a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the 
overall trends of economic events and preserves the social conditions necessary for 
fair equality of opportunity.”40 
 
These two principles represent Rawls’ predicted outcome of the original position. The 
one point that remains concerns the relationship between the two. The fact that the 
first principle is a consequence of the initial response of equality, and that this sets the 
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baseline from which the difference principle is drawn, suggests that the latter is 
logically subordinate to the former. And this is exactly the position that Rawls takes: 
that the liberty principle is lexically (lexicographically) prior to the difference 
principle.41 This term is used because the way in which the principles are ordered 
resembles the way words are listed alphabetically: only when the first letters are the 
same does the second letter become relevant. This places the two principles on 
entirely separate levels, and means that matters affecting liberty should always be 
considered prior to those concerning inequality or, in other words, that only liberty 
can limit liberty.42 
 
Rawls also argues that these two principles and the relationship between them is 
completely reasonable in a politically pragmatic sense: they tend to promote the good 
of individuals, tend to be stable, and will promote self-respect and social co-operation 
and a mutual public respect.43 They mean that all people will be treated as ends in 
themselves, and that their interests will not be traded off for the good of others or of 
the majority.44 These assertions satisfy our beliefs about justice and politics, in 
addition to being the result of a procedure that must produce fair principles. The 
intuitive value of each of these aspects of Rawls’ theory builds a strong justificatory 
argument that these principles represent a valid reflective equilibrium of justice, and 









The first task of analysing Rawls’ theory is to identify the basic position in relation to 
uncertainty, as represented by its universal aspirations. It is clear that the nature of the 
theory and its approach to justification does not involve the assertion of an absolute, 
perfect and unchangeable truth. Amy Gutmann, for example, has commented that  
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[g]rand theorists as different as Plato, Hobbes and Mill wrote as if their conceptions of justice 
were justified for all people at all times. They searched for a set of eternal forms, a self-evident 
truth, or a very simple first principle from which to derive all practical moral imperatives. In 
defending his method of “rational equilibrium,” Rawls is the most modest, and in this respect 
wisest, of the grand philosophers. He argues that we have no better way of justifying 
principles… than by translating [them] into social practices and judging whether these practices 
are consistent with our moral convictions.45 
 
Thus, Rawls’ reliance on a process of testing principles of justice against out own 
moral judgments limits the potential value of the theory relative to those asserting an 
absolute truth. Rawls himself states that 
 
I do not claim for the principles of justice proposed that they are necessary truths or derivable 
from such truths. A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or 
conditions on principles; instead its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many 
considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.46 
 
Rawls here rejects the value of absolute moral theory. The position of a reflective 
equilibrium involves the ‘fitting together’ of our considered judgments, some 
proposed principles of judgments, and our acceptance of both the conditions and 
workings of the original position. It is the potential coherence of these ideas, Rawls 
argues, that can serve to justify a moral theory, rather than by reference to some 
universal rule or truth. This realisation does not mean that his theory is relative, or 
eschews the claim of universality. In fact, as Rawls makes clear throughout, A Theory 
is aimed at justifying the two principles of justice from a perspective common to all 
people, and so awarding them some universal value. This is readily apparent from the 
final passage of the work: 
 
The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the 
point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that can, 
whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive 
at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own 
standpoint.47 
 
Rawls seems to be asserting that a universal moral standpoint is possible, even though 
it cannot take the form envisaged by grand or absolute theory. This typifies his overall 
approach while justifying A Theory: he aspires to achieve a universal set of liberal 
principles, but accepts the inherent limitations of moral theory and thought.48 This 
acceptance is manifest throughout A Theory: in the way Rawls compares his two 
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principles against other likely approaches, rather than presenting it simply as the 
correct result derived directly from true premises; in the way he presents his result as 
being part of a potentially larger process, and not an incontestable endpoint; and in the 
means of justification itself, by relying on the considered judgments of the reader. 
However, while the approach is necessarily imperfect and the results only an 
approximation of justice, they do refer to a true justice, and represent a more accurate 
transcript than any known alternative approach. The ‘perspective of eternity’, 
although not perfect, is common between all people in all contexts, and it is inherent 
in Rawls’ approach that it can be employed to discern the best of a number of moral 
theories. 
 
This expresses a basic response to uncertainty: an acceptance of the limitations of the 
pursuit of moral knowledge, coupled with the belief that, by the application of both 
reason and our considered judgments, we have the ability to recognise the shape and 
content of justice. In this way, Rawls accepts and incorporates many of those 
arguments that are sceptical of the power of moral theory, yet attempts to overcome 
their basic consequence, that no objective or universal results are possible. It is this 
approach that prompts Gutmann to class Rawls among the grand philosophers. The 
success of A Theory as an expression of justice, then, depends on Rawls achieving this 
universal moral position while acknowledging the limitations of moral theory. 
Determining whether this is achieved involves analysing the theory’s justificatory 
strategy and, in particular, how these limitations on moral theory are conceived, and 
how they are overcome by his approach.  
 
 
3.2 Justification and the original position
 
 
Rawls’ approach to justification involves the formulation of the original position and 
the resulting principles of justice as a reflective equilibrium. Analysing this approach 
will involve looking at two common arguments made against it, relating firstly to the 
contractual aspect of the original position and then the legitimacy of using our 
considered judgments in the process of looking for a reflective equilibrium. This will 
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be followed by an examination of the features of the original position itself, and 
finally, the principles of justice.  
 
As a matter of justification, it is essential that the conditions of the original position 
are moral, and it necessarily produces a fair result. The focus here is on the nature and 
value of the agreement that the original position represents. As was mentioned above, 
Rawls views one of his main aims as presenting a theory that “generalizes and carries 
to a higher level of abstraction” traditional contractarian approaches to political 
theory. 49 In very basic terms, these approaches involve identifying some social 
contract with which people agree, whether explicitly or implicitly. This contract then 
legitimises the actions of the government that are within its ambit. The idea of 
deriving legitimacy from agreement or consent is an old one in political and social 
philosophy. 
  
Rawls’ contract differs from more traditional approaches in that the situation it 
represents is hypothetical. This has led to significant difficulty in identifying its 
meaning and justificatory role. Michael Sandel, for example, identifies the contract in 
the original position as being doubly hypothetical in that “[i]t imagines an event that 
never really happened, involving the sorts of beings who never really existed.”50 He 
argues that even actual contracts are not “self-sufficient moral instruments”, and can 
only be understood within a broader moral context: one that would encompass the 
positions of the parties, the details of bargaining process, and the nature of the actual 
obligations that arise.51 The contracting process, then, does not by itself guarantee a 
fair result, even when there is actual agreement between actual parties.  
 
Dworkin also questions the role of the contract within A Theory. He examines its 
hypothetical nature and decides that such an agreement is not legitimised merely by 
virtue of being a contract. The role of the contract, then, must be that it “call[s] 
attention to some independent argument for the fairness of the two principles – an 
argument that does not rest on the false premise that a hypothetical contract has some 
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pale binding force”.52 Consequently, if the contract is to have an effect it must be as 
part of some other argument, and not merely because of its nature as a contract. 
Together, Sandel and Dworkin can be taken as arguing that the two principles of 
justice are not legitimised because they are the subject of a contract, and that any such 
legitimising process is dependant on the contract’s context, both in terms of the details 
of the bargaining situation, and the broader justificatory strategy within which the 
contract is embedded. But, this does not mean that the value of any such contract is 
negated; rather, that it is not sufficient justification by itself of any obligation or 
principle. 
 
Valid though this argument may be, it is not clearly in conflict with A Theory. The 
original position is constrained in a way that is supposed necessarily to produce a fair 
result. Its legitimacy, then, is dependant on our recognition and acceptance of its 
details, and not the status of the agreement reached. In this sense, the value of the 
contract comes not from it being a contract, but rather from our own moral judgment 
of the original position as a whole. This means that the ‘contract’ can be a part of the 
theory’s justification without falling afoul of Dworkin’s and Sandel’s concerns.  
 
Despite this, the role of such a contract as part of a justification is difficult and 
potentially misleading, since it seems to add nothing to the moral value of the theory. 
Unlike traditional contractarian arguments, no justificatory weight is placed on either 
the consent or agreement aspects of the contract. Sandel recognises that the agreement 
in the original position is not the kind of agreement that is reached as the result of 
discussion within a diverse group of people, but, rather, is in the nature of an 
individual agreeing to a proposition. Such an agreement 
 
amounts to acknowledging [the proposition’s] validity, and this requires neither that others be 
involved nor that I take the validity of the proposition to be a matter of choice. It may be enough 
that I see it to be valid, as when I agree to (or accept, or acknowledge) the proposition that 2 + 2 
= 4.53 
 
Strictly speaking, then, the original position would carry the same weight even if it 
involved the decision of just one representative person.54 Thus, it is an exercise in 
morally constrained choice, and not deliberation or agreement. Consequently, 
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although the point made by Sandel and Dworkin does not undermine Rawls’ 
justificatory approach, it does remind us that, in applying our considered judgment to 
the original position, the normal contractarian intuitions relating to consent and 
agreement are not relevant. The only role of the contract in the original position, then, 
is to make clear the point that every possible representative person who is constrained 
in that same way would reach the same decision. This may contribute to our judgment 
of the fairness of the result, but the fact that Rawls presents it in the form of a contract 
is not relevant to its moral value. This seems to undermine Rawls’ claims as to the 
importance of the contractarian aspect of A Theory, yet it is in accordance with the 
most reasonable reading of his justificatory approach, and avoids what Sandel and 
Dworkin have correctly identified as a difficult or even untenable position. 
 
Overall, this means that the agreement in the original position can play a valid part in 
justifying Rawls’ theory, but that this depends on recognising its conditions – the veil 
of ignorance etc. – and the inherent fairness of the processes involved. These are to be 
considered, along with the actual result of the process, to determine whether the 
standard of a reflective equilibrium has been reached. Rawls asserts that his 
conception of the original position and the two principles of justice represent an 
equilibrium with which everyone, upon consideration, could agree. The remainder of 
the analysis of his justification of A Theory will look at the role considered judgment 
plays in this process, and what this sort of agreement, if achievable, could mean. 
 
 
3.3 Moral intuitions and considered judgments 
 
The process of recognising a reflective equilibrium relies heavily on the use of our 
considered judgments, both in relation to its conditions and the resulting principles of 
justice. Rawls defines these judgments in the following way: 
 
Considered judgments are simply those rendered under conditions favourable to the exercise of 
the sense of justice, and therefore in circumstances where the more common excuses and 
explanations for making a mistake do not obtain. The person making the judgment is presumed, 
then, to have the ability, the opportunity, and the desire to reach a correct decision.… Moreover, 
the criteria that identify these judgments are not arbitrary.55  
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These judgments, then, amount to moral intuitions that are properly directed towards 
matters of justice, and reasonably constrained to exclude potentially distorting 
influences and considerations. Their role in the justification of Rawls’ theory makes 
clear that he is relying on a form of intuitionism, in the sense that our actual moral 
judgments are one of the criteria upon which the principles, and in fact the whole of 
the theory, are being judged.56 If the challenge of Rawls’ theory is to achieve 
universality while adopting some of the limitations of moral theory, then intuitions 
represent the main mechanism by which this is to be achieved. The universality is 
proved not by the truth of some underlying rule or doctrine, but by the agreement 
between people who direct their considered judgment at the theory. As Nagel has put 
it: 
 
[Rawls] intends … that the underlying principles should possess intuitive moral plausibility of 
their own, and that the total theory should not merely summarize but illuminate and make 
plausible the particular judgments that it explains. Moreover, its intrinsic plausibility may 
persuade us to modify or extend our intuitions, thereby achieving greater theoretical coherence.57  
 
The interplay here is between our considered judgments of the principles of justice 
and of the original position. The aim is to arrive at a coherent position that is 
characterised by our willingness to accept not just the plausibility of each part of the 
theory, but the manner in which each part relates to and supports the other, and how 
this is reflected by, and also informs, our intuitions. Since our own considered 
judgments will themselves be modified and illuminated in this process, the important 
intuitive standard is that of plausibility: if we find a position plausible then we have 
recognised sufficient intuitive value in it that we may be willing to accept it as the 
most appropriate moral position given its necessary relationship to the other parts of 
the theory. 
 
The approach of searching for a plausible and coherent equilibrium can be contrasted 
with more traditional grand moral theory, whereby moral prescriptions are derived 
from some rule or doctrine that is presented as being absolutely true. It has the virtue 
of relying not on abstract theory, but rather on our actual moral feelings and beliefs 
about justice. However, it is difficult to see how some of our intuitions indicate a 
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universal value, and why Rawls’ approach should be considered successful in 
identifying which of our intuitions possess this quality.  
 
This difficulty has prompted a great deal of criticism. One of the most belligerent 
attacks is from R M Hare, who argues that Rawls’ approach hides a bias that 
undermines the theory. He asserts that Rawls’ claim of universality is a matter of self-
deception, which means that “if (as will certainly be the case) [Rawls] finds a large 
number of readers who can share with him a cosy unanimity in their considered 
judgments, he and they will think that they adequately represent ‘people generally’, 
and congratulate themselves on having attained the truth.”58 In this way Hare argues 
that Rawls’ view from eternity is actually just Rawls’ personal view, and that the use 
of intuitions merely disguises what he is actually doing, which is presenting his own 
idiosyncratic and morally unjustified beliefs as the correct view of justice. Hare goes 
on to illustrate this by identifying the extent to which Rawls’ theory relies explicitly 
on intuition and belief: 
 
I have counted in two pages thirty expressions implying a reliance on intuitions: such 
expressions as ‘I assume that there is a broad measure of agreement that’; ‘commonly shared 
presumptions’; ‘acceptable principles’; ‘it seems reasonable to suppose’; ‘is arrived at in a 
natural way’; ‘match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way’; 
‘which we can affirm on reflection’; ‘we are confident’; ‘we think’; and so on. … Since the 
theoretical structure is tailored at every point to fit Rawls’ intuitions, it is hardly surprising that 
its normative consequences fit them too – if they did not, he would alter the theory … and the 
fact that Rawls is a fairly typical man of his times and society, and will therefore have many 
adherents, does not make this a good way of doing philosophy.59  
 
This claim, that Rawls’ persistent reliance on intuition undermines the universality of 
his theory, should seemingly be easy to test. Rawls claims that this universality comes 
from a “certain form of thought and feeling” of all people on matters of justice, and 
that leads to intuitions and results that are common between them.60 Rawls’, in effect, 
argues that his own conception of a theory of justice is an example of this 
universality. If he is right then every person, regardless of background and belief, who 
considers this matter ought to agree with this conception. The existence of persistent 
and rational disagreement should then signal the non-universality of A Theory.  
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Of course, A Theory has not met with anything approximating the required level of 
agreement, which seems to undermine its whole project. This is not directly 
addressed, but it is a consequence that Rawls would no doubt deny. He might argue 
that the intuitions involved do not reach the standard required by considered 
judgments, by being the result of a mistake, by taking into account considerations not 
relevant to the matter of justice, or by including non-arbitrary criteria for example. 
This would be the case if readers consider the theory with some established moral or 
political agenda, and not as a pure conception of justice.  
 
Rawls might also add that this disagreement merely reflects the inherent limitations of 
moral theory: although his strategy of justification implies some theoretical possibility 
of consensus, in practice this is not achievable because, for example, of the 
imprecision of language and the finite space available. Or he might argue more 
generally that such an agreement is simply unrealistic, given the complexity of what is 
at stake. Each of these arguments has some merit, yet they seem inadequate to explain 
the lack of agreement with A Theory, particularly when it is this agreement upon 
which it ultimately depends: it is quite possible to follow all of Rawls’ directions and 
prescriptions and still to disagree with Rawls’ conclusions. 
 
Rawls comes closest to dealing with this issue in making some remarks about the 
nature of a reflective equilibrium: 
 
[D]oes a reflective equilibrium (in the sense of the philosophical ideal) exist? If so, is it unique? 
Even if it is unique, can it be reached? Perhaps the judgments from which we begin or the course 
of reflection itself (or both), affect the resting point, if any, that we eventually achieve. It would 
be useless, however, to speculate about these matters here. They are far beyond our reach. I shall 
not even ask whether the principles that characterize one person’s considered judgments are the 
same as those that characterize another’s.… If men’s conceptions of justice finally turn out to 
differ, the ways in which they do is a matter of first importance.… If we can characterize one 
(educated) person’s sense of justice, we might have a good beginning toward a theory of justice 
… So for the purposes of this book, the views of the reader and the author are the only ones that 
count.61 
 
Rawls’ actual response to this potential disagreement seems to be to downplay the 
significance and universality of his theory of justice. This is expressed most obviously 
when Rawls allows that conceptions of justice may differ between individuals, and 
that his theory might play a useful role if it does nothing more than characterise the 
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conception of one person. This suggestion culminates in the direction that the reader 
should be concerned only with his or her own view of the theory, and should ignore 
the issue of a widespread consensus. This does not sit easily with the universal 
elements of Rawls’ justification: conceivably, the view from eternity is not only his or 
his reader’s, and does not adequately counter Hare’s criticism. Instead it seems only 
to encourage further examination of the use of considered judgments as a criterion of 
justice.  
 
The argument against this intuitionism involves two separate issues: firstly, the role of 
our intuitions in identifying universal moral principles, and secondly, the claim that 
the two principles of justice exhibit such universality. Rawls’ inclusion of our 
intuitions, as considered judgments, in the justificatory process is itself significant. It 
certainly seems a sensible and plausible position that our actual beliefs and intuitive 
responses to situations are relevant to justice. An approach that incorporates our 
intuitions while attempting to reach universal results faces the general and related 
issues of, firstly, finding some relationship between our actual intuitions and what our 
moral principles ought to be, and, secondly, incorporating our intuitions within a 
logical structure. Rawls’ solution to the latter is exceedingly clever: use our intuitions 
of both the original position and resulting principles as part of a dynamic process of 
comparison and evaluation, with the aim of reaching a coherent, mutually reinforcing 
position. The problem is in relation to the former: he never adequately explains the 
relationship between our intuitions and universal justice, and, so, never plausibly 
justifies his conception of this position, beyond it being the expression of his personal 
beliefs. The result is a conception that is plausible, or even somewhat seductive, at 
least to western sensibilities, but which is accompanied by the nagging feeling of 
being free-floating, tethered to nothing more than the ideas of one person, or of an 
aspect of one tradition. 
 
This conclusion does not necessarily deny the universality of Rawls’ theory, but it 
does suggest that his justificatory approach is incapable of supporting this result, in 
particular because the relationship between our considered judgments and justice is 
not adequately explained. Consequently, the existence of considered and rational 
disagreement with the reflective equilibrium, and Hare’s argument as to Rawls’ 
parochial moral content, raise issues that go unanswered by A Theory. This offers a 
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basic criticism of the justificatory process underlying A Theory. In order to gain a 
more complete picture of the theory from the view of moral uncertainty, it is 
necessary to examine the theory’s substantive processes and principles as well. These 
are contiguous with and are an expression of its justification and, despite the general 
and foundational importance of the latter, a complete view of the theory cannot be 
achieved without this. 
 
 
3.4 Deontology, the right and the good 
 
The deontological nature of Rawls’ theory, and its expression as the priority of the 
right over the good, is the fundamental organising principle of its substance, and has 
been described both as contemporary liberalism’s great virtue and as its foundational 
flaw.62 Rawls defines deontological theory in the negative sense of being non-
teleological, in that it “either does not specify the good independently from the right, 
or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good”.63 His theory is deontological 
in the second sense, since the two principles of justice do not tend to maximise the 
good, and instead the right is separate and prior to the good.64 
 
The nature of deontological moral theory, then, is that the right is not exclusively 
determined by the good.65 For Rawls, this means that the justice of a particular social 
arrangement can be found primarily in expressions of the right, such as individual 
liberties, institutional fairness and equality, rather than being derived from the welfare 
of some individual or group, whether expressed as their preferences, happiness or 
desire, hence the priority of the right over the good in matters of justice. This does not 
mean that the consequences of a situation are not morally relevant, but rather that the 
welfare of those involved plays a role secondary to the rightness of the action itself. 
By this general deontological approach, and in applying the priority of the right over 
the good, Rawls structures the substance of much of his theory and steers it away 
from the utilitarian (and teleological) conclusion that the right is defined by the good. 
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He characterises this priority in a number of sections of A Theory, but gives relatively 
little attention to its justification. In introducing the idea, Rawls sets out that 
 
[i]t has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be supported by the convictions of 
common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle between the claims of liberty and 
right on one hand and the desirability of increasing aggregate social welfare on the other; and 
that we give a certain priority, if not absolute weight, to the former. Each member of society is 
thought to have an inviolability founded on justice, or as some say, on natural right, which even 
the welfare of every one else cannot override.… Therefore in a just society the basic liberties are 
taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the 
calculus of social interests.66 
 
As a justification of the priority of right, this passage is quite cursory, and cites as 
supporting evidence ‘many philosophers’ and ‘common sense’. His basic claim is that 
the concerns of welfare are inferior in relation to justice, to matters of liberty and 
right. A significant source of this seems to be the intrinsic worth of all people, which 
means that it would be wrong for one person’s liberty to be traded off for the welfare 
of another.  
 
This basic conception of the priority of the right is quite plausible, despite being 
inadequately justified in A Theory. The general problems with depending on this sort 
of intuitive plausibility have already been identified and discussed. The priority of the 
right over the good, in fact, offers a prominent example of the way that these 
intuitions can play a role in the substance of the theory, in addition to its justification. 
A detailed examination of this priority will illustrate some of these issues, and also 
assist in explaining the substantive structure of A Theory. 
 
It is well recognised that Rawls’ use of the priority of the right over the good involves 
two potentially distinct claims: that some rights are so important that they cannot be 
traded off with welfare, and that the justification of a theory of justice should not 
depend on a particular conception of the good.67 The first of these has been briefly 
explained. The latter expresses the idea that the organisation of society should not 
depend on any one person’s or group’s idea of how people ought to live, but, instead, 
should be based on more general and fundamental moral concerns, such as those 
relating to appropriate individual liberties. This makes it a concept particularly 
amenable to a liberal framework. This is reflected both in the justification and 
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substance of Rawls’ theory: in the former, in that our considered judgments about the 
various aspects of the theory that contribute towards any reflective equilibrium 
explicitly exclude any arbitrary considerations, such as any individual conceptions of 
the good; and, in the latter, primarily because the veil of ignorance precludes anyone 
in the original position from having prior knowledge of their own conception.68 These 
conditions mean that A Theory is conceived independently of any particular 
conception of the good. If either were breached this would undermine the universality 
of the theory since, as Rawls conceives them, the right is moral and common between 
people, whereas the good is diverse and dependant on each individual’s beliefs and 
backgrounds.  
 
The other use of the priority of the right over the good dictates that a person’s liberties 
or moral rights cannot be traded off for the welfare of any other person or group. This 
is expressed in the theory in large part by the role of two principles, and, particularly, 
in the special status of those rights protected by the liberty principle. These take 
absolute precedence over matters of material welfare; they cannot be abridged or 
abrogated for the good of another. This use of the priority of the right is linked to the 
other in the sense that it is the prescriptive expression of the theoretical structure the 
other implies. Together they construct a conception of justice independent of our 
personal motives and interests, which promotes a system of universal inalienable 
rights and satisfies our deeply-felt intuitions concerning the relationship between what 
is right and what is good. This approach is prominent not only in A Theory, but flows 
through much of contemporary liberal theory. It claims universality in that it is by 
design independent of our individual beliefs and ideas of how it is best to live. The 
resulting structure is so strongly appealing that it amounts to the essential beauty of 
contemporary liberalism. It is a conception to which everyone can subscribe, because 
everyone has the same moral capacity, and the same irrevocable moral value; if each 
were to act truthfully and in good faith then they would have to admit that their own 
conception of the good is reasonably contestable and that, as a matter of justice, each 
person should be allowed to choose and live their own conception. This would occur 
within a broader system of rights which recognise the moral value of each person and 
reasonable variations in conceptions of the good. 
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This simple structure of a liberal conception of justice is both strongly intuitively 
appealing and is remarkably cogent and logically sound. Its major flaws do not relate 
to the system derived from the priority of the right, but rather from criticisms of the 
priority itself and the assertions and beliefs that support it. This system is dependant 
on the idea of a real and effective distinction between the right and the good, and 
agreement on the nature of their relationship, namely one of absolute priority. 
 
The contrast between the right and the good is one that is familiar in moral theory. It 
can be described in terms of the distinction between behaviour that is self-regarding 
and behaviour that is other-regarding, altruistic or sympathetic. However, Rawls’ 
characterisation of this basic idea is more questionable. He treats the good as 
expressing a consequential material value that is contingent on the reaction of the 
valuer, or the meaning and value that person gives it. In this sense the good is 
personal and revisable, an assessment that can easily give way to the idea that 
conceptions of the good are ephemeral and spurious in any context broader than the 
individual who holds them. The right, by contrast, is indicative of an intrinsic and, 
therefore, necessary moral value that can be perceived by anyone who faithfully 
commits his or her moral abilities to its assessment. To Rawls, then, the good is 
contingent and morally arbitrary, and naturally subordinate to the right, which, in turn, 
is the common and true representation of moral value.  
 
In many ways, there seems to be a plausible distinction between self-interested and 
moral behaviour. Rawls, however, gives this intuitive duality meaning that it cannot 
plausibly bear. He joins self-interest to our personal conceptions of the good life, our 
understanding as to how it is best to live, and he characterises these conceptions as 
being matters of personal preference, which have no meaning beyond our individual 
acceptance of them. In contrast, he equates the right with morality, and he 
characterises it as being rationally correct, singular and universal. According to this 
picture, varying conceptions of the good represent valid human diversity, whereas the 
right can always be the subject of rational examination and agreement.  
 
The effect of this approach is to downplay actual moral difference and dispute, 
implicitly treating these as merely indicating the absence of rational analysis. It 
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ignores the potential for the good to play a fundamental role in moral theory. It also 
assumes that our conceptions of how it is best to live do not have any moral or 
communal content, and, so, are not morally relevant in any significant way. It is 
entirely plausible that matters of both the right and the good play a substantial role in 
our moral lives, so that there is no clear and absolute priority of one over the other. 
Rawls’ cleaving of right from good, his equating of this with moral and welfare 
concerns, and his characterisation of one being morally fundamental and the other 
morally arbitrary, seems unconvincing. The structural importance of this distinction 
brings into question much of Rawls’ theory. 
 
This position on the right and the good is then used to justify, both, the contention that 
justice should be conceived without reference to considerations of what is good and, 
also, that the liberties that follow from this conception should never give way to such 
considerations. Will Kymlicka questions whether these two uses are consistent with 
each other. He argues that 
 
[i]n discussing the definition of the good, Rawls says that there should be a priority of the right 
over the good, in the sense that our legitimate entitlements should not be tied to the promotion of 
any particular view of the good life. But this “antiperfectionist” sense of the priority of the right 
over the good has nothing to do with the first, “deontology versus teleology” sense of that 
priority.69  
 
He goes on to suggest that these do not in fact concern the priority of the right over 
the good and do not reflect a single contrast in the way Rawls claims. Rather, they 
reflect two very different concerns, so that “there is not a single choice to be made 
here, but a range of possible positions that connect the two issues in various ways”.70  
 
There are significant links, both theoretical and structural, between Rawls’ two uses 
of the priority of the right. The idea that liberty cannot be traded for welfare is a result 
of excluding conceptions of the good from the substance and justification of the 
theory, and both involve a seemingly similar subordination of the good to matters of 
justice. Yet Kymlicka is correct in suggesting that the two express different moral 
ideals. The exclusion of conceptions of the good from discussions of justice does not 
correspond to the subordination of matters of welfare to the basic liberties. The 
reasoning between the two is quite distinct: one is based on the idea that moral 
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judgments should not be clouded by individual bias; the other, that an individual’s 
rights should not be abrogated for the material benefit of some other person or group. 
It is only Rawls’ broad-brush approach to the right and the good that make the 
assertion of its two separate principles seem correct. Kymlicka’s criticism illustrates 
one of its most basic flaws: while it has the virtues of being strongly intuitive and 
extremely simple and neat, further inspection reveals it to be incoherent and 
unconvincing, and potentially at odds with reasonable moral beliefs. 
 
It is the neatness of Rawls’ broad-brush approach, as it fails to register the 
complexities of our moral lives, which underlies the seemingly flawless liberal 
structure of universal rights and common moral thought. John McNaughton criticises 
this aspect of the priority of the right: 
 
As long as ethics and justice, in particular, continues to be viewed and defined in terms of these 
classical philosophical distinctions, those of what James called “intellectualism” (i.e., right vs. 
good, is vs. ought, etc; as Dewey pointed out, to set up an exhaustive dualism presupposes, often 
wrongly, that the entities are entirely separate to begin with), inconsistencies… are bound to 
appear. The complex psychological, motivational, biological, and cultural patterns woven into 
the exquisite tapestry that is man and his actions are far too sophisticated to be reduced 
exclusively to particular concepts such as those of right and good. A proper delineation of justice 
requires as its necessary propaedeutic an adequate description of man IN [sic] his ethical 
situation, his concrete relationships to himself, to others, and to the world about him.71 
 
McNaughton is arguing that justice is no less complicated in structure or substance 
than people themselves, and that Rawls’ reliance on the distinction between the right 
and the good is an over-simplification that can only distort and limit his conception of 
justice.  
 
Although it is difficult to rule out completely the possibility of a simple structure of 
morality, this idea seems a strong one. It might be argued in reply that the distinction 
between the right and the good, although not illustrative of the whole of justice, still 
has some explanatory or prescriptive power and, so, some role in moral theory. 
However, this is not the approach taken in A Theory. There, the distinction is applied 
without limitation, although often implicitly, to virtually every aspect of the 
justification and substance. This being the case, its failure brings into question much 
of the theory. The nature of this failure is such that our intuitive agreement with the 
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elements of a potential reflective equilibrium would be undermined. The veil of 
ignorance, for example, seems a plausible tool for removing self-interested 
considerations from the original position. If the good has morally valuable content, 
however, this approach seems to undermine the intuitive value of the veil, and of the 
fairness of the original position.  
 
The doubt as to the priority of the right over the good, then, should be kept in mind in 
assessing the value of the various parts of the substance of Rawls’ theory. This is the 
final task in applying the methodology of uncertainty, examining the original position 
and the two principles of justice as the expression of the justification of the theory. In 
doing so, the problems identified in relation to the justification should also find 
expression, along with any criticisms that relate to only the theory’s substance. 
Examining the substance of A Theory involves looking at the conditions and 
assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, placed on the original position; considering 
the actual derivation of the two principles from those conditions; and, finally, 
considering the two principles independently as being intuitive expressions of our 






The original position is supposed to be, in the words of Rawls, “the appropriate initial 
status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair”.72 This is 
achieved by employing conditions and assumptions that are intuitively accepted as 
being strongly moral, and that will necessarily lead to just results. Sandel makes the 
point that: 
 
the conditions of the original position cannot be so immune from actual human circumstance 
that just any assumptions producing attractive principles of justice would do. Unless the 
premises of such principles bear some resemblance to the condition of creatures discernibly 
human, the success of the equilibrium is, to that extent, undermined.73 
 
Because the intuitive response to the conditions of the original position must be 
common between people, it seems reasonable that they must in some way resemble 
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actual human circumstances, as Rawls’ theory in fact does. However, recognition is 
more important as a standard than resemblance; the conditions of the original position 
must be recognisable by everyone as being morally important. Their resemblance to 
our actual circumstances will be necessary as a matter of practicality, because 
intuitions will naturally tend to relate to what is actually the case. But this will only be 
relevant insofar as the moral content of the situation is capable of being recognised 
and accepted by all. Rawls attempts to formulate conditions that are effective while 
being the weakest possible, so that this agreement might be achieved in relation to a 
situation that is constrained in a morally meaningful way.74 However, the weakness of 
these conditions has been strongly doubted, and they have been described both as 
“strong and far-reaching”, and not “either weak or innocuous or uncontroversial.”75  
 
This relates to my earlier criticism of Rawls’ intuitionism. It was concluded that he 
fails in adequately explaining and justifying his use of intuitions, but that this would 
not exclude entirely the possibility of his approach being valid. Looking at the 
conditions of the original position involves looking at intuitionism in action, as it is 
expressed in the substance of the theory. The problem that we might have predicted 
from the earlier discussion is that Rawls presents a number of seemingly plausible 
conditions as being morally appropriate, and potentially agreeable, by those who 
apply only their moral judgment to their assessment; commentators respond to these 
by arguing they are actually highly contestable, and demonstrate Rawls’ implicit bias. 
The veil of ignorance, the requirement of rationality and the equality implied in the 
original position each have some plausible moral content, at least to a person who 
shares some of Rawls’ moral beliefs. Yet each can be criticised as being contestable 
in a way that indicates more than that the people contesting them are not applying 
their moral judgment in the prescribed manner. The veil of ignorance, for example, is 
supposed to remove information about morally arbitrary considerations, such as a 
person’s material self-interest and their conception of the good, from any decision 
made in the original position. Yet this, as has been said above, rests on the idea that a 
conception of the good is morally inferior to the right, either in the sense of the good 
of any person or group, or the aggregate good of everyone. Any doubts that the 
distinction between the right and the good can be meaningfully drawn so as to leave 
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the morally relevant on one side and the morally inferior on the other, may mean that 
the agreement Rawls envisages is not reasonably possible.  
 
The most prominent and persistent of these criticisms deal with the conditions 
together. They claim to find a structure implicitly supporting the original position, 
which runs contrary to Rawls’ explicit theoretical foundations, by incorporating some 
hidden conception of the good, or some conception of the person that is patently 
liberal and questionable. William Galston, for example, identifies in the original 
position an implicit theory of the good, which assumes “the worth of human 
existence, the worth of human purposiveness and the fulfilment of human purposes, 
and the worth of rationality as the chief constraint on social principles and social 
actions.”76 This theory incorporates ideas of rationalist humanism, which reflect the 
links between liberal theory and the Enlightenment.77 Although this assumption may 
seem inconsequential, Galston argues that the reliance of the original position on it 
reveals that A Theory is not independent of any conception of the good, but rather 
promotes one type of conception over another: namely those that do not “preach the 
superiority of specific types of character and ways of life” over those that do.78 In 
other words, the veil of ignorance restricts knowledge about individual conceptions of 
the good, while the condition of rationality and the general set-up of the position itself 
impose such a conception.  
 
This conception of the good is weak in that it depends on the general idea of human 
purpose rather than any narrow and more obviously personal ends, and, so, is no less 
plausible that other parts of A Theory. Yet, permitting its role in the original position 
would require justifying why this conception is acceptable where others are morally 
arbitrary. Without this justification, it seems that Rawls’ understanding of the good, in 
the words of Galston, “has the appearance of an arbitrary arrangement of convenience 
rather than a principled position”, and that the liberal outcome of the original position 
seems dependant on its hidden liberal assumptions, rather than revealing new and 
common moral truth.79 
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Nagel explores the same area in looking at the thin theory of the good that Rawls 
attributes to people in the original position, namely their rational desire for primary 
goods. He then considers whether this limited conception undermines the remainder 
of the theory. 
  
What Rawls wishes to do, by using the notion of primary goods, is to provide an Archimedian 
point, as he calls it, from which choice is possible without unfairness to any of the fuller 
conceptions of the good that lead people to differ. A theory of the good is presupposed, but it is 
ostensibly neutral between divergent particular conceptions, and supplies a least common 
denominator on which a choice in the original position can be based without unfairness to any of 
the parties.80 
 
Nagel’s characterisation of the implicit conception of the good is justifiable in that it 
is a minimal conception that is neutral as between more substantive beliefs. But this 
approach, Nagel argues, is not tenable. The problem is that, although the conception 
seems a weak one, “it depends on a strong assumption of the sufficiency of that 
reduced conception for the purposes of justice.”81 In other words the conception is so 
heavily relied upon in Rawls’ theory that it magnifies the non-neutrality of his thin 
conception of the good. 
 
The suppression of knowledge required to achieve unanimity is not equally fair to all the parties, 
because the primary goods are not equally valuable in pursuit of all conceptions of the good. 
They will serve to advance many different individual life plans, … but they are less useful in 
implementing views that hold a good life to be readily achievable only in certain well-defined 
types of social structure, or only in a society that works concertedly for the realization of certain 
higher human capacities and the suppression of baser ones, or only given certain types of 
economic relations among men.… The original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral 
theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best that can 
be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere 
with the rights of others.82 
 
Galston and Nagel both examine the conditions of the original position and find some 
hidden bias that undermines the status and value of the two principles that result. The 
difference in approach is that, while Galston considers the broader implications of 
rational purposefulness, Nagel focuses on a particular expression of the thin 
conception of the good in relation to primary goods. The non-neutrality of the original 
position between individual and communal goals is the result of the latter, and is an 
important practical consequence of this argument. 
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Joseph Raz repeats this argument, and identifies that this non-neutrality is not limited 
to non-individualistic goods, but rather applies to “[a]ll conceptions involving the 
cultivation and satisfaction of the so-called expensive tastes”83 But he agrees that non-
individualistic goals will tend to be expensive since “their realization depends on the 
cooperation of others, and they will take some convincing to come round to that 
agent’s point of view.”84 This suggests that the original position is averse to resource-
expensive rather than non-individualistic goods.  
 
This argument weakens Nagel’s view in two ways. First, because it focuses on 
resource-expensive goods, it suggests that there could be some communal action that 
is not expensive, and in fact is favoured by the original position. It is quite possible 
that some such action could occur without the cost of convincing, and could involve 
cooperation, mutual satisfaction and even substantial economies. Second, it accords 
with the basic intuition that, in a world of scarce resources, people should to be 
responsible for the cost of their actions.  
 
Raz’s approach seems to miss some of what Nagel is claiming – that the original 
position presupposes a conception of the good that is inherently individualistic and, 
so, at odds with non-individual behaviour. In this way, the original position involves a 
discrimination against communal behaviour, not simply because it tends to be 
expensive, but because the original position is not easily amenable to group-
dependant conceptions of the good. Raz’s view is correct, that non-individual goals 
tend to come within the broader group of expensive goods; but, this view is 
incomplete. It suggests that, if making the distribution dependant upon the resource-
costs of conceptions of the good is valid, then Rawls’ approach achieves neutrality 
between these various conceptions. In this situation there would be no discrimination 
against communal behaviour beyond the legitimate idea that the resource costs of that 
behaviour should be borne by those people who choose to adopt it. 
 
However, Nagel is saying more than this: even if this approach is in this sense neutral 
between goods, the underlying system, including what ‘goods’ means in this context, 
is biased in favour of individualistic behaviour. It is possible to identify two 
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arguments here: that the use of the thin conception of the good in relation to primary 
goods involves a potentially arbitrary standard, i.e. the moral relevance of the 
resource-cost of a person’s conception of the good; and, that the system in which this 
standard is embedded is constituted in terms of the individual and, so, will tend to not 
deal fairly with non-individual conceptions of the good. The difficulty is that this 
inherent bias is manifested through the resource-cost standard. However, the use of 
resource-cost itself is not in itself important here, since any standard the system uses 
to allocate resources will tend to reflect that system’s bias.  
 
Rawls has replied directly to this criticism of the individualistic bias of the original 
position. He argues that Nagel is mistaken in focussing on the neutrality of the 
original position, and that it is inevitable that some conceptions of the good will be 
favoured over others. 
 
The most that can be expected, then, is that the original position be fair to the parties (conceived 
as moral persons). Even this may be asking too much, since there may be no very clear notion of 
fairness for this case or, at any rate, no notion of perfect fairness. But it is still worth asking 
whether the original position is as fair as possible; or whether some other account of the original 
position would be more fair.85 
 
Rawls suggests that the appropriate standard for the conditions of the original 
condition is that of fairness, rather than neutrality between different conceptions of 
the good. He asserts that the original position is the fairest approach, a conclusion that 
presumably depends to some extent on the intuition that people should be responsible 
for the resource cost of their conceptions of the good. To this extent, Rawls answers 
Raz’s argument that the original position is biased against expensive conceptions of 
the good. In relation to the separate charge of a potential individualistic bias, Rawls 
goes on to assert that, although the original position is individual in nature, it is 
capable of dealing with non-individual conceptions of the good: “it is true that the 
theory of the good uses the notion of an individual’s plan of life; but this does not 
imply that such plans must be individualistic”.86 In fact, in the well-ordered society 
that the original position prescribes, Rawls envisages the flourishing of communal 
values and actions: 
 
The basic liberties are not intended to keep persons in isolation from one another, or to persuade 
them to live private lives, even though some no doubt will, but to secure the right of free 
                                                
85
 Freeman, op cit, above note 9, pp270-71. 
86
 Ibid, p273. 
 57
movement between associations and smaller communities. There is, to be sure, one collective 
aim supported by state power for the whole well-ordered society: namely, that it be a well-
ordered society, a just society wherein a common conception of justice is publicly recognized; 
but within this framework communitarian aims may be pursued, and quite possibly by the vast 
majority of persons. Other socially collective ends may well exist besides that of being a well-
ordered society; but these ends cannot be upheld by the coercive apparatus of the state. If 
socially collective communitarian aims could survive in no other way, why should we regret 
their demise, and consider the original position unfair and arbitrarily biased against them?87 
 
Nagel’s argument is that the original position reflects a liberal conception of the good, 
and, so, is biased against non-individual values. Rawls’ response seems to be that 
communal values can flourish despite being embedded in an individualistic 
framework. Furthermore, he suggests that this is appropriate; otherwise the state 
would be artificially supporting these values. The essential difference, then, depends 
on whether it is sufficient for the purposes of justice to be concerned with non-
individual values only insofar as they are expressed through individual values.  
 
The original position, as Nagel has noted, uses individual decision making as a proxy 
for thinking about matters of justice, and utilises the perspective of individuals who 
have no knowledge of any personal communal beliefs or affiliations, as these fall 
within the boundaries of their conceptions of the good. This approach has the virtue of 
being clean in the sense that it allows thinking about justice that is conceivably 
unanimous and potentially universal. However, this is achieved at the expense of 
characterising people only in terms of their individual interests and expunging any 
communal tendencies. It is true that these can then be expressed within the boundaries 
of the resulting principles and that, in fact, individuals in the original position would 
be closely concerned with the freedom of individuals to express their communal 
values, but the fact remains that this is determined from an individualistic framework.  
 
The extent to which this undermines the results of the original position must 
ultimately depend on the conception of individualism and collectivism, and the 
relationship of this to justice. This can be expressed in relation to the conception of 
the person used in the theory and, in particular, the relationship between a person and 
their normative and moral beliefs. An examination and criticism of Rawls’ conception 
of the person is the basis for Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. In it he 
comments that Rawls’ liberalism 
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avoids reliance on any particular theory of the person, at least in the traditional sense of 
attributing to all human beings a determinate nature, or certain essential desires and inclinations, 
such as selfishness or sociability, for example. But there is another sense in which this liberalism 
does imply a certain theory of the person. It concerns not the object of human desires, but the 
subject of desire, and how this subject is constituted.88 
 
Rawls’ conception of the person is unusual in that it focuses on the subject him or 
herself, or, in other words, the identity and capacity common between people, rather 
than on the nature of their preferences or desires. This means, Sandel argues, that 
people are antecedently individuated, that they are viewed primarily as morally 
capable individuals who can be separated from their subsequent beliefs or 
preferences, and, thus, are “non-contingent and prior to any particular experience”.89 
With this conception the self “is distinguished from its ends – it stands beyond them, 
at a distance, with a certain priority – but it is also related to its ends, as willing 
subjects to the objects of choice.”90 This represents a deontological self, whose 
identity is independent from his or her “interests and ends and … relations with 
others.”91 
 
This conception of the person clearly reflects Rawls’ priority of the right over the 
good in that it emphasises the common nature of our moral capacity, while distancing 
us from our personal desires or ends. In this context it seems natural for those in the 
original position to be shorn of their conceptions of the good. Further, the liberal 
outcome of the original position seems equally acceptable in that it states that there is 
a system of overarching freedoms, corresponding to our common moral sense, which 
allow us to express our individual values insofar as this is consistent with the rights of 
others. These moves make sense because people are only contingently related, and so 
stand apart from their ends. Given the difficulty already discussed with Rawls’ 
priority of the good, this approach must raise questions, some of which are expressed 
by Sandel: 
 
One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it 
invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so deeply that I 
could not understand myself without it. No transformation of life purposes and plans could be so 
unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my identity. No project could be so essential that turning 
away from it would call into question the person I am. Given my independence from the values I 
                                                
88
 Sandel, op cit, above note 48, p10. 
89
 Ibid, p49. 
90
 Ibid, p59. 
91
 Ibid, p55. 
 59
have, I can always stand apart from them; my public identity as a moral person ‘is not affected 
by changes over time’ in my conception of the good.92 
 
The basis of Sandel’s criticism, then, is that Rawls’ liberal project implicitly excludes 
that individuals can be constituted by their desires and ends. This downplaying of the 
good is at odds with a more communal conception of the person, whereby our beliefs, 
culture and goals form part of who we are, and from which we cannot sensibly be 
separated for the purposes of justice.  
 
The underlying difference between this now-common theme of communitarian 
argument, and Rawls’ system of liberal justice, seems to concern the relationship 
between the individual and, what Rawls would call, their conception of the good. It is 
not possible here to explore exhaustively this difficult relationship, but it is important 
to identify the implicit conceptions of the person and of the good that lie beneath 
Rawls’ system of justice. That these conceptions are themselves contestable and, it is 
argued, reflect Rawls’ own perspective rather than a universal truth, calls into 
question the purported universality of the whole system. This issue exemplifies the 
potential for bias in a moral theory, and the difficulties with the priority of the right 
over the good as an organising principle; it also highlights the danger of using 
intuitionism as a moral criterion where the system being assessed is structurally clean 
and quite plausible. Ultimately, no firm decision on the nature of the person, and the 
true relationship between individuals, norms and justice, can be made here, but the 
very fact of the argument and the nature of the disagreement undermines Rawls’ 
assertion that his theory is the best of those available. 
 
 
3.6 Two principles of justice
 
 
The final part of Rawls’ theory concerns the two principles of justice. As part of the 
reflexive process these should be assessed from two perspectives, namely as being 
validly derived from the original position, and as being independently plausible and 
appealing as principles of justice. The goal here is not a perfect coincidence of the 
intuitive plausibility of the assumptions of the original position and of the principles 
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themselves, but rather a coherent compromise between the two, characterised by 
reflection and adjustment. The assumptions of the original position have already been 
explored, which leaves for examination the derivation of the principles and their 
intuitive value. 
 
The derivation of the liberty principle depends on the people in the original position, 
in ignorance of their particular conceptions of the good, deciding to implement an 
equal liberty for each to pursue these conceptions. Of course, this structure of the 
individual pursuit of the good, as embedded within a moral system of liberties, is 
reflective of Rawls’ priority of the right, and, so, is subject to the same criticism, as 
well as the difficulty of applying restrictions on the original position that would 
produce a unanimous outcome. Putting aside these problems, the derivation of the 
liberty principle itself does seem quite reasonable. Although there are some arguments 
with regard to material equality, and also the makeup of these liberties, the idea that, 
once divorced from our self-interest and personal goals, we would tend to favour an 
equality of liberty, is quite compelling. In relation to this principle, at least, there 
seems to be the possibility of coherence between what rational people in the original 
position would do, and what seems just. 
 
This quality is not present, however, in relation to the difference principle. As Brian 
Barry has put it, “[n]o other aspect of Rawls’ theory has attracted more commentary 
than his effort to show that the difference principle can be derived from the original 
position as he specifies it, and it is, I think, safe to say that no other aspect of the 
theory has met with such uniform rejection.”93 In fact, this criticism amounts to a vast 
literature that cannot be fully explored here, although some general and representative 
arguments can be motioned, both in relation to the derivation of the difference 
principle and its intuitive value as part of a reflective equilibrium. 
 
The difference principle is agreed to by those in the original position on the grounds 
that it approves of social and economic inequalities that are to everyone’s 
advantage.94 A heuristic that is often used to describe the outcome of the difference 
principle is the maximin rule, which dictates that the choice between possible social 
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alternatives should maximise the position of the person who is worst off.95 The 
position of this person must be at least as good as in the position of equality. The 
decision to adopt the difference principle does seem, at first glance, to satisfy the 
constraints placed on those in the original position: they desire to increase their own 
level of primary goods, yet are unsure of their identity within the alternatives they are 
comparing. The adoption of the difference principle represents a conceivable reaction 
to this situation. 
 
Hare has objected to the principle’s derivation in claiming that it “does not appeal to 
me as in general a good one for choices under uncertainty.”96 He argues that the 
original position, as constrained as it is, would not necessarily choose the maximin 
strategy, and that Rawls “has reduced the information available to them and about 
them so much that it is hard to say what they would choose, unless his own intuitions 
supply the lack”.97 The basis of this argument is that, although the difference principle 
is a possible and not unreasonable result of the original position, it is not the only one. 
In other words, the conditions of the original position are not such as to lead to a 
unanimous agreement on the adopting principle. It is quite conceivable, for example, 
that some in the original position would choose a principle that causes a greater total 
material prosperity, to the detriment of some of the poorer citizens, and, so, 
effectively take the chance that they are not themselves one of the latter. It is not 
irrational, even in the Rawlsian sense of the term, to take this sort of risk. Under this 
view, the difference principle can properly be viewed as a reasonable, albeit 
conservative and risk-averse, response to the original position, and Rawls’ explicit 
attempts to downplay the risk-aversion element of the principle as unconvincing.98 
 
The literature aimed at demonstrating that the people in the original position might 
adopt some position other than the difference principle, including that of average 
utility, is prodigious.99 In addition to much abstract theorising, some have actually 
attempted to carry out experiments whereby subjects are placed in a situation 
analogous to the original position, and asked to choose between possible social 
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alternatives. The experiment carried out by Michelbach et alia in 2003 is 
representative of much of the work in this area. The method used to simulate the 
original position and, then, interpret the results is quite ingenious.  
 
Participants read a short description of a hypothetical society and are asked to imagine they are 
outside observers giving their advice to the society. In order to insure impartiality they are 
explicitly told they are not members of this society. They will evaluate different policies being 
considered by the society based on the effects they will have on the level and distribution of 
income as determined by “economic studies”.100 
 
This involved looking at nine different income profiles and scoring each out of ten. 
The nine alternative societies represent each combination of low, medium and high 
equality, and low, medium and high efficiency. Each profile consists of five different 
representative levels of income. Put simply, more equality means a lesser gap between 
the levels, and more efficiency means a greater absolute income at each level. By 
looking at the scores given to each society, the subjects can be classified according to 
their attitude towards distributive justice, from strong egalitarian, to strong efficiency-
maximiser, to Rawlsian maximin.  
 
If the setup of the experiment does substantially mimic the original position, then the 
popularity of the maximin approach should have some relevance to the question of 
what people in the original position would actually do. The experimenters found that 
18% of participants exhibited behaviour consistent with the Rawlsian approach. 
While substantial, this clearly falls short of the unanimity Rawls envisages in the 
original position. There are a number of potential differences between this position 
and the experiment. Most generally, as the experiment focuses on the difference 
principle alone, all primary moral and freedom-based issues are excluded.  
 
In addition, the participants were explicitly told they were outsiders to the society, 
presumably to try to remove personal interest from the equation and, so, to simulate 
some of the informational limitations in the original position. It is conceivable that 
these sorts of differences distort the results of the experiment – perhaps people think 
differently in observing another society than one that will be theirs. Yet, the result that 
maximin is merely one potential distributive approach among a number of reasonable 
alternatives accords with the theoretical criticism of the derivation of the original 
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position, and is quite compelling. This result undermines Rawls’ derivation of the 
difference principle as the potentially unanimous preference of those in the original 
position.  
 
The difference principle is also criticised as being decidedly counter-intuitive.101 This 
point is illustrated by John Harsanyi’s approach of applying the principle to personal 
decision-making: 
 
Suppose you live in New York City and are offered two jobs at the same time. One is a tedious 
and badly paid job in New York City itself, while the other is a very interesting and well paid 
job in Chicago. But the catch is that, if you wanted the Chicago job, you would have to take a 
plane from New York to Chicago.… Therefore there would be a very small but positive 
probability that you might be killed in a plane accident.… 
 
The maximin principle says that you must evaluate every policy available to you in terms of the 
worst possibility that can occur to you if you follow that particular policy. Therefore, you have 
to analyze the situation as follows. If you choose the New York job then the worst … possible 
outcome will be that you will have a poor job but you will stay alive.… In contrast, if you 
choose the Chicago job then the worst outcome will be that you may die in a plane accident. 
Thus, the worst possible outcome in the first case would be much better than the worst possible 
outcome in the second case. Consequently, if you want to follow the maximin principle then you 
must choose the New York job. Indeed you must not choose the Chicago job under any 
condition – however unlikely you might think a plane accident would be, and however strong 
your preference might be for the excellent Chicago job.102 
 
This approach takes the difference principle out of its natural context, in that it applies 
to the different possible outcomes of a personal decision, rather than the different 
levels of material wellbeing within a society as a consequence of some principle of 
justice. In this way, the chance of dying in the plane crash corresponds to the chance 
of being poor as the result of an unfavourable principle. Clearly there is a conceptual 
difference between what might happen to you and what will happen to someone, and 
equally clearly, Harsanyi only reaches the result by assuming away the myriad of 
other possible outcomes of the decision: one could easily be killed in a car accident on 
the way to the New York job, or some malevolent being could kill the person because 
of their decision. The latter of these is ridiculous, but this is the point that Harsanyi is 
making, that a decision made according to maximin is highly irrational because it 
bases the decision on an outcome regardless of the chance of that outcome occurring. 
Applying it would mean that “you could never cross the street (after all, you might be 
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hit by a car); you could never drive over a bridge (after all, it might collapse); you 
could never get married (after all, it might end in a disaster), etc.”103  
 
If the difference principle is correspondingly irrational, then, it is because it involves 
focussing only on the poorest person, despite the small chance of any person in the 
original position actually turning out to be that person. In effect, Harsanyi notes, the 
difference principle means assigning a probability of one to the worst possibility, 
namely being the person who is the worst off.104 But the use of the maximin rule as a 
principle of justice is not quite so dire as this suggests. Focussing entirely on one 
person or outcome is, by itself, exceedingly irrational. But the worst-off person is not 
a random and morally arbitrary choice, but rather is the subject of the principle 
because he or she is particularly disadvantaged in relation to it. There is an important 
distinction between the difference principle as an individual decision-making 
procedure, and as a principle of social justice: the worst possible outcome is an 
independent contingency which has no relationship to the other possibilities, whereas 
the worst-off person is defined by their relationship to others, in that they have a 
lower material welfare.  
 
It could be argued that the worst-off person is a representation of the effect or the 
extent of the effect of a decision, and, as such, is the valid focus for the concern of a 
just state. The intuitive value of the difference principle would then be based on the 
idea that the justness of a society depends on, or is reflected by, the way the worst-off 
person is treated, and that this implicitly considers the position of every person. This 
would mean that the difference principle could plausibly carry some normative value. 
But even if this is accepted, it does not mean that the two principles together amount 
to a complete and potentially universal system of justice, and, in fact, a weakened 
form of the irrationality Harsanyi describes still remains. Although the worst-off 
person may be relevant to justice, there are a number of other plausible 
considerations, such as income distribution, efficiency and desert, which could also be 
taken account of. The difference principle, in the system set out by Rawls, is 
characterised by an absolute unwillingness to trade off between different normative 
considerations and between different potential outcomes, and an abhorrence towards 
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risk taking. All are subordinated to the single consideration of the worst-off and, as 
Harsanyi suggests, this fails to reflect the “great complexity and the unavoidable 
dilemmas of real-life moral situations”.105 
 
The final point about the difference principle concerns its practical ability to manage a 
system of inequalities. Putting aside the problems of identifying and measuring the 
inequality effects of various policies, there are inherent problems with the principle’s 
effect. This touches on a difficulty relevant to all contemporary liberalism, namely 
how to reconcile voluntary exchange and co-operative and productive behaviour with 
a system of fundamental moral rights; and, in some cases, how to promote some form 
of material equality while permitting market behaviour that will inevitably and 
substantially upset it.  
 
The concept of the difference principle relies on inequalities improving the positions 
of everyone, including the least advantaged. This implies a baseline that his or her 
position is compared with. Barry, in looking at the mutual co-operative aspect of 
Rawls’ theory, identifies this baseline as the point of non-cooperation, or what each 
party would be able to obtain independently of others.106 In this way, the principles of 
justice seem to be compared to a non-cooperative state-of-nature type situation where 
this system is not followed. Although Rawls does express the benefit of the difference 
principle in terms of social cooperation, this does not mean that the appropriate 
baseline is that of non-cooperation.107 If the situation under the difference principle is 
to be compared to the situation without it, then the reasoning in the original position 
suggests that a better baseline would be that of equality. Since this equality is 
logically prior to the difference principle, and since the arguments in favour of it 
apply whether or not the difference principle is adopted, it does seem to be the 
position that would apply in the absence of the difference principle. This accords with 
Rawls’ statement that the difference principle applies to inequalities “that work to 
make everyone better off in comparison to the benchmark of equality”.108 It might 
also be argued that since the difference principle must ultimately be compared with 
other possible distributive principles, then these alternatives should form some part of 
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a complex baseline position. This seems appropriate since the choice being made is 
not simply whether to apply the difference principle or not, but rather which of a 
number of possible approaches to apply.  
 
Even if equality is taken as the appropriate baseline with which to compare the results 
of the difference principle, there is a further difficulty that relates to the operation of 
the difference principle over time. The difference principle ought to be able to 
incorporate some of the normal operation of a market. For example, voluntary 
exchange would often be permitted by the principle since all parties to the exchange 
are presumably made better off by it, or they would not have agreed. Over time this 
sort of exchange has the potential to substantially undermine the position of material 
equality, as some can make material gains by exchange and others lose out and 
consume their purchases. The passing of time would render the original distribution 
unrecognisable. This seems to undermine both the egalitarianism of A Theory, and the 
arbitrariness of natural endowments, and supports a more conservative economic 
approach.  
 
In defence of Rawls’ position, the difference principle can only operate in a manner 
subordinate to the principle of liberal equality, and so must give way to an equality of 
opportunity, yet how the two positions can be reconciled, or what limitations this 
places on the market, is not clear. The basic difficulty is that the market will naturally 
lead to material inequality, and once this occurs, material equality only exists, much 
as with the original position, as some hypothetical starting point. In this light, the 
difference principle, with its focus on initial equality, seems hopelessly static, unable 
to deal with the dynamic shifts inherent in market operation, and quiet as to the nature 





Rawls’ basic aim in A Theory of Justice is to identify and explore a conception of 
justice that, he argues, is universally valid. One approach to achieving this would have 
been to identify some truth, about human nature or the nature of morality for instance, 
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or, rather, a system of connected truths about a number of matters relevant to justice, 
and, then, derive a conception of justice directly from it. This conception would 
prescribe the best or highest mode of life, to which every member of society ought to 
aspire.  
 
This perfectionist-type approach has proved problematic for a number of reasons, the 
first of which is the difficulty of identifying any system of truths that can be revealed 
to be universal, and yet is sufficiently restrictive to lead to a definite conception of 
justice. Rawls’ approach is explicitly non-perfectionist. Although he aims at showing 
that his conception of justice is universally valid, this is in relation to a number of 
specified alternatives, and not to any possible conception. In attempting to achieve 
this universality he does not draw on specific moral or empirical truths, but, rather, on 
people’s moral intuitions, using tools such as reasonableness, plausibility, 
approximations and incompleteness. The specific conception of justice Rawls 
promotes is characterised not as the result of a chain of truths and reasoning, but as a 
hypothetical decision-making situation that people are encouraged to recognise and 
explore. It should be no surprise, then, that this conception extols the virtue of liberty, 
namely that no single way of life is to be morally prescribed or politically favoured. 
Citizens within this regime would have, above all else, the power to determine their 
own direction and goals, and would, in furtherance of this, have command over a fair 
share of the resources of society.  
 
The criticism of uncertainty is, at its sharpest, against perfectionist theory. It rejects 
the basic truths from which the theory is drawn, as well as the idea that such truths 
exist, and that they can be identified and used to show the correct conception of 
justice. Rawls’ theory, being anti-perfectionist, is implicitly aware of these criticisms, 
and would be expected to be better able to respond to them. But, the examination that 
has been taken of his approach reveals a number of shortcomings, and, ultimately, 
undermines his assertions of universal value.  
 
In general terms, there are two basic problems with A Theory of Justice. The first of 
these resembles the sort of problem faced by perfectionist theory, namely the 
correctness of an underlying truth or representation. The conception of the right and 
the good and the relationship between them amounts to a substantial assertion about 
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the nature of our moral lives, and is used by Rawls to structure and justify much of his 
theory. Although plausible, Rawls ultimately fails to show that this distinction is the 
correct view of our moral behaviour and ought to guide moral theorising. This failure 
extends to the more fundamental uncertainty that no true characterisation of our moral 
nature can be made such that it could guide our deliberation to some universal moral 
truth. In this sense, Rawls’ attempt leaves us none the wiser as to how moral theory 
might actually make general statements about morality that would allow conclusions 
to be drawn that might validly be described as universal. 
 
The second basic problem with A Theory of Justice relates directly to its non-
perfectionist approach. The use of intuitions as part of a moral deliberation that is 
supposed to reach a universal agreement is certainly one of the most interesting and 
compelling aspects of Rawls’ theory. But, here, Rawls fails to fully justify his faith 
that such an agreement could ever be achieved. The criticism that the theory has faced 
suggests that the components of the proposed reflective equilibrium are, in fact, quite 
contestable, and that many who applied themselves diligently to their examination 
would not reach those same results.  
 
Recognising the contestable nature of assertions about our moral intuitions leads to 
the concern that many of the results that Rawls presents are only particular 
expressions chosen from a number of equally possible alternatives, and that these 
indicate his own particular moral beliefs, rather than the true or correct approach. The 
possibility that Rawls’ theory might be an expression of bias rather than universal 
moral beliefs is one that ought to be taken seriously in examining a theory that is 
explicitly intuitive, yet claims universality. Readers who share many of his beliefs 
might naturally be inclined to believe that these would be shared by anyone who 
properly addressed themselves to the issue. In this context one must also be wary of 
results that seem plausible. Many of Rawls’ results seem convincing, yet they are not 
the only answer that the structure of the theory allows, and many might opt for some 
other result.  
 
Ultimately, A Theory of Justice trades on the plausibility of many of its parts, but 
raises questions of bias and potential disagreement, and also is inimical to complexity 
in its results. The intuitions that Rawls presents as being those that we would agree to 
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given proper examination, since they represent a potentially biased but plausible and 
broadly acceptable point of view, are naturally quite straightforward. Such results 
belie the potentially complex nature of moral issues, as well as the problems of 
adequately rationalising and expressing this complexity as part of a coherent moral 
theory.109  
 
It is the nature of theory to simplify and rationalise, but this should not impoverish the 
theory relative to the full complexity and detail of the real world. Our moral capacities 
and intuitions are themselves seemingly complex, and are potentially plural and 
conflicting. What is important is that any moral theory is sufficiently representative so 
that it is capable of achieving its own aims. Although Rawlsian theory is non-
perfectionist, and is aware of these sorts of difficulties, it does not overcome them so 
that its results might in some meaningful way be described as universal. In this sense, 
many of Rawls’ plausible and simple results seem to do more than merely smooth out 
the bumps; rather, they present a view that is contestable and that ignores the inherent 
colour and texture of our complex moral lives. 
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Anarchy, State, and Utopia is philosopher Robert Nozick’s 1974 libertarian reply to 
the egalitarian conception contained in A Theory of Justice. It represents the primary 
recent exposition of a libertarian ideal, and the first response to Rawls that is itself a 
landmark in political theory. Both together have been described as having “arguably 
framed the landscape of academic political philosophy in the last decades of the 
twentieth century.”1 Although these works prescribe principles of justice and fair 
distribution that are quite different, they are both part of a single thread of political 
theory; although it rejects the principle of material equality, Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia is itself a recognisably liberal conception of justice, as it is based on a strong 
theory of inviolable rights. Because it offers an alternative conception of liberal 
justice, and because it amounts to an important response to Rawls’ approach, a careful 
analysis of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is necessary, both in relation to A Theory of 
Justice, and in its own right.  
 
The most obvious difference between the two works is between their egalitarian and 
libertarian prescriptions. But for present purposes, these principles are not as 
significant as their approaches to justifying the respective conceptions of justice. 
Examining these will indicate whether Nozick has overcome any of the problems set 
out in the previous chapter, and the sense in which Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
represents a progression in liberal theory.  
 
Any examination of the theoretical underpinnings of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is 
confronted with the difficulty that these are lacking. Nagel, in describing the work as 
being ‘libertarianism without foundations’, comments that: 
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[t]o present a serious challenge to other views, a discussion of libertarianism would have to 
explore the foundations of individuals rights and the reasons for and against different 
conceptions of the relation between those rights and other values that the state may be in a 
position to promote. But Nozick’s book is theoretically insubstantial: it does not take up the 
main problems, and therefore fails to make the kind of contribution to political theory that 
might have been hoped for … He has left the establishment of the moral foundations [of 
libertarianism] to another occasion, and his brief indication of how the basic views might be 
defended is disappointing.2 
 
Nozick explicitly admits to leaving aside the moral and theoretical background to his 
theory, and to omitting a precise theory of the moral basis for the human rights that 
are at the very core of the work.3 These omissions are serious, and have never been 
addressed by Nozick. A recent re-evaluation of his theory less-than-charitably 
concludes that “[w]here Nozick has not simply begged the question, the answers he 
provides are often internally contradictory or seemingly random with respect to any 
coherent moral vision.”4 
 
Nozick would be the first to admit that the style of his work is different from that of 
Rawls. Where A Theory is multi-stranded and theoretically robust, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia is thinner, less reasoned and complete, and is more plainly a rhetorical 
statement of belief, rather than a technical statement of moral theory. For the purposes 
of this thesis this represents a particular concern, but it should be remembered that 
Rawls himself omitted various arguments fundamental to the theoretical structure of 
the theory, such as a full discussion of the relationship of our intuitions to moral 
theory and moral truth. Anarchy, State, and Utopia is, potentially, an interesting and 
relevant subject for this study. Its theoretical limitations may limit the discussion of 
some of its parts, and others may require some extrapolation from the available 
material, yet it still offers a potentially substantial contribution, and is certainly a 
significant part of the theory under examination.  
 
The actual approaches of Rawls and Nozick are similar in that both utilise 
hypothetical worlds as part of their theoretical structures. However, these worlds 
differ both in detail and in the way that they are embedded in the justification of their 
respective theories. The two conceptions of liberal justice are structured differently 
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and have strategies of justification that are substantially different, and, in turn, imply 
different approaches to moral theory.  
 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia has prompted less of a response than Rawls’ work, and 
this tends to relate to the details of the workings of the theory, rather than its 
theoretical implications. As with A Theory, it makes sense to begin an examination of 
this work by setting out its basic structure on its own terms, without criticism, and 
then to engage in a detailed analysis of it, working outwards from its aims and 
justificatory strategy to its more substantive parts. This can then be concluded with a 
comparative analysis between the approaches of the two theories, in particular how 
each deals with the difficulties of uncertainty. 
 
 
2. Basic structure  
 
2.1 Structure and justification 
 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia uses a hypothetical reasoning process to identify the 
boundaries of the legitimate state. This involves three arguments: the first 
characterises a state of nature and demonstrates how an ultraminimal state can arise 
out of it; the second shows how that ultraminimal state becomes a minimal state, 
which involves the addition of a scheme of resource redistribution. These two 
hypothetical moves are assessed according to an independent standard of legitimacy, 
such that, if each is shown to be morally legitimate, then the minimal state will have 
been shown to be legitimate.5 Nozick’s final task is to show that any state activity that 
extends beyond the role of the minimal state breaches this same standard of 
legitimacy. In this way, the activity undertaken by the minimal state is justified, and 
all other activity is morally invalid. Because the redistribution undertaken by the 
minimal state is strictly compensatory, it is the last of these arguments that expresses 
the theory’s libertarian flavour, in the sense of protecting individual rights over 
property. It is used by Nozick to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the sort of 
redistribution implied by Rawls’ egalitarianism.  
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The basic form this theory takes is to characterise and assess the moral legitimacy of 
each of the ultraminimal, minimal and extraminimal states. Nozick employs a strict 
system of rights as the standard by which each move is assessed. These define the 
legitimate and illegitimate action of a state.6 They include the entitlement of a person 
to the products of their making or their labour, and, so, apply to acquired resources 
and wealth. These particular rights are fundamental to Nozick’s scheme, and are 
explicitly borrowed from the work of John Locke. Government action that is 
inconsistent with this system of rights is illegitimate, which includes the forced 
contribution to the welfare of another.7 Importantly, these rights are not one aspect of 
a state’s objectives that can be traded off with others to achieve some good, but, 
rather, act as inviolable constraints on its actions.8 Applying these rights strictly, 
Nozick argues,  
 
reflect[s] the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they 
may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals 
are inviolable.9 
 
Nozick adopts a position of Kantian deontology much the same as that of Rawls. The 
latter expresses this in the idea that some rights are so important that they cannot be 
traded off with welfare; with Nozick, the relevant rights must not be breached, which 
means that individuals cannot be forced to contribute to the welfare of others. The two 
are similar in that both assert the entrenched value of some set of rights against which 
the welfare of others cannot overcome or outweigh. Both mean that the central moral 
parts of the respective theories are constituted outside of any utilitarian trading-off, so 
that it cannot be argued that they are reducible to a utilitarian approach, or are some 
form of utilitarianism in disguise.  
 
Yet these two expressions of deontology are part of two quite differently principled 
theories. The primary difference is not in the way in which the deontological idea is 
applied, but, rather, in the nature of the rights that are being enshrined: the set of equal 
liberties that would be agreed to in the original position for Rawls, and the set of 
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Lockean property rights for Nozick. It is interesting to note here the significant 
difference between the fundamental moral content of the two theories. 
 
Although Nozick does not fully explain and justify his particular system of rights, he 
does direct some attention to the foundations of their deontological nature. This is 
manifested in his searching for some aspect of human nature that explains why some 
moral rules must be applied strictly for the benefit of each individual, so that, in such 
matters, their interests should not give way to those of society. In doing so, he singles 
out our rationality, free will and moral agency, as well as our ability to regulate our 
lives in accordance with some overall conception that we have chosen as being 
significant.10 He asserts that this issue “is concerned with that elusive and difficult 
notion: the meaning of life”.11 In fact he identifies ‘meaningfulness’ as, potentially, 
representing that part of our nature that underlies these deontological rights.12 
 
The inviolable nature of these rights links closely to voluntariness or consent in that it 
means that the state is restrained from forcing people to make contributions against 
their will. Nozick makes significant use of practical examples to illustrate many of the 
ideas of his theory, and one is particularly relevant here: 
 
Suppose some of the people in your neighbourhood (there are 364 other adults) have found a 
public address system and decide to institute a system of public entertainment. They post a list 
of names, one for each day, yours among them. On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) 
a person is to run the public address system, play records over it, give news bulletins, tell 
amusing stories he has heard, and so on. After 138 days on which each person has done his part, 
your day arrives. Are you obliged to take your turn? You have benefited from it, occasionally 
opening your window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling at someone’s funny story. 
The other people have put themselves out. But must you answer the call when it is your turn to 
do so? As it stands, surely not. Though you benefit from the arrangement, you may know all 
along that 364 days of entertainment supplied by others will not be worth giving up one day… 
Given these preferences how can it be that you are required to participate when your scheduled 
time comes?13 
 
The idea that compelling someone to give up their time or some other resource 
amounts to morally illegitimate coercion is a persistent theme in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, and is in conflict with the Rawlsian notion that equality in liberty and primary 
goods is morally fundamental. It is the different sets of rights protected by each theory 
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that leads to these divergent results, and which imply differences in the approaches to 
justification and to moral theory.  
 
 
2.2 The state of nature and the ultraminimal state
 
 
Nozick asserts that his theory is a fundamental explanatory account of politics, 
meaning that it is part of a potentially complete understanding of the political 
situation, derived from a non-political situation.14 This situation is one that is familiar 
in political theory, namely the state of nature, which simply describes the situation of 
people living prior to any political organization. Nozick reasons how the state might 
arise out of this anarchy, the idea being that, if an understanding of politics is derived 
from this fundamental pre-political situation, then it will, itself, carry some 
fundamental value, and the theory that expresses it, some universal legitimacy.15 
 
Nozick’s argument from the state of nature is hypothetical, but, in a sense, slightly 
different than that of the original position: the individuals who are the subjects of the 
latter are carefully engineered by Rawls so that their decisions are morally fair. 
Nozick uses the state of nature not to show what would be chosen in an artificially 
restrictive situation, but, rather, to show how a state might arise out of a model of the 
situation faced by people in a pre-political context. The use of state of nature 
arguments is common in political philosophy and dates from Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
Nozick adopts a characterisation that is explicitly Lockean: 
 
Individuals in Locke’s state of nature are in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and 
dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, 
without asking leave or dependency upon the will of any other man”16 
 
The state of nature is not without restriction, since a person’s actions can affect the 
ability of others to exercise their freedoms. This idea describes a set of standards that, 
even in the state of nature, ought not to be breached; as Nozick states, again quoting 
from Locke, “[t]he bounds of the law of nature require that no one ought to harm 
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another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions”.17 Since the situation is pre-
political, however, there are no established institutional mechanisms to enforce these 
laws of nature or compensate for their breach, yet even in the state of nature there are 
abstract rights to self-defence and compensation, and to punish transgressors.18 
 
In a state of nature it would be difficult for an individual to exercise these rights, 
particularly if the transgressor is strong. Nozick argues that this situation could lead to 
an informal system of mutual protection, whereby people help others enforce their 
rights, in exchange for the benefit of the assistance of others.19 As such relationships 
develop, mutual-protection associations would be born that would utilise their 
members in protection of their individual rights. Such associations would also adopt 
the role of settling disputes between members, since otherwise people might use their 
membership to avoid remedy.20 To settle these disputes some procedure must be 
employed. Nozick argues that the procedure most attractive to prospective members 
would be one that is non-arbitrary; one that actually determines whose claim is 
correct.21 Equally, a mutual-protection association that only intervenes against non-
members when the complaint is valid would be attractive in that reduces the cost of 
membership, by reducing the action the association would take.22  
 
Nozick goes on to argue that conflict between rival associations will tend to lead to 
the creation of a single dominant protection association in any one geographical area. 
This consolidation results for one of two reasons: either one association consistently 
beats another (so that their determination of the issue becomes prevalent) and the 
members of the other association switch in order to have their rights better protected; 
or, the costs of conflicts between two systems lead to their merger, so that such 
conflicts are then dealt with within one institutional system.23 
 
In each of these cases, almost all the persons in a geographical area are under some common 
system that judges between their competing claims and enforces their rights. Out of anarchy, 
pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associations, division of labour, market 
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pressures, economies of scale, and rational self-interest there arises something very much 
resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states.24 
 
Nozick describes the process which sees the rise of a single dominant protection 
association as an ‘invisible-hand explanation’, meaning that it occurs without 
conscious design.25 That the rise of the state is not dependant on any collective 
planning contributes to the parsimony of the theory.26 
 
The last part of Nozick’s argument is to inquire as to whether this dominant protection 
association satisfies the basic definition of a state. Put simply, the test for statehood he 
employs asks whether the association has a monopoly on the use of force.27 At this 
stage, however, the dominant protective association does not fully satisfy this 
requirement: although it may fairly be described as having a practical monopoly on 
force, there remains the possibility that some people would choose not be members, 
and, so, would enforce their own rights.28 So Nozick concludes that the dominant 
protection association does not appear to satisfy fully the requirements of a state.29 
Instead, he argues that it resembles a kind of ‘ultraminimal state’. Such a state 
 
maintains a monopoly over all use of force except that necessary in immediate self-defence, and 
so excludes private (or agency) retaliation for wrong and exaction of compensation; but it 
provides protection and enforcement services only to those who purchase its protection and 




2.3 The minimal state 
 
Setting aside the issue of whether the dominant protective agency has the required 
monopoly on force, the ultraminimal state has been reached spontaneously and 
legitimately, without breaching anyone’s rights or acting without their consent. The 
next move is to show that the actions of the ultraminimal state can be legitimately 
extended so as to create a fairer and more just system of government, which Nozick 
labels the minimal state.  
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Nozick’s reasoning from the ultraminimal to minimal state focuses on those acts of 
individuals that breach our natural rights. The illegitimacy of any state-sponsored 
breach is already established, but this does not suggest how a dominant protection 
agency ought to act in relation to the boundary crossing of an individual. Nozick 
begins by addressing the issue of whether the state should prohibit such action, or 
whether it should be allowed provided that the boundary crosser compensates their 
victim.31 
 
On one hand, if the latter is fully compensated then there is no good reason to prevent 
the boundary-crossing action; but, on the other, if the victim has not consented then 
the boundary should be respected.32 Given the importance Nozick places elsewhere on 
the strictness with which these rights are applied, the latter argument might be 
expected to prevail. Such a result has the additional virtue of avoiding the  practical 
problems associated with implementing a system of compensating boundary-crossing, 
which would include determining the appropriate level of compensation in each case, 
as well as the possible fear and apprehension that would be caused by a system where 
a person’s rights could validly be breached at any time without warning.33 
 
These considerations lead easily to the conclusion that border-crossing ought always 
to be prohibited. However, Nozick himself adopts a more sophisticated position. He 
recognises that problems can prevent a person gaining consent for a proposed breach, 
and, so, permits some of those border-crossing acts where prior consent is impossible 
or very costly to negotiate, such as where the victim cannot be communicated with 
easily.34 These would be limited, as far as is possible, to those acts that do not create 
fear or apprehension, and would by implication include situations where consent 
would have been given were negotiation possible and practical.35 
 
This conclusion seems a reasonable and practical response to individual border-
crossing, and is largely consistent with other parts of Nozick’s theory. A greater 
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difficulty arises, however, when individuals undertake activities that will not 
necessarily breach the rights of another, but, rather, carry the risk of this occurring. 
This covers a wide range of activities, including those strongly beneficial to the 
parties involves and to society, and that involve only a slight risk of the relevant 
border being crossed. It seems clear that activity at this extreme ought to be permitted, 
while acts that will almost certainly lead to a breach ought to be prohibited, as if the 
breach were certain. The difficulty here is to draw the line between these different 
types of activities.36 The complexity and variation involved will not allow such a line 
to be concrete and straightforward, and both the nature of the activity and of the risk 
involved would be relevant, including the fear and apprehension that this caused were 
the activity permitted.37 As with the earlier example, this analysis would enable 
actions to be undertaken where the cost of gaining the consent of all those who might 
be harmed by the action would be prohibitively high, but where they might actually 
have agreed given the promise of compensation.38 
 
An interesting issue raised here is whether those who have been prohibited from 
acting ought to be compensated for suffering that prohibition. There ought to be no 
compensation, Nozick argues, for not being allowed to play Russian roulette on 
others.39 But there are other prohibitions on activities that are important to many 
people, and so mean a genuine disadvantage that warrants compensation.40 Again, 
there is the need to draw a line in a complex and variable space, here, between that 
prohibited activity for which it is appropriate to compensate, and that which it is not.  
 
The substance of Nozick’s reasoning from the ultraminimal state, up to this point, 
concerns the actions of individuals that threaten to breach the natural rights of others. 
To deal appropriately with any such action it must be determined, firstly, whether it is 
to be prohibited, and, secondly, if it is, whether compensation is to be paid to the 
constrained person. This involves a complex factual analysis which depends on the 
nature of the activity involved and the costs of allowing it, including the fear of any 
person that they will be harmed by it, the risk that it will result in harm and the nature 
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of the harm itself. Clearly this analysis is one of weighing up the consequences of 
allowing and prohibiting the action, and, so, is in the fashion of an economic cost-
benefit analysis.  
 
However, this weighing up will be informed by the strictness with which the natural 
rights should be enforced. The main mechanism by which this strictness can be 
overcome is also economic in nature, namely that the transactions costs involved with 
acquiring ex ante consent to the possible breach would be prohibitive, but that such 
consent may have been attained were they not so. This keeps alive the idea that such 
rights ought not to be breached unless consented to, even if the consent will never 
actually be gained. It is also significant that these principles of prohibition and 
compensation are derived in the context of the state of nature, and do not depend on 
the existence of a functioning state. The prohibition that a dominant protection agency 
might enforce stems from the right of each person to defend themselves against 
having their rights breached by others, and the various types of compensation 
represent the just response to allowing and prohibiting various actions. 
 
The next step in Nozick’s reasoning from the ultraminimal to the minimal state is to 
identify the private enforcement of justice as one of those activities which risks 
breaching the natural rights of others. If people undertake to enforce their rights 
independently of the dominant protection agency, and their procedures are unreliable 
and dangerous, then they risk boundary-crossing against others, and so face potential 
prohibition.41 This means that, in effect, the dominant protection agency inherits the 
responsibility of ensuring that their members are treated fairly by others.  
 
The dominant protective association may reserve for itself the right to judge any procedure of 
justice to be applied to its clients. It may announce, and act on the announcement, that it will 
punish anyone who uses on one of its clients a procedure that it finds to be unreliable or unfair. 
It will punish anyone who uses on its clients a procedure that it already knows to be unreliable 
and unfair, and it will defend its clients against the application of such a procedure.42 
 
This power is derived from the right of each of its clients to resist the application of 
an unreliable procedure.43 It is through this process of resisting the application of 
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other associations, and applying its own procedures, that the dominant protection 
association becomes what is recognisably a state. 
 
Everyone has the right to defend against procedures that are in fact not, or not known to be, both 
reliable and fair. Since the dominant protective association judges its own procedures to be both 
reliable and fair and believes this to be generally known, it will not allow anyone to defend 
against them; that is, it will punish anyone who does so. The dominant protective association 
will act freely on its own understanding of the situation, whereas no one else will be able to do 
so with impunity. Although no monopoly will be claimed, the dominant agency does occupy a 
unique position by virtue of its power.44 
 
Nozick argues that, because the dominant agency has the power to apply and enforce 
its procedures, and to exclude the use of the procedures of others, it has a de facto 
monopoly on the use of force and, so, satisfies the requirement of statehood.45 This 
completes his argument from state of nature to state, and shows how the latter can 
arise without the violation of any natural rights.46 It also describes a minimal state; 
one that will apply its own procedures of justice to determine disputes and will 
prohibit the use of any unauthorised methods, and one that will determine whether 
activity that threatens to breach the rights of another will be permitted and what 
compensation will result. These powers are built from only those rights granted 
voluntarily to the state by the individuals who possess them in the state of nature.47 
 
As a coda to his theory, Nozick examines the merits of such a minimal state, 
independent of its legitimacy and the means of its development. Clearly it is not a 
utopia, in the sense of representing a single and uniform ideal of life.48 But, he argues, 
such a utopia would not be possible anyway: people are individual and have various 
criteria of goodness, and the idea of there being a single approach of life that can be 
manifested in the institutional structure and substance of a state does not recognise or 
support this enormous complexity.49 
 
The conclusion to draw is that there will not be one kind of community existing and one kind of 
life led in utopia. Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in 
which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions…. Utopia is a framework 
for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt 
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to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose 
his own utopian vision upon others.50 
 
Such an open utopia has the advantages of being acceptable to most future utopians, 
regardless of their individual visions, and is “compatible with the realization of almost 
all particular utopian visions.”51 It would also promote voluntariness and persuasion 
over coercion, as any person who requires the assistance of others to fulfil their own 
visions would have to do so through argument rather than the threat of force.52 
 
Having described this utopia, Nozick then argues that the minimal state satisfies this 
description.53 The legitimate role of the minimal state does not coerce individuals into 
pursuing a particular way of life, but rather enforces efficient procedures of justice in 
response to breaches of the natural rights. Clearly this utopia incorporates some 
Rawlsian ideas. Most significantly, it excludes individual conceptions of the good 
from the state, and so offers a broad framework of rights within which individuals can 
act to achieve their own desires and ends. In A Theory of Justice this is reached 
through the priority of the right over the good. With Nozick, it is achieved through the 
strict application of natural rights, which a state coercing or imposing a particular way 
of life on individuals will breach. It is this theme that distinguishes Nozick’s Anarchy, 




2.4 Beyond the minimal state 
 
Having identified a viable minimal state that can arise without breaching the natural 
rights of any individual, and having only that power which has been voluntarily ceded 
to it, Nozick goes on to argue that no legitimate state can be more extensive. In 
particular, he identifies redistributive policies as being an improper activity for a just 
and legitimate state.54 
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In making these claims, he employs an entitlement-based theory of distribution, 
which, he argues, is superior to the end-state and patterned principles used by such 
theorists as Rawls. Under this theory, a distribution is just if each person’s holdings 
were gained either by a just acquisition, or the just transfer from someone else who 
was justly entitled.55 
 
Instead of rules of allocation which identify some human characteristic or propensity in 
accordance with which income and wealth are to be distributed (to each according to his need, 
… merit, … contribution), Nozick merely specifies those activities of appropriation and transfer 
which confer rights on people without reference to the relative condition or standing of their 
fellows.56 
 
To achieve this Nozick examines how his system of natural rights applies to and 
affects matters of distribution. The concept of entitlement defines how people can 
legitimately acquire and deal with their holdings and, as with the standard of 
legitimacy that corresponds with the natural rights, is applied absolutely. This means 
that individuals can enforce these entitlements as against anyone else, and that any 
attempt to overcome these rules amounts to an illegitimate coercion.  
 
The actual substance of the rules of entitlement, of acquisition, breach and 
rectification, are not fully detailed by Nozick; however, some points can be made. As 
with the natural rights, for example, it seems clear that one’s entitlements can be 
voluntarily surrendered to another, so that exchange is legitimate.  
 
The rules by which property is first acquired are brief, which is significant 
considering that all entitlements must ultimately stem from a legitimate acquisition. 
Nozick does discuss Locke’s ideas of acquisition, in particular, how the mixing of 
labour and unclaimed capital can amount to a valid acquisition; but, these are not 
well-developed.57 In relation to production generally, Nozick states that whoever 
makes something, provided they were entitled to any resources used in the process, is 
entitled to the end product.58 The acceptance of exchange and production at such a 
general stage in the reasoning does give Nozick’s approach a capitalist feel, a point 
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with which he seems comfortable.59 This leads him to summarise the distributive 
effect of entitlements, at first in detail: 
 
From each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he makes for himself 
(perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what others choose to do for him and choose to 
give him of what they’ve been given previously (under this maxim) and haven’t yet expended or 
transferred.60 
 
He restates this simply as: “From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.”61 
 
In support of this system of entitlements, Nozick explores the nature of different 
possible principles of distributive justice. He begins by distinguishing between 
historical and end-state principles. The former recognise that “the past circumstances 
or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to 
things.”62 The latter are structural principles that apply in relation to one point in 
time.63 Nozick also applies the idea of patterned principles, where the resulting 
distribution “is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural 
dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions.”64 These dimensions 
might include moral merit, usefulness to society, and IQ; in fact, most suggested 
principles are of the patterned type.65 
 
Nozick’s system of entitlements is an example of one distributive principle that is not 
patterned, in that, although several patterns run through the resulting distribution, 
there is no single or simple combination of natural dimensions by which the principle 
is defined.66 Even if some of the factors that contribute towards the overall 
distribution are patterned, such as marginal productivity, there are other factors 
involved that will not be reducible to this kind of ‘natural dimension’, such as the 
effect of gifts, charitable donations and bequests.67  
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Nozick uses this characterisation of different distributive principles to criticise other 
approaches, including that of Rawls. To achieve this he uses what is probably the 
most recognised example from his theory, that relating to Wilt Chamberlain: 
 
[S]uppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great game 
attraction…. He signs the following sort of contract with the team: In each home game, twenty-
five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him…. The season starts, and 
people cheerfully attend his team’s games; they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate 
twenty-five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain’s name on it. 
They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us 
suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain 
winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even that 
everyone else has. Is he entitled to this income? Is this new distribution… unjust? If so, why?68 
 
Nozick argues that the distribution prior to the basketball season was fair since it 
reflects some patterned principle, whichever a particular reader favours. This being 
the case, are not the voluntary payments to Wilt, and the resulting distribution of 
wealth (relatively strongly unequal in his favour), also fair? Anyone who agreed with 
the patterned principle that defined the initial situation, but argued that the outcome 
was unfair, would need to show how the consensual exchange was morally 
illegitimate. Given the voluntary aspect of this exchange, and the power that 
individuals have to use their fair resource allocation as they choose, showing that the 
result is not fair is a difficult task.  
 
Nozick argues that this difficulty shows that both end-state and patterned principles 
cannot “be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s 
lives.”69 In relation to the Chamberlain example, were the original patterned principle 
to prevail, then, either the contract with the basketball star must be prohibited, or there 
must be a redistribution that effectively undoes its result, to the extent that it is 
contrary to the particular pattern or patterns on which the principle is based. The same 
is true with end-state principles, since the contract would result in some deviation 
from the end-state position, just as it does from the patterns. This means that end-state 
and patterned distributive principles cannot operate over time in a manner consistent 
with contractual freedom and the voluntary utilisation of one’s resources. This result 
is especially startling in relation to an egalitarian principle, since an egalitarian 
distribution would inevitably be destroyed by voluntary transactions.70 
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Thus Nozick buttresses his system of entitlements by drawing on ideas of 
transactional freedom, and, in effect, extends his argument against a more than 
minimal state. Any theory which attempts the latter faces two problems: firstly, any 
non-consensual takings or transfer of resources by the government is contrary to our 
natural rights; and, secondly, any patterned or end-state distributional approach will 






3.1 Universal aims and justificatory approach 
 
At its most basic, Anarchy, State, and Utopia is intended as a cogent defence of a 
libertarian state. This defence involves two separate tasks: justifying the minimal 
state, and showing the moral illegitimacy of a more extensive state. The first of these 
is based on the identification of state legitimacy with adherence to a number of natural 
rights; with the second, these rights are developed into a system of distributive 
entitlements that sets boundaries on legitimate resource holdings, and which nothing 
more than the minimal state can respect.  
 
In effect, these two tasks represent responses to an anarchist position, and to 
alternative positive theories of social justice respectively. They are intended to be 
universal in effect; the standards of legitimacy they employ are not contingent on any 
particular social context, nor do they presuppose an existing set of unjustified beliefs. 
Yet, as with Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, Nozick is explicitly aware of some of the 
limitations his theory faces, and of some shortcomings of moral theory generally.  
 
In the preface Nozick argues that works of philosophy should not be presented as “a 
finished, complete and elegant whole,” and, instead, suggests that such works can be 




and problems, leads, side connections, as well as a main line of argument.”71 He goes 
on to characterise more certain philosophical approaches as “pushing and shoving 
things to fit into some fixed perimeter of specified shape.”72 
 
All those things are lying out there, and they must be fit in. You push and shove the material into 
the rigid area getting it into the boundary on one side, and it bulges out on another. You run 
around and press the protruding bulge, producing yet another in another place. So you push and 
shove and clip off corners from the things so they’ll fit and you press in until finally almost 
everything sits unstably more or less in there; what doesn’t gets heaved far away so it won’t be 
noticed … Quickly, you find an angle from which it looks like an exact fit and take a snapshot; 
at a fast shutter speed before something else bulges out too noticeably. Then, back to the 
darkroom to touch up the rents, rips and tears in the fabric of the perimeter. All that remains is to 
publish the photograph as a representation of exactly how things are, and to note how nothing 
fits properly into any other shape.73 
 
Nozick recognises the complexity of moral theory: the difficulty of producing a 
consistent and complete system, fully and precisely detailed, that expresses the whole 
of some philosophical truth. Nozick’s theory itself should be studied in the light of 
this admission, since the validity of any justificatory strategy, and so theoretical 
substance, depends on their being consistent with an acceptable model of moral 
theory.  
 
It is clear that Nozick’s theory, in order to be consistent with his views on 
philosophical activity generally, would not attempt completeness or finality. It is 
equally clear that Nozick is attempting to say something universal and meaningful in 
the area of political philosophy about actions of the state, albeit that the truth of this 
statement is incomplete and subject to development with political theory itself.  
 
If conscious incompleteness and inconsistency are to be expected within the substance 
of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, then Nagel’s criticism of it as being theoretically 
insubstantial and without foundations becomes less significant.74 It has been 
commented that 
 
Nozick’s explicit objectives for the book obviously fall short of providing the sort of “knock-
down” argumentation for his position that we expect of the paradigmatic philosophical work. 
What he hopes to do is to lend plausibility to his libertarianism by deflating a variety of 
alternative positions, thereby leaving the field open to a possible successor … Nozick aspires to 
elevate natural rights libertarianism to serious contention among competing political 
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philosophies. This aspiration is not ambitious enough to satisfy Nagel who consequently 
impugns the book for its neglect of foundational questions.75 
 
This view of Nagel’s assessment is appealing, but seems to identify Nozick’s own 
aims in writing the book as the reason for its limitations, rather than being a reflection 
of the inherent difficulties of philosophical inquiry. This doesn’t change the general 
point: the theory should not be indicted for its structural or substantial 
incompleteness, and, while its main principles and arguments should be viewed as 
part of a coherent theoretical system, this system does not attempt to be the final 
incontrovertible truth on the matter.  
 
Even the recognition of this, however, does not completely refute Nagel’s argument. 
Nozick’s views on philosophy are not so generous as to be entirely unconcerned with 
justification or with avoiding glaring logical inconsistencies; such an approach would 
remove the possibility of any meaningful theory. The tension inherent in the 
justification of Nozick’s theory is between accepting the limitations of philosophical 
activity – the possibility of fully expressing some ultimate, unchanging truth – and 
attempting to devise a theory that itself has some universal content and importance. 
The implicit task of his theory, then, is to make some legitimate response to these 
difficulties, and lend the substance of his theory some moral weight.  
 
Were Nozick to succeed in this undertaking, his theory would achieve some moral 
value that is universal, but bounded or limited by the view of moral philosophy on 
which it is based. The idea of a bounded universality was raised in relation to A 
Theory of Justice, and there are some underlying similarities between the approaches 
of Nozick and Rawls, such as the shared doubts as to the power of philosophical 
thought. Despite the basic similarities, the two aspire to different ideas of universality, 
corresponding with different conceptions of the role of moral theory, which result in 
quite different theoretical approaches. Rawls’ approach is explicitly anti-perfectionist, 
and, so, as a matter of principle rejects the idea that there is a single ideal conception 
of life that political or moral theory is able to elucidate. His response to the limitations 
of moral theory ingeniously and importantly involves the application of rational 
thought in the original position, and our considered moral intuitions as part of a 
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reflective equilibrium. This is developed into a logical structure that is both closely 
argued and well developed. 
 
In contrast, the limitations inherent in philosophical inquiry lead Nozick to focus on a 
few general ideas, arguments and principles, and the central relationship between 
them. His political theory is self-consciously incomplete and is not presented as a 
consistent and true whole, but, implicitly, within the context of a tradition of moral 
and political thought and as part of the continuing development of ideas and beliefs. 
What can be assumed from the manner and tone of Nozick’s theory is that the fact of 
being one step in the development of ideas, does not imply arbitrariness. What is 
being asserted is a truth, not the whole truth, but a truth that changes and potentially 
develops over time. Unfortunately, Nozick does not present an understanding of this 
truth, and is content with identifying the difficulties of moral philosophy and then 
building the substance of his theory. In terms of justification, his approach is less 
interesting than that of Rawls given its complete dependence on the necessary moral 
value of a system of infrangible natural rights. The power of the resulting theory will 
inevitably depend on the justification of the standard implied by these rights. 
 
It is interesting to note the complexity of potential universalities. The assertion of a 
political theory to universality is not identical to any other such assertion, but, rather, 
has a complex nature that reflects the methodology of the theory, as well as implying 
a view of the role and power of moral theory generally. The recognition in a theory of 
some form of moral uncertainty will necessarily restrict the nature of the universality 
the theory can hope to achieve. This will flow into the justificatory strategy and the 
substance of the theory. Viewing Nozick’s theory from the perspective of uncertainty, 
as with any other, involves looking at each of these parts in turn and inquiring as to 
their success in achieving the aims of the theory, as well as considering the way in 
which this represents a response to moral uncertainty. 
 
Nozick’s theory is founded in the hypothetical: it shows how a minimal state might 
arise without breaching our natural rights, and, then, that no more extensive state 
could act without breaching the system of entitlements developed from these rights. 
These arguments are buttressed by the utopian value of the minimal state, and by 




corrupted over time, or must abridge some fundamental beliefs about the rights we 
hold over resources. The analysis of the theory will deal with each of these steps in 
turn, but must begin by examining the standard by which they are guided, namely the 
system of rights imposed over the hypothetical world. 
 
 
3.2 Natural rights 
 
The importance of the system of natural rights is reflected in the first passage of 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia: 
 
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of 
what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room do individual rights leave 
for the state?76 
 
This question is the guiding principle of the theory: given that there are a set of rights 
that are so fundamental that even the state cannot legitimately breach them, what role 
can the state legitimately perform? The theory’s validity rests on justifying this 
system of rights, and demonstrating both their inalienability and their relevance to 
justice. 
 
A common criticism of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is that Nozick operates in an 
environment that is “theoretically inadequate”, or, in a recent assessment, rather than 
elaborating or defending his ideas, he “begs or dodges the question.”77 This has been 
levelled, in particular, at his account of incontrovertible rights, which has been 
criticised variously as lacking in foundation, and as inadequately explained and 
explored.78 
 
Nozick’s argument in support of these rights is limited and, in tone, is impressionistic 
rather than precise and rationally compelling. He argues that they reflect a Kantian 
and deontological ethic, that the operation of fundamental rights respects the separate 
existence of persons, and the view of each person’s life as an end. But this is 
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discussed rather cursorily, and has been fairly described as a vague allusion and 
opaque description.79 The remainder of Nozick’s argument in favour of these rights 
centres on some fundamental ideas of free will, moral agency and meaningfulness that 
are “elusive and difficult” to deal with in a work of political theory.80  
 
Given his general approach, and the nature of the subject on which he draws, the 
limited and impressionistic character of these arguments is not surprising. The issue is 
whether this can offer adequate support to what is essentially the central justificatory 
criterion of the theory; whether Nozick’s explicit question-begging leaves enough of a 
foundation on which even a provisionally valid theory can stand; or, whether he is 
merely relying on the intuitive plausibility of fundamental and inexorable rights. This 
leads one to question of this foundation, to then examine the system of rights for more 
substantive omissions, and, finally, to ask whether the system thus revealed can 
validly play the role asserted by Nozick. 
 
Apart from being vacuous, there have been a number of accusations levelled at 
Nozick’s justification of these rights. Nagel has, in particular, criticised the 
underpinnings of their inalienability. Nozick builds these on the Kantian idea that the 
good of one person cannot be sacrificed for that of another: 
 
Why not … hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for 
the sake of overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some 
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, with their own individual lives. 
Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others…. To use a 
person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate 
person, that his is the only life he has.81 
 
The perspective here is from a strong sense of individuality: people are separate from 
one another; respecting this prohibits their good being sacrificed for that of others. 
This idea informs the system of rights that each person enjoys. Nagel has questioned 
this reasoning: 
 
It is not clear how Nozick thinks individual rights derive from the fact that each person’s life is 
the only one he has. He appears to draw the implication that a benefit to one or more persons can 
never outweigh a cost borne by someone else. This however is far too broad a claim for 
Nozick’s purposes. It is both obviously false and unsuitable as a basis for constraints on the 
treatment of individuals.… To make sense of interpersonal compensation it is not necessary to 
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invoke the silly idea of a social entity, thus establishing an analogy with interpersonal 
compensation. All one needs is the belief, shared by most people, that it is better for each of 10 
people to receive a benefit than for one person to receive it, worse for 10 people to be harmed 
than for one person to be similarly harmed… and so forth. The fact that each person’s life is the 
only one he has does not render us incapable of making these judgments, and if a choice among 
such alternatives does not involve the violation of any rights or entitlements, but only the 
allocation of limited time or resources, then we regard those comparisons as excellent reasons 
for picking one alternative rather than the other.82 
 
Nagel here shifts the focus from the separateness of persons to comparisons of good. 
Nozick is stating, he claims, that the good of one can never outweigh the good of 
another, so that no person’s good should be sacrificed for another. But, if this is the 
case, there is no way of meaningfully comparing the good of different people, even 
when rights or entitlements are not concerned.  
 
This argument depends on reducing Nozick’s position to the claim that interpersonal 
comparisons of the good are never possible, at least not in any meaningful way. 
Nozick might reply that Nagel has confused the making of interpersonal comparisons 
with basing the moral permissibility of social or state actions on them. He might 
admit that most people would accept the good of ten people to have more moral value 
than the similar good of one, but argue that this does not imply that the good to which 
that one is entitled should be sacrificed to them. 
 
The difficulty in analysing this claim is that, as Nagel suggests, it is not clear how a 
respect for the separateness of persons leads to inalienability. Nozick’s reasoning is 
that people are separate, so that the good of each is also separate. This means that we 
should not make decisions based on the aggregate of their good, nor can we trade off 
between the good of different people, because this fails to respect their separateness. 
What is unclear is the nature of this failure. Nozick suggests that to trade off the good 
of one person for another is effectively to use that person; it does not respect the 
distinct importance and value of their good; a value that cannot be superseded by the 
value of another. Nagel takes from this that one person’s good cannot be outweighed, 
in the sense of never being able to compare the good of one to the good of another. 
An alternative interpretation, however, entails that Nozick is not concerned with the 
comparison of values, but rather with their moral standing; that it is possible to 
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meaningfully compare value, but that the distinct moral value of each prohibits one 
being used for the other. 
 
Such a reply deflects much of Nagel’s argument, but prompts further questions as to 
the source of the inalienability of rights. This stems not from the inability to compare 
the good of different people, but, rather, the moral inadmissibility of acting on any 
such comparison where matters of fundamental rights are involved. This is founded 
on the distinct moral value of the good of individuals, which should not be traded off 
with others. But the issue of why this is the case remains. Nozick needs to offer an 
account of moral value that both explains this distinctness of value and its moral 
consequences, and also that links this directly with the subjects of the fundamental 
rights. Even if a deontological ethic is accepted, the substance of the resulting rights 
needs to be explained. Rawls applies similar ideas of distinct value, but these do not 
extend to individual good; so, his theory is redistributive in a way that Nozick’s could 
not be. The portrayal of philosophical inquiry as necessarily incomplete does not 
excuse the absence of this discussion, as it is fundamental to the justification of the 
remainder of the theory. Neither can intuitive appeal carry the burden of supporting an 
absolute moral standard.  
 
Nozick does offer an additional argument in favour of these rights, based on the 
elusive idea of the meaningfulness of life. In fact, it is this idea that seems to imply 
the distinct value of individual good.83 This has been criticised by Samuel Scheffler: 
 
[W]hat is important is that Nozick believes that the moral basis of rights has to do with the 
capacity to live a meaningful life. For then we may ask, what rights would such a basis be the 
basis of? In other words, if the capacity to live a meaningful life is a uniquely valuable 
characteristic, and if we say that beings with this characteristic have rights, in virtue of which 
there are constraints on the way others must behave, then presumably the function of the rights 
is to safeguard the ability of beings with the valuable characteristic to develop it… [I]t seems 
clear that the alternative conception of rights is a much more accurate specification than the 
Lockean conception of the rights which people actually have. For the alternative conception 
assigns to each individual the right to a sufficient share of all distributable goods whose 
enjoyment is necessary to have a reasonable chance of living a decent of fulfilling life. Now 
whatever a meaningful life may turn out to be, it seems reasonable enough to suggest that any 
distributable good necessary for living a decent and fulfilling life (such as food) will also be 
necessary for a meaningful life…. If that is so, then the alternative conception of rights is clearly 
the correct one: for it alone insures that all the necessary material conditions for having a 
reasonable chance of living a meaningful life will be met.84 
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Scheffler examines the link between the capacity to live a meaningful life, and the 
content of a conception of rights. He argues that, if rights are to be justified by this 
capacity, then the latter should inform the substance of the former; in particular, we 
would expect rights to protect and nurture our abilities to live meaningfully. Scheffler 
then asserts that this is best achieved, not by Nozick’s system of natural rights, but by 
an alternative conception that champions the right to “a sufficient share of every 
distributable good whose enjoyment is a necessary condition of the person’s having a 
reasonable chance of living a decent and fulfilling life”85 In other words, a better 
system of rights is one explicitly conceived to further the ability of individuals to live 
decent and fulfilling lives, which corresponds with the development of our capacity 
for meaningfulness.  
 
Both Scheffler and Nozick take as the foundation for a system of natural rights the 
human capacity for meaningfulness, or some similar distinctly human ability.86 From 
this, Scheffler derives a principle whereby each person has the right to a sufficient 
share of resources relevant to exercising this ability, whereas Nozick identifies 
meaningfulness as the source of the value of individual good, and so favours a 
principle where each person has the right to those resources legitimately acquired, 
which cannot be abridged for the good of others. These could also be compared with a 
third, Rawlsian approach, whereby the principle derived is of an equality of resources 
and opportunities to exercise them, in order for each person to have a fair opportunity 
to realise their capacity for individual fulfilment.  
 
Each of these three conceptions of rights suffer from the same problem, namely that 
their foundations, in this case the capacity to lead a of meaningful life, don’t 
necessarily define the rights they justify. In fact, each of these three conceptions, 
sufficiency, equality and non-abridgment, are all reasonable derivations from the 
fundamental capacity to lead meaningful lives. Each protects and nurtures this 
capacity in a substantial way: by ensuring each person has enough resources to have a 
reasonable chance of having a meaningful life; by ensuring an equal call on resources 
with which to have a meaningful life; and, by strongly protecting the resources to 
which each person is entitled against any appeal from the good of others. Each of 
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these has also its own intuitive appeal: the natural abhorrence of poverty and 
enslavement; the idea of a strict fairness of distribution; and the idea of strong 
property rights, and control over an individual’s entitlements.  
 
The point here is that the appeal to some general human capacity will not in itself 
indicate the correctness of one conception of rights, to the exclusion of all others. 
Such a capacity will inevitably be able to be expressed in a number of alternative 
ways, corresponding with different moral principles and expressions of moral value. 
Some of these conceptions may be better or more complete expressions of the 
capacity in question, and some that are initially appealing may turn out to be wrong, 
unrealistic or have unappealing or inconsistent consequences. But no conception can 
be the complete its moral expression. Nozick may emphasise the incompleteness and 
continuing nature of philosophical enquiry, but this discussion suggests something 
more: a contestability and openness that belies the assertions of universality implicit 
in his theory. It is simply the case that definitive moral theory cannot be strictly 
derived from such general ideas. 
 
However, such moral-political theories are not merely attempts to express some 
human capacity in a system of rights; they each have additional justificatory aspects 
and principles that flesh out the structure and substance of the theories. Rawls uses the 
original position in reflective equilibrium to reach a result that is supposed to express, 
in a moral way, the rights appropriate to the circumstances of our existence. Scheffler 
himself is not arguing absolutely for a conception of rights, but rather proposing an 
alternative to Nozick’s system that is defensible.87 A possible response to the claim 
that Nozick’s natural rights are not sufficiently linked to the capacity for 
meaningfulness would be that the latter is only a general, and necessarily vague, 
underlying source of these rights, the substance of which is demonstrated by other 
means. But this is not an adequate response: if a human capacity is cited as the source 
and foundation of a conception of natural and universal rights, then it ought to imply 
that conception alone. Ultimately the universal aims of Anarchy, State, and Utopia are 
undermined by the contingency of this link. Even Kantian deontology itself has 
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proved difficult as a foundation for a set of rights, as demonstrated by its reasonable 
but quite different expression in the theories of both Rawls and Nozick. 
 
This illustrates one form of the more general problem facing liberal and moral theory: 
reaching some particular substantive result that meets the claim of universality. The 
general statements that underlie a theory may well lay claim to some form of 
universality, but the theory itself must be more narrow and particular, more closely 
specified, in order to reach a result that prescribes a particular set of rights, principles 
or rules to the exclusion of others. Once a theory adopts specific substantive ideals it 
is subject to the argument that these are not fully implied by its more general 
foundations. It may well amount to a reasonable expression of the latter, but it seems 
likely that it will not be the only one, and even the concept of reasonableness in this 
context is not beyond contest.  
 
What is suggested here is a pervasive form of uncertainty, namely the contestability 
and openness of particular moral theories, which any universal liberal theory must 
overcome. This approach doubts there can be a well-defined theory that stands alone 
as the reasonable or best expression of any universal foundation. Rawls’ theory, 
despite adopting a number of ingenious methods, does not overcome the assertion of 
intuitive bias in its structure and substance.  
 
The criticism of Anarchy, State, and Utopia that persists is that its criterion of moral 
legitimacy, the system of strictly applied natural rights, is not adequately justified, in 
the sense of showing that these rights express their foundations to the exclusion of all 
alternative conceptions. It consequently fails to justify the infrangible nature of these 
rights. It would be expected that this argument would also be reflected in the criticism 
centred on the content and effect of Nozick’s rights, that these rights are actually 
contestable and cannot carry the weight that Nozick assigns them.  
 
As with much of Nozick’s theory, the first criticism is one of inadequacy. His account 
of rights has been criticised both because it omits a theory of rights, which would 




boundaries that they imply.88 Both of these arguments are valid: the lack of both an 
explanation of rights and an elucidation of the content of those rights is of some 
concern in a rights-based theory, but is not fatal to the most basic principles on which 
the theory is based.  
 
Commentary has also focussed on what general statements Nozick does make about 
the nature and substance of these rights. Thomas Scanlon, for example, refers to 
Nozick’s attempt at distinguishing between those interests that should be under our 
individual control, and those that should not. Nozick examines the idea that we have a 
right over those decisions that “importantly affect our lives.”89 This he rejects on the 
grounds that it would give people an illegitimate level of control over the interests of 
others. He illustrates this with a number of examples of decisions that affect others. 
But, he suggests, that it seems wrong to give them the right to alter certain decisions: 
to accept or decline a proposal of marriage; as to how to use one’s property; as to 
whether to retire; and, the decision of Thidwick, the big-hearted moose, to go across 
the lake against the wishes of the animals living in his antlers.90 The conception 
whereby these decisions can be coerced by others, Nozick argues, is clearly mistaken, 
and his conception of rights overcomes its shortcomings by considering how a 
decision affects our interests, and, in particular, whether it breaches our natural rights.  
 
Scanlon objects to this on the grounds that it offers no clear and acceptable standard 
by which to allocate rights. 
 
I would agree that, while the importance of rights largely flows from the importance of having 
control over things that affect one, the function of a system of rights is to distinguish between 
the various ways that things can affect people and to apportion out particular forms of control. It 
follows that if we are agreed how this is to be done, then we will refer to people’s rights in order 
to determine what they are entitled to cover. But it does not follow that Nozick’s “Lockean” 
rights are the correct ones, and this is just what is at issue…. If a supposed right turns out to give 
the person holding it an obviously unacceptable degree of control over other people’s lives then 
that is ground for saying that there is no such right. The proposed “right to have say over what 
affects you” fails this test. But … unrestricted property rights of the sort favoured by Nozick 
must also be rejected on the same grounds.91 
 
Nozick emphasises the importance of distinguishing between those individual 
interests and corresponding forms of control that are legitimately protected by rights, 
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and those that are not. But, as Scanlon notes, the basis of this discrimination is simply 
the system of Lockean rights; Nozick assumes without argument that his rights reflect 
the correct expression of this distinction. Scanlon goes on to suggest that Nozick’s 
unrestricted natural rights can in fact lead to situations of illegitimate control, and, so, 
suffer from the same difficulty as having a right in relation to that which importantly 
affects our lives. 
 
The example Scanlon offers is one that Nozick himself discusses, namely the 
legitimacy of pressuring an individual into entering into unfavourable conditions of 
employment by reducing the alternatives they have available.92 Nozick argues that if 
the other workers (and employer) all act voluntarily and within their rights, then this 
decision will itself be voluntary since no-one else has illegitimately restricted their 
alternatives.93 Scanlon asserts that this is an inadequate criterion, in that it does not 
sufficiently explain the illegitimacy of the situation, and also because the principle of 
voluntariness is difficult and would lead to disagreements in particular cases.94  
 
The point Scanlon is making is that the simple reference to the Lockean rights, and 
some basic supplementary concepts such as voluntariness, is not sufficient. The rights 
must themselves be justified in the sense of showing why the control they offer over 
the interests of others is legitimate. He argues that Nozick fails to explain adequately 
the rule being applied here: that employers have the right to limit the alternatives of 
prospective workers, as long as they are not breaching any rights or removing the 
voluntariness of their decision. 
 
The suggestion is that any interference with the rights of employers would be an intolerable 
intrusion – as a forcible reassignment of marriage partners would. Serious consideration of such 
a claim would bring Nozick’s argument onto the same plane as the objection he is confronting. 
To settle the question between them, one would need an assessment of the relative importance of 
the various forms of liberty that are at stake and an account of how these and other values would 
be affected by alternative assignments of right.95 
 
The illegitimacy of forcible marriage reassignment is an easy point to make, and, so, 
requires little additional explanation. But this is not true of the claim regarding the 
legitimate actions of employers. Nozick imports the concept of voluntariness in order 
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to flesh out the content of the relevant rights, but the doubt as to the role of this idea, 
and its effect in particular cases, makes the identification of particular rights difficult 
in a way that Nozick never really addresses or accepts. It is Scanlon’s contention that 
this difficulty makes clear that the natural rights are not automatically correct in 
cleaving control appropriately. This means that, for Nozick’s account of rights to be 
reasonably complete, he would need to actually identify and justify the content of 
these rights in terms of legitimate control. 
 
The importance of this omission is demonstrated by Nozick himself, in rejecting the 
idea that we ought to have rights over all that importantly affects us; the uncertainty 
about which of these rights are legitimate, then, requires a complex substantive 
analysis. In the words of Scanlon, this would involve examination of the “relative 
importance of the various forms of liberty that are at stake” as well as the relevant 
values.96 But this manner of analysis is contrary to Nozick’s general approach: 
assessing the relative importance of particular liberties implies a conception of rights 
that is contextual, and depends on the particular circumstances and values involved, 
rather than simply applying a set of natural, absolute rights.  
 
Scanlon objects to his lack of justification in terms of the content of his rights, but, 
more significantly, to the assumptions that underlie his conception. Because Nozick’s 
view is essentially libertarian, the rights he is espousing tend to be restricted, and 
would be agreeable to most liberal-minded people. It is easy not to question these 
basic rights. But Scanlon demonstrates the complexity and contestability involved in 
the justification of particular rights, and that Nozick’s approach is inadequate in 
addressing this.  
 
Another aspect of his conception of rights that has faced criticism is the principle of 
absolute non-interference: that the state cannot abridge to any degree the legitimate 
rights of individuals. The complexity as to the content of these rights does not sit 
easily with this principle, a point made by Nagel in identifying the different 
importance of different rights: 
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It is far less plausible to maintain that taking some of an innocent man’s property is an 
impermissible means for the prevention of serious evil, than to maintain that killing him is 
impermissible. These rights vary in importance and some are not absolute even in the state of 
nature…. The sources of morality are not simple but multiple; therefore its development in 
political theory will reflect this multiplicity…. The only way to make progress in understanding 
the nature of individual rights is to investigate their sources and their relations to each other and 
to the values on whose pursuit they set limits.97 
 
The assertion that different rights carry different levels of importance is entirely 
plausible, and brings into question the strict application of Nozick’s conception of 
rights. At the most basic level, Nagel argues that the application of rights should 
reflect the variable importance of the interests they protect. He goes on to suggest that 
the plural nature of morality underlies this variation in importance, and means that 
there may be circumstances where rights should be sacrificed to some ends, since 
these ends can reflect morally important interests.98 The conclusion Nagel draws is 
similar to that of Scanlon: that dealing fully with these rights requires a careful 
analysis; for Nagel, this involves the sources of the rights and their relationships with 
other rights and welfare-effects.  
 
Nozick seems to make some overly simplistic assumptions about the nature of 
morality, and the rights a theory of justice should protect. In the words of Bernard 
Williams, “his conception of justice does look like an enormous exaggeration of at 
best one aspect of our moral ideas.”99 To demonstrate this point Williams offers the 
following example: 
 
[S]uppose that, when the Mayflower arrived, some foresighted fellow, crouching by the gang-
plank, jumped off and bagged a good area of what is now Massachusetts, before his companions, 
more cooperative, pious, idle, or enfeebled, got going; it looks as though Mr Nozick, if we 
assume there were no prior holders, would grant him just title. Do we agree? Would it be unjust 
to redistribute in favour of those others (even the idle)?… These are questions for Mr Nozick’s 
theory of justice … but we can notice more broadly that, even if we eventually agreed that this 
pushy settler was not to be faulted in justice, that would only underline the point that we could 
hope that the Pilgrims, and ourselves, would have arrived with more virtues than justice. We are 
reminded again of that richer range of moral resources… which Mr Nozick’s treatment 
systematically leaves out.100 
 
The general point that these arguments raise is that Nozick relies on a set of rights that 
reflect a particular, contestable view of justice and that are bereft of substantive 
complexity. They ignore variations in the nature and importance of the interests they 
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protect, the relationships between rights, and other matters relevant to morality and 
justice. The approach of applying the rights absolutely as the sole moral criterion 
itself appears overly simplistic and morally illegitimate. 
 
 
3.3 The ultraminimal state
 
 
The doubt as to the correctness of Nozick’s natural rights will undermine the 
remainder of his theory. Despite this, it is useful to examine its more substantive 
aspects. As well as including an analysis of his reasoning separate from the rights 
justification, this will allow a discussion of Nozick’s criticism of patterned and end-
state distributive principles. 
 
The first step in Nozick’s argument is to derive the ultraminimal state from the state 
of nature.101 He achieves this by imagining a hypothetical situation where protective 
agencies are employed by individuals, and which results in a single, dominant 
protective agency that is employed by virtually every individual. This occurs without 
any rights being breached, and has the additional parsimony of an invisible hand 
explanation. In this way Nozick shows how a state, or something resembling a state, 
can arise legitimately out of a state of nature without the use of coercion or the 
adoption of illegitimate powers.  
 
As with Rawls’ original position, Nozick employs a hypothetical narrative in his 
theory. The two are used in different ways: the original position is supposed to reflect 
the principles of justice that rational individuals would adopt given particular 
limitations on their knowledge. This situation is supposed to be recognisable as a 
morally valuable reflection of our actual circumstances. But such recognition cannot 
play the same role in Nozick’s theory, since his focus is on a conception of rights that 
is true rather than intuitively acceptable. The moral significance of Rawls’ result 
comes from the general acceptance of the original position and the two principles as a 
reflective equilibrium; the significance of Nozick’s ultraminimal state is less obvious. 
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Williams questions the moral value of the ultraminimal state: “What weight is there in 
the fact that we could, relative to certain wildly idealized psychological assumptions, 
reach the state without violating anyone’s rights?”102 Nozick’s hypothetical narrative 
shows how a government could arise without any morally impermissible steps. This is 
important since his admitted starting point for political philosophy is to justify the 
state relative to a state of nature.103 By showing that a government could arise given 
the legitimacy constraints, Nozick defeats the anarchist argument that governments 
are necessarily wrong by virtue of their coercion of the individual. 
 
But Nozick’s conception of the ultraminimal state has a greater justificatory role than 
merely showing how a legitimate state could arise. 
 
A theory of a state of nature that begins with fundamental general descriptions of morally 
permissible and impermissible actions, … and goes on to describe how a state would arise from 
that state of nature will serve our explanatory purposes, even if no actual state ever arose that 
way.104 
 
Nozick talks not of how a state could arise from his state of nature, but of how it 
would arise, given the legitimacy constraints. He envisages that, if these constraints 
were applied, the ultraminimal state would be the natural outcome without any 
conscious direction given the incentives of the individuals and associations involved. 
The justificatory power of the ultraminimal state, then, is that it is the plausible and 
likely outcome of a state of nature where every person and group acted according to 
settled moral rules. This power subsists regardless of whether any state actually arose 
in this way, and, in fact, it would be unlikely that any state could ever actually 
develop legitimately.105 
 
Contrary to Williams’ comments, this result seems to be able to bear much weight. If 
the legitimacy constraints were settled then Nozick’s account of the development of 
the ultraminimal state from the state of nature is compelling, as is the conclusion that 
this state is a plausible theoretical foundation for a legitimate government. These 
constraints have been convincingly discredited, but, if this was the only problem with 
Nozick’s approach, it might be possible to replace them with an agreed set of 
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constraints, and then look to the state that would arise from the corresponding state of 
nature. However, there are doubts not only as to the possibility of agreement on such 
constraints, but also as to the reasoning from state of nature to ultraminimal state.  
 
Nozick approaches political philosophy from the perspective of what he argues to be 
its main alternative, anarchism. The state of nature reflects this perspective; the 
hypothetical and legitimate moves from it represent acceptable improvements on 
anarchism. The process of reaching a legitimate state is simply a bundling of 
individual rights, vested voluntarily in a central association. But this is not the only 
possible theoretical perspective. Instead of viewing the legitimate state as a response 
to anarchism, and, so, one that grows theoretically out of a state of nature, one might 
instead, see the state as a necessary response to a complex society of individuals. In 
this case, the theoretical focus is on, not the state as restricted to legitimately obtained 
rights, but the state in its capacity to achieve certain social goals: to co-ordinate 
action; to maximise some measure of the goodness of the lives of its members; or, to 
further their opportunities or the exercise of their essential capacities. If the focus is 
on some conception of justice not based so strongly on natural pre-political rights, 
then the state will be developed from its capacity to carry out an alternative 
conception of justice. 
 
The point is that Nozick’s initial theoretical perspective, that of anarchism or 
legitimate moves from a state of nature, seems plausible, but not so as to refute other 
possible approaches.106 A universal approach would involve identifying a particular 
theory as being the best perspective and would, in turn, require locating it within a 
general conception of moral theory. Nozick does discuss his theory in relation to end-
state and patterned principles, which can be taken as the first steps to towards a 
general view of such moral theories; and, it is in this argument that his refutation of 
other perspectives of justice must lie. 
 
 
3.4 The minimal state
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The shift from the ultraminimal to the minimal state introduces new functional 
concepts, including prohibition and compensation, which are in themselves 
questionable, and the effect of which seems contrary to the natural rights framework 
that underlies all of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The new tools seem to reflect the 
difficulties in applying a strict rights framework to an increasingly complex situation. 
According to a simple rights analysis, actions that breach the rights of others should 
not to be permitted unless the victim freely consents to the breach. Conversely, any 
action that does not breach the rights of others ought to be permitted.  
 
This basic approach fails to deal adequately with two significant situations. The first 
is where prior consent would be very costly or impossible to gain. In this situation, 
Nozick argues, the act could be permitted if accompanied by appropriate 
compensation.107 The second and more significant situation is where there is some 
chance that an act will breach the rights of another. This risky behaviour can either be 
permitted, and compensation paid to the victim for actual or expected breaches, or 
prohibited, and the person who is restricted compensated or not.108 
 
In one sense, dealing with these situations outside the basic rights analysis appears to 
be reasonable and deepens that analysis. But in another, it does not sit easily with the 
simple picture of strict rights set out in earlier parts of the theory. To determine 
whether a particular risky action is to be prohibited, for example, and what form of 
compensation should be used, requires a complex contextual analysis of the 
circumstances involved; with this deeper analysis the emphasis seems to shift from 
whether a right is breached to the nature and effect of a possible breach. This may 
reflect the true-to-life complexity of a rights-based system, but it seems contrary to 
the essence of Nozick’s legitimacy criteria. 
 
This concern is present in the criticism of the shift from the ultraminimal to the 
minimal state, which comments generally on the technicality and difficulty of the 
required reasoning. Perhaps the most cogent summary of this criticism is presented by 
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Keith Hyams, in ‘Nozick’s Real Argument for the Minimal State.’109 He argues 
persuasively that in order to deal with risky action, Nozick invents what he labels the 
‘compensation for disadvantage paradigm,’ which “applies when, and only when, one 
agent enforces a morally sanctioned prohibition on another agent’s risky activities.”110 
In this situation the person whose action is prohibited is entitled to compensation 
when they have been disadvantaged by the prohibition relative to the normal situation, 
and not for what the person would have been, or could have been, if permitted to act.  
 
This important principle is supposed to avoid the situation where someone has to 
compensate the person whom he or she prohibits from forcing them to play Russian 
roulette.111 This approach, however, suffers from many of the suggested problems: the 
implied standard of a ‘normal situation’ against which Russian roulette is judged is a 
difficult one, and is described and defined by nothing more than the exclusion of an 
obviously abhorrent game; and, this idea seems to be used only to make compensation 
with prohibition work, rather than as a necessary and justified part of a broader rights 
framework. Even in this most obvious of cases it seems that the conception used by 
Nozick, of disadvantage relative to a normal baseline, is one informed by our intuitive 
judgment of what is legitimate and illegitimate coercion rather than according to the 
conception of natural rights. 
 
Even if the rules for risky action are inconsistent with the basic natural rights 
approach, there is no denying the elegance of Nozick’s next move: identifying the 
action taken by protective associations (or individuals) in investigating and punishing 
rights infringements as a form of risky behaviour. In this way the rules on risky 
behaviour are applied to protective associations. The outcome of this is that the 
actions of small associations can be prohibited by the dominant protective association, 
which will itself undertake to protect those affected by this prohibition. The result is 
that the dominant protective association enjoys a de facto monopoly on settling rights 
disputes, and, in this capacity, can be fully recognised as an effective state.112 
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This move appears to contradict the idea that individuals have the right to prohibit or 
punish violations, and that they cannot be coerced into forgoing this right in favour of 
another party. To overcome this, Nozick applies the risky-action reasoning: 
procedures for prohibiting or punishing rights violations are not themselves perfect, 
but depend on the person being guilty of the violation, or not being entitled to commit 
the act; these procedures, as risky actions, can themselves be prohibited if the person 
or association is not in the best feasible position for ascertaining this violation.113  In 
this way the dominant protective agency can gain legitimately the power to prohibit 
the procedures of others, since they are in the best position to judge the situation. 
 
This move has been criticised by Robert Holmes, who objects that it implies the 
dominant protective agency itself uses procedures of proven reliability and fairness. 
 
Yet there is no independent criterion by which to establish this to be found in Nozick. He simply 
reiterates that the DPA will apply its own criteria according to its lights and will be the one 
entity in the position to enforce their acceptance. If reliability and fairness are defined in terms 
of what the DPA decides, this of course is question-begging and yields a theory of “might makes 
right.”114 
 
If there is no reason to think the dominant protective agency’s procedures are going to 
be any better than those of any other association, then Holmes’ criticism is merited. 
There are two complementary arguments against this view. The first is that the 
development of a non-arbitrary decision procedure is one of the determinants of the 
success of a protective association, so that it might be expected that any dominant 
association has a well-developed non-arbitrary procedure.115 Secondly, the power to 
prohibit is founded not on the association’s position of dominance, but on being in the 
best feasible position to judge rights disputes. These suggest that the dominant 
association’s procedures will tend to be fairer and more accurate than those of any 
other association. This idea blunts the might-makes-right accusation of Holmes. 
Arguments about the reasoning from the ultraminimal to the minimal state seem better 
directed at the underlying legitimacy assumptions or the technical rules used, rather 
than at disputing what goes on in the hypothetical world. 
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The second argument Nozick makes in favour of the minimal state is that it has 
utopian value, not in that it champions one conception of how to live, but as a 
framework that permits people and groups to choose their own version of utopia, 
unmolested by the state.116 Smaller communities can form that adopt some common 
understanding and rules that apply to all members, but there is always the right to exit 
this community and live elsewhere.117 Barbara Fried has criticised this argument as 
being inconsistent with the remainder of Nozick’s theory: 
 
Why does it not follow from the justificatory role of exit at the community level that any state, 
with any compulsory package of rights/restrictions/prohibitions … is morally justified, as long 
as dissenters who do not like the particular package are permitted to exit? And why then didn’t 
Nozick limit his ambitions in [the other parts of his theory] merely to proposing his libertarian 
version of utopia to compete, in the marketplace of state-ideas, with all those mildly 
redistributive, social-welfarist, democratic states out there, in the hope that he could drum up 
enough takers to get it up and running on some utopian island somewhere?118 
 
There does seem to be a thematic conflict between the idea, central in Nozick’s 
theory, that compelling another to act in a certain way is illegitimate, and the idea that 
communities can legitimately set rules that members must follow, as long as they are 
free to exit. Fried argues that these two threads cannot be adequately reconciled. This 
view is most obviously illustrated by Nozick, arguing, on one hand, that no state can 
legitimately go beyond the minimal, and, on the other, that the right of exit justifies 
any manner of super-minimal compulsion. 
 
Nozick’s response to this criticism is to distinguish between nations and communities, 
so that his libertarian analysis applies to and justifies the central government; whereas 
communal compulsion is permitted only at a sub-state level, to communities that are 
embedded in the libertarian framework and are justified by the consent of their 
members and have the right of exit.119 However, as Fried recognises, the distinction 
between nation and community is not coherent, ultimately because Nozick relies on a 
conception of harm by offence, whereby people can be harmed by the non-conformity 
of others within a community, but not within a nation.120 This leads even Nozick to 
question what powers of compulsion communities and nations can adopt in relation to 
harm caused by offence, and to state that he does not see his way clearly through the 
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issues involved.121 Ultimately, then, this idea of utopian value, and its place within the 
boarder theory and rights framework, is not adequately dealt with by Nozick. It is 
interesting to note, however, that his attempts to set up a framework, a meta-system of 
rights within which people or groups can pursue their own conception of the good, is 
similar to that of Rawls, and much of contemporary liberal theory. It is also 
interesting to find Nozick, in considering how communities can make rules that 
compel their members, grappling with majoritarianism, despite promoting a theory 
based on consent and strict rights.122 
 
 
3.5 Beyond the minimal state
 
 
The claims made by Nozick in arguing against any state beyond the minimal are of 
fundamental importance, since they involve a general criticism of any distributional 
principle of justice characterised as end-state or patterned.  
 
Certainly Nozick’s distinction does capture something intuitively appealing. It has often been 
said as a criticism of utilitarianism that it ignores morally significant relations resulting from 
past actions. Nozick’s distinction is of great interest if it gives this criticism a more abstract form 
and shows it to apply not only to utilitarianism but also to Rawls’ theory and to virtually every 
other commonly offered.123 
 
The basis of this criticism is that other such theories cannot accommodate the 
dynamic distributional effect of transactional freedom, an effect which over time can 
only distort the end-states or patterns that were originally the primary focus of the 
principles. Such a theory must either allow this distortion, or curtail an intuitively 
valuable freedom. This is clear from the Wilt Chamberlain example: either Wilt is 
allowed his money and the original equality is seriously undermined, or people are 
prevented from entering into an entirely voluntary and mutually beneficial agreement 
with him. As Scanlon notes above, this idea has the potential to pervade much of 
distributional moral theory.  
 
Scanlon, however, ultimately rejects the power of this idea on the grounds that he 
doubts whether anyone actually holds a patterned conception of justice: 
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A person who objects to the inequality in the world is unlikely to be concerned with those who 
have less as a result of their giving away or trading part of what was once an equal share. What 
offends an egalitarian primarily is the great inequality in the initial resources people have as a 
result of the social positions in to which they are born.124 
 
Scanlon notes that the right to retain any resources that others are willing to pay for is, 
like egalitarian patterns of distribution, not necessarily absolute.125 He goes on to 
describe a number of viable theories that are not patterned, but are still, broadly 
speaking, egalitarian.126 
 
The possibility of theories that are mixed, in that they have an egalitarian focus yet 
allow some degree of transactional freedom, is a common, and plausible, response to 
Nozick’s claims.127 Rawls’ theory, the main object of Nozick’s criticism, itself 
probably falls within this mixed category. It prescribes equality in liberties, including 
primary goods, but allows inequalities that favour the worst off, and which would 
cover many consensual transactions. In this way it offers a basic criterion for 
permissible transactions and is partially historical in the sense that it focuses on the 
original distribution and the consequences of a transaction in order to determine its 
legitimacy.128 
 
Nozick does succeed in identifying a weak part of Rawls’ theory, by emphasising that 
he does not adequately deal with consensual transactions, and particularly their 
cumulative effect on a distribution. But it is to be expected that, since property rights, 
including transactional rights, are central to Nozick’s theory, his will be more 
transactionally dynamic than a theory where the primary concern is that of 
distributional fairness.  
 
Nozick’s distinction between historical, and patterned or end-state theories, then, is 
important, in that it shows that the desired effect of a principle of justice on the 
distribution of resources can be undermined by the freedom to use and transact with 
these resources, and that this would increase over time. But, the effect of this on other 
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theories is overplayed by Nozick, primarily because he views any theory that does not 
actively promote the transactional freedoms as being ultimately destroyed by them. In 
this way, he fails to recognise that there can be more complex relationships between 
distributive justice and transactional freedom than the simple priority of one over the 
other. Ultimately, A Theory of Justice needs to evince an effective interplay between 
the two, such that, the nature of valid resource transactions are defined, and that this is 
related to the distributive goals or processes in such a way that neither is 
overwhelmed by the other. With a theory that has an emphasis on some form of 
egalitarianism or resource equality, this would involve dealing with matters such as 
fair opportunity and education, dessert, gains from trade, illegitimate and coercive 
bargains, intergenerational wealth and non-wealth resources. Rawls’ theory discusses 
many of these in a complex and enlightening manner, yet he never deals with the full 






Although the political prescriptions of Rawls and Nozick are diametrically opposed, 
there are many similarities of approach and structure between the two. Generally, both 
attempt to build theoretical, universally justified structures. Nozick’s method is 
probably more primitive than that of Rawls, in that it is based on a supposed universal 
standard of natural rights, independent of the rest of his theory. The biggest questions 
of Anarchy, State, and Utopia are those that challenge the justification and substance 
of these rights as the primary criterion for morally legitimate actions.  
 
Rawls’ approach makes a more sophisticated use of our intuitions and considered 
judgements, as well as the judgments of those hypothetical people in the original 
position. Yet these depend on another supposedly universal standard, namely the 
priority of the right over the good. Despite the additional complexity and elegance of 
Rawls’ approach, this priority is an absolute in much the same way as Nozick’s 
natural rights. Both are deontological expressions that reflect the Kantian ideal of a 
person as an end rather than a means of value; so, with Rawls, matters of the right will 




not be compromised by the welfare of others. In the context of liberal theory, both 
define a meta-system of rights with a substantial liberal space, within which 
individuals can pursue their own conceptions of the good, or of utopia.  
 
But these two priorities suffer from the same basic problems: they fail to adequately 
justify their respective rights conceptions as being absolutely morally prior to other 
possible approaches or beliefs. Both benefit from some strong intuitive plausibility, 
yet in neither case is this adequately confirmed as a universal priority. These failures 
are essential to the respective theories. For Nozick, the absolute value of his natural 
rights is the central universal foundation supporting his theory. Rawls’ position is 
more complex: for him, the priority of rights over welfare is not simply declared at the 
beginning, but is agreed to both in the original position, and in reflective equilibrium, 
and reflects a broader conception of the right as being moral and common, and the 
good as individual and base. Without these theoretical struts, neither theory can stand 
against the arguments of moral uncertainty.  
 
These failures seem to occur much in the same way: some absolute and seemingly 
reasonable conception is drawn that, upon investigation, is found to be not rationally 
supportable; the distinctions involved are drawn too sharply and aren’t actually valid; 
complexities are ignored; and possible alternatives are rejected without consideration. 
Both theorists seem to make the error of apotheosising a particular moral intuition, or 
group of intuitions. With Nozick it is that we should control both those matters that 
are within our personal spheres, and those which we have created or earned. For 
Rawls, justice is based on fairness within a society, which emphasises the importance 
of a fair equality between people. What neither Rawls nor Nozick seem to appreciate 
is the contestability of such intuitions, which corresponds with the uncertainty in 
reaching some morally universal result. Attractive as these ideas are, neither has been 
shown to be the valid foundation for a comprehensive and universally just political 
system.  
 
The mere fact that both these theories exist and have been influential in political 
theory raises doubts as to the universal value of either, or, at least, as to the ability to 
demonstrate them as universal and our ability to recognise this. These two divergent 




people educated in the same tradition, using similar theoretical tools. That two such 
people can differ so markedly in the content of their deontological priorities, and, so, 
in their theories and results, raises serious doubts as to the potential effectiveness of 
such political theories.  
 
To overcome these doubts would require either some different approach to justifying 
such priorities or an approach to moral uncertainty that does not involve any such 
priority at all. It is conceivable that comparable results, results universal in some 
importance sense, might be reached without recourse to a definite and universal moral 
standard. Perhaps the desire to vanquish what was the dominant political paradigm 
prior to Rawls, utilitarianism, caused both theorists to err on the side of deontology, 
and, so, to set up a standard of absolute priority that allows no semblance of trading 
off with welfare. Their motives in doing so are expressed well by McNaughton in his 
criticism of Rawls’ distinction between the right and the good: 
 
Can the notions of the right and the good ever be made congruent, or are they simply mutually 
exclusive? It appears that once the element of right is allowed into an ethical theory, it must, by 
definition, take precedence over the good. If right does not take precedence over the good, then 
right necessarily becomes relative to the good, thus becoming a good itself. That is, if right is 
relative, and not “absolute,” its value must then be relative to some perceived good.129 
 
McNaughton expresses the concern that anything less than an absolute priority might 
leave Rawls and Nozick open to the utilitarian argument that such rights reflect and 
express the welfare of individuals, and are valuable in this respect, or, in other words, 
that their theories are really just expressions of utilitarianism in disguise. But, such an 
argument need not succeed. It is, in fact, quite possible to attach some value to a 
moral standard or a corresponding set of rights that is not absolute in nature and, yet, 
is not reducible to utilitarianism. There can be complex relationships between 
individual welfare and other moral issues that mean neither an absolute priority nor a 
simple trading off, as has been recognised and suggested in relation to Nozick’s 
natural rights.130 Such a position would better reflect the complexity of recognising 
and delineating the moral and the right, and could, conceivably, better reflect the 
contestability of moral values and, so, represent a more effective response to moral 
uncertainty. But, a theory based on such rights would face a whole new set of 
                                                
129
 J McNaughton, ‘John Rawls and the Conflict Between Right and Good’ (1980) Auslegung 270, 
p277. 
130




challenges: whether and how universality might be achieved while admitting 
contestability, or at least complexity, of morals.  
 
A Theory of Justice and Anarchy, State, and Utopia both employ a deontological 
priority as part of a theoretical structure that describes and justifies a distinct set of 
rights: equality of liberty in one, and a system of natural rights in the other. Despite 
their theoretical ingenuity and elegance, and notwithstanding their substantive 
inconsistencies, both fail as responses to moral uncertainty, as the priorities of both 
are conceived in a way that ignores the complexity and contestability of our moral 
lives. Both confuse strong intuitive plausibility with moral universality and, but for an 
extended explanation of their priorities or a new approach to justification, the projects 









In the years following Anarchy, State, and Utopia, up until the early 1980s, liberal 
theory focussed on more egalitarian and recognisably Rawlsian conceptions. This 
chapter will focus on the two significant expressions of liberal theory that largely 
precede the criticisms and alternatives set out by those critics, collectively known as 
the communitarians, who will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
The theories of Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman are undeniably post-Rawlsian, 
in the sense that they adopt some of the assumptions and arguments from A Theory of 
Justice. But, they represent developments in the theory and respond to some of those 
criticisms of Rawls’ theory discussed in the earlier chapter. The goal of exploring 
their work is to identify and test these developed justifications and approaches against 
the criticisms levelled at Rawls and Nozick, and against moral uncertainty generally. 
This will involve looking at any absolute priorities or standards and inquiring as to 
whether they have been plausibly justified against other considerations, and looking at 
the resulting relationship between the liberties defined by the theories and other 
concerns such as welfare. 
 
The primary difference between Dworkin’s and Ackerman’s work, and that of Rawls, 
is the shift in the concept used as the central liberal focus. If A Theory of Justice were 
to be reduced to one substantive and driving concept, it would be justice as fairness; 
the fairness that underlies the details of the original position and from which the 
principles of justice are drawn. With Dworkin and Ackerman, the primary focus is 
more on equality and neutrality respectively.  
 
 





2.1 Equal concern and respect 
 
In his book Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Dworkin identifies the somewhat hidden 
but central and basic right of Rawls’ theory: equal concern and respect. It is this right, 
he argues, that implicitly informs the design of the original position and the setting 
aside of the natural and social differences between individuals as being morally 
arbitrary.1 It is this right, then, from which the two principles of justice stem.  
 
We may therefore say that justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of all 
men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth 
or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make 
plans and give justice.2 
 
In effect, Rawls’ fairness is an expression of the basic and abstract right to equal 
concern and respect, and the original position is the means by which more concrete 
rights are derived from it.  
 
Dworkin’s view of liberalism, then, amounts to a conception of equality out of which 
various liberties can be drawn. In his view, this amounts merely to a clarification of 
Rawls’ approach, a bringing into focus the equality that is already its driving force. 
But, by making this point explicitly, Dworkin is able look directly to equality to 
determine the best set of liberal rights. This equality, he argues, requires that 
individuals be treated as equals, in the sense that each has the right to equal concern 
and respect in political decisions about how goods and opportunities, broadly 
understood, are to be distributed.3 This does not necessarily amount to a strict 
resource equality or egalitarianism, but, rather, means that, in the process of 
determining the desired distribution, each person’s interests will be treated equally. 
 
There seems to be three closely linked consequences of such an approach. The first is 
the protection of some of the basic political liberties; in order to be treated equally, 
individuals need the right to free speech and to vote. The second consequence is that 
no person’s conception of the good should be applied to society generally, since this 
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would treat those who hold that conception as more important than those who do not.4 
The final effect relates to decisions based on utilitarian reasoning. Superficially, 
utilitarianism seems to satisfy equal concern and respect in that everyone’s interests is 
taken into account and weighted equally. The problem with utilitarianism, Dworkin 
argues, is that it incorporates external preferences, the preferences we have that are 
not about our own situation, but relate to the assignment of goods or opportunities to 
others.5 Examples of such preferences are racism, and the disapproval of the actions 
of others in relation to homosexual practices or the use of contraception.6 These 
preferences ought not to be counted as they affect the way that the individuals in 
question are treated politically, and mean that the concerns of others are prior to their 
own. 
 
So, utilitarianism, and for that matter democratic majoritarianism, is not capable of 
fully expressing an equal concern and respect for every individual. Rights are 
necessary to overcome the defects in these ideals, and must, in order to preserve equal 
concern and respect, overrule or trump their operation.7 
 
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for 
some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, 
as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or 
injury upon them.8 
 
This ‘rights as trumps’ approach may be drawn from what Dworkin believes to be the 
underlying concern of A Theory, but it differs in approach and effect. Although only 
sketched briefly by Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously, these differences can support 
some comment.  
 
The ideal of equal treatment and concern in political decisions is certainly present in 
the conditions of the original position, yet this is only one aspect of Rawls’ 
justificatory process. In effect, Dworkin has extracted from Rawls’ theory one 
important underlying conception, and built around it a simpler structure that justifies 
rights and distributive policies. The idea of deriving liberties from this equality that 
correct for the defects of utilitarianism and democracy is plausible. The nature of 
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these defects is that the latter incorporate external preferences; individual conceptions 
of the assignment of resources to others. Effectively, he is arguing that being treated 
as equals in the decision of how to distribute resources prohibits taking account of 
what people think others should have, and includes only preferences as to our own 
interests. 
 
It is clear that utilitarianism and democracy include such considerations, in that they 
are simple expressions of preference. What is unclear is whether Dworkin’s 
conception of being treated equally actually excludes these, and whether they should 
to be excluded anyway. Dworkin argues that the expression of external preferences in 
a political decision implies unequal treatment, but this seems to confuse the outcome 
of a decision with the decision-making process. If racist preferences, for example, are 
taken into account in determining resource allocation, this might mean that one race 
receives a lower level of resources and opportunities than they might otherwise have 
received. This does not mean that they were treated unequally in the decision-making 
process itself. Taking account of external preferences may lead to resource inequality, 
but this is quite different from being treated unequally. Dworkin himself notes that a 
person’s interest may be taken into account and yet outweighed by the interests of 
others, “and in this case their right to equal concern and respect, so defined, would 
provide no objection”.9 This being the case, Dworkin offers no reason, in terms of 
equal treatment, why external preferences should not be taken into account. 
 
It seems unusual that Dworkin wants to exclude external preferences anyway. In his 
argument this appears as the removal of discriminatory beliefs – illegitimate and ugly 
ways that people want to interfere in the lives of others. In fact, external preferences 
include all moral judgements and beliefs about distributive justice. His own 
predilections for equal treatment and their distributive consequences could be 
accurately described as an external preference, and his system is its embodiment. If 
his system is to express this external preference while excluding all others, Dworkin 
needs to give a better explanation of why this is.  
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The final criticism of Dworkin’s conception of liberal justice from Taking Rights 
Seriously must be levelled against the idea of equal concern and respect itself. This 
concept is the primary focus of his system, and is treated by him as the primary 
concern of justice, one that overrules the effect of utilitarian and democratic ideals. It 
is this superiority that justifies the priority of the rights that define his system’s liberal 
space; in this sense, it performs the equivalent role of Rawls’ priority of the right, or 
Nozick’s natural rights. Dworkin’s conception of equality is strongly attractive, 
especially in the abstract form in which it is presented. But Dworkin makes no 
realistic attempt to justify it as the primary or dominant principle of justice. He 
identifies it as the operative principle of A Theory, and argues for its value in relation 
to utilitarian or majoritarian approaches, but neither of these adequately explains why 
equal concern and respect should be the primary consideration of justice, as opposed 
to a system of natural rights or some other conception of equality. Perhaps this can be 
excused on the grounds that Taking Rights Seriously was not supposed to be an 
expression of a coherent liberal position in the same way as A Theory of Justice or 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Yet, it contained a degree of support and confidence in 
his conception of equality that was not sufficiently justified by his arguments, and that 
contributes to an understanding of his later work on equality.  
 
 
2.2 Distributive equality 
 
In a number of subsequent essays Dworkin developed and extended his project of 
liberal equality. In the introduction to the recent collection of these he labels equal 
concern as “the sovereign virtue of political community”, without which government 
is tyranny.10 This reflects his continued belief in his conception of equality as the 
central and primary subject of liberal theory, from which other matters, such as rights 
and distributive outcomes, are derived.  
 
In ‘Liberalism’ (1978), Dworkin attempts to refine further his conception of equality, 
and to identify the source of its value. He asserts that the constitutive, meaning the 
essential and intrinsic, part of liberal theory is expressed by equal treatment, in the 
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sense that decisions are independent of particular conceptions of the good life.11 This 
account of equality, he argues, best satisfies the conditions of a constitutive moral 
theory of liberalism: it represents authentic, commonly held liberal intuitions; it is 
sufficiently complete to constitute a liberal core; it is sufficiently detailed to 
distinguish it from other liberal conceptions; and, it is as abstract and general as the 
other conditions allow.12  
 
In two subsequent essays, Dworkin attempts to find the best expression of this 
distributive equality. It is this exploration of the moral and liberal meaning of equality 
that represents Dworkin’s most significant and most novel contribution to recent 
liberal theory. 
 
Equality is a popular but mysterious political ideal. People can become equal… in one way 
with the consequence that they become unequal … in others. If people have equal income, for 
example, they will almost certainly differ in the amount of satisfaction they find in their lives. 
It does not follow, of course, that equality is worthless as an ideal. But it is necessary to state, 
more exactly than is commonly done, what form of equality is finally important.13 
 
In order to do this he considers two types of approaches to distributive equality: those 
that promote an equality of welfare, and those that promote an equality of resources. 
The former involve taking the differences between people into account in order to 
equalise as much as possible the welfare of each, however this is measured, whereas 
the latter are insensitive to such differences, and entail an even division of the 
resources available.  
 
Dworkin’s first task is to survey a number of potential approaches to applying the 
equality of welfare standard, corresponding with several different measures of 
welfare, and to reject this standard generally. Welfare, he argues, seems like the best 
approach since it means equalising the well-being of each person, rather than their 
actual wealth.14 This welfare could be measured in a number of ways, the first of 
which Dworkin identifies as success measures of welfare. These focus on matters 
such as fulfilling preferences, goals and ambitions. He separates preferences into 
political (preferences about how resources and opportunities ought to be distributed), 
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personal and impersonal (which correspond with his earlier distinction between 
internal and external preferences).15 
 
Dworkin’s argument as to why these measures of equality fail centres on showing 
how each of these three types of preferences are not in themselves relevant to 
distributive justice. If political preferences were included, then individuals who had 
preferences that were not taken into account in the distribution (racists for example) 
would have to be compensated for this.16 To reward such political disappointment in 
the name of equalising success is clearly problematic, and in this sort of example, 
quite grotesque. Equally, impersonal preferences should not to be included in the 
equality calculation as this would mean incorporating such things as the hope that 
there be life found on Mars, or that the Great American Novel be written in a person’s 
lifetime.17 It seems clear that these are also invalid as part of a just resource 
distribution.  
 
That leaves personal preferences. Here Dworkin moves away from his earlier idea of 
incorporating personal preferences as a valid part of resource distribution, and instead 
argues that these would also distort any equalising process. This argument is 
expressed in a number of distinct ways, which are interesting in themselves, and 
which form the basis of his conception of distributive equality. One of the initial 
arguments is that personal preferences fail to take account of important parts of our 
lives by excluding the external and the impersonal.18 Even if preferences are not a 
valid means of including these in an equalising process, it does not mean that these 
areas ought to be excluded entirely. In other words, an equality of welfare that is 
nothing more than the equality of personal preferences is morally impoverished.  
 
Dworkin goes on to explore what such equality might actually entail. It might imply, 
for example, an equal chance of success in meeting one’s own goals. But this cannot 
make sense, since the person who chooses goals well within their abilities would 
receive few resources relative to the person who chooses impossible goals.19 Perhaps, 
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it is our overall success that should be equalised instead. This measure is also 
inadequate in that it would depend on equalising different conceptions of what 
success actually is, and would mean that those who are more demanding on 
themselves in terms of measuring their own success would receive few resources 
relative to a person who achieves very little, but values what they do achieve.20 
Lastly, Dworkin suggests that, instead of a success measure of welfare, a conception 
of enjoyment or pleasure might be used. However, this suffers from many of the same 
problems, in that it limits consideration to personal circumstances, and fails to reflect 
that people can and will often value states other than enjoyment, however broadly 
conceived, and that it is not morally wrong to do so.21 
 
These examples demonstrate quite convincingly that personal preferences should not 
be the primary focus of a conception of distributive equality. There seems to be two 
reasons for this: firstly, that a single conception of our personal welfare is too limited 
in scope to satisfy distributive fairness, not only because it would exclude moral and 
impersonal preferences but also because one such measure cannot adequately convey 
the weight and complexity of even our personal circumstances; and, secondly, that 
some aspects of our judgments of personal welfare seem to be morally irrelevant at 
best, and, at worst, would clearly distort the moral value of the equality position. 
Dworkin concludes that approaches that attempt to equalise welfare, where expressed 
as some conception of success or enjoyment, are not valid distributional schemes.  
 
Dworkin then attempts to describe a morally viable conception of resource equality. 
To do this he begins with a now-familiar hypothetical situation: 
 
Suppose a number of shipwreck survivors are washed up on a desert island that has abundant 
resources and no native population, and any likely rescue is many years away. These 
immigrants accept the principle that no one is antecedently entitled to any of these resources, 
but that they shall instead be divided equally among them.… They also accept… the following 
test of an equal division of resources, which I shall call the envy test. No division of resources 
is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone 
else’s bundle of resources to his own bundle.22 
 
This outcome, Dworkin argues, suffers from two potential sources of unfairness: 
firstly, in the composition of the resources being distributed, and, secondly, in the way 
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these resources are bundled together to form the endowment of each person.23 Both of 
these infer a multiplicity of possibilities between which the envy test is silent. 
Dworkin’s response to these is to propose an auction whereby each person is endowed 
with the same amount of money (clamshells), and where each lot can, at the request of 
any potential bidder, be broken down into smaller parcels.24 The prices, and size, of 
each lot is then adjusted until a position is reached where there is only one purchaser 
of each lot at those prices and all lots are sold. This process uses the auction-market to 
set the relative prices of resources. By this method it overcomes the difficulty of 
finding a meaningful equality between heterogeneous resources. The outcome is 
clearly recognisable as equal and fair in that each party has the same purchasing 
power at the auction, and the process seems to treat all individuals equally.  
 
This auction process overcomes the second potential unfairness, in that all resources 
are broken down in any possible way, should an individual wish to purchase only part 
of them. However, the first source of unfairness is not addressed. Dworkin recognises 
that all will be arbitrarily constrained by the initial set of resources. A person may not 
particularly enjoy or desire any of the resources on offer, but this, as he puts it, is just 
bad luck.25 And this is not the only source of luck Dworkin recognises; because a 
market process is used to set prices, the bundles people are able to purchase will 
depend on the desires of others. Under such circumstances, having unpopular 
preferences would be quite beneficial.26 Dworkin recognises, then, that the moral 
value of this market approach to equality is undermined by the play of luck, in a 
number of different forms, and much of the remainder of his theory is based around 
identifying and reducing this deleterious effect. 
 
Dworkin distinguishes between option luck, which represents the outcome of 
deliberate and calculated gambles, and brute luck, which does not involve in any way 
a deliberate gamble or intentional risk-taking.27 To illustrate this point, the person 
who develops cancer might be thought to be suffering from brute luck, although if this 
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person has smoked all their life, then it might better be described as option luck.28 
Dworkin uses this distinction in two initial ways. The first is to claim that equality is 
furthered by option luck, provided that all have a similar opportunity to take the risks 
involved, but is diminished by brute luck.29 The second is that the possibility of 
insurance links the two kinds of luck: if one could have purchased medical insurance, 
and yet fails to do so, then developing cancer takes on the flavour of option rather 
than brute luck.30 
 
The basic structure of the remainder of Dworkin’s theory can be readily derived from 
this analysis: Dworkin advocates a comprehensive scheme of insurance to convert 
brute into option luck, and to ensure that the initial equality is not compromised by the 
continuing operation of market mechanisms. This raises the issue of whether natural 
differences are to be treated as brute or option luck. Rawls’ approach to the natural 
lottery is to correct for its effects. In doing so he sets out a theory that is difficult to 
reconcile with the operation of a market system. In contrast, Dworkin embraces the 
market mechanism, using it to define resource equality, and allowing it to affect this 
equality over time through the operation of option luck. Rawls might object that some 
are naturally more able to take advantage of option luck, and that a system that allows 
this is will lead to inequalities over time. Dworkin treats natural disadvantages as part 
of his insurance scheme. 
 
In examining the distinction between option and brute luck, it is important to realise 
how natural differences are treated. Dworkin focuses on this issue by using the 
example of someone born handicapped – and, so, never had the opportunity to buy 
insurance against this unlucky outcome. He argues that in this situation, in order to 
preserve a fair equality, we ought to calculate the average amount of insurance that 
everyone would buy against this handicap and to award out of some common fund the 
benefit of such an insurance policy to the individual in question.31 This leads Dworkin 
to consider what would amount to a handicap that should be compensated for in order 
to achieve a morally valuable equality. People’s lives are affected by all manner of 
differences in mental and physical attributes, many of which are unable to be traded 
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or equalised in any truly meaningful way.32 The hypothetical insurance market seeks 
to compensate those disadvantaged by their handicaps; not to overcome or negate 
these differences, but to provide them with a greater share of resources in such a way 
as to satisfy, and to reinforce, his conception of resource equality.33 
 
Dworkin goes on to account for the differences between people in terms of the 
disequalising effect of the market. He argues that, if all people are equally talented, 
then the operation of the market will support the satisfaction of the envy test. 
 
Suppose Adrian… would rather work hard at tilling his land than settle for less than 
champagne.… The choice should be indifferent under equality of resources, so long as no one 
envies the total package of work plus consumption that he chooses – so long as no one envies, 
that is, his life as a whole…. [This] requires that no one envy the bundle of occupation and 
resources at the disposal of anyone else over time, though someone may envy another’s 
bundle at a particular time.34 
 
In this way Dworkin rather deftly overcomes the criticisms of the inequality effect of 
the market by including in the envy test the effort chosen in order to gain the 
resources and, presumably, the risks accepted in the process, and not simply by 
speaking in terms of bundles and resources. 
 
However, this approach fails in a world of unequal talents for production: the options 
that are available to one person may not be available to others, so that the bundle of 
consumption and effort that is available to one person may not be available to another. 
Dworkin admits that the effort involved in building one’s resources does not breach 
the envy rule, but that the rule itself is undermined by the natural differences in talents 
and abilities, which ought to be adjusted for in order to preserve a meaningful 
equality: 
 
We must, on pain of violating equality, allow the distribution of resources at any particular 
moment to be (as we might say) ambition-sensitive. It must, that is, reflect the cost or benefit 
to others of the choices people make so that, for example, those who choose to invest rather 
than consume, or to consume less expensively rather than more, or to work in more rather than 
less profitable ways must be permitted to retain the gains that flow from these decisions in an 
equal auction followed by free trade. But on the other hand, we must not allow the distribution 
of resources at any moment to be endowment-sensitive, that is, to be affected by differences in 
ability of the sort that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among people 
with the same ambitions.35 
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The best way to implement this ambition, but not endowment-sensitive idea, Dworkin 
argues, involves a system of income tax and redistribution. This represents a 
compromise between allowing a person to benefit from the choice and the effort 
expended to be productive, and acknowledging the luck involved in being able to 
achieve, and actually achieving, productive outcomes.36 
 
Such a system treats a lack of talent as, in effect, a disability, and applies a 
compulsory insurance scheme in relation to each person. But the difference between 
this and the earlier approach to physical handicaps is that every person is likely to 
suffer in some areas of their lives, or their potential lives, a substantial lack of talent. 
This being the case, it is not realistic to insure everyone fully against this lack; there 
would not be sufficient resources to compensate all for their shortfall from a state of 
complete talent. This type of insurance, Dworkin argues, will be viable only when 
much lower levels of resources are insured for.37 Ultimately, this equates to a system 
of income tax, the proceeds of which are distributed among those who are most 
lacking in resources. Such a level of insurance would be purchased by individuals 
were they in the position to do so, especially, Dworkin argues, given normal attitudes 
to risk and diminishing marginal utility of money;38 most people would make such a 
payment to guarantee they would always be able to afford to have some basic choices 
about how to live regardless of their actual level of talent. In such a system, people 
tend to benefit from additional money to a decreasing extent as the level of money 
rises, i.e. your first dollar tends to benefit you more than your thousand and first.  
 
The overall scheme of Dworkin’s equality of resources, then, involves an initial 
auction that serves to set the relative prices of various goods, and in which all have an 
equal purchasing power. Subsequently, an essentially market-based system would be 
applied. To the extent that shifts in resource levels reflect differences in ambition, 
effort and risk-taking, the envy test will continue to be satisfied; but, since these shifts 
also reflect natural differences in ability and talent a system of income tax and 
redistribution will be used so that a minimum level of income and, so, a valid 
conception of equality of resources would be perpetuated. 
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A final point on Dworkin’s resource equality concerns the role of liberty, as discussed 
in an essay published six years later. Here the liberties are viewed in respect to 
equality, although the relationship between them is developed further: 
 
So liberty is necessary to equality, according to this conception of equality, not on the 
doubtful and fragile hypothesis that people really value the important liberties more than other 
resources, but because liberty, whether or not people do value it above all else, is essential to 
any process in which equality is defined and secured. That does not make liberty instrumental 
to distributional equality any more than it makes the latter instrumental to liberty: the two 
ideas rather merge in a fuller account of when the law governing the distribution and use of 
resources treats everyone with equal concern.39 
 
Dworkin’s original overarching idea of equal concern and respect is not inconsistent 
or contrary to a focus on liberties, but, rather, some liberties are essential to his 
scheme, not as necessary consequences of distributive equality, but as part of the very 
fabric of equality. 
 
 
2.3 Liberalism and equality 
 
Dworkin's project is to examine the distributive consequences of holding an equal 
concern and respect to be the central ethical principle. The general ideal here, and one 
that has influenced subsequent liberal theory, is that a just distribution should allow 
individuals to make choices according to their own conceptions of how to live, but 
should compensate for differences in their circumstances. The justification of this 
equality-centred approach stems from Dworkin’s requirements of a description of the 
constitutive morality of liberalism, as set out above. Essentially, this means that it 
must represent the best account of liberalism’s moral core. His later exploration of 
resource equality is not supposed to contribute anything further to this justificatory 
approach. In the introduction to the account of resource equality he states that he is 
“occupied, for the most part, simply in defining a suitable conception of equality of 
resources, and not defending it except that such definition provides a defence”.40 
Although he cannot be understood as providing a full justificatory account for 
resource equality, it is clear that he understands equality to be a substantial part of the 
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core of liberal moral belief. This means that the resulting system must be recognisable 
as both liberally and ethically valuable, and, so, examinable on these terms.   
 
Dworkin did publish a later essay purporting to examine the foundations of his theory 
of resource equality. In it he identifies a particular liberal model of the good life that 
he argues is consistent with, and strengthens, the case for his theory. This ‘challenge 
model’ consists of individuals selecting and facing challenges, and promotes skilful 
performance on one hand, and justice and ethical integrity on the other.41 Dworkin 
hopes to describe a model of the good life that accords with or implies his resource 
equality, and is itself recognisable as a liberal expression of what it means to live 
well. This account would seem to be undermined in a familiar way: it is plausible, yet 
ignores alternative aspects of the good life that are equally plausible or valued, and 
the potential complexity that a general account of the good life might reasonably 
involve.42 Whether this accusation is well-founded or not, the challenge model offers 
little by way of a justificatory foundation for his resource equality. This means that 
the latter can best be examined on its own terms, as an important part of liberal 
literature aimed at defining a morally valuable conception of liberal equality.  
 
Dworkin's equality of resources has two separate equalising mechanisms: the envy 
test and the insurance market. The former, which is satisfied when no person prefers 
the bundle of resources belonging to any other person over their own, does not 
actually use the emotion of envy, in the sense of being a discontented longing or 
painful awareness; nor would it be reasonable to focus a system of distributive justice 
on a single negative emotional state. Instead, the envy test is best understood as 
expressing the preferences of a group of people. As such, the satisfaction of the test 
has a number of virtues: 
 
First, it conforms to a widely held egalitarian view that an individual is disadvantaged if she 
enjoys less wealth than others because of the circumstances in which she lives …, rather than 
because of her ambitions.… Second, the envy test's reliance on preferences in establishing 
whether inequality exists satisfies the liberal concern that justice must be sensitive to the 
diverse lifestyles pursued by different individuals.43 
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The envy test reaches an outcome that is recognisably equal, in that no person would 
switch with another, yet allows for various goods, ambitions and choices. In this way, 
it respects the choices of individuals, as alluded to in the first virtue identified by 
Matthew Clayton above, while carving out a recognisably liberal space within which 
each individual has the freedom to act as they choose. The test also removes the 
effects of bare circumstance on our resource bundles, in that any significant windfall 
for an individual would upset the envy-free balance. This result is achieved in 
Dworkin’s auction situation by the equality of initial purchasing power. Any residual 
unfairness, such as the unequal distribution of talents, is then dealt with by the 
insurance mechanism. 
 
The preferences expressed in the envy test can be subjected to Dworkin's own 
distinction between impersonal and political preferences, and personal ones. Because 
individuals are concerned only with the value of various bundles of resources to them, 
and not with a bundle as the possession of another individual, it is clear that the 
preference involved is entirely personal in nature. Dworkin has criticised personal 
preferences as the basis for welfare equality. As part of a system of resource equality, 
however, these preferences are incorporated differently, in that the equality that 
emerges from the envy test comes from the lack of preference for the resource 
bundles of others, rather than from the equalisation of an abstract conception of 
preference fulfilment. This does not eliminate the effect of a distorting belief or 
choice, but it does at least limit its effect to the person’s bundle preferences, and to the 
way their resource bundle is used. In other words, because the approach equalises 
resources rather than welfare, distorted preferences will be limited to the legitimate 
purchasing power of the relevant individual. That the individual is able to prefer and 
use these resources as they wish, that they are able to express their preferences in this 
way, actually affirms the ideal of choice that underlies Dworkin’s system. For this 
reason the auction and the envy test successfully minimise, if not avoid, the problems 
that welfare equality faces.  
 
Overall, Dworkin's envy test produces a result that is recognisably liberal and fair in 
the face of both homogeneous goods and varied preferences and ambitions. It can also 
take into account an individual’s deliberate risk-taking behaviour, and their attitude 




However, as Dworkin admits, it cannot by itself adjust for brute luck and 
circumstance, different endowments of talent, and the dynamic shifts inherent in the 
operation of the market. In each of these situations an insurance system will operate to 
charge each person the premium relating to the level of coverage they choose, or 
would have chosen, and pay out as is appropriate. By this approach, brute is converted 
into option luck, which furthers rather than distorts equality and promotes the role of 
choice in distributive justice. It is this move that has drawn the most criticism of 
Dworkin’s theory and has led to it being labelled as ‘luck egalitarianism’. One of the 
main criticisms is that the insurance system could not work in the straightforward and 
seemingly fair way that Dworkin envisages.  
 
His approach rests on two crucial assumptions: firstly, as to the circumstances that 
people would choose to insure against, and, secondly, as to the likely level of 
coverage. In terms of the first assumption, Dworkin identifies disabilities and lack of 
talent as the two general states against which individuals would insure. Yet, it is 
possible that additional coverage would be chosen. Phillipe van Parijs argues that this 
system might lead to compensation for expensive tastes – the incorporation of which 
is one of Dworkin's criticisms of welfare equality. 
 
Suppose you and I have identical internal endowments, including a pathetic disposition for 
playing the oboe. I am stubbornly sticking to the ambition of becoming a brilliant oboe player, 
whether for its own sake or because of the fortune I believe I could earn this way. You instead 
have wisely shifted your aspirations to table soccer, which we are both far more gifted for.44 
 
According to van Parijs’ argument, the oboe player would be able to insure against 
their taste for playing the oboe turning out to be costly, as a result of their lack of 
talent. This would mean compensation for an expensive taste, which is against the 
intuitive beliefs of both Dworkin and van Parijs. 
 
Dworkin explicitly replies to this argument in saying that  
 
[l]ow wage insurance insures against being unable to earn at the level the insured party 
specifies in the insurance contract. If we both specify the same earning level, if we both have 
the same talents, and if these talents do not enable us to earn at the stipulated level, then we 
will both collect the same indemnity in spite of my stubbornness about the oboe.45 
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Dworkin argues, then, that what individuals are compensated for is a lack of endowed 
talent and ability as manifested in a lack of earning capacity or opportunity. Because 
the decision to stubbornly persist in playing the oboe, despite a lack of talent, does not 
affect that person’s earning opportunity, he or she will receive the same compensation 
as his or her table soccer-playing twin. Dworkin’s insurance scheme, then, is 
restricted to compensating for a lower earning capacity caused by lesser talents and 
abilities. This achieves the desired effect of correcting for unfair outcomes of what 
Rawls would call the ‘natural lottery’, but not for the choices people make about how 
to live. As such, it is robust enough to counter arguments about other uncertainties or 
problems against which individuals might conceivably want to insure on the grounds 
that these do not concern the unfairness that the scheme is supposed to correct, as 
manifested in terms of earnings or resource potential. In this way van Parijs’ 
criticisms are unfounded.  
 
The next issue concerns the level of insurance. Dworkin’s system depends on this 
level being minimal. In this way he avoids the enslavement of the talented: where 
those with few talents receive a high level of compensatory income, while talented 
individuals are forced to spend much of their time working, in order to be able to pay 
the high premiums that such a system would require. A number of commentators have 
criticised Dworkin’s insurance market on the grounds that he does not effectively 
prevent this form of unfairness. Robert van der Veen, for example, argues that the 
hypothetical insurance decision does not in itself imply a low-coverage result, and 
that this choice will depend on each person’s hypothetical risk preferences.46 It is 
possible to explain and test Dworkin’s insurance market using a graphical example 
that represents a possible society.  
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This graph shows a society where the income opportunities (represented on the 
vertical axis) are distributed regularly across the population. The horizontal axis 
records the population level, which is, in effect, ordered by their income 
opportunities. The 45 degree line shows that these opportunities are distributed evenly 
from the lowest to highest income. This would be satisfied, for example, by a society 
where there is one, and only one, person with the opportunity to earn each income 
level from, say, $1 to $1m. Such a distribution is unrealistic, but the graph still allows 
some basic points to be made about Dworkin’s scheme. In particular, the fact that the 
population is represented in this way allows geometrical areas to be used to represent 
total amounts. In the above graph, for example, the total area under the income line 





This graph demonstrates the insurance scheme in the above-described society, where 
each person chooses to insure at 50% of the maximum income level, as shown by the 
line of coverage. The shaded triangle represents the amount of compensation that 
would be paid to those whose income opportunity is below the coverage level. The 
person with the lowest income, represented at the very left of the graph, for example, 
is compensated by virtually the entire coverage level. This compensation needs to be 
funded by a premium. This amount is shared evenly between everyone, since all have 
adopted the same level of insurance. This premium is represented by the shaded 
rectangle, whose area is equal to that of the triangle. Any possible profit from the 
insurance is ignored, but this should not alter the problem significantly. 
 
The total income opportunity, net of both compensation and premium, is represented 
by the dotted line in the following graph. It shows a minimum net income equivalent 
to the level of the coverage minus the premium, which is greater for those who have 
an income opportunity higher than the level of coverage. The point labelled A is 
where the income opportunity line crosses the net income opportunity line. The 




amount of the premium. Overall, their income opportunity is not altered by the 
insurance.  
 
This level of coverage means that there is a minimum level of income (opportunity). 
This is achieved by a system that is talent-insensitive yet ambition-sensitive, and, so, 
according to Dworkin’s analysis, is fair. It is talent-insensitive in that it equalises the 
net income opportunities of individuals regardless of their talent. This is most 
pronounced on the horizontal part of the net income line, but there is also a lesser 
equalising effect on the remainder of the graph, because of the effect of the premium. 
It is ambition-sensitive in that the net income line represents opportunities to earn; 
people have the choice of how hard to work, and whether and how to take their 
opportunities. The question that needs to be answered, then, is why it is unfeasible to 
have a level of coverage that maximises the equalising effect of the insurance market. 
This is shown in the following graph, where the level of coverage is equal to the 
maximum income. This means that, for this society, the premium and net income 
levels are equivalent at 50% of the maximum income level. In this way, the system is 








Dworkin makes a number of objections to this level of coverage, and questions its 
effect on welfare: 
 
Since… the chances of “winning” are extremely high – very few immigrants will turn out to 
have the maximum earning power – the cost of the premium will be extremely high as well. It 
will approach the value of the projected return if the risk eventuates. So someone who buys 
this insurance faces an extremely high chance of gaining very little. Suppose he loses, 
however; suppose he is one of those who does have the maximum earning power. He is now 
in much worse position than if he had never insured, because he must now work at close to his 
top earning capacity just to pay the high premium for his insurance on which he collected 
nothing – just, that is, to break even. He will be a slave to his maximum earning power.… 
[T]his insurance decision would be the… financially disadvantageous bet of a very small 
chance of a very great loss in return for the very large chance of a vary small gain.47 
 
This analysis is undermined by the above graphical representation of the maximal 
insurance market. Although there is a very high premium, namely half of the level of 
coverage, half of the population are actually advantaged by compensation. In this 
way, instead of facing a very large chance of gaining very little, people have an even 
chance of augmenting their income opportunity so that it is equivalent to the average 
earning potential. On these terms the insurance does not seem such a poor bet.  
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The person with maximum earning power, at point B, is not in a great situation, but 
certainly is not as damned as Dworkin insists. He or she must pay half his or her 
potential earnings in insurance premium; anything beyond that is retained as usable 
income. It is true that he or she has to take his or her maximum earning opportunities 
in order to reach the 50% income level, but that is equally true of the person at point 
C who receives no net assistance from the insurance scheme. The main difference 
between the two is that the leisure time for the person at C is cheaper than the 
maximally earning person – but that is also true regardless of any insurance. Here, the 
risk of being the person at point B is not so great as to absolutely overcome the 
benefits from maximal insurance, namely knowing that, no matter where a person 
falls on the income profile, they will be capable of earning to a level that is half that 
of the maximum. A decision to purchase this insurance is not completely irrational, as 
Dworkin suggests. Consequently, his conclusion that a minimal or subsistence level 
of insurance would be appropriate is unwarranted. 
 
It may be that the slavery-of-the-talented result is more easily reached when income 
opportunity is less equally distributed. If, for example, there are one hundred people 
who have income opportunities of 1, and one person who has the opportunity to earn 
of 100, then that person will have to pay a premium of just over 98 in a system of 
maximal insurance. But, even here, it may be that people are willing to take the risk 
that they will be one of the hundred, whose income opportunity is almost doubled by 
the insurance.  
 
Overall, then, Dworkin’s system of minimal insurance has a number of problems. 
Firstly, the slavery-of-the-talented result seems to depend on the nature of the 
distribution of talents, and, in particular, on the shape of the distribution of income 
opportunities. But, whatever this distribution, the idea that people would reasonably 
agree to only a minimal level of insurance is not sustainable. In fact, a system that is 
more talent-insensitive and resource-equalising seems quite a possibility. Given that 
these are important aims of Dworkin’s theory, it seems unusual that he would not 
recognise and embrace this. What Dworkin may actually be concerned with is 
avoiding the result that the talented are disadvantaged, that they cannot do better than 




talent is appropriated for the general good. This contrasts strongly with the Kantian 
ideals of both Rawls and Nozick, where a person cannot be used simply for the good 
of another. Seen in this light, Dworkin’s insurance starts to take on some of the 
characteristics of utilitarianism, a point that has not escaped the notice of critics.48 
One final difficulty with Dworkin’s proposed minimal insurance scheme is its 
uncertain relationship with the envy test. Because minimal insurance implies a 
minimal level of compensation, and some residual inequality based on differences in 
talent, it will not result in a resource distribution that satisfies the envy test.  
 
What is unclear is how the insurance scheme and envy test each contribute towards 
greater overall resource equality. A number of commentators have identified this 
tension between the two as a substantial fault in Dworkin's theory.49 According to 
Dworkin's narrative the envy test is applied to the original auction that is undertaken 
by the shipwreck survivors. At that point the insurance system takes effect in order to 
compensate for talent differentials. The problem is that if the envy-free and resource-
equal position is progressively undermined, then over time it seems to serve no 
purpose at all. Dworkin seems to reconcile the two by arguing that the envy test is 
satisfied at the point at which the insurance decision is taken, ex ante, and that “[t]rue 
equal concern requires ex ante, not ex post, equality”.50 Michael Otsuka rejects this 
conclusion by arguing that ex ante equality does not represent a morally fair position. 
His arguments seem to depend primarily on the idea that the insurance coverage need 
not, and, in fact, will usually not, be fully compensating. Dworkin’s insurance system, 
he argues, is unfair to those severely incapacitated, who will only be partially or 
minimally compensated for their loss. The choice to insure does not, in any 
reasonably fair way, transform the brute bad luck of going blind, say, into the 
morally-acceptable bad option luck.51  
 
Otsuka also uses the example of a horrible and incurable mental illness.52 If nothing at 
all can be done to help the unfortunate victim of such an illness, then they will be the 
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victims of bad brute luck. This result, he argues, does not reflect the ideal of resource 
equality.53 But, if there is some procedure that is expensive but only minimally 
effective at alleviating the symptoms of the illness, then each person will have the 
opportunity of insuring for this procedure. This, it seems, turns the brute luck into 
option luck, and makes the situation ex ante equal and fair. Otsuka argues that this 
change, from unfair to fair, is not justified simply by the change in circumstances, and 
does not actually reflect an equality of resources. Finally, he compares this to the 
situation where the illness is curable, and at a minimal cost. In this situation the 
insurance system is fair, as each person will have the reasonable opportunity to insure 
against the whole of the loss that they would potentially face.54 
 
In fairness to Dworkin, his insurance system is concerned primarily with 
compensating for a diminished opportunity to earn income, whether through disability 
or want of talent; the effect of resource-costing cures on disability insurance is outside 
the scope of his system. But the reasoning behind Otsuka’s argument remains, that 
partial compensation insurance does not deal adequately with disadvantage, and that 
ex ante equality does not reflect adequately the ideal of equal concern and respect. 
Expressed in this way, his general argument seems quite convincing.  
 
Dworkin’s theory of resource equality as a whole, then, does not seem to achieve its 
own objectives. It consists of an envy test that cleverly results in a position that is 
recognisably equal, and that is sensitive to differential goods as well as individuals, in 
their desires, preferences and plans. It is also able to incorporate different decisions by 
people as to leisure, and the amount of effort and enterprise expended in income 
earning. In order to compensate for what Rawls would call the natural lottery, 
Dworkin augments the envy test with an insurance scheme. The resulting inequality, 
however, cannot be justified by the hypothetical choice to purchase partially-
compensating insurance. This choice is, in effect, an expression of risk assessment in 
ignorance of a person’s actual position, and is not recognisably equalising. Dworkin 
might argue that it is fair or reasonable, in the context of scarce resources, or because 
it respects individuals; however, it does not hold resource-equality as its first virtue. 
This virtue would imply a fuller compensatory scheme and more obviously egalitarian 








results, but would also mean that the talented would be disadvantaged and, to some 
extent, used by the remainder of society. It could be argued that equal concern and 
respect would go against this result, but Dworkin is explicitly concerned with how 
this equality is expressed in relation to resources. What this may actually indicate is 
the complexity of such a nebulous concept as equality, and of the variety of political 
structures that might be required to express it adequately, in order to avoid the 
unattractive consequences of any one approach. 
 
 
2.4 Equality revisited 
 
In the preceding chapters there were found to be a number of similarities between the 
theories of Rawls and Nozick, in that both employ complex theoretical structures in 
order to reveal a morally acceptable theory of justice. In both cases, this is carried out 
in the context of a moral priority: for Rawls, the priority of right over the good and, 
for Nozick, natural rights. These reflect the Kantian ideal of the individual as an end 
and not a means of value, and they operate to allow individuals to pursue their 
versions of the good life within the corresponding liberal guidelines.  
 
Dworkin’s system loosely employs a moral priority, namely equal concern and 
respect, expressed in a resource context. It also defines a liberal space within which 
individuals can choose how to act: the choice to earn and spend resources however 
one pleases within the guidelines implied by the system and, in particular, within the 
adjustments implied by minimal income insurance. What stands out about Dworkin’s 
system is its focus on comparisons of resources, rather than on any overarching rights, 
and on equality as the central liberal concern. The substance of the system itself faces 
a number of technical problems, as did those of both Rawls and Nozick, but the shift 
implied by Dworkin’s theory is one away from rights-centred approaches. This 
approach was quite significant in the development of liberal thought, and led to a 
number of competing theories focussed on defining a morally valid expression of 
liberal distributive equality.  
 





Luck egalitarians disagree with one another primarily over the space in which they advocate 
equality. Should egalitarians seek equality of resources or assets (Dworkin, Rakowski, 
Roemer), real freedom – that is, legal rights plus the means to achieve one’s ends (van Parijs), 
equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson), or equal access to advantage – a mixed bag of 
internal capabilities, opportunities for welfare, and resources (Cohen, Nagel)? This looks like 
a wide diversity of views, but the central disagreement among them separates luck egalitarians 
into two camps: one which accepts equality of welfare as a legitimate … object of egalitarian 
concern … and one which only equalises resources.55 
 
Elizabeth Anderson categorises these theorists using Dworkin’s original distinction 
between equality of welfare and resources. It is not clear that any of these has 
managed to overcome, either, the arguments against welfare-equality identified by 
Dworkin, or, the arguments levelled against resource equality. Issues such as 
expensive tastes and the slavery-of-the-talented seem to persist against these 
theories.56 
 
Two more arguments are interesting in this general way. Firstly, Samuel Scheffler has 
criticised the focus of these theories on giving positive expression to the distinction 
between choice and circumstance. Scheffler argues that a liberal equality ought to 
allow resource differences brought about by the choices of individuals, but should 
correct for those that are the consequence of mere circumstance. The division between 
choice on the one hand and circumstance on the other he calls both “philosophically 
dubious and morally implausible”.57 The distinction is difficult, and brings into 
question the meaning of free choice and voluntariness, and whether there is any 
meaningful and concrete distinction between this and unavoidable circumstance. 
When a choice is made because of a person’s identity, which is itself an amalgam of 
some kind of choice and circumstance, it is difficult to see the sense in which it is free 
and voluntary, and even more difficult to imagine basing a political system on this 
idea.58 This general argument is compelling in that it forcefully attacks the very 
distinction that informs all of these liberal approaches to distributive equality.  
 
A second general criticism is that they focus on resource distribution to the exclusion 
of all else. This would seem to be behind Anderson’s argument that 
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[i]n focussing on correcting a supposed cosmic injustice, recent egalitarian writing has lost 
sight of the distinctively political aims of egalitarianism. The proper negative aim of 
egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end 
oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is not to ensure 
everyone gets what they morally deserve, but to create a community in which people stand in 
relations of equality to others.59 
 
She argues that the focus on distributive equality and away from personal and 
political rights is mistaken. Such an approach does represent a narrowing of the liberal 
focus that excludes an independent and prior conception of rights, and concentrates 
wholly on correcting the unjust effects of the natural lottery and other circumstances 
on one’s welfare or resource bundle. This narrowing is unfortunate in that it has taken 
liberal theory away from constructing an acceptable justificatory structure for liberal 
institutions or ideals, in favour of calculating a plausible and common conception of 
equality. That even this task has led to a number of unanswered and perhaps 
unanswerable technical problems, and persistent disagreement between its 
practitioners, is perhaps the most interesting result of the meticulous industry 
involved.  
 
Social economist Amartya Sen has also participated in this debate, and supports a 
conception of equality based on human capabilities. In reaching this conclusion, he 
makes a number of general comments about equality as the focus of a political theory. 
He argues that every liberal theory, and in fact every normative theory of social 
arrangement, requires some form of equality.60 The question then becomes, not why 
equality, but equality of what.61 In exploring this question, Sen notes two important 
ideas: firstly, that equality in one space will tend to lead to inequality in another; and, 
secondly, that a complicating factor in approaching equality is our inherent and 
substantial diversity.62 
 
Sen’s response to these difficulties is to develop a conception of equality based on our 
capability to function. Functioning, he states, consists in our being and doing.  
 
Closely related to the notion of functionings is that of the capability to function. It represents 
the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. 
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Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one 
type of life or another.63 
 
Our capabilities are basically the opportunities we have to be or do things. They are 
valuable both in that they represent the freedom to function, and that functioning 
depends on them.64 
 
In many ways this is a natural end to the egalitarian strand of thought. Here, the 
conception of equality (albeit welfare equality) has become more abstract, and more 
encompassing of diverse ideas of a valuable life, but contains less concrete meaning 
and a lesser potential for measurement. In such a system the content of equality 
diminishes; at the very extreme we would seek the equality of an explicitly undefined 
‘valuable life’, with no means of recognising that life or of equalising different lives. 
Such an approach might be largely agreed to, but its prescriptions would be entirely 
empty. Even then, there would still be some who would argue, not without some truth, 
that ‘valuable’ presupposes a conception of life that is not universally shared.  
 
It seems that either a liberal conception of equality is well-defined and contestable or 
so broadly conceived as to have no definite meaning. This result is entirely 
concordant with the view of equality as an open and undefined term, one that has 
meaning, but not one that accords with a single conception, as well as with the view 
that there is no correct or best liberal conception of equality that we can discover by 
application of hypothetical situations and rational structures. It not only matches the 
morally uncertain approach that criticised the priorities inherent in the theories of 
Rawls and Nozick; it also questions the idea of a liberal theory being found from 
some constructed conception, be it of justice, natural rights or equality. In other 
words, it questions liberal theory as a project whereby a single theme is conceived, 
built, and given content from a theoretical structure. Although some form or 
expression of material equality will be important to any liberalism, equality itself does 
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3. Ackerman and neutrality 
 
3.1 Neutral liberal dialogue 
 
In his book, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980), Bruce Ackerman attempts to 
build a complete liberal theory on a significant justificatory structure. As with A 
Theory of Justice, be begins from a hypothetical narrative that pares away many of the 
complicating and distorting layers present in any real society, in order to reach some 
general and universal conclusions about liberalism. 
 
Imagine that you and I (and the rest of us) embark on a voyage of discovery, forsaking our 
previous wealth and position to enter upon the quest. Coming unexpectedly upon a new world, 
we scan it from afar and learn that it contains only a single resource, manna, which has some 
remarkable properties. Most important, manna is infinitely divisible and malleable, capable of 
transformation into any physical object a person may desire. Further scanning reveals, 
however, that… there won’t be enough manna to satisfy the total demands of all the members 
of our party. A struggle for power is inevitable.65 
 
As the spaceship approaches the planet a conversation ensues as to how the manna 
will be divided amongst the population. The Commander of the spaceship presides 
over this conversation in order to ensure that a fair and legitimate outcome is reached. 
To achieve this she employs two rules, the first of which is rationality: for a rule that 
effects the distribution of manna to be effective it must “specify a power structure in 
which each power wielder can support his claim to manna by giving a reason when 
challenged by any of his fellow citizens.”66  
 
What is then required is a way of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate reasons. 
This is dealt with by the second rule: neutrality. Ackerman conceives this idea as 
having two parts: firstly, the bar against selectivity, so that no speaker can say that 
their conception of the good is intrinsically superior to anyone else’s.67 This means 
that one person’s desire for manna in order to build cathedrals does not overcome the 
desire of another to keep his belly warm.68 The second part of the neutrality condition 
is the bar against unconditional superiority, so that no speaker can base a claim of 
superiority simply on the fact that they are making the claim, or by virtue of some 
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feature they possess. So, neutrality simply means that no argument can succeed that 
involves the claim of superiority of the claimant themselves or for their conception of 
the good.  
 
Given these prohibitions, and the desire not to starve on board the spaceship, 
Ackerman identifies material equality as an appropriate and legitimate starting-point. 
This stems from the idea that we are all morally autonomous beings: 
 
Our claims to manna can be based on nothing more – and nothing less – than a dialogic 
exchange in which each of us describes himself as a morally autonomous person capable of 
putting a value on his life plan. Given this self description, it follows that something can be 
said on behalf of initial material equality. While I cannot say that I’m an unconditionally 
better person than you are, Neutrality does not forbid me from claiming rights based on a 
description of myself as a person whose claim to moral autonomy is at least as good as that of 
my competitors: Since I’m at least as good as you are, I should get at least as much of the stuff 
we most desire – at least until you give me some Neutral reason for getting more.69 
 
This is the central result of Social Justice: the condition of neutrality forbids many of 
the distributive arguments that could be made, and, by default, what remains is the 
claim that I am at least as good as you and, so, I should receive at least as much as 
you do. This leads inevitably to pure material equality, as represented by the equal 
division of manna. This result permeates the whole of Ackerman’s theory; and, in 
fact, the remainder of its substance is concerned with identifying the various liberal 
rights that are necessary for the continuation of such a system and for putting the 
theory into practice. Included in this are discussions to two closely related and 
quintessentially liberal concerns: taking account of the natural lottery, and the 
distorting effect of free exchange on a distributive equality.  
 
Dworkin devised a conception of equality to deal with talent differentials and natural 
disadvantages. Ackerman’s approach is quite different. He imagines a situation where 
the passengers on the spaceship could genetically manipulate their offspring so as to 
exclude certain types of people. He argues that, if every passenger agreed to exclude a 
type of person on the grounds that they would be at a relative disadvantage in 
pursuing their own conception of the good life, then that person should be genetically 
excluded from the population.70 A possible example of such an excluded type is a 
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person who is deaf, blind and crippled.71 Such a person is said to be genetically 
dominated by the rest of society. 
 
But the diversity of individuals’ conceptions of the good would mean that this 
situation would be very rare. The much more common outcome of a comparison 
between genetic types would be that of an undominated diversity, where a genetic 
endowment is held to be better than at least one other person by at least somebody.72 
This, Ackerman argues, marries his liberal equality with a diversity of people: 
 
Rather than some nightmare identity, liberalism affirms an ideal of undominated equality, 
where very different human beings have an equal right to use material resources to pursue the 
ideals that seem best to them.73 
 
Instead of using an insurance scheme to adjust for deficiencies in talents and abilities, 
Ackerman argues that, in most cases, natural difference should have no effect on 
distributive shares. This is because neutrality prevents the supposedly inferior person 
from claiming more than the same share as everyone else, since at least one other 
person believes that they are better endowed than some other person. 
 
The second liberal concern relates to the effect of free exchange on distribution of 
resources over time. Ackerman exploits the potential technological advancements of 
his futuristic society to devise the idea of transactional flexibility; a situation that 
allows individuals to negotiate, enter and exit agreements at zero cost. He uses this to 
answer a number of criticisms of liberal systems, for example the bias in favour of 
individual over collective property. With costless negotiation and exit, any group can 
easily decide to pool their resources and live collectively, and this arrangement would 
be perfectly defined without expense.74 Also, if one person decides to leave the group 
they could exit without cost, taking an appropriate proportion of the resources with 
them. This technology would also promote the liberal ideal of free speech and free 
competition. Because it involves a costless and perfect communication device, 
everyone would have the ability to communicate with other people as they choose – 
no government could curtail this communication, and any recipient could block 
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communication from anyone else.75 This ubiquitous and costless communication 
would also facilitate exchange and competition between people, and prevent any 
attempt to exercise monopoly power through having privileged access to methods of 
communication.76 In this way, Ackerman’s approach actually facilitates exchange by 
providing a technology that is itself neutral between individuals. 
 
The resulting society, shaped by the neutral liberal dialogue, Ackerman believes to be 
a harmonious vision of social order: 
 
The harmony is of a distinctive kind. It does not promise an end to ambiguity, disagreement, 
disappointment; it does not promise an idyllic social union where all mankind loses itself in 
lyric praise of cosmic order. Instead … it offers each citizen the chance to achieve self-
understanding without subordinating himself to the meanings imposed by others; it bids us 
glimpse a deeper harmony in the dialogue that provides the social foundation for all 
subsequent disagreement.77 
 
This is not an unfamiliar liberal sentiment, and is similar to statements made by both 
Rawls and Nozick. Both champion, not a single prescribed way of life, but, rather, a 
liberal space within which individuals can choose how to live. Distinct in Ackerman’s 
claim is the focus on neutrality and on dialogue, which, together, are the means by 
which the space he envisages is conceived.  
 
In his final chapter Ackerman sets about justifying his theory of liberalism as a neutral 
dialogue, and, so, this ideal liberal society. In doing so he addresses the challenges of 
justification. He begins by arguing that there are a number of potentially different 
justifications for or, as he puts it below, “paths to” liberalism. Because of these 
alternatives a liberal cannot blindly follow their own path, but must engage openly in 
conversation with others in order to find and use those other paths.78 Ackerman argues 
that the rules of a neutral dialogue are as valid to the conversation of liberal 
justification, as to that of fair resource distribution. 
 
There is a perfect parallelism… between the role of political conversation within a liberal 
state, and the role of philosophical conversation in defence of a liberal state. Political talk 
within a liberal state is a device for organizing people who are otherwise free to follow the 
different paths to the good. Philosophical conversation in defence of a liberal state is a device 
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for persuading people who are otherwise free to pursue very different paths to 
understanding.79 
 
Ackerman conceives moral justification as a situation of dialogue through which 
people can discover and explore different paths to liberal neutrality, which amount to 
valid philosophical justifications of the universality of liberalism. Ackerman himself 
identifies four such paths, each representing dialogical and philosophical routes to 
liberalism. 
 
The first of these is the corrosiveness of power: the modern fact of imperial 
government, bureaucratic institutions and advancing technology mean that any 
governmental power is apt to be used mistakenly or to be abused.80 The second 
involves an acknowledgement of doubt as to what is good and right for mankind.81 
The third path comes from the realisation that what is best for one person may not be 
what is best for another, and that imposing one’s conception of the good on another 
fails to respect their autonomy and the independent value of their own conception.82 
The last comes from a liberal scepticism that avoids attaching any moral meaning 
whatsoever to our beliefs or desires. Each of these, Ackerman argues, represents a 
separate explanation for, and justification of, liberal neutrality; liberal dialogue is the 
end-result of each of these paths, as it decentralises and equalises political power and 
control, recognises doubt as to the proper conception of the good and prevents one 
person’s conception being imposed on another, and, also, responds to the actual 
meanings people give to their own lives. 
  
 
3.2 Neutrality and equality 
 
Ackerman employs the hypothetical situation of the inhabitants of a spaceship making 
decisions about their new world, in a way similar to the work of Rawls, Nozick and 
Dworkin. Ackerman’s situation involves real people who are unconstrained by any 
veil of ignorance; the role of constraint is instead carried out by the requirements of 
the need to give reasons, consistency in those reasons, and the neutrality of those 
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reasons.83 Ackerman’s focus is interesting, not because neutrality is new to liberal 
theory – a neutrality between conceptions of the good plays roles in both Rawls’ and 
Dworkin’s theories.84 Rather, Social Justice in the Liberal State suggests that 
neutrality is the central liberal concern, from which equality and various political and 
personal liberties are derived.  
 
The progression from neutrality to equality is the primary mechanism of Ackerman’s 
theory. Neutrality dictates that no-one can justify a distribution of manna by reason of 
a superiority of their conception of the good, or of themselves. This ultimately means 
that the only valid justification of a particular distribution is that each person deserves 
at least as much as any other, which results in a perfect material equality. Ackerman’s 
aim here is to present a form of neutrality that is readily acceptable and recognisable 
to those who follow one or more of his ‘paths to liberalism’, and, so, who accept 
already the need for liberal neutrality. Perfect material equality is derived from this 
neutrality, as is expressed by what has been called the mantra of Social Justice: “I am 
at least as good as you, so I should get at least as much.”85 The first part of this 
statement – “I am at least as good as you’ – is supposed to stem from the observation 
that both hold some valued conception of the good that entitles them to some share of 
the manna. Ackerman argues that this does not breach the bar against claiming to be 
superior, or to having a superior conception of the good, since it does not imply that 
the maker of the statement necessarily is better than anyone else.  
 
Dworkin identifies two possible meanings for this statement: that we are as good as 
each other from the standpoint of political justification; or that I am confident that no-
one has a better conception than I, or at least, that these conceptions can not be 
meaningfully compared.86 The first of these, he argues, is simply a restatement of 
neutrality and offers no positive argument for equality. The second can lead to an 
acceptable and potentially destructive reply to the claim that my conception of the 
good is as good as yours:  
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No, it is not. I do not say that the superiority of my own ideals provides any argument why I 
should have more than you … But of course I think my own ideals are better than yours, so 
there is no reason why I should accept the false proposition, that yours are at least as good as 
mine, as providing any positive argument for anything.87 
 
Dworkin argues that the statement “I am at least as good as you” as a personal 
judgment is probably wrong, and certainly does not have the depth or power on which 
to base a system of justice. Bernard Williams also criticises this statement on the 
grounds that it reveals that Ackerman’s neutrality allows some evaluations about 
conceptions of the good, but not others: 
 
Someone might really think that someone else’s conception of the good was just as good as 
her own, and she would be allowed to say that. This shows clearly that what we’re offered 
isn’t a Neutralist restriction on the content or subject matter of our dialogues… It’s a 
restriction that bans just some judgments and not others, although all of them belong to the 
same dimension of judgment. It’s like being allowed to discuss the merits of the weather, so 
long as you don’t say that today’s is better than yesterday’s.88 
 
Whereas Dworkin asks why, if we believe our own conceptions to be better, we 
should only say that they are at least as good, Williams comments that neutrality does 
not exclude all judgments about the relative value of conceptions of the good. In 
particular, it allows us to say that someone else’s conception is better.  
 
What these arguments suggest is that the move from preventing people from claiming 
to be better, to the statement that “I am at least as good”, is quite a jump. In the 
relevant dialogue, it is precipitated by the realisation that both people involved have 
valuable conceptions of the good, and are deserving of some material means to their 
achievement. This is clearly neutral between conceptions, and is not problematic. 
Next, one of the speakers makes this statement: 
 
Well, I can’t say that I’m an especially deserving citizen for reasons that have nothing to do 
with my conception of the good. Nevertheless, the prohibition on unconditional claims of 
superiority does not bar me from saying that I’m at least as good as [the other person].89 
 
Both of these statements are also unproblematic: neutrality prevents the speaker from 
asserting a superior conception, yet it is open for him to say that he is at least as good 
as the other. It is clear that saying that he is at least as good does not breach neutrality. 
However, this raises the question as to why he would say that.  
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Such a person might actually believe their own conception to be better, in which case, 
as Dworkin suggests, they are acting falsely, or at least being unnecessarily vague, 
like saying that three is at least as big as two. Alternatively, they might believe that 
comparisons valid to matters of political justice cannot be made. But, then, this 
statement seems unusual as a response, like saying that blue is at least as good as red. 
Neither of these ideas seems adequate as the basis for a theory of justice. However, 
this statement must be understood within the context of Ackerman’s hypothetical 
situation, where each person is trying to maximise the resources they will receive 
while wanting to avoid a stalemate, and where the focus of the discussion is on the 
relative value of people and their conceptions of the good. Under these terms, 
claiming to be at least as good as everyone else is the best someone can do for 
themselves. It is a strange statement that seems non-neutral in one part and untrue in 
the other, but it is consistent with other aspects of the dialogue. 
 
The next move is that, if I am at least as good as you, then I deserve at least as much. 
There is a clear link, in the context of Ackerman’s dialogue, between the comparative 
value of a person and their proper resource allocation. Consequently, this statement, 
in the absence of an argument that the dialogue could take a sideways step away from 
interpersonal comparisons of value, seems consistent. The question it begs, as James 
Fishkin has pointed out, is “[a]t least as much what?”.90 In deciding against using 
utility as the measure of equality, Ackerman’s Spaceship Commander notes: 
 
We search in vain for a neutral yardstick for measuring the “real” value of different 
conceptions of the good. To justify one yardstick over all the other possible ways of ranking 
values will require utterances that are inconsistent with at least some of the ideals affirmed by 
some of your fellow citizens.91 
 
Fishkin convincingly replies that any yardstick is subject to this criticism, including 
using manna itself.92 There is no reason to privilege manna above utility or any other 
measure, simply because the ship arrives at a place where it is available and obvious. 
In this way, Ackerman fails to head off arguments from welfare. This has also been 
recognised by Larry Alexander who suggests that using the yardstick of utility might 
actually improve the theory: “it is perhaps more neutral to see that people receive 
equal utility despite their choices of good rather than to influence the choices by 
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offering objectively equal goods with subjectively different yields”.93 In this way, 
Ackerman does not overcome the difficulties that plague Dworkin, namely that 
equality is a complex and difficult conception with no single agreed meaning.  
  
 
3.3 Diversity, exchange and justification
 
 
Ackerman addresses the closely linked difficulties of the natural lottery and free 
exchange with conceptions of undominated diversity and costless communication and 
exchange. The idea of undominated diversity is interesting because it reflects a moral 
intuition that is so completely contrary to those conceptions of Rawls and Dworkin. It 
rests, ultimately, on the idea that our personal abilities are plural and complex, so that 
it is difficult to declare that one person is better than another without implicitly 
relying on a conception of the good as the standard by which this is judged. The 
resulting idea of an undominated genetic diversity is recognisably neutral. The 
problem here is that it does not fit easily within Ackerman’s liberal dialogue. He uses 
it to show why all but the most seriously handicapped genetic types should be allowed 
to be born. This is the case where there is at least one person who believes that a 
particular genetic type is better than another.94 But each of these individual judgments 
is clearly non-neutral, and the standard of unanimity among non-neutral judgments 
within a particular population, apart from itself being non-neutral and arbitrary, is not 
sufficiently justified as part of a neutral dialogue.95 
 
This approach to the natural lottery fits easily with Ackerman’s promotion of free 
exchange. From this perspective it seems that his view is libertarian in the sense that 
people are entitled to the benefit of their own efforts, although he never states this 
explicitly.96 In fact, Ackerman, while championing free exchange, seems to 
contemplate neither production and productive action, nor the inequalities that may 
result from them over time. This has led Dworkin to comment that Ackerman’s 
system 
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has this cold message for most of those who end up with less income: you had a liberal 
education, you had your equal grain of manna, and no argument is available why you should 
be entitled to invade the manna of those more clever or more skilful or simply luckier.97 
 
This may have been an oversight, but it is difficult to see how redistribution could be 
permitted in the context of a liberal dialogue between people in an undominated 
genetic diversity. 
 
The final, and perhaps most interesting part of Ackerman’s theory of justice is his 
justification of the neutral liberal state. If the derivation of equality from the 
conditions of neutrality is the main mechanism of Social Justice, then the outcome of 
the theory depends on justifying these conditions. Ackerman provides four reasons, or 
paths, for this in the context of philosophy as a conversation between persons. In 
building his conception of philosophy as a dialogue, Ackerman draws a number of 
parallels with the neutral political dialogue. Taken on their own, his comments on 
philosophical dialogue are significant: 
 
Philosophical conversation in defence of a liberal state is a device for persuading people who 
are otherwise free to pursue very different paths to understanding.… The task of philosophical 
conversation is to make it possible for a person to reason his way to Neutrality without 
declaring that the path he has chosen is intrinsically better than any other route to 
liberalism.… [R]ather than using philosophical argument to convert people to a single 
common understanding, liberal theory invites people to pierce their substantive disagreements 
and achieve a deeper unity.98 
 
On these terms it seems that there is an exact match between philosophical and 
political dialogue, and that the conditions of neutrality apply to each. Patrick Neal has 
described this approach as being both absurd and circular: 
 
[C]ircular, because neutral dialogue needs to be defended, not presupposed. Absurd, because 
we cannot prove that there is no good common to all persons as such by preventing anyone 
from raising the question of whether there might be in the first place. This is ordinarily called 
coercion, not argument.99 
 
From Ackerman’s comments it does seem that neutrality is both the condition and the 
endpoint of philosophical dialogue, so that anything not relevant to showing that 
neutrality is appropriate for political discussion is excluded from philosophical 
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discussion from the beginning. If this is the case then Neal is correct in calling the 
process coercive. 
 
There is more to Ackerman’s approach than this simple result. He goes on to criticise 
those who believe that liberalism is based on a grand metaphysical or epistemological 
error, and that the only response to this is to hack at its roots and branches. This 
approach, Ackerman claims, is misconceived.100  
 
Liberalism does not depend on the truth of any single metaphysical or epistemological system. 
Instead, liberalism’s ultimate justification is to be found in its strategic location in a web of 
talk that converges upon it from every direction. Each strand is itself sufficient to support a 
reasoned belief in Neutrality; yet to cut oneself off from a single strand hardly liberates from 
the web of belief.101 
 
He goes on to say that  
 
I do not, in short, claim that you can reason your way to Neutrality regardless of the way you 
understand your place in the world. Instead of proclaiming liberalism’s complete 
independence from other branches of reflective talk, I mean to assert its relative autonomy. In 
order to accept liberalism, you need not take a position upon a host of Big Questions of a 
highly controversial character. So long as you understand your relation to the world in one of 
a number of familiar – if very different – ways, you will find it sensible to regulate our power 
struggle by means of Neutral dialogue.102 
 
These passages move away from the idea of a close parallelism between political and 
philosophical dialogue, and from the idea that this philosophical dialogue prohibits 
non-liberal discussion. Instead, they suggest that determining neutrality as the best 
condition of a political dialogue does not imply any particular metaphysical or 
epistemic approach; that is not to say that it is independent of other knowledge, or of 
our personal contexts as human beings, but, rather, that the result can be achieved 
without any particular standpoint or approach in any of a number of different ways.  
 
This conception is markedly different from those of Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin, who 
each search for a single justification of their liberal structures, based around the right 
over the good, natural rights and resource equality respectively. Ackerman suggests, 
instead, that neutrality is important for a number of different, cumulative and mutually 
exclusive reasons. In addition, these reasons do not depend on a carefully researched 
and understood philosophy, but, rather, on some simple results from thinking about 
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our moral and political lives: that people tend to use power in a way that is mistaken 
or corrupt; that no-one seems to know clearly the best way to live; that each person 
has a special moral standing; and that there may be no meaning to moral judgment 
anyway.  
 
This is different not only in being a looser approach to moral philosophy, but also 
because it represents a response to moral uncertainty apart from those of Rawls, 
Dworkin and Nozick. This is the case of two of the paths to liberalism: uncertainty as 
to the best conception of the good, and moral scepticism. This is a reversal of the 
earlier approach that changes the very moral nature of liberal theory.  
 
Ackerman’s theory can be seen as an attempt at a new approach to justifying 
liberalism that embraces plural, alternative and potentially complementary 
justifications, and that implies a conception of moral theory that is sympathetic to 
moral uncertainty. There remain, however, a number of questions about this approach. 
Despite Ackerman’s clarification, it seems like his philosophical dialogue is 
constrained so as to remove all arguments except for those that result in neutrality. In 
fact, it is quite consciously directed as justifying only political neutrality. What 
Ackerman fails to address is whether there are other political approaches that might as 
easily find their own paths as significant as those leading to neutrality, and also 
whether his four paths might just as easily lead elsewhere. Moral scepticism, for 
example, might lend itself more readily to a political free-for-all power game. A 
consequence of conceiving of philosophical theory as plural and open is that an 
anticipated result might not be unique in deserving consideration.  
 
In addition, Ackerman’s approach has been criticised on the grounds that it does not 
succeed in bypassing the Big Questions of philosophy, but, rather, implies a particular 
pronouncement on these questions.103 His image of philosophical dialogue may be 
plural and open, and may encourage some basic agreement among people, but this 
itself is an image that denies approaches that suggest that there is a single, best 
approach to moral philosophy, and those that suggest that his approach is inferior. 
This meta-ethical perspective is one that needs to be addressed in any attempt to 
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found a theory of liberalism on ideas that exclude or downplay the role of moral 
philosophy. 
 
Overall, Ackerman’s approach to justifying liberalism, as set out in Social Justice in 
the Liberal State, is important and thought-provoking; however, it suffers from a lack 
of detail. Fortunately, these ideas are taken up in different forms by various liberal 
theorists, as will be seen in subsequent chapters. In terms of substance, the 
justification of neutrality as the central liberal concern, and the derivation of equality 
from this neutrality, are both weak. The theory does contain, however, a number of 
important aspects, including the use of actual dialogue as a liberal device and the idea 
of an undominated genetic diversity. But, for present purposes, the shift in 
justification away from the idea of liberalism as an answer to moral uncertainty, and 
towards liberalism as a response to moral uncertainty, is most significant. 
 
 
4. Contemporary liberal theory 
 
The works of Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Ackerman, published between 1971 and 
1981, constitute the early era of contemporary liberal theory. Each devises 
hypothetical situations that pare away irrelevant and arbitrary details and that, 
therefore, inform a conception of justice. Each involves interplay between various 
conceptions of liberal ideals, primarily between liberty, equality and neutrality. This 
interplay is expressed in two ways: for Rawls and Nozick as a moral priority – the 
right over the good and natural rights respectively; and, for Dworkin and Ackerman, 
the elevation of a conception of one of these ideals so that it becomes the central 
liberal concern – equality (of resources) for Dworkin and neutral (dialogue) for 
Ackerman. Nozick probably stands out from the others the most in using a system 
derived from a set of presupposed rights, which results in the least egalitarian system. 
 
Each of these four recognisably liberal theories describes a particular space within 
which people are free to make their own choices and pursue their own conceptions of 
the good. This space is defined by the liberties, neutrality and equality. Liberties offer 




discriminate between conceptions of the good; and equality implies some measure of 
equal opportunity to pursue a conception of the good. The interplay between 
particular conceptions of these ideals within a liberal theory specifies the nature and 
constraints of the space within which individuals are free to act.  
 
This space reflects the openness of liberal theory. It is in eschewing the idea of a 
single privileged conception of the good, and committing, instead, to allowing 
individuals to determine their goals and actions that liberalism lays claim to the best 
expression of social justice. In this way, liberalism is an open system that allows 
individuals to make decisions about how they want to live. These decisions, however, 
must conform to the system of liberties itself. No liberal theory is perfectly open: 
none addresses and indulges the desires and conceptions of every citizen to the point 
of a free-for-all. Instead, there is a closedness to each liberal system, implicit in any 
set of liberties, that is defined by the restrictions on action and resource allocation. It 
is tempting for liberal theorists to believe that, because liberalism is essentially open 
to alternative ideas and ways of life, it does not need to defend itself against systems 
that suggest these alternatives; or, to believe that liberalism transcends less obviously 
open systems. But, the closedness implicit in any liberal conception of justice refers to 
particular positive ideas and conceptions that must be justified as being morally 
valuable. It is not enough for liberalism simply to claim value by virtue of its 
openness, without addressing the particular and closed ways in which this openness is 
conceived and defined. 
 
The early works of contemporary liberal theory each take a different approach to 
justifying the substance of their systems. Rawls’ is the most complete and is probably 
the most innovative. His ideas, of the reflective equilibrium and the use of our 
considered intuitions, are linked closely to the original position in order to justify his 
two principles of justice. Nozick is quieter on matters of justification and relies 
wholly on his set of natural rights. Dworkin relies on equality in a similar way, and 
the justification of his luck egalitarian approach to resource-equality depends on 
recognising the system itself as liberal and just. Finally, Ackerman’s work represents 
a shift to incorporate some aspects of moral uncertainty into his justification, which he 





All of these theories have in common a theoretical structure that implies their liberal 
approach to be, in some sense, universally valid. Despite differences in outcomes, 
structures and justifications, there seems to be justificatory errors common to all four: 
that is, the common reliance on conceptions or intuitions that are quite plausible, but, 
upon reflection, are revealed to be rationally and reasonably contestable. This is 
particularly problematic given that the readers of the theories are likely to be 
predisposed to accept liberal ideals. 
 
This has the most pronounced effect when the contestable conception or ideal is 
raised to the status of absolute. Each of the theories seems to contain such an ideal, of 
the right over the good, natural rights, equal concern and respect, and dialogical 
neutrality. These conceptions are important in that they focus the theory and define 
the interaction of the various liberal conceptions, and they lend to the theory the 
promise of a deontological universality. Yet, each of the theories have been validly 
criticised on the grounds that, at best, these conceptions have not been adequately 
defined and justified as central; and, at worst, they reveal a bias in the closedness of 
each liberal theory. In relation to these theories, William Galston comments that 
 
[w]e can discern a recurrent pattern. Each of these contemporary liberal theories begins by 
promising to do without a substantive theory of the good; each ends by betraying that promise. 
All of them covertly rely on the same triadic theory of the good, which assumes the worth of 
human existence, the worth of human purposiveness and the fulfilment of human purposes, 
and the worth of rationality as the chief constraint on social principles and social actions.… 
The liberal theory of the good is the theory of rationalist humanism.104 
  
He identifies those implicit assumptions and ideals that support and inform particular 
liberal theories. Instead of justificatorily open to and neutral between various ways of 
life, Galston reveals liberal theory to apply particular, albeit general, conceptions, 
consistent with the ideals of rationalist humanism. In this way, the justifications of 
liberal theory fail in the way they purport to be general and open, and, instead, 
represent particular moral and political positions.  
 
The justificatory challenge of this form of liberal theory is to create a system that is 
founded on a conception of justice and of our selves, and that defines a morally 
substantial liberal space within which people are free to determine their own 
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conception of how to live and act. The difficulty is that the conceptions and rules on 
which such a system relies are themselves contestable in a way that tethers it to a 
particular set of beliefs, and that denies the universal application and value of the 
theory. This is exacerbated by the sheer complexity of our moral lives, and of the 
plurality of beliefs that theorists attempt to confine as the subject of liberal freedom. 
Overall, these aspects of moral uncertainty, complexity and contestability have not 







1. The communitarian critique of liberalism 
 
Those theories examined in the preceding chapters dominated liberal and political 
thought for the decade following the publication of A Theory of Justice. Despite 
various differences, the four had a roughly similar attitude to moral political-theory: a 
focus on the value and autonomy of the individual; a use of hypothetical situations to 
elucidate issues of justice; and, the use of complicated structures that define 
conceptions of equality, liberty and neutrality, and the relationships between them. 
The first major challenge to this approach came from a group labelled the 
communitarians. Their criticisms prompted a set of debates between communitarians 
and liberal theorists that were central to liberalism in the 1980s.1 
 
The grouping of theorists and critics of liberalism into communitarians, as with any 
grouping of independent thinkers, is imperfect: it includes probably four or five 
people with diverse approaches and attitudes to moral theory, and who would not 
necessarily identify themselves as being part of any group.2 Nevertheless, they do 
represent a common criticism of liberal theory, the central claim of which has been 
described as “the necessity of attending to community alongside, if not prior to, 
liberty and equality”.3 In this way, they each criticise the liberal approach that focuses 
on conceptions of liberty, equality and neutrality, and ascribe only secondary meaning 
to “the shared practices and understandings within each society.”4 
 
 
1.1 The unencumbered self 
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Michael Sandel’s criticism of the conception of the person implicit in A Theory of 
Justice can now be viewed in the context of the liberal-communitarian debate. 
Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, published in 1982, was the first major 
communitarian work, and is a critical reading of A Theory of Justice. One of Sandel’s 
central themes is that Rawls’ theory implies a conception of the person, not as having 
some particular and essential desire or drive, but with respect to the “constitutive 
understanding we have of ourselves”.5  
 
Sandel’s claim, then, is that Rawls’ theory depends implicitly on a conception of the 
essential structure of our selves. This self is antecedently individuated; its essence lies 
in its ability to choose its own conception of the good, and its own ends.6  
 
Where the self is disempowered because detached from its ends, dispossession is repaired by 
the faculty of agency in its voluntarist sense, in which the self is related to its ends as a willing 
subject to the objects of choice. The relevant agency involves the exercise of will, for it is the 
will that is able to transcend the space between the subject and its object without requiring that 
it be closed.7 
 
In this way the Rawlsian self is antecedently unencumbered by its ends, and has the 
innate capacity to choose its own conception of what is good and how best to live. 
This picture of the self pervades Rawls’ conception of the meaning of justice. The 
background of justice, in his words, consists in “the plurality of distinct persons with 
separate systems of ends”.8 Justice defines the relationships between these 
individuals, in their vying for the fulfilment of their own particular ends, a conception 
that Sandel argues promotes plurality at the expense of unity.9 
 
Generally speaking, it is the distance between the self and its ends that marks Sandel’s 
concern with Rawls’ conception of the person. 
 
One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it 
invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so deeply that I 
could not understand myself without it. No transformation of life purposes and plans could be 
so unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my identity. No project could be so essential that 
turning away from it would call into question the person I am.10 
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The distance between self and ends shapes the original position, and, so, the two 
principles of justice.11 One’s shared concerns and values, and one’s sense of 
community, are subject to this same distance, and, so, are always peripheral to the 
self; these are chosen voluntarily from among alternatives, and do not define or 
constitute the meaning or essence of the self. As the self is prior to its ends, so a 
society is prior to any of the aims or shared values any of its members might 
possess.12 
 
The charge against Rawls, then, is one of circularity and liberal bias: that his 
conception of the self forms part of the foundation of his theory and, so, must itself be 
justified in order for its conclusions to be valid, otherwise its liberal conclusions are 
reached only because the theory’s structure itself is liberal. The argument that a liberal 
theory conceives of the self as individual, pre-social and unencumbered by a sense of 
community is a typical communitarian criticism.  
 
Another communitarian thinker, Charles Taylor, makes a similar argument about 
Rawls’ implicit conception of the self, although his focus is more on how the self is 
actually constituted. Taylor, in Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity, 
attempts to set out in detail the history and the moral sources of the modern, 
subjective identity. This identity, he argues, searches for meaning through self-
expression and self-interpretation.13 Moral judgments are made only in relation to 
interpretive frameworks. These distinguish between and give meaning to the various 
moral ethics that we might employ.14 These act as the background, or the horizons, for 
our moral judgments and intuitions, and are inescapable parts of our moral selves. 
 
[T]he claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human 
agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we 
would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood…. My identity is defined 
by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I 
can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or 
what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking 
a stand.15  
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This means that our individual moral selves have meaning only in relation to our 
interpretive frameworks. These, Taylor argues, are expressed in terms of language, 
and, so, our selves are inextricably linked to the linguistic communities of which we 
are part. In this way, our self-understanding and self-definition is dependant on our 
linguistic and social context.16 It is this sense that the Rawlsian conception of the 
person, as antecedently individuated, is incoherent, and amounts to a denial of the 
actual foundations of our selves.17 
 
If the Rawlsian conception of the self cannot be sustained, then any liberal project of 
the Rawlsian type is undermined. Such theories rely on the unencumbered self as an 
essential element: an autonomous individual who makes valuable decisions as to their 
own conceptions of the good and their own ends; a political unit that is declared to 
have independent moral worth, and who should be respected. 
 
The obvious response to this criticism is to assert that it is the individual that is the 
appropriate unit of moral and political concern, and, further, that liberal theories do 
not prevent individuals from acting in communal ways, nor from valuing communal 
beliefs. On the contrary, they permit people free association with whatever group and 
whatever corresponding conception of the good they choose. The point of Sandel, and 
implicitly of Taylor, is that, while this communal behaviour is permitted as the 
legitimate expression of one’s conception of the good, the Rawlsian self has a more 
fundamental role in liberal theory. In relation to A Theory, for example, this 
conception informs the priority of the right over the good, as well as rational 
behaviour in the original position. That the outcome of such theories allows 
communal behaviour does not amount to adequate recognition of the idea that they 
are themselves built on an impoverished, and potentially incoherent, conception of the 
self.  
 
This communitarian argument appears to have substantial merit, and certainly 
conveys a conception of the person that has more depth and more detail. Individual 
rationality and the personal autonomy to choose one’s own goals, however, still retain 
considerable moral force. While it could not be denied that we all operate in front of a 
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horizon that is communally defined, it might still be argued that it is the individual 
who is the proper focus of liberal theory. If this argument is to be successful, 
however, the liberal must explain how the resulting conception forms a legitimate part 
of their theoretical structure, and how it coheres with the seemingly meaningful 
portrayal of the self offered by the communitarians. 
 
What this communitarian criticism achieves, then, is to reveal a supposedly accurate 
and objective aspect of some early contemporary liberal theories, to contain liberal 
bias. This indicates a structural bias in liberal theory, as well as a potentially 
impoverished foundation. This requires that liberal theory restructure itself, by either 
incorporating a more communally-focussed conception of the self, or by explaining 
why the antecedently individuated self is a morally relevant point of focus.  
 
 
1.2 The enlightenment critique 
 
The communitarian critique of the unencumbered self is one of structure: that liberal 
theories tend to be built around an implicit conception of the person that is itself 
essentially liberal. Some communitarian arguments are more general, and attack the 
justificatory approach and meta-ethical attitudes of liberal theories. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre joins Sandel and Taylor in criticising the implicit conception of 
the person employed by liberal theorists, but, for him, this is merely one aspect of an 
approach to moral theory that is bankrupt.18 At the beginning of his book After Virtue, 
he describes an imaginary world where scientific knowledge has been previously lost, 
and an attempt is made to piece together and continue its work.19 This state of affairs, 
asserts MacIntyre, characterises contemporary moral theory: 
 
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the 
language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science 
in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the 
fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their 
significance derived. We possess indeed a simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of 
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the key expressions. But we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both 
theoretical and practical, of morality.20 
 
MacIntyre identifies the beginnings of this loss as being the moral projects of the 
enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Social anthropologist Earnest Gellner has 
characterised the enlightenment as being 
 
concerned with describing, and above all denouncing, the society it was rejecting and which it 
hoped was passing for ever – a society based on tyranny and superstition. The rule of kings 
and priests was to give way to the rule of Reason and Nature. If falsehood had endorsed, 
legitimated and underwritten oppression and expectation, would not luminous truth engender 
a new, free and happy social order? It seemed a plausible hope, and the philosophes were 
dedicated to its propagation.21 
 
The enlightenment involved the doubting of religion as the basis for an understanding 
of right action, and sought a shared, publicly justified, rational account of morality.22 
This project, MacIntyre argues, failed completely. The main reason he offers for this 
is that the philosophers of the time “shared characteristics deriving from their highly 
specific shared historical background”.23 It was this common scheme of moral beliefs 
that appeared as the true foundations of a rationally justified morality.  
 
The realisation of this failure had, MacIntyre argues, a number of important effects, 
not the least of which was the common doubt in any shared moral rationale.24 It led 
also to what MacIntyre calls ‘emotivism’ in moral dialogue and theory. This 
emotivism is at the heart of the failure MacIntyre perceives in current moral theory. 
Emotivism is encapsulated by the idea that moral judgments are “nothing but 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling”.25 Thus, there is no 
objective or true moral judgment, simply the personal evaluations of individuals 
within the moral sphere. This means that there can be no rational justification of any 
supposedly objective or universal moral belief.26 MacIntyre argues that this 
emotivism, in various guises, forms a substantial part of post-enlightenment moral 
philosophy.27 
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MacIntyre compares the distributive conclusions of Rawls and Nozick. He concludes 
that neither of the two impugns the approach of the other; in the sense that each 
operates independently of the other, that is, behind an imagined veil of ignorance, and 
with a set of entitled rights.28 MacIntyre seems to be saying that each occupies a 
different justificatory space, so that one does not make a direct statement against the 
other; the two results are incompatible, but they are not derived from arguments that 
are directly contrary to each other. This he describes as their incommensurability, 
which suggests that they are unable to be compared by any independent or common 
standard.29 
 
This is virtually all MacIntyre has to say on the subject of contemporary liberalism. 
Yet, his conception of enlightenment and emotivist influences in moral philosophy 
can be applied meaningfully to these theories. The obvious first step is to identify the 
ways in which emotivism is present. The autonomous, emotivist self resembles the 
antecedently individuated self implied by Rawlsian liberalism. In addition, the 
individualism implicit in the unencumbered self, and in the neutrality of liberalism 
between various conceptions of the good, resembles the emotivist attitude to moral 
judgment: that there is no rational superiority of one conception over another, and that 
each merely reflects the autonomous choice of each individual.  
 
The difference is that this emotivism extends only to the good; to various conceptions 
of how it is best to live. Rawls and the other theorists search for universal 
justifications of rational liberal structures, in a way that reflects enlightenment aims. 
But these are not, with the possible exception of Nozick, expressed in ways that are 
congruent with the enlightenment way, as logical structures derived from universal 
conceptions. Instead, they incorporate variation in the conceptions of the good that 
people can hold.  
 
This suggests a tension in contemporary liberal theory between the underpinnings of 
emotivism, implied by the autonomous individual and neutrality between conceptions 
of the good, and emotivism’s enlightenment aims to achieve a universal rational 
moral theory or to overcome the separateness of moral theories in the justificatory 
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space. It makes sense, then, that Rawls and Ackerman employ novel justificatory 
strategies in order to reconcile the two. It also makes sense that the liberal theories 
must face the presumptions and biases that MacIntyre ascribes to enlightenment moral 
theories. 
 
In his later book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), MacIntyre considers 
liberalism as a historical movement. He defines a ‘tradition of enquiry’ as being “such 
a movement in the course of which those engaging in that movement become aware 
of it and its direction and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and 
carry enquiries forward”.30 The overt aim of liberal thought, MacIntyre argues, is to 
transcend these traditions, yet the liberal movement itself has become such a tradition. 
 
[T]he project of founding a form of social order in which individuals could emancipate 
themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing to genuinely 
universal, tradition-independent norms was and is … the project of modern liberal, 
individualist society, and the most cogent reasons that we have for believing that the hope of 
the tradition-independent rational universality is an illusion derived from the history of that 
project. For in the course of that history liberalism, which began as an appeal to alleged 
principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself 
been transformed into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the interminability 
of the debate over such principles.31 
 
MacIntyre focuses on the universality of liberalism’s aims, and on its failure to meet 
these aims. This failure is in not recognising its own nature as a tradition, socially and 
philosophically located.  
 
MacIntyre goes on to characterise two central problems of liberalism: the liberal self 
and the common good. He claims that a self is implied that represents a falsely 
unified, well-ordered will, and that this implies the single overarching good of 
liberalism itself.32 These arguments are both familiar: the former is dealt with in the 
preceding section, and the latter emphasises liberalism as a closed system that must 
justify itself as such. What is interesting here is that these criticisms are presented in a 
social context, as part of a critique of historically informed attitudes to moral theory.  
 
Philosopher John Gray has made these arguments more explicit in declaring that 
liberalism has failed in its attempt to attach itself to universal foundations.  
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It is characteristic, and perhaps definite, of liberalism that it should seek to ground the 
historical contingencies of liberal practice in a foundation of universally valid principles…. 
Liberalism, which in its applications to personal conduct aims for toleration, and even 
pluralism, is in its political demands an expression of intolerance, since it denies the evident 
truth that many very different forms of government may, each in its own way, contribute to an 
authentic mode of human well-being…. Because of its universalizing doctrinal zeal, liberal 
thought has always sought to elevate liberal practice into a set of principles, and then to 
demonstrate the unique claim on reason of those principles.33  
 
This argument is a clear expression of the ideas suggested by MacIntyre. It includes 
an explicit acceptance of the closedness of liberal systems, and accuses liberalism 
squarely of making false claims of its moral power. This implicitly denies the 
neutrality of liberalism, a point made more plainly by Gray in a later work when he 
states that it is arguable that the scholarship borne out of A Theory of Justice “has 
done little more than articulate the prejudices of an Anglo-American academic class 
that lacks any understanding of political life in our age”.34 This claim is more brash 
than any made by MacIntyre, but the underlying idea is similar; liberal theory is 
located socially, and the sources of its bias are identified. 
 
The two communitarian criticisms are both important to liberalism. The first sets out 
the idea that a conception of self as unencumbered forms an implicit and contestable 
part of each of these theories. The second accuses liberalism of seeking a rational 
justification appropriate to a universal theory, and of failing to conceive of itself as 
the product of a contingent social and political context. Both of these suggest that the 
early contemporary liberal theories, in both justification and substance, contain a 
liberal bias that undermines any assertions of universality. As such, they repeat and 
illustrate many of the arguments discussed in previous chapters. In particular, the 
more general criticism emphasises the failure of liberalism to achieve its universal 
aims.  
 
MacIntyre’s characterisation of emotivism and enlightenment universalism together 
offers an interesting perspective on liberalism: as aiming at a constructed universal 
moral theory, and, also, admitting the plurality of personal beliefs that are rationally 
insoluble. Rawls’ resolution of this tension, to base the former on the right and restrict 
the latter to the good, has already been doubted. Overall, these communitarian 
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criticisms present a powerful and fundamental challenge to liberal theory, and in 
particular raise the issue of whether and how any moral analysis can overcome the 
bias implied by the social location of its practitioners. 
 
 
2. Liberal responses 
 
2.1 Pluralism in liberal theory 
 
Because communitarianism played so central a role in the development of liberal 
theory, a positive liberal response to communitarianism was required. This came in a 
number of forms: both from Rawls himself, and in the work of other liberal theorists. 
That the communitarian criticism broke down the Rawlsian approach to theory, gave 
theorists the impetus to shift the focus and approach of liberalism. One of the general 
and important aspects of the post-communitarian shift was the holding of difference to 
be the central concern of liberal theory. The most common expression of this is the 
increasing role of a conception of pluralism as part of liberalism.  
 
The idea of pluralism conveys the essential multiplicity or diversity of its subject 
matter. All of contemporary liberal theory recognises pluralism in one way or another. 
A Theory of Justice, for example, works from the premise of a plurality of individual 
conceptions of the good. Often, pluralism featured as a morally disequalising fact of 
the world to be overcome or corrected for by liberalism. After the communitarian 
criticisms, pluralism took on a new prominence in the structure of liberal theories, 
and, ultimately, played the role of the central justificatory concern, superseding 
equality or neutrality.  
 
This pluralism often took a form similar to that described by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin’s 
essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, originally presented in 1958, is probably the most 
significant work of political theory prior to A Theory. Its main task is to set out two 
conceptions of freedom: positive freedom, which means the desire to take control of 
one’s life and to be one’s own master; and negative freedom, which is the absence of 
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interference with one’s body or activity.35 Berlin ultimately prefers the latter 
conception to the former in that it involves less coercion, and, so, is the safer form of 
liberty.36 
 
Berlin also asserts a pluralism of irreducible and potentially conflicting values.37 This 
means that it is not possible for any single human project or system to satisfy all of 
our values, and that conflict, and even tragedy, is the inevitable outcome of any such 
attempt. For this reason, Berlin argues, it is better for a state to be tolerant of different 
values than to risk authoritarian coercion by imposing positive ideals of freedom.  
 
Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more 
humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian 
structures the idea of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. 
It is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of 
them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another…. It is more humane because 
it does not (as the system-builders do) deprive men, in the name of some remote, or 
incoherent, ideal, of much that they have found to be indispensable to their life as 
unpredictably self-transforming human beings.38 
 
In this way, Berlin sees the pluralism of values as being at the centre of his reasoning 
for negative liberty and toleration. By contrast, Rawls relegates differences 
resembling these to the domain of conceptions of the good, which he subordinates to 
matters of the right. The communitarian arguments against his general approach led to 
liberalism granting this pluralism a more central and justificatory role in theory. This 
will be explored by looking at the theories of Walzer, Raz and Gray, and, then, by 
considering in general terms the relationship between pluralism and liberalism.  
 
 
2.2 Walzer’s complex equality
 
 
Michael Walzer is more readily identified as a communitarian than a liberal, yet, in 
his Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) he offers a 
positive and recognisably liberal theory that expresses the idea that justice is not 
absolute or universal, but is relative to social meanings.39 
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Walzer’s theory involves the use of two conceptions, social goods and spheres of 
justice, tied together by the necessity of a complex equality. He argues that the natural 
philosophical impulse in searching for a valid form of equality is to look for some 
underlying unity: “a short list of basic goods, quickly abstracted to a single good; a 
single distributive criterion or an interconnected set”.40 This simple equality, he 
argues, is a misunderstanding of distributive justice, as it ignores its potentially plural 
nature, and claims, instead, that “it is doubtful that it [justice] can be made in only one 
way”.41  
 
The subjects of this distributive justice are goods, conceived broadly and given 
meaning through their social context. All goods, he argues, are social goods; no good 
has meaning independent of the society and culture that values it.42 These goods are 
not only used by us, but our relationship to them informs our identities.43 The plural 
and contextual nature of goods dictates the nature of a complex equality, and directs 
the use of multiple principles of justice. 
 
The questions posed by the theory of distributive justice admit of a range of answers, and 
there is room within the range for cultural diversity and political choice. It’s not only a matter 
of implementing some singular principles or set of principles in different historical settings. 
No one would deny that there is a range of morally permissible implementations. I want to 
argue more than this: that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that 
different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with 
different procedures, by different agents; and each of these differences derive from different 
understandings of the social goods themselves – the inevitable product of historical and 
cultural particularism.44 
 
From the foundational premises that goods are the subject of justice, and are plural 
and their meaning contextual, Walzer concludes that justice itself must be plural and 
contextual, and can be conceived only in relation to the society that it affects. 
 
This brings us to the notion of what justice, or complex equality, actually entails. 
Walzer identifies it as the absence of injustice, the latter being characterised by 
dominance and monopoly in the distribution of goods: 
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Dominance describes a way of using social goods that isn’t limited by their intrinsic meanings 
or that shapes those meanings in its own image. Monopoly describes a way of owning or 
controlling social goods in order to exploit their dominance.45 
 
Social goods, Walzer argues, each have their own spheres in which they operate 
“freely, spontaneously and legitimately”.46 The nature of equality involves preventing 
dominance, which means that social goods are allowed to operate only in their own 
spheres. When each of the various spheres of goods functions autonomously, free 
from the influence of the goods of other spheres, then dominance is avoided and 
justice is served.47 This leads Walzer to his principle of non-dominance: 
 
No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y 
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x.48 
 
The task of justice, then, is to define these spheres in relation to a particular society, 
and place boundaries between them. This is the subject of much of the remainder of 
Walzer’s book; each chapter maps out a new sphere of public goods and marks off its 
territory from that of the other spheres. In this vein he looks at social membership, 
security and welfare, money and commodities, education, and political power, among 
other spheres. In relation to money and commodities, for example, Walzer identifies a 
number of illegitimate uses of money, or ‘blocked exchanges’. These include 
engaging in the buying or selling of political power, marriage and procreation rights 
and political offices.49 They are blocked to prevent money from playing a role in other 
social spheres. 
 
By applying the principle of non-dominance, Walzer reaches a set of rules of justice 
that are specific to a particular society, and to the meaning that society gives to its 
goods. This allows the actual principles to be complex and defined by the belief 
system in question. This, Walzer argues, is appropriate to justice since it operates in 
relation to people and meanings that are themselves complex, plural and contextual. 
 
There are an infinite number of possible lives, shaped by an infinite number of possible 
cultures, religions, political arrangements, geographical conditions, and so on. A given society 
is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way – that is in a way faithful to the shared 
understandings of the members.50 
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Walzer finds justice in the faithfulness of the way people live to their shared 
understandings; this is interlaced with the idea that shared understanding will draw 
boundaries between spheres of goods, and prohibit a person gaining influence in one 
sphere merely because of their influence in another. 
 
Walzer’s general approach is refreshingly simple: it is derived from a conception of 
the nature of the subject of justice. It has the communitarian virtue of being based on 
social and shared meaning of goods, rather than being neutral between individual 
conceptions of the good, and, as a consequence, is explicitly contextual and particular. 
In this way, it seems to avoid the communitarian criticisms of liberalism’s conception 
of the unencumbered self, and its reaching for universal justification. It also offers an 
answer to the difficulty inherent in finding a single conception of liberal equality: that 
such a project misunderstands the nature of goods, and that any such equality must be 
complex, that is, plural and contextual. 
 
The substance of Walzer’s theory is also simple: it maps the interplay between an 
understanding of the social meanings of goods, and the separation of their various 
spheres. This separation is a novel and ingenious approach to conceiving justice, and 
accords with many plausible ideas about the improper use of power. It does, however, 
imply a particular structure of goods, and that breaches of the boundaries set out in 
this structure are unjust.  
 
Linda Mullenix describes this approach as resting on a “somewhat fanciful 
assumption that the world’s social goods can be neatly divided into autonomous 
spheres”.51 She describes Walzer’s boundaries as “dressed up truisms” that simply 
repeat familiar ideas of justice.52 However, since these spheres reflect the existing 
social meaning of goods, such a criticism seems beside the point. 
 
Govert Den Hartogh has taken Mullenix’s argument one step further and asserts that 
there is no structural distinction between the spheres; no clear, rational conception of 
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where the boundaries should lie.53 He goes on to point out that, because of the 
complexity of the principles that attach to spheres, different goods within a sphere can 
be distributed according to different principles. A good that is treated differently 
might be part of a complex sphere, or might just as easily form a new autonomous 
sphere. 
 
The concept of “sphere” should therefore be understood as nominalistically as possible. We 
may, for instance, choose to discuss “the sphere of education” or the separate spheres of 
“basic, liberal and professional education” as it pleases us…. Nothing depends on the 
decision; it is only a matter of convenience of exposition.54 
 
Because Walzer has made the application of justice to spheres of goods potentially 
complex and plural, and because of the lack of clear distinction between spheres, it 
seems that the boundaries are neither obvious nor particularly meaningful; there 
seems no necessary difference between setting boundaries between a number of 
spheres, and having a single sphere where various principles of justice apply in 
various different ways to the diverse goods the sphere encompasses. Given these 
difficulties, it seems that Walzer’s spheres and principle of non-dominance are 
valueless. It may be that it is wrong for power in one area to mean power in another; 
but, there is no clear structure of spheres, nor a clear delineation of the proper effect 
of distributive principles, that would allow his system to function.  
 
What remains of Walzer’s theory is the use of social meaning to inform the use of a 
potential plurality of principles. The use of actual social meaning is a particularistic 
and relativistic move. It has been criticised as involving looking essentially at what is, 
rather that what is just, and also for failing to correct for potentially unreasonable or 
ignorant beliefs.55 As has been argued by James O’Fallon: 
 
Walzer’s fragmented good-by-good, sphere-by-sphere analysis of shared social meaning does 
not preclude a replication of the society of apartheid. Depending on the social meaning that a 
society attaches to goods, blacks, Hispanics, or women might find themselves principle-by-
principle, sphere-by-sphere at the bottom of the heap, not meriting education or office, not 
deserving honour, not wanted in association.56 
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Because Walzer relies so heavily on the social meanings of goods to define the 
distributive principles that should be applied, he leaves himself open to this sort of 
argument. He might respond that the social meaning that is being sought is the 
meaning of justice; of what principles should apply, rather than what principles 
actually do apply. This might give the theory a greater ability to be critical and 
dynamic, but, ultimately, Walzer cannot avoid the possibility that it may prescribe the 
perpetuation of a system that by today’s standards is abhorrent. 
 
The point of Walzer’s theory, however, is to view the justice of a society by its own 
standards and meanings. It is not about abolishing slavery or apartheid; it is about 
finding an understanding of justice that is faithful to the beliefs of the people 
involved. In Walzer’s words, “[t]here are no external or universal principles that can 
replace [social meaning]. Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local 
account.”57 Such an account is critical and dynamic because these beliefs are critical 
and dynamic. 
 
The only non-contextual, substantive content Walzer provides is as to the spheres of 
justice and the principle of non-dominance, but the value of these is highly doubtful. 
Without them, rather than a system, Walzer’s theory seems to be more an abstract 
conception of justice as an expression of the shared understandings of those involved. 
But this leaves a number of questions unanswered. Walzer never explains, for 
example, how justice can be given substance out of social meaning, in other words, 
how we get from a common understanding of the subject of justice to a substantive 
and valid system of justice. The justice-content of an understanding of goods and how 
they relate to us is not readily discernible, and this is partly behind criticisms that 
social meaning focuses on what is and not what is just: social meaning may provide 
the backdrop for justice, but it is not justice itself, it is more what various goods mean 
to us.  
 
The process of deriving justice from social meaning, and even of discerning what 
social meaning is in the first place, is difficult and vague. The possibility of using 
such a process simply to justify an existing power structure is very real; as is finding a 
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justice that simply reflects the bias of the individual or group (the point is to find a 
justice that reflects the bias of the whole of society). Walzer offers that: 
 
The appropriate arrangements in our own society are those, I think, of a decentralized 
democratic socialism; a strong welfare state run, in part at least, by local and amateur officials; 
a constrained market; an open and demystified civil service; independent public schools; the 
sharing of hard work and free time; the protection of religious and familial life; a system of 
public honouring free from considerations of rank or class; workers’ control of companies and 
factories; a politics of parties, movements, meetings and public debate.58 
 
This list is arranged in terms of bounded spheres of goods. Some items are obvious 
and scarcely need mentioning; others are contestable and contested. The latter cannot 
reasonably be called social meanings and may simply reflect Walzer’s own beliefs.  
 
Walzer’s theory, then, is founded on the idea that justice is plural and contextual, as 
people and societies are plural and contextual. Taking into account the failure of the 
bounded spheres argument, little further is actually said about the substance of the 
general theory. This has led Den Hartogh to assert that the theory itself is “only a 
disguise”, which hides “a very effective way of doing applied ethics without 
theory”.59 This ‘way’ is to specify and balance principles of justice by looking at the 
social meanings of the corresponding goods, instead of searching for a universal set of 
principles.60  
 
Whether this approach can be practiced without theory is unclear, but it is clear that it 
is expressed by Walzer through theory. What characterises this use of the theory is a 
focus on complexity and pluralism at the substantive level, and particularism (rather 
than universalism) and relativism at the meta-ethical. Although Walzer recommends a 
socially-contextual approach, that does not mean he can be described simply as a 
relativist. As William Galston has recognised, 
 
Walzer’s relativism is actually quite constrained. To begin with, he deploys a non-contextual, 
universalistic, and thoroughly traditional conception of philosophic truth. His entire theory of 
justice is presented as a transcontextual metatheory, structurally valid for all communities…. 
And the nerve of his relativism – the assertion that it is not possible to rank-order social 
worlds – is itself put forward, not as an interpretation of our existence, but as a universal 
truth.61 
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He goes on to identify further universals in Walzer’s theory of the respect for social 
meanings, and of people as culture-creating creatures.62 Like A Theory of Justice, 
Walzer’s theory makes a number of universal claims, including a broad conception of 
the self and the moral value of respect, although both of these have a social rather 
than an individual focus. What is different between these theories of justice is the 
nature of the approach, and of the universality being asserted. Rawls himself 
incorporates a type of pluralism in his theory, but this is in relation to different 
conceptions of the good, and, so, the prescribed liberal response is to design 
institutions according to the right that do not discriminate between these conceptions.  
 
For Walzer, the complex and plural content actually forms part of the substance of the 
theory; instead of trying to sidestep this plurality, it defines how a society ought to 
organise itself in order to be just. Instead of a set structure of distributive principles, 
he argues that we should adopt any of a number of various principles, depending on 
the context of the situation and the social understanding of the goods being 
distributed. This contextual approach represents an interesting step in liberal theory, 
but faces a number of important challenges. Walzer has failed to give an adequate 
justification for his approach beyond the assertion that human understanding is 
complex and plural. There is a distance between this observation and the conclusion 
that no single set of principles can consistently deliver justice, and that justice is to be 
found in our social understanding of the subject matter involved. Also, the method by 
which this meaning can be found and the way in which it can define justice should be 
explained further in order to counter the argument that Walzer’s system simply 
reflects what is, and ignores what is just. The very fact of the plurality and complexity 
of meanings makes the idea of finding and agreeing on a just approach in a particular 
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Joseph Raz entered the liberal debate with the publication of The Morality of Freedom 
in 1986. Instead of being a theory of justice, this book is a far-reaching treatise on 
political morality, and includes a number of parts that are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. As a work of liberal theory, it is known for incorporating aspects of 
communitarianism, and as a critique of the anti-perfectionism and neutrality in earlier 
conceptions of liberal justice.63 
 
Perfectionism is the term used by Rawls to describe a moral theory that aims at 
advancing a particular conception of the good, such as to some expression of 
excellence or culture.64 Rawls explicitly argues against this approach, and, instead, 
that liberal theories should advance the right, and be neutral between conceptions of 
the good.  
 
Raz responds that this neutrality is an illusion. Firstly, there is an implicit liberal bias 
to this neutrality.65 The communitarian argument that liberalism favours the 
individual over communal values is one example of this. Secondly, this position of 
neutrality is dependant on a particular baseline, which is itself not neutral.66 There is 
some value to this argument: even in Ackerman’s highly constrained and history-free 
spaceship narrative, the baseline is shaped by the fact that genetic effects already 
belong to their biological ‘hosts’. This argument does not deny the value of neutrality; 
it simply identifies the implicit baseline and requires of liberal theory that this is 
independently justified – just as Ackerman attempts to justify the allocation of genetic 
entitlements by using the separate principle of genetic non-domination. These 
arguments together suggest that any conception of neutrality is necessarily complex 
and depends on the structural context of the theory in question.  
 
Raz argues that the better liberal response is to eschew any nominal ideas of neutrality 
and anti-perfectionism, and to permit the subjugation of repugnant conceptions of the 
good.67 Instead of neutrality, Raz adopts autonomy as the central liberal concern. In 
order to describe the nature and requirements of this autonomy, a conception of the 
                                                
63
 Mulhall & Swift, op cit, above note 1, p309. 
64
 Rawls, op cit, above note 8, p286. 
65
 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986), p119. 
66
 Ibid, p121.  
67
 Ibid, p417. 
  
177
self is required. In the absence of neutrality, Raz is able to unselfconsciously conceive 
of the autonomous person as being a goal-directed part-author of their own lives, 
whose well-being “consists in the successful pursuits of self-chosen goals and 
relationships”.68 As such, autonomy requires the availability of adequate options, and 
a minimum number of coerced choices.69 
 
This autonomy is constrained in two important ways. Firstly, Raz recognises that 
individuals do not author the whole of themselves; they are already situated within a 
social context that is the background and not solely the outcome of the exercise of 
autonomy.70 Secondly, as a consequence of his perfectionist stance, autonomy is 
constrained by the disapproval of immoral and repugnant ways of life.71 The latter, 
Raz argues, does not represent a significant effect on autonomy.72 
 
Rawls defines perfectionism in a political theory as the championing of some 
particular conception of the best way to live. The question that arises in relation to 
Raz’s theory is how perfectionism can coexist with autonomy; in other words, what 
prevents Raz’s perfectionism from removing every less valuable form of life, until a 
single, ‘best’ conception of the good remains. The answer lies with Raz’s use of 
pluralism: 
 
Moral pluralism claims not merely that incompatible forms of life are morally acceptable, but 
that they display distinct virtues, each capable of being pursued for its own sake. If the active 
and contemplative lives are not merely incompatible but also display distinctive virtues then 
complete moral perfection is unattainable. Whichever form of life one is pursuing there are 
virtues which elude one because they are available only to people pursing alternative and 
incompatible forms of life.73 
 
Because different and incompatible lives have distinct virtues, there is no single way 
of life that society ought to promote. His perfectionism, then, is limited by the fact 
that “there are several maximal forms of life”, rather than just one.74 It subordinates 
only those ways of lives that are manifestly wrong.  
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Raz reinforces this view of pluralism by reference to two additional factors, namely 
the related ideas of social forms and incommensurability. Our well-being depends on 
pursuing comprehensive goals that must, he argues, be based in existing social 
forms.75 These are defined as “forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practiced 
in [a] society”, and that define and determine a person’s success in social pursuits.76 
So, even though he promotes a conception of people as self-authoring, Raz recognises 
both that this authorship is partial, and that it takes place within the context of a 
society. Because goals and well-being are necessary to autonomy, it is itself 
dependant on social forms. 
 
The second factor that supports Raz’s pluralism is the incommensurability of our 
comprehensive goals. He states that: 
 
A and B are incommensurable if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that 
they are of equal value.77 
 
Raz also mentions the mark of incommensurability, which is where neither A nor B is 
better than the other, and this remains the case even when one is improved.78 Both of 
these situations involve the inability to compare the overall value of the two in a 
meaningful way. This incomparability might conceivably be explained in a number of 
ways: as uncertainty as to what criteria to use to compare two things; or, as 
uncertainty as to how to apply an agreed criterion.79  
 
This incommensurability, however, is not an imperfection: 
 
The mistake in this thought is that it assumes that there is a true value behind the ranking of 
options, and that the ranking is a kind of technique for measuring this value. It is true of 
course that when we express a judgment about the value of options we strive to identify what 
is true independently of our valuation. But the ranking which determines the relative value of 
options is not a way of getting at some deeper truth, it constitutes the value of the options. 
Values may change, but such a change is not a discovery of deeper truth. It is simply a change 
in value. Therefore, where there is incommensurability it is the ultimate truth. There is nothing 
further behind it, nor is it a sign of an imperfection.80 
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Although we may choose between activities, or between comprehensive goals to 
pursue, this does not indicate some deeper and true value. Incommensurability means 
then that, although we may prefer one option to another, this does not make one better 
than the other; the judgment, instead, is contextual, and is subject to being different 
between people, or with the same person at different times or in different situations.  
 
That plural ways of life are incommensurable in this way, and their values dependant 
on contingent social forms, defines a strong value-pluralism.81 This pluralism allows 
Raz to champion the autonomous choice between any moral and non-repugnant ways 
of life, despite his explicit perfectionism. It leads him to prescribe broad ideas of 
toleration between individuals, and freedoms that are instrumental to the exercise of 
his autonomy thus constrained.82  
 
The centre of Raz’s liberal scheme is his conception of autonomy, informed on one 
side by an incommensurable pluralism, and on the other by perfectionism. This 
autonomy, to make good choices, must be justified in its value and its location as the 
primary conception of liberal concern. There is a basic tension in Raz’s account of 
autonomy between its absolute value as the most important of all socially valuable 
conceptions, and its restriction in application to choices that are good. As Donald 
Regan points out: 
 
there is no inconsistency in saying that autonomy is autonomy even when it chooses the bad, 
and saying also that autonomy is valuable only when it chooses the good. But there is an 
inconsistency in asserting both of these propositions and in supposing also (as Raz does) that 
autonomy tout court is valuable. These three propositions taken together entail that autonomy 
which chooses the bad both is and is not valuable.83 
 
Raz needs to admit, either, that autonomy exercised badly is not autonomy, or that 
autonomy is not always valuable. The first of these would mean that the definition of 
autonomy depends on the moral value of the actual choice made. The second would 
subordinate autonomy to that value, and, so, place Raz’s identification of autonomy as 
the central liberal concern in jeopardy. Both conflict with the general principles of 
that theory, and bring his conception of autonomy into question. 
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Perhaps the better way of understanding Raz’s account of autonomy is by looking to 
the nature of its justification. There has been some debate as to whether this autonomy 
is universally valuable or merely valuable to liberal societies.84 At times, The Morality 
of Freedom does seem to justify autonomy in a contextual way: 
 
In western industrial societies a particular conception of individual well-being has acquired 
considerable popularity. It is the ideal of personal autonomy. It transcends the conceptual 
point that personal well-being is partly determined by success in willingly endorsed pursuits 
and holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual well-
being.85 
 
At other points in the book, Raz seems to endue autonomy with a special and 
universal quality. He begins by asking whether autonomy is only valuable if chosen, 
and decides that this idea is attractive but incorrect.  
 
There are powerful reasons telling in favour of the view that personal autonomy is only one 
valuable style of life, valuable to those who choose it, but that those who reject it are none the 
worse for that. Their refutation is important to gain a proper understanding of the special 
features of autonomy which distinguish it from ordinary valuable options, such as playing 
golf, or becoming a nurse.86 
 
Raz expands on this position in a later, explicit response to arguments about the 
contextuality of autonomy. He does state that, to be a universal value, it must be the 
case that “people who lack personal autonomy cannot be completely well-off, or have 
a completely good life.”87 He then seems to suggest that societies where there is no 
personal autonomy can, in fact, have a high level of well-being. Raz states:  
 
I do not see that the absence of choice diminishes the value of human relations or the display 
of excellence in technical skills, physical ability, spirit and enterprise, leadership, scholarship, 
creativity, or imaginativeness, which can all be encompassed in such lives.88 
 
Raz does not clearly deny that autonomy has universal value, but, on balance, he 
seems to employ some sort of contextual argument for its justification. He suggests 
above that, in western societies, autonomy is essential to individual well-being, and 
that the individual cannot avoid or opt out of this. He also suggests that a citizen of a 
non-autonomous society can, nonetheless, enjoy a great measure of well-being. This 
seems to imply that his account of autonomy is relevant to those socialised in an 
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autonomous environment. To these people, choice is a necessary aspect of the value 
of what is chosen.89  
 
This is a significant step away from earlier universal liberal theories. Here, the 
conception of central concern is contingent on pre-existing liberal characteristics. In 
this way, Raz’s theory, insofar as it sets the foundation for a liberal theory of justice, 
is an admittedly biased liberal document. Its value is asserted only for those from a 
certain tradition, and its project is only to structure pre-existing liberal attitudes to 
justice in a cogent and attractive way. 
 
There are a number of challenges faced by this contextualised conception of 
liberalism. Perhaps the greatest is the strong account of autonomy suggested by Raz. 
He argues not only that it is essential to our personal well-being, but that it is essential 
in such a way that society’s primary ethical concern is to best satisfy autonomy. The 
first of these is questionable; it might be argued, for example, that choice does not 
play the role that Raz suggests, and that we might be able to achieve some level of 
well-being without the extensive autonomy that we westerners now enjoy.  
 
But the latter is a more serious claim, and means that, effectively, autonomy, or the 
availability of good options, is the highest political goal; higher than the substance of 
the options themselves. The absolute strength and priority of this assertion seems to 
belie the plurality and complexity that Raz attributes to our other political beliefs and 
understandings.  
 
For such a strong and yet contextual theory of autonomy to succeed, three things 
would need to be achieved. Firstly, an extensive sociological account of autonomy 
would be required. In particular, Raz would need to explain why autonomy is the 
essential feature of liberal societies, and not of non-western societies, when both 
feature a significant degree of freedom, formed and constrained by political and social 
institutions and practices. Secondly, this account of autonomy would need to be 
related to a conception of morality and justice, in order to be justified as the proper 
focus of a liberal political system. In particular, this justification must explain the 
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subordination of other socially valued conceptions. Finally, the contextual account of 
autonomy must be set within a meta-ethical theory that justifies a contextual ethical 
approach. Raz must explain why this manner of justifying moral theory is appropriate, 
as opposed, say, to looking for some universal truth that may be less obviously a part 
of the actual substance of a particular society or culture.  
 
Raz satisfies these requirements in only a superficial way. He offers a socialised 
account of autonomy and well-being that may be quite powerful, but that is examined 
only cursorily. The moral reason for pursuing autonomy so ardently is presumably to 
promote well-being within a liberal state, but this is not explored sufficiently, and 
neither is his meta-ethical approach. These shortcomings may be attributed to the fact 
that Raz’s contextual account of autonomy is tentative and fleeting. It seems that he 
has not addressed fully the difficulties in using a contextual justification, and that this 
results in a measure of reticence on his part. Ultimately, this means that Raz does not 
offer a coherent account of autonomy as the central liberal concern.  
 
The two other aspects of Raz’s theory, pluralism and perfectionism, should also be 
examined briefly. Raz’s pluralism is defined by incommensurability between our 
comprehensive goals. Raz’s account of incommensurability rests on the idea that 
sometimes A is neither less nor more valuable than B, and, yet, they are not the same. 
Regan notes that this does not prove the existence of incommensurability, merely its 
logical possibility.90 He makes two alternative suggestions that are not denied by 
Raz’s account, and, yet, undermine his conclusions about incommensurability. The 
first concerns the fact that Raz’s examples are taken from an individual point of view, 
rather than from the perspective of justice. A personal choice, such as whether to take 
a walk or read a book, may be incommensurable from the perspective of the 
individual involved, but this does not mean that it is incommensurable for the 
purposes of social value.91 It may be that their social value is subjective to the 
individual, but objective from the perspective of justice, and, in fact, this is quite 
plausible. In this way, Raz appears to fail to make the link between personal and 
moral incommensurability.  
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Secondly, what Raz sees as incommensurable, may simply be a hard decision. The 
fact that people do choose between options might indicate that they are not 
incommensurable in the way Raz supposes. The fact that people agonize over such 
decisions, Regan suggests, may, in fact, show that they are commensurable, otherwise 
such lengthy deliberation would be pointless.92 Both of these points are valid, and 
show that Raz’s account of incommensurability is not sufficiently explained to justify 
its role in explaining why autonomy is valuable in a perfectionist system. 
 
Finally, Patrick Neal discusses the general distinction between perfectionism and anti-
perfectionism. He characterises this distinction as being between a liberal recognition 
of choosing freely and choosing correctly, or, in other words, of respecting the 
individual’s will and respecting the individual’s intellect.93 Anti-perfectionism, such 
as is advocated by Rawls, respects the will of the individual and is tolerant and non-
judgmental.94 However, Neal doubts that such an approach could allow for the 
agreement and order necessary to a theory of social organisation.95 This leads him to 
examine Raz’s approach as an answer to this problem.  
 
Raz’s perfectionism, Neal argues, must involve drawing a line between permitted and 
prohibited behaviour that is objective in nature.96 This is because perfectionism is 
fundamental to his approach, and is not contextualised in the same way as autonomy. 
In other words, it is part of the foundation for government authority, rather than a 
consequence of the society in which we find ourselves. This means the an objective 
standard of action is incorporated into justice: 
 
What is objectionable about Raz’s perfectionism, in my view, is that it acts to consecrate the 
acts by which the lines of inclusion/exclusion are drawn in the name of a reason which is 
understood to be noncontingent and noncontestable, a reason which acts, ironically enough in 
a theory so critical of neutralist liberalism, as a disinterested sovereign power untainted by the 
politics which it judges.97 
 
In this way, Neal argues that Raz incorporates an objective standard of reason that 
transcends the incommensurability between comprehensive goals and the 
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contextualised account of autonomy. He suggests that it is this inconsistency that is 
behind Raz’s reluctance to actually identify any prohibited actions.98 This argument is 
compelling, and seems to open Raz’s theory up to the bias that should be excluded 
from his perfectionism. 
 
Neal concludes with respect to the will and intellect models of liberal justice, that 
both are clearly flawed: 
 
To affirm the intellect model at the expense of the will model is to have become frozen into 
the perspective of authority and the (entirely legitimate) concern of trying to legitimate it…. 
To affirm the will model at the expense of the intellect model is similarly to have become 
frozen into the perspective of the subject and the (entirely legitimate) concern of trying to 
protect it from the fallout arising from the contingencies of even “justified” authority.99 
 
The preoccupation of the intellect model with authority stems from the idea that 
consent cannot be readily used to justify it, as it is, by definition,s contrary to the 
(wrong) beliefs and (bad) actions of many. This means that Raz faces the difficulty of 
justifying his standard of reasonableness, and its effect on removing certain goals. The 
will model can appeal to consent, since it champions the unadulterated beliefs of 
individuals, but the side-effect of this is the lack of agreement or a common 
understanding between people. 
 
This analysis is misleading. Rawls, for example, is the archetypal anti-perfectionist in 
positing a theory that is neutral between people with different conceptions of the 
good. However, as Neal recognises, Rawls’ theory is not open to all possible forms of 
the good.100 It does, in fact, imply general conceptions of the good of the 
unencumbered self, both of which are subordinated to the right. Similarly, liberal 
perfectionists, such as Raz, do not enforce a particular way of life on all citizens; 
rather, they define some space within which individuals are able do choose their own 
goals and act accordingly. Both approaches suffer from the problem of legitimating 
restrictions on goals and action.  
 
Where the two approaches differ is in terms of structure, or in the way that liberal 
space is defined. This difference, however, seem insufficient to warrant thinking of 
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the two approaches as antithetical, or of conceiving of the perfectionist/anti-
perfectionist distinction as being a fundamental liberal distinction. In truth, all liberal 
theories of justice will be, both, open to alternative conceptions of the good, and, 
structurally and substantively closed; and, what is important is that this dualism 
expresses a valid meta-ethical approach and justificatory structure.  
 
The Morality of Freedom is a work of political and moral theory whose subject 
stretches beyond the perspective given of it here. Nevertheless, it does assert the 
moral underpinnings of a theory of liberal justice, and, as such, it fails in a number of 
ways. It is significant and interesting in its explicit assertion of perfectionism, its 
contextualised account of autonomy, and its pervasive appeal to an incommensurable 
plurality of goals. However, the accounts of each of these are inadequate: Raz fails to 
justify autonomy as the proper focus of justice; to give a detailed account of 
incommensurability: and, to present a plausible and justified account of perfectionist 
limitations on action. Raz’s work does represent a significant development from 




2.4 Gray’s post-liberalism 
 
The political theory of John Gray is made up of a number of relatively distinct stages. 
The first of these corresponds with the publication of Post-Liberalism in 1993. In this 
book he affirms many of the themes developed by Raz, makes some interesting 
pronouncements on liberal theory, and develops the idea that value-pluralism could 
function as the central liberal concern.  
 
In Liberalisms, an earlier work, Gray seems to declare his goal as being to “clear 
away the rubble, piece by piece, of the grand liberal theories, so as to open up a 
perspective in the political tradition we have inherited.”101 Like MacIntyre, he views 
liberal theory, not as the search for a timeless, universal truth, but, rather, as a 
“historical singularity” that acts only to “summarize or abbreviate (very imperfectly) 
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certain passages in the historical experience of specific liberal societies”.102 He 
suggests that the way forward for post-doctrinal liberalism is to admit its own 
shortcomings, and reformulate itself as a historically limited undertaking.103 Gary 
suggests that the liberal theorist should acknowledge that 
 
there are few universal political dilemmas and no universal solutions. He may adopt liberal 
positions on a variety of questions, and even defend his own liberal order as one among the 
legitimate forms of political order. He may … seek to identify the postulates of liberal society, 
and to give a defence of liberal political morality that aims to be compelling to his readers. 
Whatever he does he will not engage in the vain project of constructing a liberal doctrine. 
Indeed, if his inquiries have a practical aim …, it will be to protect the historical inheritance of 
liberal practice from the excesses of an inordinate liberal ideology.104 
 
Gray’s attitude towards this post-liberal thought is historically-aware, and that seems 
to eschew the role of theory. Instead, he suggests that the proper activity of liberal 
thinkers is to explore liberal ideas, or a liberal system, in a way that is convincing to 
his or her liberal readers. This is how Gray views Raz’s The Morality of Freedom: 
because its justification is contextual, the role of the work itself is not to reveal truth, 
but, rather, to convince people that his is a valuable conception of liberalism, one that 
is worth reproducing in liberal societies.105  
 
In Post-Liberalism, Gray elucidates his own view of liberal contextual thought. At the 
centre of this is an account of value-pluralism that is dependant on our social context. 
 
We are none of us defined by membership in a single community or form of moral life. We 
are ‘suckled on the milk of many nurses’ …, heirs of many distinct, sometimes conflicting, 
intellectual moral traditions. Further, the traditions to which we are heirs are not windowless 
monads, self-sufficient and fully individuated entities which (like pebbles) coexist without 
interacting. They are rather prisms, each of which refracts the light cast by the other traditions 
which environ it, and which together throw into each of us a shifting pattern of colours. The 
complexity and contradictions of our cultural inheritance give to our identities an aspect of 
complexity and even of plurality which is not accidental but … essential to them. For us … 
the power to conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbour dissonant projects and 
perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives with divergent categories and concepts, is 
integral to our identity as reflective beings.106 
 
There are a number of interesting points to be drawn from this powerful statement. 
Gray suggests that the complexity of our cultural contexts informs the plurality of our 
identities. This plurality is not trivial or secondary, but is essential to our selves. This 
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applies to members of the modern western societies, since it is there that “status 
hierarchies are permeable, roles complex and often conflicting and social monitoring 
of personal behaviour intermittent and weak”.107 Like Raz, Gray presents a view of 
liberalism that is justified only in relation to western societies. Unlike Raz, Gray 
focuses primarily on the pluralism of people’s identities and their values.  
 
The view of the self conveyed here is not of the Rawlsian unencumbered self; nor is it 
the communitarian self, constituted by the relationship to his or her community. 
Rather, it is one that acknowledges the importance of our cultural context. Gray’s 
modern self is culturally constituted; but rather than embodying a single set of 
authoritative beliefs, it comprises a number of overlapping and potentially 
contradictory ideas and groups, none of which “ever claims the entirety of our life or 
loyalty”.108 
 
As an explanation of our modern identities, Gray’s account is quite compelling. This 
identity-pluralism is then connected with a value-pluralism through an explanation of 
incommensurability. Gray adopts Berlin’s account of the incommensurability between 
ultimate and objective, yet uncombinable ends.109 Gray is careful that his value-
pluralism is objective, rather than relativist or sceptical. This means  
 
that ultimate values are knowable; that they are many, that they often conflict and are 
uncombinable, and that in many of such conflicts there is no overarching standard whereby 
their claims are rationally arbitrable.110 
 
Unlike Raz, Gray makes it clear that his conception of pluralism goes beyond the 
subjective choices of individuals, and so is relevant to an account of justice. 
Interestingly, despite his historical focus, Gray rejects intuitionism as relevant to 
ethics on the grounds that it “sanctifies the deliverances of local knowledge, however 
restrictive or distorted they may be”.111 To complete Gray’s conception of the modern 
self, he agrees with Raz that in our pluralist lives, autonomy is constitutive of our 
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well-being.112 Consequently, at every stage of our lives we need the freedom to 
choose between plural ends, and to express plural aspects of our lives.  
 
These historical and contextual conceptions of pluralism and autonomy deny “the 
authority of liberalism as a universal, trans-historical and cross-cultural ideal”, and 
leave behind “the historic inheritance of civil society that has now spread to most 
parts of the world”.113 Civil society refers to arrangements of voluntary collective 
action, separate to the state, including “voluntary associations, market exchanges and 
private institutions within and through which individuals having urgent conceptions 
and diverse and often competitive purposes may coexist in peace”.114 These 
arrangements and institutions, and the liberty they engender, are essential to 
liberalism.115 
 
The final point in Gray’s account of post-liberalism is the link between the necessary 
pluralism and autonomy of our modern lives, and liberal civil society. Gray seems to 
make three separate points. Firstly, he notes that a liberal society is one where “the 
richest diversity of forms of flourishing is most likely to be achieved.”116 In a related 
point, because a liberal society respects autonomous choice, it also promotes our 
western sense of well-being and partial self-authorship.117 Finally, a liberal civil 
society protects the epistemic freedoms of people, namely the freedoms of inquiry and 
expression. These are significant because they allow us to explore what he calls the 
‘intimations of incommensurability’ suggested by interactions between cultures.118 
Because of the level of these interactions, Gray asserts that this justification for liberal 
civil society is near-universal, meaning that his liberal conception is theoretically 
contextual, but in today’s world would be almost ubiquitous. 
 
Gray’s conception of liberalism is persuasive in a number of ways. It builds on Raz’s 
contextual account, but offers a more convincing sociological picture that combines 
pluralism, autonomy and a compelling account of the relationship between individuals 
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and communities. The important central difference between the two is the focus in 
Gray’s work on value-pluralism, as opposed to autonomy. This deepens the 
contextual understanding of liberal civil society.  
 
Because his sociological account of the western, modern self is more extensive, Gray 
avoids some of the problems from which Raz suffers. This also allows a closer 
examination of the links between his account and justice. Gray argues explicitly in 
favour of a liberal civil society on the grounds that it promotes a rich diversity of 
human flourishing, allows examination of cross-cultural incommensurability, and 
promotes our autonomous well-being. However, he fails to explain the moral value of 
such a rich diversity. Even if the social fact of value-pluralism were to be admitted, 
this does not necessarily mean that diversity is valuable. Gray offers no other 
conception of diversity, or the reason for its importance.  
 
The same applies to his examination of incommensurability. That two goals cannot be 
compared or combined does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that examination of 
the differences between the two is important. In fact, it might be argued that, in the 
context of incommensurability, such effort is pointless. In relation to Gray’s final 
argument, the promotion of our well-being has definite value in relation to our 
individual interests; but this is not, by itself, a sufficient argument on which to base 
the political organisation of a society, nor would Gray want his argument to be 
reduced to one of contextual well-being.  
 
Deep and compelling though Gray’s conception of the modern self and his 
understanding of the interplay between individual and community are, these are not 
sufficient to support the moral conclusions he draws. Admittedly, he devotes only a 
minimal part of his book to these positive arguments, and describes his conception of 
the liberal civil society only vaguely. However, the tenor of Post-Liberalism is the 
peeling back of liberal-doctrine from liberal thought to see what remains; and Gray’s 
moral account of this core liberal residue seems inadequate.  
 
This inadequacy cannot discount the argument that, into his pluralism-autonomy 
framework, Gray pours his own moral beliefs and biases; an ironic conclusion since 
this is one of the accusations he makes against Rawlsian theory. One might reply that 
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the moral arguments he makes are valid since they convey western ideals: to explore 
difference and to embrace diversity. This goes against Gray’s assertion that 
intuitionism is an improper part of ethics, and would lead to a number of the problems 
relating to the use of social understandings in justice that were discussed in relation to 
Walzer’s work.  
 
Gray later distances himself from this post-liberal approach. In Enlightenment’s 
Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (1995), he adopts an 
account of value-pluralism that is explicitly non-liberal. He states firstly that  
 
[v]alue-pluralism cannot entail, or ground, liberalism in any general, still less universal way. 
The historical fact of a diversity of conceptions of the good, or of world-views, in a particular 
society may be a good reason for the adoption of liberal institutions in that society; but if 
value-pluralism is true, the range of forms of genuine human flourishing is considerably larger 
than can be accommodated within liberal forms of life. As a matter of logic alone, it is safe to 
say that value-pluralism cannot mandate liberalism.119 
 
Gray states that even in the context of western value-pluralism, there is no universal 
grounding or necessary link between this and a system of liberalism. The reason for 
this is simply that liberal civil society prohibits valuable forms of life and valuable 
ends that, because of incommensurability, we cannot say are objectively better or 
worse than any other. This argument is a shift from Gray’s earlier work, and he makes 
this shift explicit. 
 
The post-liberal view seems to me now to be mistaken. It is mistaken in arguing that strong 
value-pluralism is, in contemporary historical circumstances, a good reason for the universal 
or near-universal adoption of a Western-style civil society, in any of its varieties. In political 
milieux which harbour a diversity of cultural traditions and identities, such as we find in most 
parts of the world today, the institutional forms best suited to a modus vivendi may well not be 
the individualist institutions of liberal civil society but rather those of political and legal 
pluralism.120 
 
Instead of value-pluralism forming the centre of a liberal theory of justice, Gray shifts 
to a non-liberal political pluralism that aims only at the pragmatic accommodation 
implied by a modus vivendi. This system aims at permitting forms of human 
flourishing that “require as their matrices non-liberal social and political 
structures”.121 Despite this, it recognises the link between individual well-being and 
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cultural contexts, so that Gray notes that, under such a pluralist structure, various 
cultural forms would exist.122 
 
This conception of human flourishing is so broad as to include ways of life that are 
fundamentally destructive to others. For this reason it is necessary for Gray to set 
some minimal standard for a valid way of life or culture. In his later book, Two Faces 
of Liberalism, Gray suggests criteria of legitimate government. This should include, in 
contemporary circumstances: 
 
a rule of law and the capacity to maintain peace, effective representative institutions, and a 
government that is removable by its citizens without recourse to violence…[,] the capacity to 
assure the satisfaction of basic needs and to protect minorities from disadvantage.123 
 
These criteria are certainly a necessary part of Gray’s system, yet they mean the 
incorporation of a number of seemingly universal rules, as well as limitations placed 
on the flourishing that an individual or group can achieve, since this flourishing 
cannot go so far as to undermine the legitimacy of the state. William Curtis argues 
that this makes Gray’s modus vivendi surprisingly intolerant: 
 
Ways of life that violate minimal standards are illegitimate, but this potentially indicts the vast 
majority of ways of life that one finds in human experience. For example, although, … Gray 
suggests that nonliberal medieval ways of life instantiate goods and are thus legitimate, it is 
clear that such ways of life are illegitimate because they presuppose a feudal social order that 
fails to meet most if not all of the minimal standards…. In fact, it is difficult to think of 
regimes that adequately meet these standards over time that are not liberal.124 
 
In Gray’s defence, he does suggest that these are contemporary expressions of 
universal criteria, so that a medieval society might meet the standards relevant to their 
historical context. Even taking this into account, Gray’s criteria do seem to describe a 
modern, minimally-liberal state. It seems that, in the absence of close examination 
and justification of each of these criteria, and an explanation of their relationship to 
his pluralist ideas, he might, again, be incorporating his own beliefs and 
understanding of liberal justice into the structure of his theory. 
 
Gray faces a more basic problem: just as his earlier liberal pluralism depends on a 
necessary link between value-pluralism and liberalism, a link here is needed between 
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value-pluralism and modus vivendi. As with liberalism, modus vivendi is one response 
to the fact of pluralism, but it is not the only response. As Robert Talisse has pointed 
out, there is nothing “contradictory about the idea of a state promoting a single way of 
life while openly acknowledging that other ways of life are also good”.125 In fact, this 
corresponds to the fate of any individual who subscribes to value-pluralism; so, it 
could be argued that just as a person must choose, so must a state. This is not a liberal 
result, but it is no less justified than a modus vivendi. 
 
Gray’s justification of his conception of modus vivendi seems to depend on the 
diversity of human flourishing that it would permit, more so than a liberal regime. 
However, the position of diversity as the overriding political value needs to be 
justified in a way that Gray completely fails to do. It is clear also that his system 
would stifle this diversity in a number of ways: by setting a moral minimum, but also 
by the accommodation that a modus vivendi implies. In an earlier criticism, Talisse 
argues that Gray’s system involves reciprocity among conflicting groups: 
 
Gray’s modus vivendi depends on citizens acknowledging that the ways of life opposed to 
their own may realise distinct human goods, and that the proponents of these other doctrines 
are not necessarily in error … [H]is modus vivendi requires that the contending ways of life 
respect each other.126 
 
This requirement places demands on groups that could potentially constrain their 
ways of flourishing, as it dictates how each group should value their culture, and their 
relationship to other groups. It almost requires an acceptance of value-pluralism on a 
group level that seems contrary to the ideal of encouraging diversity. As Curtis 
comments, this “substantive ethic of mutual respect … is difficult to square with 
Gray’s quest for moral minimalism”.127  
 
In all, Gray’s attempt to justify a modus vivendi between various cultural groups rests 
on an unexamined and unjustified account of the value of permitting the greatest 
diversity of human flourishing. It seems to imagine a society of distinct groups 
dictating monism to their members, but acting as pluralists in the public sphere, a 
picture that is at odds with Gray’s earlier and richer conception of the modern person. 
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This system does not allow unrestricted flourishing, but, rather, imposes various 
constraints, which in turn seem to reflect his own minimally-liberal leanings. Even if 
he were to justify his view of diversity and overcome the various constraints, the 
resulting system would fail to permit all forms of human flourishing, since not all 
forms could conceivably ever be realised at the same time anyway. Even a wholly 
permissive society, for example, would prevent those forms of flourishing that, in 
Gray’s terms, require as their matrices more restrictive social and political structures. 
It is always necessary to allow some, and prohibit other, forms of flourishing, and it is 
the nature and substance of the structure that informs the relationship between the two 
that is the concern of liberal theory.  
 
 
3. Liberal pluralism 
 
This chapter concerns the communitarian criticisms of liberalism, and the initial 
responses to these. In particular, it focuses on the developing and expanding role that 
pluralism plays as part of liberal theory. The role of pluralism in contemporary liberal 
theory goes back to A Theory of Justice; Rawls’ approach involves recognising and 
permitting a broad pluralism in the domain of conceptions of the good. The difference 
here is that, in the wake of communitarianism, the centrality and importance of 
pluralism has grown. In this section some features these theories will be examined. 
 
In structural terms, the new attitude towards pluralism has replaced neutrality as the 
conception that defines the liberal space within which we are permitted to act: where 
once freedoms would come from a state remaining neutral between conceptions of the 
good, now this restraint comes from the recognition of the value-pluralism of these 
conceptions. From a justificatory standpoint, this pluralism, as expressed in the 
variations between individuals, is no longer a factor for liberalism to overcome, to 
ignore or to correct by way of redistribution; instead, it is the very reason that 
liberalism is valuable as a political approach, because it acknowledges the 
incommensurability between persons, groups and cultures. This liberalism is not 
designed to overcome or manage pluralism, but, rather, it identifies pluralism as both 




In terms of liberal theory as a response to moral uncertainty, this represents a 
fundamental shift. Whereas the earlier theorists aim for a universal justification of a 
liberal theory of justice, these post-communitarian thinkers tends to employ a 
contextual justification that results in a less structured and less settled system of social 
organisation. They are careful, perhaps with the exception of Walzer, to distinguish 
between their contextual approach and both relativism and scepticism. The approach 
of liberal pluralism is that the fact of pluralism, whether contingent or universal, 
justifies the liberal state. If this does not imply moral relativism or scepticism, it does 
at the least show an incomparability between the fundamental units of political 
justice, which denies a closely-structured approach to political theory, and brings into 
question the possibility of any clear and meaningful political prescription. 
 
 
3.1 Contextual justification 
 
The theories of Walzer and Raz incorporate conceptions of pluralism, but without 
these becoming the central focus: social meaning plays the central role in Walzer’s 
work, as does the contextual but essential value of autonomy with Raz. Together with 
the various works of Gray, these post-communitarian liberalisms express the themes 
of historicism, social meaning and contextuality, as opposed to the Rawlsian focus on 
theory, structure and universality. These new and closely linked themes, in effect, 
respond to the communitarian criticisms of liberalism. The use of historicism and 
social meaning shift liberalism away from the unencumbered self, and tend to adopt a 
position where a person’s beliefs and conception of the good are part of a broader 
historical and social experience. The contextual justifications and historical 
explanations of liberalism’s core values represent a shift away from enlightenment 
approaches to moral theory. 
 
This new approach brings with it new justificatory challenges. Whereas earlier 
theories attempt at a rational and universal expression of moral justice, these 
contextually justified approaches derive the structure and content of justice from the 
shape of our western cultural values. The obvious initial requirement of this is a 
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socio-historical account of the relevant aspect of western society. Even if a 
convincing account is rendered, there is something disconcerting about a contextual 
justification, and not just that the result is contingent rather that universal. Strictly 
speaking, all moral justification is contextual: it may depend on the nature of reality 
or on human nature, but all moral theory begins from some real foundation. A Theory 
of Justice, for example, begins from a position that is characterised by circumstances 
of justice, and a conception of people as morally capable beings.128  
 
It is not the fact of contextuality, then, but rather the nature of the particular context 
involved that makes the resulting justification disturbing. In particular, these theories 
tend to depend on some essential feature of western society. Such a feature may be 
transitory or accidental; it may be complex and impossible to define; it may itself be 
the subject of significant difference and dissent. What is difficult to accept is that 
from the utter complexity and, as has been asserted, plurality of accepted beliefs, can 
be drawn a single principle of political legitimacy, from which is derived a complex 
and ubiquitous structure of justice. This approach seems strained. The difficulty is in 
pulling from the nebula of thought and understanding a single conception that is 
rationally articulated, and built into a great moral structure that is not merely 
descriptive or influential, but is the best expression of justice available. 
 
This is clearest in relation to Raz, who uses a conception of autonomy to direct his 
system of morality. This autonomy is drawn from western society, and is championed 
enthusiastically by him. The validity of this approach is suggested by the broadness of 
the conception itself; autonomy or personal freedom is itself a complex and difficult 
ideal that, in some form, plays an underlying role in almost any conceivable and 
complete idea of value, and has a special normative place in western morality. Despite 
this, it is one conception of moral value among many; it does not even incorporate the 
realisation of any material end, merely the opportunity to realise. 
 
Walzer’s approach is more substantively than structurally contextual. For him, shared 
social understandings express principles of justice (excluding the universal separation 
between spheres). This approach is clearly contextual, as it depends on social 
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understanding, but Walzer overcomes the problem of simplifying social meaning, as 
he is not limited to a single conception. However, his approach would need to explain 
the means by which justice could be actually realised out of this social meaning. 
While incorporating all the complexity of social belief, Walzer fails to identify how 
this could be distilled into a coherent account of justice.  
 
The approach of contextual value-pluralism has an additional attraction in that it 
implies a general and foundational variation in social belief and understanding. 
However, this brings its own difficulties. At this stage it can be concluded that 
socially contextual approaches to justice, however they are conceived, are not 
necessarily wrong, but face a substantial justificatory burden. 
 
It should also be noted that similar problems of complexity apply in some form to any 
liberal theory that founds justice on a single conception or idea, as were featured in 
the analysis of the earlier chapters. For contextual justifications, this issue is brought 
into sharp focus in that differences in our actual beliefs and understandings are more 
readily perceptible than those of morality or human nature generally, and arguments 
that a single conception can faithfully represent the whole are less convincing. 
 
 
3.2 Conceiving pluralism  
 
The project of liberal pluralism depends on an acceptable conception of pluralism. A 
typical approach is to identify the persistent disagreement between people on what is 
to be valued, and characterise this difference as being incommensurable. This means 
that there is no possible means of combining the values and belief systems of a 
population of people into a unitary system of value such as to guide a theory of 
justice. From this fact of pluralism a liberal system can then be derived. 
 
But, the fact of pluralism is by no means unimpeachable, and has been described itself 
as a controversial moral truth.129 On this view, the acceptance of pluralism can be 
seen as an admission that the fundamental nature of moral or social value is plural. 
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Yet pluralists, such as Gray, while asserting the very real incommensurability 
between values, deny that this invariably means relativism or scepticism: that personal 
conceptions of value relate and are relevant only to the valuer; and that we cannot 
know the value of any personal set of beliefs and values.  
 
Objective pluralism … affirms that ultimate values are knowable, that they are many, that they 
often conflict and are uncombinable, and that in many of such conflicts there is no 
overarching standard whereby their claims are rationally arbitrable: there are conflicts among 
the incommensurables.130 
 
Gray’s ultimate values are real and have objective moral value, it is just that they are 
potentially in conflict with other values in a way that is not reasonably resolvable. 
This pluralism does not infer a relative or subjective value, but, rather, means an 
incomparability between objective values. Another value-pluralist and liberal, 
William Galston, takes a similar position: 
 
Pluralism is not the same as relativism. Philosophical reflection supports what ordinary 
experience suggests – a nonarbitrary distinction between good and bad or good and evil. For 
pluralism as for any serious position, the difference between (say) saving innocent lives and 
shedding innocent blood is part of the objective structure of the valuational universe.131 
 
Each of these value-pluralists takes the position that there is real, objective content to 
moral value, and, so, endorses pluralism without adopting a radically uncertain moral 
view.  
 
These views of value themselves are substantively contestable: it could be argued that 
our choice of ends can in fact be compared in some meaningful way; or, that an 
attempt to judge between our chosen ends is not relevant to justice anyway, and that 
moral value consists not in what we might choose or believe, but, rather, a rational 
view of value informed by a conception of human or moral nature. At the very least, 
value-pluralism is sceptical towards a singular rational conception of what is relevant 
to just social arrangements. Implicit in it is the rejection of a monist moral conception, 
in favour of a searching for justice in relation to the ends chosen by morally capable 
individuals.  
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In this way, the conception of pluralism is itself a complex moral assertion. It cannot 
just be a socio-historical fact, but has significant moral consequences, otherwise it 
would simply be the fact of disagreement. Although it draws on our experience of 
conflict and the seeming implausibility of one set of values or value system being 
shown to be true, this is a moral conclusion and one that should not be made without 
justification. Within the context of liberal theory, this pluralism should be clearly 
explored, and its moral aspect should cohere with the remainder of the theory. The 
work of both Gray and Galston in this respect seem, as moral theories of value, to be 
tentative and embryonic.  
 
 
3.3 Pluralism and liberalism  
 
After laying down some conception of value-pluralism, the liberal theorist’s next task 
is to find a viable and necessary link, whether universal or contextual, between 
pluralism and liberalism. The relationship between the two, as moral conceptions, is a 
difficult one; it can be characterised as including at once both antipathy and 
sympathy.  
 
This sympathy comes from the openness of liberalism. The liberty to pursue the ends 
one chooses, within particular liberal boundaries, coheres closely with the idea that 
these ends are, by nature, plural and incomparable. The unwillingness of liberalism to 
promote particular ways of life expresses the pluralistic idea that none could be 
demonstrated to be deserving of this focus. In this regard, there is clearly much that is 
similar between pluralism and liberalism, from Rawls’ attitude towards justice and the 
good, to the neutrality and the equal respect of later liberal thinkers. 
 
The antipathy between pluralism and liberalism is expressed by Gray’s later work, 
when he notes that liberalism could not accommodate all the plural forms of genuine 
human flourishing.132 John Kekes explores this matter in more depth in The Morality 
of Pluralism (1993). He suggests that the liberal tendency to identify one particular 
liberal value and prioritise it over all others is contrary to pluralism. 
                                                
132




[T]he reason why that matters is that pluralists deny that there are any overriding values. In 
fact, it is an essential claim of pluralism that all of our values are conditional. Indeed, the 
unjustifiability of regarding any values as overriding is a straightforward implication of the 
incommensurability and incompatibility of values, which excludes a highest value, a medium 
for comparing values, as well as a canonical scheme for ranking values. It seems, therefore, 
that liberals who regard some values as overriding cannot consistently adopt pluralism as 
well.133 
 
It is the quality of overridingness that Kekes identifies as the basic inconsistency 
between liberalism and pluralism. He goes on to examine neutrality-based systems of 
liberalism, whereby a plurality of conceptions of the good are permitted within a 
procedural system of justice that champions liberal values. Such a system leads him to 
ask why this pluralism is constrained, and why it is not “extended across the whole 
range of values, including the procedural and substantive ones”.134 His answer is that 
there is no valid reason for this limitation. 
  
Pluralists object to the liberal ideal not because of the diagnosis of danger that inspires it but 
because it is a misdirected attempt to avoid the danger. The way to avoid the state’s favouring 
some values over others is not to give power to the state to enforce some procedural values as 
overriding, for that would merely increase the danger. Rather it is to make sure that the values 
the state favours will be hospitable to the flourishing of the widest possible plurality of values. 
And the first step toward achieving that is to make sure that the state has no overriding 
commitment to any particular value, be it procedural or substantive.135 
 
Kekes’ argument against liberalism is against its procedural rather than its substantive 
content; the latter implies neutrality between conceptions of the good, whereas the 
former identifies particular liberal values that prevail over and inform this neutrality. 
In other words, Kekes’ argument is not against the openness of liberal theory, the 
space that its liberties define, but, rather, its closedness, and, in particular, that this 
closedness is achieved through the overridingness of certain liberal values, be they 
some conception of autonomy, equality or neutrality.  
 
There are two initial arguments that could be made against Kekes’ position. The first 
is that he is concerned with theories of liberalism that champion particular values, 
and, although there are many such forms, the type of liberalism that is most amenable 
to a pluralist conception is one that focuses on the fact of pluralism itself. The 
differences between this and older forms of liberalism do not seem to be taken 
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seriously by Kekes in either this book, or in his later work, Against Liberalism.136 But, 
within this fact lies his probable response: that even in liberal theories focussed more 
clearly on pluralism, there is present a drive that is not pluralistic, but is essentially 
liberal. While these theories might tend to incorporate pluralism more, and so be 
closer to Kekes’ own views, they are still recognisably liberal. This reply matches up 
with Gray’s ultimate criticism of liberalism, that it must close off some forms of 
human flourishing, simply because of its nature as pluralism.137 
 
The second argument against Kekes is that the values that liberalism promotes are, in 
fact, closely allied to pluralism, especially in the case of liberal pluralism. Kekes 
identifies the core liberal (and non-pluralistic) value as being autonomy. However, 
autonomy itself tends to promote pluralism, in that it implies freedoms that allow 
plural conceptions of life to flourish. Again, Kekes (and Gray) would probably 
respond that these are bounded by liberal ideals, and, so, would lead to a social 
organisation that is essentially liberal rather than being essentially plural.  
 
These descriptions of the affinity and antipathy between pluralism and liberalism are 
both valid. One general idea does result from the discussion, that is, that the 
relationship between pluralism and liberalism, in particular, the derivation of 
liberalism from pluralism, is not necessary and automatic. Instead, any theory of 
liberal pluralism must draw clearly the justificatory process by which liberalism is 
inferred from the fact of pluralism. There may be a real affinity between the two, but 
this is not by itself sufficient grounding for liberalism, as any such theory must also 
contain liberal content that is not a simple expression of pluralism, and which 
necessarily sets boundaries on the scope of individual choice and action.  
 
In an important sense, liberal pluralism is best thought of as one possible response to 
pluralism. It is the concern and the burden of any liberal pluralist theory to show that 
it amounts to the best, or at least to a good, response. On these terms, the fact of 
value-pluralism carries no necessary social scheme, and, so, can be employed by 
various theories of social arrangement in various ways. This must also apply, then, to 
Kekes’ pluralism; it must be the case that, while drawing heavily on the idea of 
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pluralism, it is not necessarily implied by it. While it is not possible to explore closely 
his pluralistic theory, it is interesting to consider the general tenor of his positive 
arguments in order to further the idea that no single theory is implied by pluralism, 
and to explicate the relationship between the fact of pluralism and liberal pluralism.   
 
Kekes’ system would require that the state should 
 
first, use its power to protect all the procedural and substantive values necessary for all good 
lives and, second, make it possible for its citizens to pursue, within appropriate limits, such 
secondary values as they may require, beyond the primary values, to make a good life for 
themselves. As to how the state should do it, the pluralistic view is that it should take an active 
role in protecting both primary procedural and primary substantive values, and it should 
maintain neutrality about secondary values whose worth varies with conceptions of the good 
life. But taking an active role does not mean that the state should regard as overriding the 
claim of any particular value. It means that it should do what it can to balance the claims of all 
the primary values. Finally, the reason why the state should do all this is that it should be 
guided by a conception of its function, namely, to guarantee the conditions in which its 
citizens could make a good life for themselves. That conception is at once the motivating 
force behind, and the ultimate standard for, conflict-resolution.138 
 
This seems to mean that the common values, those required for all conceptions of the 
good life, will be actively protected by the state. This would probably include those 
rights and freedoms relevant to the exercise of a person’s choice of how to live, and 
presumably some minimum level of resources. When in conflict, the state will engage 
in a balancing exercise between the relevant values. It will also protect the secondary 
values, those that are desired in different ways by different people, while remaining 
neutral between them.  
 
This system sounds similar to how a system of liberal pluralism would operate, but 
there are a few significant differences. Kekes’ pluralistic perspective means that the 
liberties and institutions that a state would recognise and employ are attuned to 
pluralism, for example, the requirement that the state support an educational system 
that “teaches students about the plurality of values”.139 
 
In addition to the difference of perspective, Kekes’ system is notable in that, when 
conflicts between values are resolved, no single value or set of values overrides the 
others. Instead, a process of balancing values takes place, the result of which will 
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depend strongly on the context of the conflict.140 In this way, the state’s promotion of 
particular values will not be general, but, rather, contingent on the circumstances 
involved. It is this contingency, Kekes argues, that sets his pluralism apart from 
liberalism. 
 
This system might be criticised broadly in that it seems to promote the idea of 
pluralism to the exclusion, or at least to the subordination, of other moral ideas. It is 
clear that, despite eschewing overriding values, pluralism is its overriding focus, and 
Kekes could be criticised for this reason. Such an argument is not fatal, but does 
require that the theorist explain why pluralism is morally prior to the plural values 
themselves. Essentially, it requires pluralism to be conceived as indicating the reality 
of social or moral value, so that it transcends other significant values.  
 
Kekes’ system seems terribly monistic, in the sense that pluralism is the only focus of 
justification, and that other values are subordinated in this pluralist system. As is 
suggested, adopting pluralism as the central politico-moral fact is itself contestable; 
but, even we were to agree on the importance of an irreducible moral pluralism, it is 
not clear that Kekes’ is the system we should accept. 
 
Firstly, it is unclear that there is sufficient common ground between conceptions on 
which to give substance to the primary procedural and substantive values. The idea of 
needing this common ground seems contrary to the singularly pluralist focus, yet 
Kekes makes much of unity of social values, and views pluralism as a virtue that 
should be taught in schools. An avowed pluralist might balk at this, and, instead, 
suggest a social free-for-all, where each person competes in a state of nature type 
environment to promote and realise their own conception of the good. Alternatively, a 
different ‘pluralist’ might call for a greater degree of social order than Kekes, and  
argue that the destabilising influences of pluralism need to be tempered by a societal 
culture and belief system, and heavy restrictions on the conceptions of the good that 
can be chosen. Such a person might not appear, to Kekes, to be a pluralist, but, 
perhaps, to the more anarchistic pluralist, neither would he.  
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The point here is the same one that applies to liberal pluralists, that there is no 
necessary link between pluralism as the central moral fact and a particular system of 
social organisation or theory of justice. Each of these approaches are possible, and 
even plausible, responses to pluralism, but they need to do more than simply identify 
some sympathy with it. The recognition of pluralism does not imply a system of 
government that focuses primarily on maximizing some conception of pluralism; any 
such system cannot rely entirely merely on a conception of pluralism for its 
justification, and to indicate its substance.  
 
The nature of this problem is that pluralism itself does not imply any particular 
scheme of social organisation or of justice. There is nothing in pluralism itself that 
indicates whether it is something to be overcome or respected, fostered or ignored. 
Even if there was agreement on, say, respecting this pluralism, how this would be 
achieved and what other moral ideas this would entail would also be relevant. So, 
Kekes’ balancing between the values of particular situations is itself an approach that 
is not inherent to pluralism, as he seems to suggest, but, rather, implies a separate and 
particular set of moral premises. These would include that pluralism can be advanced 
by making judgments between values, and that such judgments should be contextual 
and should vary so that no single value will ever be favoured generally. 
 
Appealing to liberal values in order to respond to pluralism should not be criticised on 
the grounds that it promotes some values over others, as such a step is necessary to 
get from pluralism to any reasonably complete theory of social justice. What is 
important is that this liberal content is acknowledged by the theorist not as being 
derived directly from pluralism, but as a particular response to pluralism, and so one 
that needs to be fully justified.  
 
 
3.4 From pluralism to liberalism 
 
The characterisation of liberal pluralism as one response to pluralism leads to an 
examination of the possible justificatory paths from the latter to the former. If 
pluralism is to be the central focus of liberal theory, then there must be some clear 
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way in which it is the basis for liberalism, or, from the other direction, in which 
liberalism is an appropriate response to pluralism.  
 
One example of an avowedly pluralistic explanation of liberalism is the idea that 
liberal freedom and autonomy promote a diversity that accords with pluralistic ideals. 
This is the argument that Gray unsuccessfully makes, and that has been developed by 
George Crowder: 
 
[T]o acknowledge the truth of value pluralism is to endorse the promotion within a given 
social arena of the widest possible diversity of human values, a goal maximally satisfied under 
liberalism.141 
 
Crowder sees diversity as a potential intermediate step between pluralism and 
liberalism. He argues that the acceptance of pluralism means that all goods that 
contribute to human flourishing must be endorsed equally, not because they are 
measurably equal, but because they are ‘equally ultimate’, a term he borrows from 
Berlin.142  From this realisation 
 
it follows that the pluralist outlook commits us to respecting the full range of human goods…. 
Since all these goods must be respected equally, it follows that in any particular situation it is 
desirable, prima facie, that as many of them as possible be promoted. Pluralism implies the 
desirability of value diversity.143 
 
Crowder completes the link by arguing that liberalism, understood as the “minimal 
framework of principles necessary to permit or enable individuals and groups to 
pursue divergent ways of life without coming into harmful collision”, is the best 
means of achieving this diversity.144 
 
But, the argument from pluralism to diversity is not as strong as he suggests. That 
plural and morally uncombinable goods or ends are equally ultimate, in the sense that 
they indicate ultimate moral value, yet cannot be usefully compared, is an acceptable 
interpretation of value-pluralism. From this, Crowder states that the pluralist outlook 
requires that they be endorsed equally. Putting aside the question of conflict, central 
though it is to pluralist social theory, this can only mean that one good or end cannot 
be given more weight than any other.  
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It does not follow from this, however, that as many goods as possible should be 
promoted in any given situation. There is no direct line from the idea that a set of 
goods are equally ultimate, to the conclusion that there is value in promoting the 
realisation of as many goods as possible. This can be demonstrated by considering 
two different societies: one that is diverse in the goods that their citizens enjoy, and 
the other society more uniform. The uniformity in the second society is not due to 
monistic ideals or coercive state practices, but occurs because the individual members 
happen to have conceptions of the good that are more closely aligned than in the first 
society.  
 
Applying the ‘pluralist outlook’ gives us no reason to prefer to the second of these 
societies to the first. Both are equally pluralist in practice, and so endorse all 
individual choices equally. The mere fact that the difference between these choices is 
greater in one society, by itself offers no justification for it carrying a greater moral 
value. In addition, the idea that the substance of a person’s beliefs will dictate their 
moral value, i.e. that the more distant a person’s conception of the good is from 
everyone else’s the morally better that society is, is inimical to the pluralist spirit.  
 
However, this is not the only conceivable argument to justify liberalism through 
diversity. There may be much to be made of the moral value of diversity; that there is 
value in some conception of difference. With further development as a moral 
conception, diversity might well gain the depth and resonance of ideals such as 
equality and neutrality. But Crowder’s argument seems to be mistaken in that it 
attempts to derive diversity entirely from pluralism, without giving it any separate 
moral content. Additionally, as is the case with equality and neutrality, it is doubtful 
that diversity could, by itself, be sufficient to support liberalism. As a practical ideal, 
it would face two initial challenges: that it would tend to undermine social stability; 
and, that it might encourage state coercion, not to unify individual action, but to 
promote ways of life that are different to those of others. A conception of diversity 
would need to be constructed that could overcome these problems and form part of a 




Crowder’s second potential link between pluralism and liberalism concerns the virtues 
of practical reasoning. Pluralism, he argues, implies the necessity of making political 
choices from among incommensurables.145 He then identifies four virtues that would 
benefit this process, and claims that these are best achieved in a liberal state. These 
are: a generous appreciation of the broad range of valuable goods; the realist 
acceptance that not all goods can be achieved; an attentiveness to the context of a 
particular decision, including the nature of the goods and the claims on the goods 
involved; and, finally, the flexibility to tailor the decision to the particular situation, 
and, in particular, to reach a balance between general rules and particular 
judgments.146  
 
The last of these virtues, flexibility, is most interesting and illuminating here. It is 
interesting because it reflects the exact same balancing approach that Kekes 
characterised as being non-liberal in nature; and yet, Crowder finds that this flexibility 
corresponds with autonomy, the very liberal value that Kekes was most concerned to 
reject. Crowder makes the argument between liberalism and this pluralist flexibility 
by asserting that, 
 
[t]o be autonomous contrasts with being coerced or manipulated, and also with the uncoerced 
and unmanipulated acceptance of what Mill calls ‘the despotism of custom’, the uncritical 
reception of prescriptive tradition as one’s ethical standard. To be autonomous is to deny that 
value conflicts can be resolved simply by the mechanical application of traditional and other 
rules. Autonomy, in its opposition to unquestioning adherence to custom, is immediately on 
the side of flexibility against rigidity in ethics.147 
 
While Kekes argues that autonomy should not override any other value, Crowder 
suggests that autonomy itself encourages a pluralist flexibility that seeks a balance 
between various goods. This conflict illustrates how Kekes is concerned with arguing 
against pre-pluralism forms of liberalism, and has not recognised how the natural 
affinity of the core liberal values with pluralism might be used to justify a liberal 
pluralism. It also recalls the burden Crowder faces to explain why the liberal ideals 
are justified by the pluralism he admits. Here, he attempts to show that the flexibility 
required by political decision-making in a pluralist context is best achieved by a 
liberal state, since it aligns with the autonomy such citizens enjoy.  
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The distinction he uses to characterise this argument is between the uncritical 
application of customary or other rules, and a process of applying the principles and 
judgments that one considers appropriate in all the circumstances, arrived at by the 
exercise of autonomy. This latter approach, Crowder argues, is the reasonable 
response to value pluralism, and is engendered by the liberal state.  
 
However, this is not as straightforward a result as he suggests. It should first be noted 
that Crowder is no longer concerned here with pluralism as a reflection of moral 
reality, but, rather, with pluralism as the central concern of political judgment. This 
shift in focus implies not only that moral value is plural and incommensurable, but 
that people should, both, be conscious of this, and, act in a reasonably consistent way 
when making political decisions. This may seem innocuous, but one of the central 
ideas of pluralism is that it takes people as they are, and implies no coercion of belief 
or judgment. Essentially, Crowder is arguing for a pluralist ethic, at least in the 
political sphere, to which all should subscribe. As William Galston eloquently puts it, 
“[t]o demand that every acceptable way of life reflect a conscious awareness of value 
pluralism is to affirm what value pluralism denies – the existence of a universally 
dominant value”.148  
 
Perhaps that statement is too strong here, as Crowder might argue that he is in favour 
of political and not personal recognition of value pluralism. The fact remains, 
however, that he imports as part of his conception of the person a conscious 
appreciation of pluralism, and reasonableness of choice and action in response. This 
does not mean that the resulting liberalism has no valid link to value pluralism, but it 
does represent a new aspect of liberal pluralism that would require the conception of 
the pluralist state be developed considerably further, in order to incorporate a pluralist 
consciousness and ethic. Arguments concerning a possible split between the political 
and the personal find a fuller expression in Rawls’ political liberalism, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
2.4 Galston’s Liberal Pluralism 
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Galston, himself, in Liberal Pluralism, posits a theory of liberalism that is founded on 
a universal conception of value pluralism as a description of moral reality. The 
connection between the two seems to consist of one primary and two ancillary links. 
The ancillary links will be discussed in dues course. The primary connection concerns 
the nature of rational choice in the pluralist situation.  
 
Value pluralism suggests that there is a range of indeterminacy within which various choices 
are rationally defensible…. Because there is no single uniquely rational ordering or 
combination of such values, no one can provide a generally valid reason, binding on all 
individuals, for a particular ranking or combination. There is, therefore, no rational basis for 
restrictive policies whose justification includes the assertion that there is a unique ordering of 
value. If value pluralism is correct, then as Steven Lukes puts it, “For the state to impose any 
single solution on some of its citizens is thus (not only from their standpoint) 
unreasonable.”149 
 
Galston’s perspective is from the justification of coercive state action. If 
incommensurable values and goods cannot be ordered in a rationally justifiable way, 
then the state cannot promote such an ordering; to do so would be to act in a coercive 
way without any rational justification. This acts as a presumption: that a state must 
justify its actions with good reasons. In the absence of such reasons, pluralism offers a 
strong argument for negative freedom, in that the state should not interfere in the 
choices and lives of citizens.150 
 
Galston does recognise that the state will have the power to decide matters of pure co-
ordination, where it matters not what the rule is but only that there is an accepted rule 
(such as the side of the road on which to drive).151 He also recognises the inevitability 
of conflict, yet argues that this does not demonstrate the bias of the system or the 
government, but, rather, that it is the “structure of particular contexts of decision” that 
necessarily limit the potential choices and possibilities that individuals can enjoy.152 
 
Talisse persuasively argues that Galston’s liberalism does not follow value pluralism. 
In doing so, he considers three possible ways of life, which he labels A, B and C. A 
represents a Millian life of civic engagement, B a life of quietude and orthodoxy, and 
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C an Emersonian life of self-sufficiency. He argues that pluralism does not deny the 
state the power to promote one of these ways of life. 
 
The state indeed has good reason to promote, for example, A, namely that A is good. Of 
course, the value pluralist will insist that the state has no better reason for promoting Millian 
civic liberty rather than religious devotion or Emersonian self-sufficiency, but surely this is 
not a reason for remaining neutral with regard to these options, and it is not a reason to not 
promote Millian civic liberty. After all, ex hypothesi, the Millian way of life is actually good. 
What could be a better reason for imposing it?153 
 
Talisse argues that pluralism does not entail negative liberty in the way Galston 
suggests. Although there is no better reason for promoting one way of life rather 
thananother, that does not necessarily imply a neutrality between the two, when in 
fact there is value in promoting either one.  
 
Galston responds to this argument by emphasising that he is concerned with a 
presumption against interference that a state must, by power of its reasons, overcome. 
The value of this presumption stems from the fact that a particular way of life is 
actually chosen by an individual.  
 
So it is not good enough to say that in the abstract, there is nothing to choose between T and 
its alternatives, because the fact that some members of society endorse the alternatives means 
that there is something to choose between them. The rulers must then offer a reason 
sufficiently compelling to overcome the weight of endorsement.154 
 
Galston uses value pluralism in this morally minimal way to indicate a presumption in 
favour of any way of life that is valued within a society, which means that no other 
way of life will be favoured over it in the absence of good reasons to do so. The 
nature of incommensurability dictates that such reasons will not come simply because 
of the preference of a particular individual or group for one way of life over another.  
 
Galston’s link between pluralism and liberalism appears to be robust. The nature of 
moral value, that it is plural and incommensurable, offers weight to any conception of 
life held by an individual or group in society. This weight prescribes non-interference, 
unless reasons of greater weight justify otherwise. This approach has a number of 
virtues: it connects liberalism with the essence of pluralism, the moral value attaching 
to various individual beliefs and choices; it is pared back, in that it links only to a bare 
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conception of negative liberty, and, so, infers no more liberal content; and, it 
represents the simplest of actual connections, between moral value and non-
interference. 
 
The connection is so simple that it does not even need Talisse’s three person society 
in order to show its central argument. Because it is logically prior to Galston’s 
account of conflict between people, a one person society is quite sufficient. That 
person holds a personal conception of human flourishing, and desires to follow that 
conception in his or her own life. The reality of value-pluralism, Galston is in effect 
arguing, means that his or her conception has a positive moral value, and the 
opportunity for the citizen to follow that conception is similarly valued. In this way, 
moral value must also attach to the non-interference of his or her actions.  
 
Once this conclusion is reached, it is easy to see how non-interference, or negative 
liberty, becomes a presumption that one must have good reasons to rebut: it applies to 
one person in the same way that it does to a vast population. The immediacy of the 
link between value pluralism and liberty is clear, but this reasoning does involve some 
assumptions in addition to a simple account of pluralism. It assumes, for example, not 
simply that morality is by nature plural, but that it is a form of pluralism that attaches 
to each person and their beliefs. It is unquestioning in the sense that it treats any 
actual beliefs as positive value. This is not a necessary consequence of pluralism: 
there is a difference between the shape of moral value being plural and 
incommensurable, and the judgment that this shape traces around each individual, so 
that each person’s beliefs have some moral value uncombinable with others.  
 
The point here is not that someone may have harmful beliefs, as these will be 
excluded once rules on value conflicts are enacted. Rather, what is in question is the 
unthinking acceptance that is entailed in this approach. Consider, for example, that a 
state does place substantial constraints on the one citizen, which leads him or her to 
adopt new beliefs on flourishing. This would be a morally bad move presumably; yet, 
the new beliefs cannot be said to be any better or worse than the old, as the two are 
incommensurable. Galston might argue that unconstrained beliefs are more valuable, 
which would be a morally plausible move, however this argument incorporates the 
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liberal ideal of non-interference directly into the conception of pluralism, and, so, 
presupposes the bonds between the two that he is trying to forge. 
 
His account is also muddied by the formulation of non-interference as a presumption. 
Although this keeps the connection pared back, it means that other reasons can 
overrule the principle against interference. This moral weighing-up seems contrary to 
Galston’s description of moral value as being incommensurable. He does not discuss 
potential reasons in any detail, but it is enough to recognise that they could arise from 
the values and choices of other individuals, or from some separate moral concern.155 
If the latter, then there is no reason to use Galston’s presumption as the starting point 
or focus, as other factors can be equally relevant. If the former, then we are left with 
Talisse’s argument that a state might choose one form of human flourishing despite 
being aware that others also have value.156   
 
In addition, conflicts of value will often require that a choice be made. Galston’s link 
from pluralism to liberalism may not make sense in these circumstances. The 
circumstances of society necessitate restrictions on the exercise of a person’s 
conception of life, a fact that is central to any account of justice. Rawls, for example, 
includes scarcity as one of the underlying circumstances of justice, and this conflict is 
implicit to theories of distributive equality. This suggests that Galston may not be able 
to make a viable link from pluralism to liberalism without some account of how value 
conflicts might be resolved. However, as was evident in relation to Kekes’ approach, 
there is nothing inherent in pluralism to direct the conflict-resolution process.  
 
Although Galston’s primary link between pluralism and liberalism follows the natural 
progression from identifying moral value to not interfering with it, it is too simple to 
succeed on its own. This shortcoming could only be corrected by incorporating other 
(liberal) ideals into his conception of pluralism or the connection he perceives 
between the two. Although this may result in a viable liberal theory, it is not one that 
is founded wholly on pluralism. 
 
                                                
155
 C.f. ibid, pp30-35. 
156
 Ibid, p35. 
  
212
Galston makes two ancillary arguments to link pluralism to liberalism. The first 
concerns the importance of diversity, although his claim is quite different to that of 
Crowder or Gray. He argues that a diversity of forms of human flourishing 
characterises our natural and pre-cultural selves. Cultural self-determination operates 
to circumscribe the opportunities of people to live in a manner consistent with their 
flourishing.157 A liberal society represents the best response to this in that it allows, to 
the maximum extent possible, various forms of human flourishing.158 
 
This argument begins with a conception of our pre-cultural selves as having 
boundless, or at least very diverse, conceptions of human flourishing. Although 
culture and society set boundaries on the forms that our lives can take, this does not 
necessarily represent a decrease in our modes of flourishing in the manner he 
suggests. Instead, it is reasonable to accept that a pre-cultural situation itself involves 
conflicts and limitations on our life conceptions, and it is plausible to conceive of 
society as giving meaning to, as well as limiting, our flourishing. In this way, the shift 
from pre-cultural to cultural life has a complex effect on diversity. Galston fails to 
discuss adequately this effect, and to link this discussion to the relationship between 
diversity and moral value.  
 
It is interesting to compare the conceptions of diversity of Galston and Crower. The 
former is concerned not with the actual realisation of different ideas of human 
flourishing, but, rather, with the opportunity or the space in which people can hold 
conceptions of flourishing. As such, it is not an argument from diversity at all, but, 
rather, one that relates value pluralism to the freedom of choice implicit in liberal 
societies. Again, the mere comparison with our pre-cultural selves seems to have no 
necessary moral consequence; in this way, comparison with our pre-cultural selves 
seems false and meaningless, and an inadequate ground for the justification of 
liberalism. 
 
Galston’s second ancillary argument consists of the practical point that once a society 
becomes liberal, and its citizens enjoy liberal forms of flourishing, it is extremely 
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difficult to return that society to a pre-liberal, and less diverse structure.159 To do so 
would involve a very costly repression and dissent. This is not particularly strong as a 
positive grounding for liberalism; it relies on a liberal conservativism, and the high 
resource costs of such a change (presumably Galston would support liberalism as 
strongly even if technology had advanced to the point where dissent could be crushed 
cheaply). But, it is interesting in that it views pluralism, and implicitly liberalism, as a 
kind of endpoint in social development.  
 
It is tempting for a liberal pluralist, especially one who is contextual and historical in 
approach, to see pluralism as a social endpoint: the result of the contracting of the 
world through increased technology and information exchange; and the 
comprehensive and complex interaction between various peoples, as defined by trade 
and commerce, travel and immigration, and various other forms of cultural contact. 
This is not to say that it is impossible for different social forms to resist or reject a 
pluralist ideal, that a pluralist state cannot change to another form, or that there is 
nothing beyond pluralism. It does, however, endue pluralism with the force of a 
certain inevitability: being confronted with difference in a very real way, we will tend 
to accept the validity and power of that difference. This point is interesting here 
because it does give contextual justifications of liberal pluralism some of the power of 
inevitability, and, so, their own form of universality, not across all possible societies 





Communitarian criticisms posed a number of important challenges to liberalism; they 
identify the liberal assumptions inherent in the underpinnings of the early 
contemporary liberal conceptions, and exposed acy of aiming for a rational and 
complete universal moral theory. The main thrust of the liberal response canvassed 
here involves a change in approach: the shift from universal to contextual and 
historical justificatory structures; an appreciation of the importance of social forms 
and meanings; the discarding of anti-perfectionism and neutrality claims; and, a shift 
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away from an unquestioning faith in theory and complex theoretical structures. This 
tends to result in political principles that promote ideals of toleration and basic liberal 
values, rather than closely reasoned conceptions of equality or boundaries on 
legitimate action. 
 
One of the chief features of this post-communitarian liberalism is centrality of 
pluralism as a liberal concern. Although pluralism is itself complex, its most common 
liberal conception is as a fact about moral value: that it is, in nature, plural or 
multiple, and that this plurality cannot be effectively combined or measured in terms 
of a single metric. This means that people can hold various understandings of human 
flourishing or of the ultimate ends of life, or can desire various goods, and, that these 
cannot be reduced to a single conception or measure of the human good to which a 
state could commit.  
 
Pluralism of this form is at least a partial denial of some of the underlying ideas of 
communitarianism: that the self is constituted by its social ties, and these ties are 
common between the members of a society. The potential diversity of pluralism 
allows self-creation and denies the promotion of group over individual belief. This 
form of pluralism is an essential condition of the theories of both Walzer and Raz, 
although the former uses the pluralism of goods in a communitarian way, subject to 
the shared understandings of the community’s members, and the latter takes pluralism 
as the subject of a contextual account of autonomy.  
 
In Gray’s earlier work, and in the work of thinkers such as Crowder and Galston, 
liberalism is actually drawn from and founded in pluralism. The adoption of pluralism 
as the central justificatory focus of liberal theory marks a stark shift in approach. 
Instead of a universal rational moral theory that adjusts and compensates for 
difference, this entails deriving liberalism from irreducible differences in belief and 
understanding.  
 
This change in justificatory approach implies changes in the justificatory burdens. The 
basic challenge of a theory of justice founded on pluralism is to make something 
singular or universal out of an uncombinable plurality. This is especially difficult if 
pluralism is held to be the ultimate moral truth or shape of moral value. The 
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advantage of attempting to derive liberalism from pluralism is that there is a clear 
affinity between the two, corresponding to the openness of liberalism: liberal societies 
allow their citizens considerable freedom to pursue their own conceptions of the good 
or of human flourishing. 
 
However, as this chapter demonstrates, this affinity is not enough on its own to justify 
liberalism. Liberalism as a system is also closed; in a social sense in that it prohibits 
some behaviour, and limits the opportunities of some to pursue their conceptions of 
human flourishing; and, in a philosophical sense in that the liberal space is itself 
defined by a set of principles and justifications that deny alternative ideas and 
conceptions. Liberalism must do more than identify the common motifs between itself 
and pluralism. It must also do more than identify some value or virtue that pluralism 
supposedly prescribes, and that liberalism delivers. This is not a problem of liberalism 
alone; political pluralism is not justified directly and completely by value-pluralism. 
Value-pluralism does not itself imply a system of political organisation. Liberal 
pluralism needs to acknowledge this, and to envisage itself as one response to 
pluralism. This means that it is not simply derived from value-pluralism, and must 
draw moral power from elsewhere.  
 
The problem with requiring this additional moral content is that this seems to 
undermine the idea of pluralism itself, since it would mean prioritising the value of 
that content over others. Talisse makes a similar point in relation to Galston’s theory: 
 
[I]n order to produce a comprehensive theory of liberalism, Galston must commit to some 
fundamental value that provides the foundation for the legitimacy of the liberal state. 
However, the identification of such a value is inconsistent with value pluralism.160 
 
He concludes that the acceptance of value pluralism is incompatible with a “robust 
philosophical foundation” for liberalism.161 So, the fundamental problem with 
political expressions of pluralism is that pluralism by itself implies no political 
system, and adding any substantive moral content is contrary to pluralism itself. 
Talisse suggests that one of the possible responses to this is to reject liberalism in 
favour of a pluralist approach, as does Gray.162 However, as the earlier examination of 
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Kekes’ work shows, this approach faces the same difficulty; and, in fact, any 
substantive political theory could not help but transgress the incommensurability of 
the plurality of values.  
 
Liberalism could respond to this difficulty in two ways. The first is to re-conceive and 
downplay the significance of pluralism. The inconsistency between value-pluralism 
and a positive political theory depends upon the conception of pluralism as 
explicating the true form or shape of morality. By reframing pluralism so that it is not 
so morally foundational, or making it one part of a larger theory of morality, this 
inconsistency would be avoidable. The plurality of moral value could become, for 
example, a plurality of doctrines whereby the complexity and context of each doctrine 
or tradition means that different doctrines could not be combined. This is a fact about 
the shape of the value of doctrines, rather than morality generally, and does not 
prevent one being preferred over another for separate moral reasons, or in order to 
promote different values. In this way, the scope of pluralism might be limited to a 
particular sphere that amounts to something less than the whole of morality.  
 
The second approach is to superimpose values or structures on the simple pluralism-
liberalism approach in the face of the inconsistency this necessarily implies. In order 
to justify whatever political approach is asserted, this inconsistency must be 
explained. One possible explanation is that of necessity: if pluralism is to be 
maintained as true, then the inconsistency must be set aside in order for a theory of 
social organisation to be suggested or supported. This pragmatic argument is powerful 
but disconcerting: powerful in that the practical need to organise complex social 
structures in a moral and effective way is strong, but disconcerting in that the truth of 
moral value is simply ignored in order for this to be achieved.  
 
A possible approach to reconciling these ideas may be revealed by a further 
examination of the nature of choosing between incommensurables. Some suggest that 
incommensurability is synonymous with being uncombinable, that there is no 
common scale by which values can be measured, but that values can in some way be 
usefully compared. Pluralist theories all seem to allow that choice between 
incommensurables is possible, and, in fact, is the situation that autonomous 
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individuals face in deciding what set of beliefs and what conception of human 
flourishing to endorse.  
 
Talisse is interesting here in that, even though he holds that liberal pluralism can have 
no valid foundation, he states that there is “nothing contradictory about the idea of a 
state promoting a single way of life while openly acknowledging that other ways of 
life are also good”.163 This seems to suggest that states can make choices in much the 
same way as individuals do, and that such choice is not contrary to morality.  
 
If this is the case then it seems to leave pluralism and incommensurability with little 
practical meaning. A more coherent reading of value pluralism is that, although states 
can make a choice between incommensurable conceptions, such a choice would be 
based on parochial rather than rational grounds. As such, there would be no generally 
acceptable or universal reason for choosing one conception over another. Or, perhaps 
such reasons could exist, but would need to come from outside the scope of 
incommensurability of values. A value that is common between individuals, for 
example, or that is present within part of a particular social context might well qualify 
as a valid reason for that value. However, as mentioned above, one of the problems of 
contextual justifications is that the relevant value is seldom unanimous, and, in a 
pluralistic world, there seems to be no way to attach value to the weight of public 
opinion; there seems no rational reason for a state to prefer the common view of a 
million against the belief of one.  
 
The only way to accept that there can be rational reasons for particular social 
arrangements in a pluralistic world is to view the plural nature of morality as being a 
foundation that can support additional structures that say something relevant about 
moral value. These cannot be derived directly from pluralism, but must cohere with 
its tenets. The nature of this relationship is a difficult one, as it is difficult to conceive 
how pluralism can have substance and yet admit of other substantive ideas. Arguably, 
this could not be achieved without some reformulation of the pluralist conception. 
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Value pluralism offers an interesting view of moral uncertainty. It does not 
necessarily imply uncertainty in the epistemological sense, or scepticism, but it does 
marry up with one of the themes of uncertainly, as an expression of moral 
contestability. The idea of pluralism as the central moral fact is compelling in that it 
corresponds with the experience of seemingly irreducible difference of moral opinion 
and value. In this form it is a fundamental fact about rational morality and is 
consistent with the liberal freedom to choose and to be autonomous beings.  
 
However, pluralism in this form is much more troublesome than it first appears; the 
contestability of values does not limit itself to individual beliefs, but extends to liberal 
values such as autonomy and equality and, superficially at least, threatens any 
political response. Liberal pluralists have not recognised sufficiently this fundamental 
difficulty, and, so, have taken few steps towards building a justificatory structure that 
defines an appropriate and mutual relationship between liberalism and pluralism. 
Pluralism has been conceived too easily and applied too readily, in particular, without 
an adequate account of the meaning of incommensurability and choice. Ultimately, it 
is difficult to draw from an irreducible moral pluralism a singular, unified political 
conception of social organisation and justice, and the attempts of liberal theorists to 
use pluralism in this way have been not just failures, but failures that give no 
indication of possible avenues for development. 
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6. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND PUBLIC REASON 
 
 
1. The political and the metaphysical 
 
Rawls’ later work responded to communitarian criticisms. From around 1980 his 
conceptions of justice shifted focus, culminating in the publication of Political 
Liberalism in 1993. Perhaps the best-known of the essays he published in the 
intervening period, and certainly the one that best reflects the tenor of this shift, is 
‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985).1 Here, Rawls is concerned 
with explaining why his conception of justice is not dependant on potentially 
controversial philosophical claims, including “claims to universal truth, or claims 
about the essential nature and identity of persons.”2 This assertion would answer or, 
rather, undermine the two communitarian criticisms presented in the previous chapter, 
as to an individualistic conception of the self, and the enlightenment aim of finding a 
universal moral theory.  
 
Rawls’ basis for these claims is that justice as fairness is meant as a political rather 
than a philosophical or metaphysical conception of justice.3 This means, firstly, that it 
is contextual; justice as fairness is constructed by Rawls to apply to what he calls 
modern constitutional democracies.4 The result is still an expression of justice, yet is 
valid only in that particular societal context. 
 
[A]s a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide a publicly 
recognized basis for a conception of justice in a modern democratic state. The social and 
historical conditions of such a state have their origins in the Wars of Religion following the 
Reformation and the subsequent development of the principle of toleration, and in the growth 
of constitutional government and the institutions of large industrial market economies. These 
conditions profoundly affect the requirements of a workable conception of political justice; 
such a conception must allow for a diversity of doctrines, and the plurality of conflicting, and 
indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by members of existing 
democratic societies.5 
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Rawls asserts that no general moral conception will be acceptable as a conception of 
justice in a modern democracy. His target here is not acceptability; he is not arguing 
that we will never be able to agree on a conception of justice, but rather that such a 
conception is not going to reflect a single moral account. This is because moral 
accounts are plural and incommensurable, and our democratic history is not one of 
championing one of these accounts at the expense of others, but of accepting this 
plurality and exercising political toleration. In this way, Rawls is not disavowing the 
possibility of an agreed conception of justice, but, rather, emphasising that such a 
conception must be pragmatic and general, and must acknowledge and incorporate, 
rather than overcome, the irreducible pluralism inherent in democratic societies; in 
other words, such a conception must be political and not metaphysical. This 
conception, Rawls emphasises, is founded on the “informed and willing political 
agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons”, rather than on a 
philosophical justification asserting some universal truth.6 As a contextualised 
conception of justice, it incorporates a similarly contextualised conception of the 
person, based on the idea of the individual as a “fully cooperating member of 
society”, and a free democratic citizen.7 
 
It is difficult to conceive of these ideas simply as clarifying what was already present 
in A Theory of Justice: the essay, ‘Justice and Fairness’, appeared some fourteen years 
after the book’s publication, and as the result of changes in emphasis and view.8 Even 
though this approach is more congruent with the intuitionism implicit in the reflective 
equilibrium (and, potentially even, the original position), it is difficult to reconcile this 
political approach with the perspective of eternity, from which we are able to “regard 
the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of 
view”.9 Nor does Rawls present in A Theory of Justice the historical or sociological 
account that would be expected from a contextual justification. It seems, then, that 
Rawls’ approach has altered substantially between A Theory and Political Liberalism; 
perhaps the seeds of the later approach were sewn in the earlier work, but the shift to 
the political was neither obvious nor trivial. This new approach represents a 
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fundamental shift in liberal theory that helped to initiate the pluralism discussed in the 
previous chapter. With these value-pluralist positions, Rawls shares a focus on the 
fact of pluralism as the main engine of liberalism, a historical and contextual approach 
to justification, a strong emphasis on the importance of toleration, and downplaying of 
the role of theory.  
 
Political Liberalism requires a separate examination. That the principal contemporary 
theorist of liberalism has eschewed truth as a valid aim for political theory is itself 
startling. More than this, Rawls presents a complex theoretical system that 
incorporates a number of important and interesting parts, and that has influenced 
much of the most recent liberal thought.  
 
 
2. Political Liberalism 
 
2.1 The political and the reasonable 
 
Rawls presents Political Liberalism as the response to a substantial problem in A 
Theory of Justice. This problem is one of the stability of the resulting society.10 The 
problem is that a modern democratic society is characterised “not simply by a 
pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”11 This pluralism 
would, Rawls argues, undermine the potential stability of a society governed by the 
two principles of justice indicated by justice as fairness. The reason for this seems to 
be that justice as fairness is itself a comprehensive doctrine, and, so, is potentially 
incompatible with the reasonable beliefs that other democratic citizens adopt. This 
incompatibility would undermine the general agreement with justice as fairness that A 
Theory of Justice requires.  
 
Liberalism, then, must set aside the search for a comprehensive doctrine that all 
would accept, since any such conception could always be reasonably rejected. Instead, 
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it should adopt a political approach to liberalism that does not reflect a particular 
philosophical position, but, rather, “leaves these to be answered in their own way by 
different comprehensive views”.12 Liberalism should focus, instead, on how to work 
out  
 
a political conception of political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a 
plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may 
endorse for the right reasons.13 
 
Rawls’ political system works within a democratic state, but is supposed to apply not 
just to those with a liberal predisposition. The important requirement here is not that 
the citizens are liberal, but that they are reasonable, and that, in agreeing to a political 
conception of justice, they are acting for the right reasons, a point that will be 
discussed in relation to public reason. 
 
The socio-historical foundation of a system of political liberalism, then, is a 
reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines. The idea of reasonableness is 
important not only in this sense, but is weaved throughout the theory. Rawls describes 
reasonable pluralism as being  
 
the fact that among the views that [free institutions] develop are a diversity of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. These are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that 
political liberalism must address.14 
 
Rawls later describes reasonable comprehensive doctrines as corresponding to the 
exercise of theoretical reason that “covers the major religious, philosophical, and 
moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner”; they 
organise our values so as to reflect a cogent world view; and they will normally draw 
upon “a tradition of thought and doctrine”.15 In terms of giving content to the idea of a 
reasonable pluralism, it is more useful to look at Rawls’ definition of a reasonable 
person.  
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There is some debate over exactly what constitutes Rawls’ reasonable person, but 
there are at least three elements.16 The first of these covers the normal moral 
capacities, as were relevant to A Theory, namely the capacity for a sense of justice on 
one hand, and a conception of the good on the other.17 The second refers to the 
person’s willingness to cooperate: 
 
Persons are reasonable… when… they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so.18 
 
It is a feature of the reasonable person that, although they might subscribe to a 
particular comprehensive doctrine, they are willing to cooperate on fair terms with 
others who do not share the same comprehensive views. This is essential to Rawls’ 
political liberal conception. Finally, a reasonable person accepts what Rawls calls the 
burdens of judgment, and their relevance to the exercise of political power. These 
help explain why plural comprehensive doctrines are incompatible, and the 
consequences of this for pluralist political life. In the words of James Boettcher, the 
burdens of judgment 
 
imply that sincere and generally reliable reasoners sharing a common human reason will 
nevertheless often fail to reach agreement about many religious, philosophical and even 
political issues. Our practical reason is burdened, as it were, with a number of imperfections.19 
 
Rawls includes in these imperfections such difficulties as: assessing complex 
evidence; assigning weight to valid considerations; applying vague concepts; and the 
effect of having different backgrounds on judgments.20  These burdens of judgment 
make agreement between comprehensive doctrines impossible, and acceptance of 
them is part of the makeup of the reasonable democratic citizen. 
 
It is the reasonable person, aware of the complexities and limitations of judgment and 
willing to enter into fair cooperation with other reasonable people, who characterises 
Rawls’ reasonable pluralism. The central assertion of Political Liberalism is that 
reasonable pluralism allows a political conception of justice that is not derived from a 
particular comprehensive doctrine or group of doctrines.  
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For rather than confronting religious and nonliberal doctrines with comprehensive liberal 
philosophical doctrine, the thought is to formulate a liberal political conception that those 
nonliberal doctrines might be able to endorse.21 
  
It is this endorsement or acceptance of the political conception of justice by the 
reasonable citizens of a modern democratic society that justifies its operation. This 
political conception is given practical expression by the two mutually reinforcing 
ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason, both important parts of Rawls’ 
theory.  
 
An overlapping consensus represents what is common in a political conception of 
justice between reasonable comprehensive doctrines.22 In other words, it is the 
political core that all reasonable people can endorse, regardless of their actual 
comprehensive beliefs. It is this consensus that informs and shapes a political 
conception of justice, and through which reasonable pluralism can find unity and 
stability. This unity is not concerned with comprehensive beliefs, but rather with 
constitutional fundamentals. 
 
Since we seek an agreed basis of public justification in matters of justice, and since no 
political agreement on those disputed questions can reasonably be expected, we turn instead to 
the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political culture. From these ideas 
we try to work out a political conception of justice congruent with our considered convictions 
on due reflection.23 
 
This agreement is not, Rawls argues, a modus vivendi, a mere pragmatic 
accommodation. Rather, it is a moral conception that is drawn from the democratic 
culture of a society and the comprehensive beliefs of each person.24 A political 
conception of justice as revealed through an overlapping consensus is not, then, a 
compromise that an individual accepts, but, rather, it relates to each person’s 
comprehensive view, albeit in potentially different ways.25 
 
In order to achieve this political conception of justice, Rawls employs a conception of 
public reason.  
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[I]n a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective 
body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in 
amending the constitution.26 
 
This approach extends to fundamental decisions, such as on constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic justice.27 The standard that such decisions must reach is defined 
by a liberal principle of legitimacy, which requires they be made according to rules 
that people may be reasonably expected to endorse “in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational”.28 
 
In this way, public reason seems to have two roles: firstly to set the rules by which 
governmental power can be legitimately exercised; and, secondly, to work according 
to those rules to determine matters of basic justice. These allow the overlapping 
consensus and democratic culture of a society to manifest themselves in a political 
conception of justice. The subject of such a conception, Rawls asserts, would 
primarily include a set of basic liberties, an explanation of the priority of these, 
particularly in relation to matters of the good, and such measures that are required to 
ensure these liberties can be effectively enjoyed.29 
 
Rawls notes that the substance of these elements, although liberal, is, conceivably, 
quite varied.30 It is the nature of political liberalism that it does not specify a particular 
principled system of justice. If it did, it would not be political, but, rather, a 
comprehensive liberalism, and would suffer from the same problems as does justice 
as fairness: it would be the subject of reasonable disagreement, and this would 
undermine unity and stability. Nevertheless, Rawls believes that justice as fairness, as 
expressed by the two principles of justice, is the most reasonable liberal conception of 
justice, because it best satisfies the conditions for a political conception of justice.31 
The main reason for this seems to be that the original position is effective in removing 
the contingencies of particular political situations, and, so, it sets a framework that 
reasonable individuals are likely to be able to agree to.32 
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Rawls’ public reason allows citizens to engage democratically in political decision 
making. They act not to further their comprehensive interests, but to apply their 
sincere opinions as to the most reasonable political course.33 The conditions of 
reasonableness and the reciprocity that this implies, along with the sincerity of 
opinion and a unified overlapping consensus, mean that the political result is fair and 
has been reached not as an expression of the power of one group or belief system, or 
as a bare compromise between factions, but, rather, as the full political expression of 
reasonable citizenship. This does not mean that full agreement will necessarily be 
reached, but, in the context of a reasonable pluralist democratic society, this public 
reason in the domain of the political is, Rawls argues, the best approach to just 
government and the legitimate exercise of coercive power.34 
 
In general terms, Rawls’ system of political liberalism is broadly conceived and 
ingeniously constructed. It is founded theoretically on the meta-ethical distinction 
between the political and the philosophical/metaphysical. In the social context, it 
depends on the fact of reasonable pluralism in modern democratic states, which is 
informed by this distinction in its practical form, namely between the political and the 
comprehensive. Rawls argues that, from this reasonable pluralism, we are led 
inexorably to the possibility of a political conception of justice, which we can all 
reasonably endorse. This conception is made possible by the overlapping consensus 
between our comprehensive beliefs, and given substance by the action of a reasonable 
system of political reason. 
 
 
2.2 The political and the true
 
 
The distinction between the political and the metaphysical, and its practical 
expression, in the distinction between the political and the comprehensive, is a 
fundamental conception of Political Liberalism. The idea of the political is one of the 
practical inquiry and expression of a society that is plural, yet democratic and 
reasonable. This is contrasted, firstly, with the metaphysical or philosophical, which 
implies a search for an objective and singular truth, and a rationally justified moral 
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system; and, subsequently, with comprehensive doctrines, which are belief systems 
that correspond broadly to a particular philosophical position. The latter are 
historically situated, relatively coherent doctrinal expressions of a philosophical or 
metaphysical kind. In this sense, comprehensive doctrines are the societal outcome of 
a philosophical or metaphysical approach, and, so, the second distinction is the 
sociological counterpart of the first.  
 
This central conception serves both justificatory and structural functions in political 
liberalism. It allows Rawls to eschew the universal, and, instead, suggests a 
contextualised approach, contingent on the conditions of modern democratic societies. 
The outcomes of political liberalism, those constitutional essentials and principles of 
basic justice, are expressions of agreement between free and reasonable democratic 
citizens. They are contingent on the particular social context, and Rawls makes it 
clear that these public expressions can take a various number of forms. He does assert, 
however, that some forms are better than others, since he believes that justice as 
fairness is the most reasonable liberal conception.  
 
In many ways this resembles the intuitionism that was part of A Theory of Justice, 
although, instead of individuals seeking a reflective equilibrium of considered 
judgments about justice, they are expressing an honest and considered opinion about 
politics. In effect, Rawls has removed the truth-claims of his theory and 
acknowledged the reasonable contestability of different liberal forms, and embedded 
his justice as fairness in a political system that is predicated on disagreement. This 
shift conveys an acknowledgement of moral contestability and disagreement that was 
not present in A Theory. 
 
The structural effect of the political-comprehensive distinction is to demarcate a 
domain within which people have differing (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines, 
from a domain that is concerned with matters of social justice. It seems that this 
distinction performs much the same role that the priority of the right over the good 
does in A Theory. There, the justification of a conception of justice does not depend 
on a particular theory of the good, but, rather, on fundamental moral concerns, as 
encompassed by the right. This informs a structure where welfare is subordinated to 
liberty and equality. In Political Liberalism, justice is independent of the particular 
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comprehensive doctrines that individuals and groups accept, and comes, instead, from 
the common and reasonable political expression of the citizens of a democratic 
society. Both of these systems define a space of free liberal choice, and both separate 
this choice from the concerns of justice, founded on either the right or on the political.  
 
The shift from right/good to political/comprehensive is interesting. Firstly, personal 
conceptions of the good life, or of the best way to live, now recognise not only a 
personal self-interested choice, but also the importance of the context of this choice, 
the belief systems and traditions that underlie it. Undoubtedly, this change has 
occurred because of the deepening of the understanding of the self that developed 
from and in response to the communitarian criticisms of liberalism.  
 
Probably more startling is the change from the right, a set of universal foundational 
moral concerns, to the political, which is characterised as more open and contextual, 
and as being reasonable rather than true. An apparent benefit of this shift away from 
truth is that the same justificatory stringency should not be required. Even though the 
content of the political domain is not philosophical or true, this does not mean that 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism functions in the absence of truth. As David Estlund 
recognises, “[i]t is important to distinguish Rawls’s view that the political conception 
does not require truth, from a comprehensive or “metaphysical” doctrine that truth is 
not required”.35 The standard of reasonable acceptance rather than truth may be 
appropriate for the political domain, but this does not remove the justificatory 
requirements of the theory itself. This means that, for example, even if the political is 
not true, the distinction between the political and the comprehensive and its 
consequences must be true.  
 
Joseph Raz has made this point more forcefully in saying that 
 
there are many theories of justice, and they are all acceptable to the same degree as theories of 
justice. To recommend one as a theory of justice for our societies is to recommend it as a just 
theory of justice, i.e. a true, or reasonable, or valid theory of justice. If it is argued that what 
makes it the theory of justice for us is that it is built on an overlapping consensus and 
therefore secures stability and unity, then consensus-based stability and unity are values that a 
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theory of justice, for our society, is assumed to depend upon. Their achievement ... makes the 
theory true, sound, valid, and so forth.… There can be no justice without truth.36 
 
Raz argues that the value of a theory of justice cannot be independent of the truth of 
its claims, and, in particular, the truth of the values that it promotes. A theory of 
justice may be justified because it respects people, or it achieves equality, or it is 
agreed to by everyone; but, this must mean that it represents true moral value. Raz 
argues that political liberalism claims value by securing a consensus-based system 
that boasts stability and unity; this depends on both the truth of this statement and the 
implicit judgment that such stability and unity is morally valuable.  
 
Estlund challenges Rawls’ theory in a similar way: 
 
[P]olitical liberalism must assert the truth and not merely the reasonableness … of its 
foundational principle that doctrines are admissible as premises in political justification only if 
they are acceptable to all reasonable citizens. If it were not true, rejection by reasonable 
citizens would not render any doctrines inadmissible into political justification. The principle 
could not be saved by being shown to be acceptable to reasonable citizens. That would assume 
what is in question: that acceptability to reasonable citizens has this moral significance, in 
truth.37 
 
Estlund emphasises that what is important here is not just factual truth, but moral 
legitimacy, or, in other words, the truth of statements as to moral value. 38 He argues 
that the reasonable acceptance criterion cannot be justified simply by its own 
reasonableness, and that there must be some external normative evaluation. He 
suggests that this criterion, as a political doctrine, must also be subject to its own 
argument for validity. This means that reasonable acceptability must itself be 
reasonably acceptable to democratic citizens, as well as being morally legitimate.39 
 
These two arguments limit Rawls’ claim to reasonable agreement over truth, and his 
aversion to metaphysics. This makes sense in that the political conception is 
embedded in a theoretical and justificatory structure that claims to be true. This is a 
point that Rawls goes to no great lengths to make clear. Consequently, all of these 
implicitly asserted truths and moral values are subject to much the same contestability 
as are the various aspects of comprehensive liberal theory. In this way, the distinction 
between the political and the philosophical, and the resulting structure, is potentially 
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subject to the same liberal bias that affects the priority of the right over the good: 
people are at liberty to live their chosen reasonable doctrines; but, it is the liberal who 
defines the overarching structure and moral objectives of society, and who sets 
boundaries on proper action. The necessity of justifying this structure is obscured by 
its openness and moral plausibility. 
 
The bias manifest in Political Liberalism is not merely liberal, but is political and 
contextual as well. Its main moral values include agreement, stability, unity and 
reciprocity, which are not, excluding perhaps the first of these, typical liberal values. 
The whole justificatory point of political liberalism is that it reaches beyond normal 
liberal ideals, and is designed to be able to attract the endorsement of all reasonable 
democratic citizens. It is the feature of reaching beyond the liberal system of beliefs 
on the one hand, and being open to the actual substance of justice on the other, that 
represents the attraction of liberalism in this political form.  
 
However, this structure does require explicit justification: the fact of reasonable 
pluralism in a democratic state must be, in a socio-historical sense, true; the values of 
stability and unity must have strong universal moral power, since they are logically 
prior to Rawls’ contextual approach, and the system must effectively promote these 
values; the legitimacy criterion of reasonable agreement must have contextual moral 
power, contingent on a modern democratic state; and, finally, the foundational 
dualism of the political and the philosophical must be accepted both meta-ethically, 






Despite its many facets and complexities, Political Liberalism is, essentially, a theory 
of liberal pluralism. As such, the central justificatory point is the fact of pluralism. 
Whereas a typical value-pluralist approach would rest on the pluralism of 
incommensurable ways of life, Rawls’ formulation is of a reasonable pluralism of 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines. The one substantial difference between these 
two approaches is Rawls’ requirement of reasonableness.  
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The first element of this reasonableness is the willingness to accept fair terms of 
cooperation, given that others are similarly willing. This requirement is a practical 
expression of the separation of political and comprehensive doctrine: a reasonable 
person accepts fair terms of cooperation that are independent of their own personal 
beliefs. In other words, they must accept a clear separation between personal and 
political lives. This cleaving between personal and public has been described by Will 
Kymlicka as “ingenious”, in that it allows a person to have a (communitarian) 
personal identity, and, yet, engage in the public (liberal) sphere.40 Kymlicka and 
others also recognise the “rather schizophrenic attitude” this requires.41 This is 
particularly the case for members of communitarian groups, or groups whose 
comprehensive doctrines do not envisage or allow for this separation of private and 
public. Political liberalism would require that they adopt this separation in their lives, 
and that they act politically according to the rules of public reason. There is the 
potential here for the undermining of personal or group comprehensive doctrines: 
either, by setting rules as to how one must act politically that are contrary to accepted 
practices, or, simply because of the potentially disruptive effect of the political on 
personal life.42  
 
In defence of Rawls’ position, the overlapping consensus does imply that the core of 
the political approach is acceptable to all comprehensive conceptions. At the heart of 
this consensus is a shared democratic culture and beliefs. Given this pre-existing 
political attitude, it is perhaps realistic for Rawls to impose the requirement of fair 
cooperation on citizens. The problem with this, however, is that the relationship of our 
current attitude of political involvement to our personal beliefs is much less clearly 
defined than in the system Rawls proposes. For example, we are largely free to 
engage or to ignore political matters as we wish or as our personal beliefs dictate; 
equally, we are free to determine our political attitude and beliefs by whatever means 
we choose, and, in particular, can build our political beliefs out of our personal ones. 
Although there is much of the democratic culture that is useful to Rawls, this 
requirement imposes a firm model of the way our personal and political lives ought to 
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interact that goes far beyond current attitudes, and is a substantial and potentially 
quite coercive condition placed on acting in a political liberal society. 
 
The second part of the reasonableness of persons concerns the acceptance of the 
burdens of judgment; that there are particular limitations on judgment that imply the 
recognition of the fallibility of one’s personal beliefs and commitments.43 This 
requirement seems to ensure that individuals, who are committed to reaching fair 
terms of agreement, are willing to look beyond their own personal understanding of 
what this might mean, and to engage generally in political reason with an attitude of 
openness towards the beliefs of themselves and others. As a feature of reasonable 
citizens, this would tend to make public reason more effective in reaching a political 
conception of justice, and in finding an overlapping consensus. In relation to their role 
within the overall theory, the burdens of judgment also emphasise that political 
liberalism and the marginalisation of truth does not imply a relativism of beliefs: it is 
not that political claims are merely personal or that no true moral claims exist, but, 
rather, that our own judgment of these issues is imperfect and fallible. 
 
Leif Wenar argues that the burdens of judgment are an unnecessary and exclusionary 
condition of the reasonable person: unnecessary because liberal toleration in public 
reason is secured by the requirement of fair cooperation; and, exclusionary in that 
they would deem to be unreasonable many who political liberalism should 
accommodate. 
 
The difficulty is that religious doctrines typically deny that the burdens of judgment obtain. 
This, on reflection, should not be surprising. The burdens of judgment are meant to explain… 
why some people believe in one faith, while others believe in other faiths, and still other are 
agnostics and atheists … By contrast, a religious doctrine – as a purportedly authoritative 
guide to moral requirements and/or salvation – characteristically presents itself as universally 
acceptable to clear minds and open hearts.44 
 
The only possible escape from this argument for the believers of religious doctrine 
would be to limit the effects of the burdens of judgment to knowledge and belief that 
is political or is expressed in the political domain. This, however, does not quite make 
sense: the separation of political and comprehensive is not so complete as to require a 
person to adopt different attitudes to moral judgment and belief depending on the 
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domain in which they are acting; and, this separation does not go so far as to require a 
true believer to be an ethical sceptic once they move from personal to political life.  
 
A defender of the burdens of judgment might claim that this division, and the attitude 
implied by the burdens, might de derived from the common democratic culture, so 
that any democratic citizen might be expected to accept the public-private distinction. 
As argued above, this distinction requires more than western democratic culture 
entails. It is quite possible to be a religious adherent and believe in participating in 
democracy without being burdened by a belief in the fallibility of value judgments. 
Because such people may well be imbued with a democratic spirit and the desire to 
enter into fair political arrangements, they seem to be valid subjects of a political 
conception of justice.  
 
Rawls’ conception of reasonableness is certainly clever: it includes for consideration 
only those with a democratic attitude, willing to play down the content of their 
comprehensive beliefs in order to achieve a cooperative and reciprocal justice. This is 
the central project of Political Liberalism: to move from conflict in a democratic 
society to liberalism. Yet, the conditions of reasonableness are too restrictive to 
incorporate easily the modern democratic attitude, and the separation required 
between political and comprehensive too sharp. It is almost as if Rawls takes the 
content of the political-comprehensive distinction too seriously. He seems to try to 
make a crystallised, logical prescription about our attitude and approach to our public 
lives out of a distinction that is under-defined and amorphous, and that cannot 
possibly bear the weight that Rawls tries to place on it. Even the underlying 
theoretical conceptions of the political and the metaphysical are not delimited 
sufficiently. The similarities between these problems, and those of the priority of the 
right over the good, are considerable. 
 
The reason why Rawls should want to place such close and potentially questionable 
restrictions on the reasonable is clear: the more restricted is the reasonable, the easier 
it is to find an overlapping consensus, and to achieve the reasonable agreement that 
links pluralism and liberalism. Unfortunately, as the reasonable is restricted and 
becomes less realistic, it moves further and further away from a recognisably modern 
and inclusive democratic attitude towards justice. This restrictive strategy is 
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interesting in contrast to value-pluralism: Rawls is not trying to argue from the fact of 
pluralism to liberalism, and, in the process, justify liberal restrictions on value 
conflicts. Instead, he identifies the fact of reasonable pluralism as his starting-point, 
and, in so doing, excludes a great deal of potential pluralist conflict.  
 
In a sense, Rawls has not identified a bare pluralism, but rather a democratic 
pluralism, within which lies the prospect of liberal redemption. This makes the link 
between pluralism and liberalism much more readily achievable, but it means an 
additional justificatory burden. In particular, Rawls needs to explain why only those 
who are reasonable are relevant to his conception of political justice, and why the 
unreasonable are excluded. The validity of the agreement on justice that is reached 
depends on adequately explaining the exclusion of many from this agreement. This 
exclusion of the unreasonable is a difficult aspect of Political Liberalism, and one that 
Rawls never really answers. By implication, such people are excluded from public 
reason, and are forced to adhere to the political conception that is reached; yet this 
position appears neither democratic nor liberal.45 They would presumably enjoy the 
same liberties and benefits as would any citizen, but would have no role in 
determining what these were. 
 
In the justificatory sphere, it is important for Rawls to have a definition of reasonable 
that is as broad as possible, to give reasonable agreement as much moral power as 
possible, so that it is not simply a case of a group of liberal citizens getting together 
and agreeing on a liberal conception of justice.46 A reformulation of these 
requirements might be able to overcome many of the problems described here. This 
might involve a number of changes: the first of which would be a restatement of the 
distinction between political and comprehensive that gives effect to the basic idea that 
citizens should conceive a division between their own beliefs and what they are 
willing to accept and support as a common idea of justice, without amounting to an 
unrealistic schizophrenia. The positive attitude towards fair and reciprocal 
cooperation would be a central requirement, and would mean an acceptance of the 
need to downplay one’s own beliefs, and to look for common ground from which to 
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express and discuss justice in a way that could be accepted by those with different 
beliefs. The burdens of judgment would be removed altogether, as contemplated by 
Wenar, and perhaps replaced by an acceptance of the problems involved in imposing 
uncommonly held beliefs on others. This would be joined by a belief in the basic 
constitutional ideas of the rule of law and the separation of powers. Such a 
reformulation of the reasonable might be enough to correct some of the shortcomings 




2.1 From reasonable pluralism to political liberalism 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, liberal pluralism needs to define and justify a 
strong link between pluralism and liberalism that takes advantages of the affinities 
between the two. With political liberalism the link consists of agreement in the 
political domain, but this needs to be read in the context of Rawls’ restriction of 
pluralism to the reasonable.  
 
Because liberalism is not the only or the necessary response to pluralism, the nature of 
the response of a particular liberal theory needs to be examined and justified. Rawls 
does not undertake this task, and relies simply on the value of agreement and 
consensus, and the consequential values of stability and unity. Charles Larmore, 
another political liberal, goes further in identifying its main value and justification. 
 
Political liberalism, as I conceive it, aims, of course, to forgo appeal to any comprehensive 
conception of the human good. Its ambition consists in working out principles of political 
association that citizens can see reason to accept, despite their inevitable differences 
concerning ultimate ends. All the same, this ambition draws upon an underlying view of 
human dignity and the respect that we thereby owe each and every human being.47  
 
Larmore perceives human dignity and respect as the values that underlie the criterion 
of reasonable agreement. He goes on to explain the nature of the respect involved. 
 
Persons are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons. If we try to bring 
about conformity to rules of conduct solely by the threat of force, we shall be treating persons 
merely as means, as objects of coercion, and not as ends, engaging directly in their distinctive 
capacity as persons. True, they cannot be moved by threats except by seeing that they have 
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good reason to fear what we may otherwise do. But we shall then be appealing to their ability 
to act on reasons simply in order to achieve the goals of compliance.… We shall not be 
engaging their distinctive capacity as persons in the same way we engage our own, making the 
acceptability of the rules in question depend on their reason just as we believe it draws upon 
our own. Thus, to respect another person as an end is to require that coercive – that is, 
political, principles be as justifiable to that person as they presumably are to us.48 
 
The significance of this respect for our capacity to make moral judgments and to 
reason, Larmore argues, is not that reasonable people share it, but rather that it is 
 
what directs us in the first place to seek our principles of our political life in the area of 
reasonable agreement. Respect for persons lies at the heart of liberal thought, not because 
looking for a common ground we find it there, but because it is what impels us to look for a 
common ground at all.49 
 
From this we can map out a plan of the justification of Larmore’s version of 
liberalism. At its heart is the criterion of reasonable acceptance, which is valued 
because it reflects an equal respect for people. This respect is based on our individual 
capacity to think and act for reasons, and requires that we be treated as ends and not 
means, and not be coerced at the will of another. This unmistakably deontological 
respect is Larmore’s foundational value of political liberalism. Its value is not derived 
from the operation of public reason or a liberal system, but, rather, is external to and, 
in fact, implies such a system.  
 
It is clear that this respect is not drawn from, but is morally separate and prior to, the 
fact of pluralism. It is the value of this respect superimposed on a pluralist foundation 
that leads Larmore to the liberal value of public justification and reason. The danger 
with such an approach, as the preceding chapter suggests, is that this respect is subject 
to the challenge that it is merely one among plural values, and cannot rationally be 
shown to be better than any other, except in contravention of pluralism. In order to 
avoid this result Larmore’s political liberalism must either use a different conception 
of pluralism or must explain and justify the additions grafted onto the simple structure 
of pluralism-liberalism.  
 
As it turns out, this form of liberalism implies a number of key differences from the 
thoroughgoing value-pluralism of Galston. Firstly, the pluralism of political liberalism 
does not indicate a fundamental philosophical truth. Instead, it is treated by Rawls 
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more as a contextual socio-empirical fact: that, in society there is a diversity of 
incommensurable doctrines, traditions and conceptions of the good. This form of 
pluralism does not necessarily undermine the claim of a particular value to special 
moral importance, although it does emphasise that this value must be justified in a 
way so as to transcend the conflict and social dialogue between doctrines. The value 
of respect has considerable appeal, in that it acts in relation to the very capacities that 
allow us to create and subscribe to these doctrines. Despite the apparent value of 
respect, and the fact that there is no logical contradiction between it and reasonable 
pluralism, the value of respect is still in need of careful explanation and justification.  
 
Another interesting point is that public reason in political liberalism depends on a 
common political (democratic) culture, and aims at reaching an overlapping 
consensus that all reasonable people can accept regardless of their comprehensive 
beliefs. This focus on common beliefs and understandings has the potential to work 
against a foundation of value-pluralism, and to promote particular liberal values. This 
would mean that respect might be justified in having a particular role despite the 
incommensurability of values, by virtue of being part of what is shared between 
people. This result depends on something being shared, but nothing in the idea of a 
plurality of values prevents a particular value being held by many or all people; in a 
system where a common public culture is assumed, this is a real possibility.  
 
Such an argument would result in a value that is justified in a particular social context, 
and would overcome a foundation of value-pluralism. However, this is not the 
approach to respect that Larmore intends. His comments assert that respect is more 
fundamental than being merely a political virtue that reasonable people hold: it is not 
the common ground, but is what impels us to look for common ground. This suggests 
some moral content to Larmore’s conception of respect that is separate from the fact 
of pluralism and from democratic culture; and, that Larmore is not simply using 
respect to mediate between pluralism and liberalism, but rather to draw from a deep 
universal moral truth. This is confirmed by comments Larmore makes about pluralism 
elsewhere: 
 
Liberalism … does not arise from an acceptance of pluralism. Instead, it seeks to found the 
principles of political association upon a core of morality that reasonable people can accept, 
despite their natural tendency to disagree about comprehensive visions of the nature of value, 
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and so in particular about the merits of monism and pluralism. The expectation of reasonable 
disagreement lies at a different, more reflective, level than pluralism. It responds to the 
religious and metaphysical disenchantment of the world, not by affirming it, as pluralism 
seeks to do, but rather by recognizing that like other deep conceptions of value this 
disenchantment is an idea about which reasonable people are likely to disagree, as indeed they 
do.50 
 
Larmore here sees political liberalism not as an appropriate response to pluralism, but 
as having a core morality of its own; it is clear that respect would form a major part of 
this core. His rejection of pluralism as a foundation for liberalism is interesting. He 
conceives pluralism, not as a foundational fact either about moral value or actual 
belief, but, rather, as itself a questionable view of morality that is capable of being the 
subject of his preferred conception of moral conflict: reasonable disagreement. So, 
pluralism does not even enjoy the status of being socially common, let alone that of a 
fundamental moral truth. Consequently, it becomes, itself, the subject of reasonable 
disagreement. He goes on to describe how pluralism affirms philosophical 
disenchantment, conceiving of it in terms of the political ideal of promoting a variety 
of beliefs. 
 
It appears here that Larmore conflates the idea that moral value is irreducibly plural in 
nature with the prescription that society should promote a diversity of beliefs; of 
pluralism as a moral truth with pluralism as a positive ideal. He then treats the 
resulting conception of pluralism as a possible moral choice, which is consistent with 
it containing substantive moral content, and he substitutes reasonable disagreement 
for pluralism. What remains is a liberalism based on reasonable disagreement, or, in 
other words, on the acknowledgement of moral contestability between reasonable 
people. The implication is that moral value is not necessarily singular or plural, but 
that there is disagreement about it.  
 
There is nothing substantially different between this view of reasonable disagreement 
and the reasonable pluralism that is the more obvious focus of Rawls. The point for 
Larmore seems to be to distinguish his liberalism from what he views as the necessary 
prescriptions that attach to value-pluralism. It is interesting, however, how easily the 
fervently held belief of difference of one theorist becomes a subject of difference of 
another: how pluralism becomes another value about which we can so readily 
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disagree. It is interesting to speculate whether Larmore’s conception of reasonable 
disagreement could be so treated by someone else: whether disagreement is the true 
shape of social interaction, or merely one of many possible outcomes between which 
no theory can rationally decide. The feature essential to these conceptions is an 
insoluble contestability between conflicting positions.  
 
There is the vague suggestion here that no single account of persistent difference, be it 
expressed as disagreement or pluralism, can represent the final truth about difference, 
as any account could be the valid subject of a separate account of broader difference. 
The nature of this difficulty is the tension between the complexity of difference and 
the idea of being able to reduce and express this difference in a singular, unified way. 
This is a disconcerting and potentially decisive comment on the possibility of 
certainty, but, for the present purposes, it is enough to note that it suggests that 
liberalism cannot rely simply on an account of pluralism to count as an effective 
response to moral uncertainty. 
 
In whatever form this difference is presented, it is used cleverly by political 
liberalism, and does seem to be capable of overcoming the inconsistency between 
pluralism and liberalism explored in the previous chapter. This is achieved by the 
expression of pluralism as reasonable pluralism, and, so, by restricting the domain of 
irreducible moral disagreement to the reasonable. There is no necessary conflict 
between this pluralism and the values that political liberalism express, since the 
former does not comment on moral value generally, and makes a categorical 
distinction between this pluralism, which is related to comprehensive doctrine, and 
the political anyway. 
 
More generally, political liberalism works from the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
without its own principles becoming the subject of this pluralism. This is achieved by 
virtue of the unifying nature of this disagreement, and of the restriction of 
reasonableness placed on it. Instead of working from a population of people who 
reflect the basic moral truth of value-pluralism, political liberalism is founded on a 
population of democratic individuals who recognise the presence of persistent 
disagreement, and are willing to agree on fair terms of cooperation, which need not 







The overlapping consensus between reasonable comprehensive doctrines is important 
to Rawls’ theory as it utilises our common political culture to steer political liberalism 
away from a modus vivendi, a mere accommodation made on pragmatic grounds. 
Instead, the political conception of justice is supposed to be agreed to for the right 
reasons: founded on our common understandings of justice, but mediated by our 
commitment to fair terms of cooperation and our realisation that the political domain 
cannot be simply the vehicle for the promotion of our own comprehensive beliefs. As 
Patrick Neal has commented, political liberalism is supposed to be a compromise 
between a prudent, morality-free modus vivendi, and an unreservedly moral 
promotion of our comprehensive beliefs, so as to allow “not too little, not too much, 
just the right amount of morality into the terms of political order”.51 
 
It is supposed to offer a democratic society political unity and stability, despite the 
plurality of conflicting beliefs. This depends, however, on whether such an 
overlapping consensus would actually exist, or, in other words, whether there really 
would be this common fund of foundational political beliefs from which political 
liberalism might draw. Neal suggests that the possibility of an overlapping consensus 
is not possible as “political disagreement cannot be stopped at the edge of political 
liberalism, because that abstract idea is itself open to numerous competing 
interpretations”.52 The contestability of the system of political liberalism itself, he 
argues, and, in particular, the criterion of reasonable agreement, would prevent the 
kind of consensus that political liberalism anticipates; people would never agree to the 
terms of an overlapping consensus, let alone to its content. 
 
Even if a democratic society could agree to implement that system, there are others 
who believe that an overlapping consensus would still lack content. James Bohman 
cites the deep cultural conflicts within modern democracies that challenge the “basic 
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framework of moral assumptions and political procedures”, in arguing that such a 
consensus would be unavailable:53  
 
If we accept the social facts of pluralism and deep conflict, then we must also wonder whether 
the scope of what is “reasonable for all to accept” turns out to be so small as to be irrelevant 
for most political disagreements.54 
 
Rawls would probably reply that such a deep conflict would imply that at least one of 
the conflicting parties is not actually reasonable, in that they, either, do not accept the 
requirements of reasonableness, or, they do not share with the other parties a common 
democratic political culture. It is difficult to predict the extent of an actual consensus, 
but these restrictions on the parties have led Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift to 
conclude the opposite, that an overlapping consensus is actually guaranteed: 
 
[I]f part of what it means for a comprehensive doctrine to be reasonable is that it accepts the 
normal priority of the political over the non-political, then there can be no need to seek an 
overlapping consensus between them, since their reasonableness simply guarantees it by 
definition.55 
 
Mulhall and Swift focus on the reasonableness of doctrines rather than people, and 
identify the priority of the political as being sufficient from which to infer some form 
of consensus. Perhaps this consensus is not so full as to include all the culture-based 
fundamental ideas of justice that Rawls anticipates, but it does at least set the 
foundation for these. 
 
The existence of an overlapping consensus depends closely on the restrictions on 
reasonableness, since these specify what is necessarily common between the relevant 
citizens. Against these is the social fact of a plurality of beliefs. Social conflict might 
well be deep in the sense that Bohman suggests, but whether this can occur among the 
reasonable, and how such conflict would play out in the political domain, is unclear. 
There is at least the foundation for a political consensus based on the democratic 
public culture of a society. Perhaps Bohman has underestimated the role of this 
culture, and the necessary similarity of perspective that it implies.  
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Rawls’ use of an overlapping consensus to lay the foundation for a political 
conception of justice, rather that a modus vivendi, is clever; but, he seems to ask a 
great deal of the political commonalities between people, if they are to accept in 
political argument his system of justice as fairness, as well as the two resulting 
principles, as the most reasonable possible conception. To achieve these results Rawls 
has to narrow the idea of reasonableness, and place significant weight on democratic 
political culture, to the point that one wonders if any resulting overlapping consensus 






It is the realm of public reason in which the political arguments are presented to 
legitimise coercive state behaviour, and to justify the state preferring the claims of one 
person to those of another. The scope of this purpose is defined by Rawls as including 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and is supposed to be made up of 
content upon which a broad range of reasonable persons can agree. 
 
The use of public reason as the process by which the substance of a theory of justice 
is reached represents an important shift in liberal theory. Earlier systems included the 
structure and justification of a particular substantive approach to a theory of justice, 
whereas political liberalism recognises plural comprehensive liberalisms and declines 
(initially at least) to choose between them. In this way, the principles of justice a 
society is to follow are no longer the result of a hypothetical and carefully constrained 
situation, but, rather, part of a political process of justifying state coercion to those 
who will be coerced.  
 
This is a subtle shift, but potentially a powerful one. By reserving questions of 
substantive justice to operation of actual public reason, it is possible to relocate within 
that discourse many of the difficulties that otherwise would be present in a theoretical 
structure. In relation to Rawls’ justice as fairness, for example, the contestability 
concerning the difference principle, and the priority of the liberties over the good, 
could be left to actual political discourse. In the context of reasonable democratic 
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citizens, contestability over the substance of justice is inevitable, and forms part of an 
open forum of public reason. Once these contestable issues have been excised, a 
liberal theory can focus on searching for matters of justice that are more fundamental 
and less contestable.  
 
In this way, public reason can also remove much of the complexity necessary to 
complete theories of justice. By allowing the more substantive matters to be 
determined by the operation of the political processes implied by a theory, rather than 
simply declared as part of its structure, much of the complexity of these substantive 
issues is shifted to actual political processes. In addition, a liberal theory that 
incorporates public reason can better incorporate actual moral difference, rather than 
simply difference as to conceptions of the good, without this undermining liberalism 
itself. This difference can form a legitimate part of the process by which principles of 
justice are determined. In this sense, public reason allows liberalism to be more open 
to substantive matters of justice; it also allows liberalism to focus on more 
fundamental philosophical or structural issues. This is a potentially important liberal 
idea, but the question remains as to how successfully Rawls employs it as part of his 
political liberalism. The difficulty in distinguishing what is constitutionally essential 
to the structure of basic justice from what is not is clearly problematic and, as has 
been recognised, Rawls makes no attempt to explain this.56 However, this limitation is 
probably more pragmatic than principled; and, it seems to result from Rawls wanting 
to start with a subject that is most obviously political and where he is most likely to 
find accord.57  
 
A more difficult aspect of Rawls’ public reason is the distinction between those 
reasons that are acceptable and those that are not, and whether the domain of the 
political is sufficiently encompassing to allow a coherent result. It is interesting here 
that Political Liberalism itself is reluctant to allow any of a person’s background or 
non-political culture to be expressed as part of public reason. The basis of Rawls’ 
argument is that political values present viable limits for the fundamental political 
questions, and that non-public reason is separate, and is itself the subject of liberties 
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granted by public reason.58 In a later essay, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, he 
allows that comprehensive doctrine can be introduced into public reason “provided 
that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and 
policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support”.59 This proviso must be 
satisfied according to the “good sense and understanding” of the political culture 
involved.60 
 
The reason for Rawls’ minimising or excluding non-public content in public reason is 
clear: public reason is supposed to express a political culture, and to lead to results 
with which all reasonable people can agree. This stems ultimately from the anti-
perfectionist instinct to exclude personal beliefs and conceptions of the good from the 
determination of matters of justice. Yet, in this later essay, Rawls concedes the 
necessity of comprehensive doctrines as part of what he labels a wide view of public 
political culture. The reason he offers for this is that 
 
[c]itizens’ mutual knowledge of one another’s religious and nonreligious doctrines … 
recognizes that the roots of democratic citizens’ allegiance to their political conceptions lie in 
their respective comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious. In this way citizens’ 
allegiance to the democratic ideal of public reason is strengthened for the right reasons.61 
 
The meaning of this passage is not straightforward, but it seems to make two 
arguments. The first is that the roots of allegiance to political conceptions are 
comprehensive, or, in other words, the reasons why a person adopts a particular 
political conception relates to their personal comprehensive doctrine. This is entirely 
plausible: it makes sense that our political beliefs would be related to our 
comprehensive beliefs, properly constrained by the meaning of the political and our 
reasonableness. 
 
The second argument is that the sharing of the relationship between comprehensive 
and political beliefs would strengthen personal allegiance to the process of public 
reason. Rawls’ reasoning seems to be that, when those who follow a particular 
comprehensive doctrine adopt the proviso, they show to others their commitment to 
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public reason.62 This fosters civility and reciprocity as features of the public process, 
not for pragmatic reasons, but because they understand the reasoning of the other 
party from comprehensive to political belief, and respect their commitment to 
supplying political rather than comprehensive reasons. In this way, the proviso, Rawls 
argues, is valuable because adherence to it encourages others to engage properly in 
the public reason process. Comprehensive beliefs, then, are a valid but provisional 
part of public reason, because they demonstrate that a person or group is committed to 
genuinely engaging in the public reason process, and in building a political 
conception capable of being the subject of reasonable agreement, rather than simply 
expressing their own comprehensive doctrine in the public domain.  
 
It is eminently plausible to say that a mutual understanding will deepen and enrich a 
process of public reason, but Rawls’ argument does not quite work in the way that he 
suggests. There will also be benefits to public reason of knowing that the other parties 
are acting genuinely and positively, but this does not help Rawls much either. The 
problem with his argument for the proviso is that, if there is a real distinction between 
a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine, people ought to be able to 
recognise that; an explanation from the other party, as to how the political belief is 
founded in a comprehensive doctrine should not make any difference to this. The very 
nature of a political conception is its lack of commitment, so far as is possible, to any 
comprehensive doctrine.63 It is this that makes it agreeable to individuals with diverse 
comprehensive, although reasonable, beliefs. In this way, political conceptions are, by 
definition, recognisable to reasonable people. No explanations by others to explain 
them, from the perspective of their own comprehensive beliefs, should be required. 
 
The proviso itself does not satisfy this justification anyway: it anticipates positive 
comprehensive arguments being used to justify aspects of a conception of justice, 
rather than comprehensive explanations and understandings of essentially political 
arguments. Overall, Rawls’ explanation of the role of comprehensive beliefs in public 
reason is difficult to reconcile with his conception of public reason generally. It seems 
to serve no useful role in the process; and, the argument that mutual understanding of 
comprehensive doctrines encourages adherence to public reason does not fit well with 
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either the proviso or the remainder of Rawls’ theory, which suggests that reasonable 
people look to the content of a conception of justice, not to other people’s 
comprehensive arguments in its favour, and that reasonable people would approach 
public reason for the right reasons anyway. The poor fit between Rawls’ political 
liberalism and his arguments for comprehensive doctrine in public reason suggests 
that there are other explanations behind the latter. In particular, it raises the possibility 
that comprehensive doctrine is included because Rawls’ political reason in a 
democratic state is not in itself sufficient to ground a political conception of justice, 
and additional normative substance is required for any kind of reasonably agreeable 
content to result.  
 
The actual basis for public reason is broad: 
 
Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political conceptions of justice, 
and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions 
about what we think are the most reasonable political institutions and policies.64  
 
This process works from the political culture of a democratic society, which 
“comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public 
traditions of their interpretation … as well as historic texts and documents that are 
common knowledge”.65 From this foundation, through the process of public reason, 
Rawls asserts that we can reach an overlapping consensus founded on justice as 
fairness and his two principles of justice.66  
 
But, there is good reason to believe that, even among reasonable democrats, people 
who have accepted the public reason process and search for the most reasonable 
political conception, substantial contestability would remain. Rawls’ suggestion that 
the political, reasonable and democratic restrictions would lead public reasoning to 
home in on justice and fairness, or any particular moral result, is hopelessly optimistic 
given the extent of difference and contestability in the individual comprehensive 
doctrines on which people’s political beliefs are based. If, as Rawls admits, our 
political beliefs are founded on and formed out of our comprehensive moral beliefs, 
then the constraints on public reason would have to negate these in order to arrive at a 
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single basic conception of justice. Although Rawls’ scheme might allow some 
constitutional agreement, implied by the reasonable and democratic restrictions, a 
conception of basic justice would be unreachable, as these restrictions fail to 
distinguish between opposing reasonable conceptions and ideas. 
 
In this light, including the comprehensive in public reasoning appears, either, as a 
misguided attempt to incorporate additional substantive moral content, or, as the basis 
for continuing political disagreement between reasonable people. This argument 
confirms that Rawls’ quest for an overlapping moral consensus on matters of basic 
justice is flawed and is not reasonably attainable. The idea of public reason as part of 
a liberal theory is an interesting and potentially powerful one, in terms of relocating 
contestability and complexity to subsequent public discussion. Rawls’ use of public 
reason, however, is bound up with his conception of reasonableness, the distinction 
between the political and the comprehensive, and is intended to reach the conclusion 
of justice and fairness. It is so moulded by the other aspects of Rawls’ theory, that it 





Rawls’ Political Liberalism is more than a reframing of his two principles of justice 
with a new focus on stability; it marks a fundamental shift in the approach to liberal 
theory. At its centre it employs a conception of pluralism, but, unlike the theories of 
value-pluralism in the previous chapter, uses it in a way that is quite different. Rawls’ 
theory is not concerned with moral truth or with comprehensive moral doctrines, but, 
rather, with political decisions made by reasonable people, characterised by adherence 
to a democratic public culture, the willingness to cooperate in the political sphere on 
fair terms, and the acceptance of various limitations on public judgment. This 
relocation of liberalism to the political and away from the comprehensive accords 
citizens the opportunity to engage in a process of determining the most reasonable 
political conceptions; and, is achieved through a process of public reason, which 
requires that coercive state behaviour be justified to those whom it affects. 
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This approach is explicitly contextual, and applies to the reasonable citizens of 
modern democratic states. In a way, the change in approach from the seemingly 
universal goals of A Theory of Justice amounts to an admission of the difficulty of 
satisfying a universal justificatory standard. It seems to accept that the earlier liberal 
theories are comprehensive in an important sense, that, although plausible and 
attractive they arise from a liberal standpoint, and make particular and apparently 
innocuous statements in what has proved to be a thoroughly contestable moral space.  
 
In admitting the bias of liberal theories, Rawls is in a position to create a theory that 
can reach beyond existing liberal beliefs, and political liberalism aims at exactly this. 
It attempts to derive liberal principles not from human nature or moral nature, but, 
instead, from democratic reasonableness. This is the justificatory heart of Rawls’ 
political liberalism: that reasonable, democratic individuals would agree to a liberal 
system of public reason as a response to the social fact of reasonable disagreement. 
The power of this assertion is that it doesn’t apply to all people, and that it accepts 
that real disagreement will remain. What it means is that these people would accept 
that it is better to have a liberal political system than to work to promote their own 
comprehensive beliefs in the public sphere. This message implies the acceptance of 
continuing personal and moral disagreement.  
 
This approach appears to have potential power, depending as it does on the veracity of 
the claim that reasonable people would accept the political liberal approach. Rawls’ 
conception and structure, however, raises a number of difficulties. His distinction 
between the political and the philosophical appears misdirected, along with his 
attempt to eschew the concern of truth from his theory. An effective form of political 
liberalism may well involve the setting aside of truth considerations in relation to 
personal belief, but this cannot remove the importance of an effective and true 
philosophical structure.  
 
Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive is also difficult. 
Political liberalism depends on effectively distinguishing between the public and 
private spheres in a way that is acceptable to reasonable people. However, it is 
difficult to separate those matters that are properly the subjects of political debate 
from those that are not, and this will be a problem that perhaps no conception of 
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political liberalism will be able to overcome. Not only is individual disagreement a 
problem, but also the natural overlap of personal and political considerations, beliefs 
and reasons.  
 
One possible approach would be to determine the boundary between the public and 
the private through the process of public reason; the first step of the making of a 
political decision would be to determine whether the political domain has jurisdiction 
to address the matter. However, this result would simply seem to shift the uncertainty 
about the boundary to the political sphere, and offer no real direction to how these 
issues should be determined. A procedure for achieving this could be set out 
beforehand, but this does not solve the problem: to the extent that this offers 
substantive direction, it characterises the boundary beforehand and so suffers from the 
problem of disagreement; to the extent that the substance is determined by subsequent 
public reason, the uncertainty would remain. Combining the two problems together 
does not manage to solve either. 
 
Along with the distinction between the political and the comprehensive/philosophical, 
the foundational conception of Rawls’ political liberalism is that of reasonableness. 
This conception amounts to a trade-off: the broader it is, the more powerful is the 
resulting theory, since it links liberal public reason to a broader base of individuals. 
The broader it is, however, the less likely it is that the group defined will accept the 
liberal conclusions, and find an overlapping consensus through public reason. Rawls’ 
reasonableness is disturbingly narrow. The condition of fair cooperation is realistic 
and broad, but the burdens of judgment imply specific beliefs about the reality of 
judgment, and seem to exclude those who, presumably, Rawls would want to include. 
It would be more realistic for him to remove these burdens, but, then, the guarantee of 
an overlapping consensus, and of the acceptance of justice as fairness as the most 
reasonable political conception, would be on much shakier ground.  
 
The problems with these foundational conceptions of political liberalism are 
manifested in Rawls’ conceptions of an overlapping consensus, and of public reason. 
Whether any overlapping consensus would actually result is difficult to judge from 
Rawls’ assertions, but, if so, it would probably simply reflect the narrow 
characterisation of reasonableness, and the subset of the overall population that this 
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applies to. The problem with the distinction between the political and the 
comprehensive informs the difficulties with public reason, and, in particular, with 
Rawls’ desire to have comprehensive reasons included in public reasoning. Finally, 
this process is pre-empted by Rawls in his conclusion that his conception of justice as 
fairness would result as the most reasonable of comprehensive liberal conceptions.  
 
Overall, Political Liberalism represents an ingenious attempt at overcoming many of 
the problems of earlier liberal theory. As a response to communitarian criticisms, 
Rawls eschews the philosophical and the true in favour of a political view of justice. 
This not so much answers as it sidesteps them, by adopting an approach that 
conceives of moral theory differently than the earlier approaches. But, much like A 
Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism fails on examination. This is not to deny its 
significance as a thread of contemporary liberal theory. Political Liberalism is an 
important attempt at liberal justification, and contains many ingenious and potentially 
powerful parts: the separation of the political and the philosophical on one side, and 
the political and comprehensive on the other; the contextualised attempt at justifying 
the link between pluralism and liberalism; the use of reasonable political pluralism to 
overcome many of the problems of a thoroughgoing value-pluralism; the assertion of 
an overlapping consensus based on a public political culture, to overcome a modus 
vivendi result; and, the use of public reason that deals with the contestability and 
complexity of substantive political reasoning within a non-theoretical process.  
 
 
3. Patterns of Moral Complexity 
 
Larmore’s version of political liberalism has already been discussed in relation to the 
role of pluralism or disagreement and the virtue of respect, but the theory as a whole 
features a number of interesting differences from that of Rawls. In fact, Larmore’s 
Patterns of Moral Complexity was published prior to Political Liberalism, in 1987.67 
Although Larmore did not adopt the label until later, Patterns adopts the two essential 
features of political liberalism: the distinction between the political and the personal, 
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where liberal principles attach to the former but not the latter, and the use of public 
reason to respond to or overcome disagreement in the political sphere. 
 
Patterns explores various influential works of political and moral philosophy and 
suggests that typical approaches to theory tend to simplify their moral subject in three 
separate ways. These three ignored moral complexities act as the philosophical 
foundations on which Larmore’s conception of political liberalism is built. The first of 
these emphasises the indispensability of moral judgment, as opposed to simply 
following a principle or virtue.68 Moral judgment helps us in two practical ways: it 
allows us to recognise that a particular virtue applies to a given situation, and tells us 
what is required for the virtue to be fulfilled.69 Additionally, this judgment assists us 
in dealing with moral conflicts and dilemmas, rather than relying on the belief that, in 
such situations, there is some higher-level principle to which we can refer.70 Finally, 
Larmore comments that moral judgment cannot be reduced to some general account 
or theory.71 This conclusion expresses the idea that judgment is by nature not 
reducible to a rational and concrete structure, and is consistent with his general 
approach to judgment as a moral complexity.  
 
The second moral complexity concerns the different spheres or domains within which 
ethics operates. Ethical systems should, Larmore argues, relate to their particular 
spheres.72 He suggests, particularly, that predictability carries considerable weight in 
the political sphere, because individuals make decisions and take actions in relation to 
how they believe the state will act.73 This places a burden on governments to act in a 
systematic way, rather than being sensitive to the subtle nuances of every situation, 
and paves the way for a distinction between the public and private spheres that is 
necessary to political liberalism. He defines this distinction in terms of “what belongs 
within the political system” and “whatever belongs outside it.”74  
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The final complexity asserts the heterogeneity of morality. In particular, if we attempt 
to apply practical reason to alternative situations in order to arrive at some idea of 
which is more morally valuable, there seems to be three relevant but different general 
principles, namely partiality, consequentialism and deontology.75 Partiality 
encompasses the moral duties owed by virtue of a person’s participation in some 
institution or association, such as are implicated in relationships between family 
members or friends. Consequentialism and deontology are familiar to liberal theory, 
the first maximizing the good, and the second requiring that certain actions should 
never be done.76 Larmore argues that these three principles are all morally significant; 
that they will often be in conflict; and, that, in the private domain at least, there is no 
general or straightforward approach to determining which should prevail. 
 
Each of these three complexities acts to support Larmore’s conception of political 
liberalism. The importance of judgment in morality encourages a practical rather than 
theoretical approach to substantive moral questions, and, ultimately, supports a 
conception of public reason as the best approach to answering questions of political 
morality. By asserting the relevance of different moral domains, Larmore clearly 
paves the way for distinguishing between the public and the private. Finally, the 
heterogeneity of morality highlights, at the most abstract level, the difficulties of 
reaching definite and agreeable moral decisions, without reverting to a strict value-
pluralism: it helps to explain moral disagreement; but, with the use of the second 
complexity, does allow Larmore to simplify political morality while accepting the 
complexity of private morality. In fact, this is the general approach of Patterns: that 
the complexities of morality can best be dealt with by separating the political and by 
applying particular knowable rules to that domain, all while retaining the power of 
public reason as the tool for reaching morally acceptable outcomes.  
 
In order to justify the functioning of the political domain, and to determine the proper 
relationship between partiality, consequentialism and deontology in the political, 
Larmore uses a conception of neutrality. Neutrality, he argues, is the best response to 
pluralism and reasonable disagreement in society.77 This means that state decisions 
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must be neutrally justifiable.78 One example of a neutrally justifiable goal is that of 
economic efficiency. Western democracies, Larmore argues, have long pursued 
economic efficiency as a goal, which means that they are justified in regulating and 
intervening in economic activity.79 Larmore’s neutrality extends also to the realm of 
public reason: if people disagree, then neutrality suggests that they should each retreat 
to a position of common ground, and continue to converse.80 
 
Larmore is then tasked with justifying this conception of neutrality. Traditional liberal 
justifications fail, as they depend on particular conceptions about human good that 
people may reasonably dispute, for example, neutrality based on the value of 
autonomy.81 Larmore suggests, instead, a justification suitable for a political approach 
to neutrality: a neutral justification for political neutrality, one which avoids 
contestable conceptions of the good, by itself, being neutral between such 
conceptions.82 This neutrality is based on what Larmore calls the universal norm of 
rational dialogue:  
 
When two people disagree about some specific point, but wish to continue talking about the 
more general problem they wish to solve, each should prescind from the beliefs that the other 
rejects, (1) in order to construct an argument on the basis of his other beliefs that will 
convince the other of the truth of the disputed belief, or (2) in order to shift to another aspect 
of the problem, where the possibilities of agreement seem greater. In the face of disagreement, 
those who wish to continue the conversation should retreat to neutral ground, with the hope 
either of resolving the dispute or of bypassing it.83 
 
He accepts that this is not morally neutral, as it depends on a moral commitment to 
rational dialogue, but it is neutral to contestable conceptions of the good and of the 
person.84 A second norm is used in conjunction with rational dialogue, namely that of 
equal respect. This has been examined as a response to pluralism/disagreement 
already, but, in general terms, it is significant because it encourages people to engage 
in conversation, and to continue conversation after disagreement results.85 So, while 
the norm of rational dialogue suggests that disagreement results from retreating to 
neutral ground, it is the respect we hold for others that encourages us to engage in the 
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dialogue. These two values together, Larmore asserts, justify political neutrality and 
make cooperation possible between people who reasonably disagree. 
 
The resulting political neutrality suggests a modus vivendi liberalism that keeps 
contested conceptions of the good away from political discussion.86 However, as 
Larmore notes, it may not always be possible to reach an acceptable agreement by this 
rational dialogue. In that situation it is possible to look to other liberal principles, such 
as to basic liberties or distributive principles.87 This should be carried out in a neutral 
way, which can be achieved by minimising the loosening of neutrality, by admitting 
beliefs that are “least central to anyone’s idea of the good life” or that “the least 
number of people do not hold”.88 
 
The result is a political liberalism structured in terms of a neutral justification of 
political neutrality, and supported by the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect. 
This theory is woven into Larmore’s three neglected moral complexities, of moral 
judgment, moral divisions and moral heterogeneity. Each of these complexities has 
some plausible standing. It seems reasonable to entertain the ideas that abstract moral 
principles conflict in a fundamental way; that it is possible to split the political, or the 
socio-moral, from the personally moral, since different general considerations apply; 
and, that moral judgment can reach a moral result in a way that is not available to 
theory. Each of these is plausible, but argued only briefly by Larmore. These are 




3.1 Neutral political neutrality
  
 
Although foundational, these complexities do not feature directly in the theory’s 
substance, and, so, it is possible to examine the latter while remaining open as to 
whether and how Larmore’s arguments of the former succeed. The general structure is 
one of political neutrality justified by the norms of rational dialogue and equal 
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respect, or, in other words, an ethic of entering into conversations, and of retreating to 
neutral ground, in the prescribed way when disagreement arises. Political neutrality is 
supposed to be a direct result of this ethic, but this turns out to be less than 
straightforward. Firstly, the idea of ‘neutral ground’ offers a novel conception of 
neutrality, which implies not the absence of conceptions of the good life, but the 
absence of conflicting conceptions of the good life. This represents an effective link 
between dialogue and neutrality, but means that the resulting political neutrality must 
also be limited to excluding contested conceptions of the good.  
 
The argument, then, is that a commitment to entering into dialogue and to retreating to 
neutral ground when disagreement arises, in the hope of resolving or bypassing the 
dispute, means that the state should promote any contested conception of the good in 
the political domain. There is something disconcerting about this fit between the two 
norms and the principle of political neutrality. It may be that the norms seem to 
represent a simple personal ethic about engaging and behaving in dialogue, yet they 
are being used to justify an eminent political principle. The ethic seems to refer to 
personal as much as political action, and, so, its application to the political system is a 
stretch, especially as part of a theory that promotes different moral considerations for 
different domains.  
 
Even if it were accepted as a universal political ethic, there is a sense in which the two 
norms are not sufficiently powerful to justify political neutrality. This may relate to 
the different senses of neutrality used. Rational dialogue implies the retreat to neutral 
ground, which is then a point from which conversation continues; political neutrality 
concerns the non-promotion of conflicting conceptions of the good. The link between 
the two of these is tenuous: using common ground as a neutral mid-point that assists 
in effective dialogue does not imply that states should not promote particular 
contested conceptions of the good. While the two may both exclude contested 
conceptions of the good, they do so for quite different reasons, and the attempt to 
draw political neutrality from this dialogical neutrality seems to rest on two ultimately 
disparate ideas.  
 
This result is independent of two other problems Larmore’s justification of political 
neutrality faces. The first is the status of the two related norms. Larmore correctly 
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recognises these as being morally substantive and, so, must themselves be justified. 
He seems to believe them to be universally acceptable.89 This in itself is questionable, 
especially when the norm of rational dialogue is fleshed out so as to include the 
retreat to common ground in order to attempt to achieve an accord. Even if they are 
both accepted as universal, this may not be enough for Larmore’s purposes. These 
norms must also be sufficiently important to justify such a politically fundamental 
principle. If this level is not reached then it would be possible for other norms to 
justify some conflicting principle, which would undermine Larmore’s neutrality.  
 
The second problem Larmore faces is in relying so completely on the distinction 
between the right and the good. This is implicit in the separation between the enabling 
norms and the principle of neutrality (the right), and the conceptions that are excluded 
both from rational dialogue and from justifications of state action (the good). As with 
earlier liberal theories, this distinction is tempting as the basis for a liberal meta-
system that is structured according to the right, and that describes a political system 
that is open as to the good. However, as with these systems, this distinction is difficult 
to draw and apply within a moral system.  
 
This is manifested most obviously in Larmore’s theory in relation to the neutrality of 
rational dialogue, which prescribes a stepping back from conflicting beliefs to a place 
of neutral ground. This is supposed to be neutral with regard to conceptions of the 
good life only, and not morally.90 Yet, rational disagreement can occur in relation to 
the right as well. The interlocutors might then revert back to agreed matters of the 
right, but this would mean that the neutral ground would be neutral as to conflicts of 
the right as well as the good, which would conflict with the idea of political neutrality 
that it is supposed to justify. Public reason theories must allow for moral disagreement 
as well as disagreement about the good, and, for this reason, alone basing a theory on 
the distinction between the two is perilous. Rawls’ shift to the broader conception of 
comprehensive doctrines avoids this problem neatly, but this is not available to 
Larmore since his theory is based on the neutrality between conceptions of the good. 
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3.2 Larmore’s public reason 
 
Setting aside matters of justification, Larmore’s political liberalism is interesting in its 
focus on the two norms of rational dialogue and equal respect, as opposed to Rawls’ 
liberal legitimacy. It has been criticised, however, on the ground that it may not 
achieve any accord.91  
 
Agreement in Larmore’s public reason depends on a mutual cooperative commitment 
to the two norms, and on the common ground from which political reason ultimately 
must work. Although common ground in a conversation between two people seems an 
acceptable basis for partial agreement and further discussion, a political conversation 
must involve all who commit to cooperation. Given that the environment in which this 
conversation goes on is characterised by disagreement, that a useful common ground 
could exist seems unlikely. Certainly, the likelihood of arriving at a useful common 
ground is more so than with Rawls, whose overlapping consensus is based on a 
common social context and stricter entry requirements. Larmore does aim only at 
reaching a modus vivendi, but some level of political agreement would still be 
required for this to function as a liberal political system. This difficulty, Jonathan 
Seglow argues, means that the two norms must take a larger role in justifying a 
political action.92 In other words, substantive political content must come from 
somewhere, and, if not from common ground, then from the other feature common to 
all participants: commitment to the two norms.  
 
Seglow then identifies respect as the possible source of this material, by reason that it 
requires us to  
 
justify our position to others on terms that would be unreasonable for them not to accept, 
where the reasonableness standard… is a universal standard of all rational agents. This 
universal standard must be what persons mutually respect, not their concrete ends and values 
which may diverge, but their general capacity to adopt ends and values in the first place.93 
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In order to derive substantive content, respect must be conceived to require people to 
justify themselves to others in reasonable ways. The standard by which this is carried 
out respects the capacities of others to adopt ends and values, or, in other words, 
appreciates their autonomous selves. In this way, Seglow argues, Larmore’s public 
reason can succeed only by incorporating the extra value of autonomy into the 
account of respect.94 The general point here is that there would be no source of 
agreement in Larmore’s political conversation without incorporating other moral 
conceptions. It is true that Larmore’s equal respect contains a hint of autonomy 
already, in that it is the capacity of others to form respectable beliefs that is respected.  
 
Larmore’s response to this is that neutrality can be relaxed so as to reach agreement, 
by cutting out the least central or most unpopular beliefs. James Fishkin argues that 
this is most unsuitable: 
 
Either of these approaches is likely to yield policies that transform the liberal state beyond 
recognition. On 1, suppose that anti-pornography forces see it as absolutely central to their 
idea of the good that this evil “must” be abolished. On the other hand, few consumers of 
pornography will view such products as central to their idea of the good, whatever else they 
might wish to say in favour of the liberty involved. Hence, on criterion 1, there might well be 
a case for stamping out pornography, for criterion 1 gives special weight to the centrality of a 
moral conviction in one’s idea of the good. Similarly, criterion 2 might be employed to 
establish theism or even Christianity, as the number of atheists or even the number of non-
Christians is relatively small in many putative liberal states. Criterion 2 would seem to give 
great power to “moral majorities” who wish to stamp out dissenting or heretical views so long 
as they are held by only a small number.95 
 
This passage ignores the fact that Larmore states that this process should be 
undertaken neutrally, so that other, less controversial moves would be made ahead of 
those suggested above. In addition, Fishkin ignores the fact that neutrality should be 
loosened not just to allow any political move, but in favour of other liberal principles.  
 
Despite both of these possible responses, Larmore’s argument is poor. It admits of the 
practical shortcoming of the central principle of his theory, and adjusts to this by 
giving effect to liberal factors that are not justified or even mentioned anywhere else 
in his theory. Even if the position is not as dire as is painted by Fishkin, this argument 
betrays a deep flaw in Larmore’s public reason, and suggests that disagreement must 
be positively overcome by a theory of political liberalism. 
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Overall, Patterns is interesting in contrast with Political Liberalism, in that it is 
avowedly philosophical. It is ambitions in attempting to accommodate the 
complexities and contestability of morality by advocating a separate political domain 
based on a simplified model of the common and the universal. This project is 
hampered, however, by Larmore’s adherence to a conception of liberal neutrality that 
does not fit well with the approach of political liberalism. It also suffers from being 
too slight in argument and justification, in regard to both its philosophical 
underpinnings and its substance. An excellent example of the latter is lack of 
discussion as to the distinction between the political and the personal, a point essential 
to any successful expression of political liberalism. Larmore’s approach to public 
reason is interesting in that it aims only at the accommodation of a modus vivendi, but 
the lack of common ground or belief cannot support even this, and, so, Patterns’ 
attempt fails to build any political substance. 
 
 
4. Liberal public reason
 
 
4.1 Habermas and discourse ethics
 
 
The approach of political liberalism is sufficiently complete and well explored so that 
it is capable of standing by itself as a contemporary liberal approach; but, it can also 
be viewed as part of a broader trend to use public reason to answer political and moral 
questions. Because of the nature of public reason, this approach often focuses more on 
democracy than liberalism. This is reflected in the work of philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas, whose work represents the philosophical underpinnings of public reason.  
 
Habermas argues that objective and universal approaches to social theory are possible 
by focussing not on one’s personal sense of rationality, but, rather, on the act of social 
and moral discourse between people. This communicative action can, he argues, 




[T]he burden of proof on moral theorists who hope to ground a conception of justice in 
something more universal than the considered convictions of our political culture is enormous. 
Because Habermas wants to do just that, the links he forges to action theory are crucial; they 
are meant to show that our basic moral intuitions are rooted in something deeper and more 
universal than particularities of our tradition. The task of moral theory, in his view, is 
reflectively to articulate, refine, and elaborate – that is to “reconstruct” – the intuitive grasp of 
the normative presuppositions of social interaction that belongs to the repertoire of competent 
social actors in any society.96 
 
For Habermas, the answers to moral questions can be found in a discourse theory of 
morality, which seeks to achieve universality through the interplay of belief, 
reasoning and judgment that characterises moral discussion. In the political sphere, 
this means focussing on the procedure by which public reason is used, and the 
practical requirements of its institutionalisation.97 In this way political morality will 
be given substance by this process of public reason, as the outcome of the institutional 
organisation implied by Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
 
This explanation of Habermas’ work is the barest possible, but it is sufficient to 
emphasise the fundamental differences between him and other theorists who employ 
public reason. A Theory of Justice, for example, provides an interesting contrast with 
Habermas in that it employs intuitionism as part of the reflective equilibrium in order 
to reach universal moral conclusions. The difference is that this result is reached 
through the operation of individual rationality and belief, rather than through the 
universalising effect of discourse. Even the original position, which is framed in terms 
of an interaction between people, does not favour discourse over personal reasoning, 
since Rawls’ conception of representation means that it could function as well with 
one person as with any other number. What is missing is a conception of a process by 
which discourse transforms moral disagreement into some form of agreement in a 
procedurally acceptable way. 
 
Political Liberalism does involve using public reason in this way, although this 
process is directed and restricted by other aspects of Rawls’ theory. The goal of this 
reason is not to achieve moral truth or universality, as with Habermas, but merely to 
reach a reasonable, mutually acceptable agreement. Many of the political theories that 
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employ public reason follow this lead in having aims more humble than the 
achievement of universal moral truth.  
 
This discussion of Habermas’ public reason is not sufficient to allow us to judge the 
success of his enterprise, but it can at least point to the challenges that this general 
account of ethical discourse must face. There seem to be two, closely linked, 
fundamental challenges: the first is to show how and why a conversation between 
people can result in a morally valuable outcome in a way that personal reflection and 
reasoning cannot; and the second is to explain and incorporate within this account 
how disagreement survives this discourse, and how a valid and singular moral result 
can be found despite this inevitably continuing difference.  
 
Taken generally, these two issues apply in some form to any theory of public reason: 
the latter is directly relevant to theories such as political liberalism; the former is 
relevant also, although different theories attribute to public reason different capacities 
and virtues. In Rawls’ case, for example, it seems simply the means by which an 
agreed political conception can be reached, and coercive state action justified. It does 
not have the special power to move from difference to truth, and so it is less of a task 
to Rawls to explain how it works. For Larmore, public reason is more dynamic, and 
he places a greater emphasis on the opportunity discourse offers to work out our 
differences, by first reverting to common ground. From the discussion of Habermas’ 
approach it seems that public reason offers more than either of these theorists adopt: it 
could be the basis for and account of social and moral transformation towards a 
particular moral goal.98 But, irrespective of how public reason is used, these two 






Because public reason expresses the will of the members of a society generally; it has 
a ready affinity with ideas of democracy. Democratic theories that focus on public 
reason look to the deliberation of citizens about social questions as being central to 
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guiding state action. An important exposition of deliberative democracy is contained 
in Democracy and Disagreement (1996), by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.  
 
Gutmann and Thompson describe deliberative democracy simply as meaning that, 
“when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to 
reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions”.99 They place persistent moral 
disagreement at the centre of their account of democracy, and suggest that this 
disagreement may well reside in the human condition itself.100 At the very least, it is a 
fact of our existence that there are moral conflicts between people and between values 
that cannot be collectively resolved.101 Democracy represents an appropriate response 
to this problem, as it “accords equal respect to each citizen, and is therefore morally 
justifiable from the perspective of each citizen”.102 Deliberation has a number of 
virtues as a potential aspect of this democracy: it involves considering people’s claims 
on their merits, and, so, makes the outcome more legitimate; it encourages citizens to 
take a broader, more moral view of issues; it helps citizens understand the nature of a 
moral conflict; and finally, by involving many people it makes reaching a justifiable 
outcome more likely.103 
 
These virtues are an interesting part of Gutmann and Thomson’s theory of 
deliberative democracy, as it endues public reason with special moral power over and 
above that of individual reason. The first three of these virtues characterise public 
deliberation as being genuinely inclusive and explicitly moral in nature. The latter 
encourages citizens to engage in deliberation, and to view it from a moral perspective. 
This can only assist in reducing the role of self-interest in politics, and in promoting a 
commitment to act in good faith to reach meaningful agreement. The possibility of an 
agreement is improved through ensuring that, even if people’s interests are not met, 
people are aware that the process includes and shows respect to everyone equally. 
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The fourth virtue responds to the truth of an imperfect human understanding of moral 
issues. This incompleteness, Gutmann and Thompson argue, is most likely to be 
overcome by deliberation. 
 
Through the give-and-take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives can 
learn from one another, come to recognize their individual and collective mistakes, and 
develop new views and policies that are more widely justifiable.… When [people] deliberate, 
they move beyond the conventional patterns of group politics that characterize the standard 
conceptions of interest group bargaining.104 
 
Deliberation allows new and better moral ideas to be developed and endorsed, and 
steers democracy away from interest and power politics. Overall, Gutmann and 
Thompson present a deliberative view of public reason that aims at agreement by 
encouraging politics to be more moral and less personal. This in itself is interesting, in 
that they allow public reason to carry some of the weight that Rawls assigns to the 
restrictions of reasonableness: the willingness to treat the political domain as separate 
from the personal, and to be fair and cooperative when acting in it. This approach is 
superior in that the moral character of the political comes out of public reason itself, 
rather than being enforced as an external restriction. This only represents a 
potentiality of public reason, however, and could never be as stringent as Rawls’ 
approach, which is defined by the restrictive condition of reasonableness.  
 
In addition, Gutmann and Thompson seem to attribute to deliberation a benefit 
beyond merely encouraging moral political behaviour, and one that is most obvious in 
relation to the fourth virtue. The idea is that public reason actually improves moral 
content; it corrects personal mistakes and allows moral development that is more 
justifiable. This suggests that public reason may have a greater role than just 
relocating moral uncertainty in a substantive political process, and may actually act to 
overcome some of this uncertainty, by virtue of adding to our understanding. This is 
expressed rather modestly by Gutmann and Thompson as correcting our mistakes, and 
the nature of these mistakes is not explained; but this seems to indicate more than just 
mistakes of fact upon which moral beliefs are based. It suggests that, contained within 
public deliberation, are the seeds for genuine moral development: not that moral 
disagreement will completely disappear, but that at least there is the real prospect of 
improvement.  
                                                
104
 Ibid, p43. 
 264
 
It could be argued against this point that such improvement is not limited to 
deliberation. Personal moral reasoning may be undertaken by one person, but it is 
never carried out in a vacuum. If common moral understanding can be improved 
through deliberation, then an individual’s moral understanding can also be improved 
by personal experience, research and contemplation. The essential difference between 
these two ideas is that, with the latter, the process of reasoning, no matter how much 
others might contribute to it, is ultimately individual; it eschews equal concern for the 
views of each person in favour of individual judgment. In this way, Gutmann and 
Thomson’s point stands: the mistakes made by that individual might be corrected by 
the genuine involvement in a moral conversation. Nevertheless, a mistake made by an 
individual, despite their experiences and research, might easily transfer to their 
participation in a public deliberation on the same topic. Although Gutmann and 
Thompson’s argument – that deliberative democracy offers a positive response to 
moral uncertainty – seems valid, it is unfortunate that they do not develop this idea, 
and, in particular, do not compare the natures of deliberative and personal reason. 
 
The remainder of Democracy and Disagreement performs two tasks. The first is to 
explore the procedural principles by which public deliberation is best carried out. 
Gutmann and Thompson identify three: reciprocity, publicity and accountability. 
Reciprocity is the most important of these, since it shapes the meanings of the latter 
two.105 This principle expresses “a sense of mutuality” that people should bring to 
deliberation, which encompasses the commitment to supporting their arguments with 
“reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are similarly 
motivated”.106 It also incorporates the condition that people should be morally 
accommodating, which means that they should, in their deliberation, exhibit both 
integrity and open-mindedness.107 The other two principles require that political 
justification be both public, and addressed to those who would be affected by a 
decision.108  
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Such conditions are requirements of any system of public reason; the concern is as to 
whether their substance is not itself morally contestable. Here, reciprocity is also said 
to include the condition that empirical statements be consistent with reliable methods 
of inquiry.109 This would exclude reference to any religious texts that defy a literal 
understanding of their contents, for example. In this way, Gutmann and Thompson 
remove from deliberation any religious understanding. The moral prescriptions set out 
in religious texts are still given appropriate respect, but their doctrinal justification 
cannot be part of the moral discourse. This seems a reasonable approach in a plural 
society, but would not encourage those whose moral systems are essentially religious 
to agree to the deliberative system. What is required here is the kind of separation 
between political and personal as drives political liberalism, so that those whose 
moral reasoning is prevented from being part of the political reasoning accept this, 
given their commitment to cooperation and public agreement.  
 
These procedural conditions on deliberative democracy, Gutmann and Thompson 
argue, do not sufficiently constrain democratic discretion. A set of constitutional 
principles are needed in order to set particular standards on citizens and their 
representatives.110 These serve to “inform and constrain the content of what 
democratic deliberators can legitimately legislate”.111 Here Gutmann and Thompson 
arrive at three principles: basic liberty, basic opportunity and fair opportunity. Basic 
liberty concerns the limits on personal voluntary action; basic opportunity, the 
responsibility to provide for people’s basic needs; and fair opportunity, the means by 
which citizens can strive to gain the resources to live their lives as they choose.112 
Each of these principles uses particular examples from recent US political history to 
illuminate the central issues at stake, and to set limits on any subsequent deliberation, 
and all are explored keenly by Gutmann and Thompson. 
 
Democracy and Disagreement could easily be taken to be a theory of liberalism in 
light of these apparently liberal principles, and the central requirement that coercive 
state action is justified to those whom it affects. It is inevitable that liberalism based 
on public reason is closely allied to a form of democracy. Democracy and 
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Disagreement bridges the divide between the two from the other direction, and, so, 
might be labelled a theory of liberal democracy. Yet, it is this liberal content that 
proves to be the most problematic and most interesting part of the theory. The main 
problem is that the theory champions public deliberation as the best response to 
persistent moral disagreement. However, these principles amount to substantive moral 
constraints; and they are a result not of public deliberation, but of the reasoning of 
Gutmann and Thomson. Daniel Weinstock persuasively identifies two aspects of this 
inconsistency: 
 
First, given that the authors are concerned to avoid the kind of foundationalist arguments 
sometimes relied upon by liberals, how do they justify their own first principles? Democracy 
itself cannot be invoked, since the principles are brought in to constrain democratic decision-
making procedures. And moral considerations also must be avoided, since they might be 
disowned by some citizens.… Second, should a book that purports to set out how decisions 
about public policy should be reached by citizens and their representatives… spend as much 
time as this one does coming to determinate conclusions about how the just society ought to 
deal with such questions as health care, affirmative action, environmental protection and the 
like?113 
 
Weinstock argues that the inclusion of substantive liberal principles is both unjustified 
within the structure of the theory; and, is contrary to the process of deliberation 
because it employs “the nondeliberative tools of the professional philosopher”.114 
 
These arguments are not entirely fair. The first one supposes that Gutmann and 
Thompson are undertaking a process of substantive moral reasoning that is entirely at 
odds with the aim of public deliberation, but a closer look at the content of these 
principles undermines such a view. The discussion of liberty and opportunity by 
Gutmann and Thompson is not a direct alternative of democratic deliberation. Rather 
the conditions of deliberation and principles of liberty and opportunity “inform the 
content of deliberation, all appropriately ordered and interpreted over time by the 
people bound by these principles”.115  
 
This means that the principles of liberty and opportunity do not represent substantive 
moral ideas such as could be the outcome of deliberation, but, rather, are partial 
principles that guide the process of deliberation. This is illustrated by their analysis of 
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these principles. In referring to actual political examples, Gutmann and Thompson do 
not simply declare a substantive result, but rather examine the issue from a 
perspective of deliberation: they look to explain and judge them as actual deliberative 
examples; they are guided by what could be called a liberal middle ground, which 
reflects both the liberal skew of deliberation itself, and the desire to reach results that 
are justifiably acceptable to all citizens; and, finally, they analyse the issues in terms 
of the deliberative steps that should be met, and, so, leave open space within which 
people can apply their personal moral beliefs in order to reach a decision.  
 
This approach is interesting in that it seems to anticipate a public reason that is not 
merely a conversation between people with different moral values, but that is closely 
guided by various necessary analytical processes. On this account, Weinstock’s 
criticisms retain some power. It is difficult to see why this deliberative democracy 
would be accepted by those who disagree with its liberal content, and, so, it might be 
rejected by the devout religious believer, the libertarian or the egalitarian. Gutmann 
and Thompson allow that the content of the liberal principles responds to deliberative 
outcomes and, so, can shift over time.116 However, this cannot quite overcome the 
unchanging liberal perspective and liberal terms of reference by which the 
deliberation is undertaken. In relation to Weinstock’s second criticism, it is true that 
there is a discord between this substantive liberal content and the use of deliberation, 
despite the deliberative eye that Gutmann and Thompson cast on the liberal issues. 
For their approach to be acceptable they would need to place both deliberation and the 
non-deliberative tools they employ into a broader model of politico-moral decision-
making.  
 
As it stands, Democracy and Disagreement is an attempt to embed moral 
disagreement into a theory of democracy. As such, it has the same structure as a 
liberal meta-system: persistent moral disagreement is made the subject of a process of 
public deliberation, which itself must be explained and justified. The overall 
justificatory structure involves two levels of agreement: firstly, about a particular 
issue that is the subject of a public deliberation; and, secondly, about the acceptability 
of the system of deliberation itself. Moral disagreement, however, cannot be restricted 
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to the first of these. Instead, the theory itself, particularly its liberal content, is the 
valid subject of such disagreement. Yet without the liberal content, it would be 
unclear that substantive agreement could ever be reached. This indicates a 
fundamental dilemma in public reason theory: public reason needs to be informed or 
constrained in such a way that some manner of agreement can result, and, yet, these 
constraints must themselves be acceptable to people with diverse beliefs.117 This is a 
political version of the general problem identified with pluralism, namely of finding a 
unity out of difference. 
 
 
4.3 Justificatory liberalism 
 
Gerald Gaus makes a similar point about deliberative democracy. His argument stems 
from the nature of political disagreement: that for any doctrine there are those who 
believe it not to be merely wrong, but unreasonably so. 
 
The problem is that we do not simply live in a society with plural understandings of the good 
life, but with diverse and conflicting ideologies that insist their competitors are deeply 
misguided. None of this is to say that political life in an ideologically fractured society is 
impossible. It does, however, strain beyond plausibility the claim that politics ought – even 
ideally – to aim at actual consensus.118 
 
This means that deliberative democracy is mistaken in that it aims for an agreement 
that it can never even come close to achieving. In relation to Democracy and 
Disagreement, this would seem to translate to disagreement about the liberal 
principles, as liberalism would represent an ideology that opposes the honestly held 
ideologies of others.  
 
Gaus levels a similar criticism against Rawls’ political liberalism. He suggests that the 
political domain is itself characterised by reasonable pluralism in a way that cannot be 
adequately dealt with by a theory aiming at near-universal acceptance.119 In making 
this assertion, however, he does suggest that liberalism has special moral content. 
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Rawls, I believe, is correct in that there is conclusive rational consensus on the basic concept 
of a liberal regime, and the broad outlines of liberal principles. But consensus only 
characterizes liberal principles at the most abstract level. As in many other complex matters, 
the use of human reason under free institutions leads us to disagree. The political cannot be 
insulated from this, nor can the realm of public reason be convincingly constricted so as to not 
be effected by it … Because the pluralism of the political manifests our different 
interpretations of the demands of liberal justice, the political is constituted by a plurality of 
articulations of public reason, of citizens seeking to construct arguments to convince each 
other about the best interpretation of the demands of justice.120 
 
This envisages an abstract agreement with liberalism that transcends the ideological 
fracturing of society posited above. It may be political in nature, but it is real and 
common between us all. This does not, however, engender actual political agreement, 
as our individual reason leads to a plurality of conflicting conceptions. Presumably 
this operates in the same space as the conflicting ideologies, and it would make sense 
for the latter to be simply conflicting conceptions of the former.  
 
Gaus states that the resulting political disagreement is unable to be overcome by 
public reason. He seems to imply that any system of public reason must itself result in 
a pluralism of outcomes, or must constrain this reason so that the system itself no 
longer reflects the full breadth of the pluralism, as does that of Gutmann and 
Thompson. This suggests that the common liberal core is so abstract that it cannot, by 
itself, imply a particular substantive liberal ethic and system of justice, and, so, cannot 
be reconstructed in the Habermasian sense. The idea of a liberal core that is then 
given political expression by a process of public reason is an attractive one in that it 
allows persistent moral disagreement, yet includes liberal content at the core of a 
system of public reason. This content is not contestable on the same level as a 
political issues, as it is, by nature, politically incorporeal, and, yet, is genuinely 
common and moral. Such an approach, however, depends on the difficult feat of 
identifying and justifying this core as described. 
 
Gaus’ approach to this is set out in his book Justificatory Liberalism (1996). It 
amounts to an explicitly liberal approach to public reason, and identifies public 
justification, both, as the proper form of public reason, and, as the central liberal 
concern. This requires that every political decision be justifiable to those whom it 
affects. Gaus admits that universal acceptance of justified liberal principles, or any 
                                                
120
 Ibid, pp281-282. 
 270
other moral principles, is not realistic. Instead, what is required is a normative theory 
of justification that allows principles to be said to be publicly justified despite being 
contested by many.121 In order to provide such a theory, Gaus argues that a detailed 
understanding of the nature of moral justification is required, or, in other words, a 
model of moral epistemology. This model will direct liberals as to what public 
justification actually requires. Gaus then uses this model in order to justify his 
conception of a universal liberal core. The structure of Gaus’ liberal justification, 
then, is that his liberal conception is publicly justifiable according to a valid 
epistemological system. He breaks down this process into three steps: developing an 
understanding of personal moral beliefs, and, so, of personal justification; applying 
this to a public reasoning process; and, then, justifying political principles according 
to this public justification.  
 
Gaus’ account of personal justification is complex, and borrows from a number of 
epistemological ideas, as well as recent work in psychology. He states that justified 
personal beliefs must be causally supported by reasons that are both accepted and 
good.122 These conditions imply that there is an actual and valid inferential link 
between the justified belief and the reasons for it. Gaus refines this position by 
applying a conception of open justification whereby a justified belief system is “stable 
in the face of acute and sustained criticism by others and of new information”.123 The 
answer to this depends on their particular set of beliefs, which leads Gaus to admit 
that reasons are relative to the belief systems of their holders, but to suggest that this 
relativism does not extend to truth itself, just the reasons we use our justify our 
beliefs.124 This does not, he argues, reduce personal justification to an unworkable 
relativism. Instead justificatory reasoning features widespread shared beliefs and 
inferential norms that allow meaningful interaction between people.125 In addition, the 
mere acceptance of a belief does not imply that the reason that supports it is valid, nor 
does it exclude the possibility that the person is in error; in fact, psychology boasts 
many examples of common inferential errors.126  
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The justification of a belief by one person to another does not, Gaus argues, require a 
person actually change their mind and accept the justified belief. That person may 
withhold their agreement for reason of “obstinacy, selfishness, laziness, perversity or 
confusion”.127 What is instead required is that the belief is justifiable given the other 
person’s existing set of beliefs and reasons.128 This concept both accords with the 
personal moral epistemology, and retains the moral content of a valid and 
recognisable conception of public reason. But, given that justification must be made 
in relation to the beliefs of the other party, the standard of social agreement would 
seem extremely high. Gaus recognises that attempts at public justification can have 
three outcomes. The first is that the justification is defeated by the receiving party, 
meaning that it is shown not to be justifiable relative to their existing beliefs and 
reasons.129 The second is that it is victorious, which requires that the receiver fails to 
point to any inconsistency between the justification and an existing, valid belief, but, 
also, that two conditions are met: that others have had the opportunity to present 
counter-arguments, and that the claim of victory meets a high evidential standard, 
similar to that of going beyond reasonable doubt.130 In this way, the standard of 
justificatory victory is more stringent than that of defeat, even in relation to two 
parties.  
 
Gaus also recognises a third possibility, where justifications are undefeated but not 
victorious. Typically, this outcome occurs because the arguments supporting the 
belief are inconclusive in that the matter is of such a complex nature that the standard 
of proof is difficult to meet.131 In such cases, a further decision-making process is 
required, which Gaus identifies as the adjudication of an arbitrator. He sees this 
democratic institution as resembling the umpire in a game: 
 
The umpire’s aim is to produce practical determinations that best track what the rules require. 
Yet players need only conceive of her as a practical authority.… Indeed it follows that players 
are committed to accepting the umpire’s practical authority even when they believe her 
decision is wrong.132 
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In this way, a democratic umpire uses their judgment, as informed by various limits 
and standards set by justificatory liberalism, to decide in cases of inconclusive 
justifications. The outcomes of this can be validly accepted by all citizens involved, 
without any committing to altering their own beliefs to match.133  
 
This expression of adjudicative democracy is an important aspect of Justificatory 
Liberalism. Its relationship to the moral epistemology is interesting, in that it accords 
with Gaus’ view of beliefs as potentially flawed, and steers away from the goal of 
public consensus. The other interesting part, especially in comparison with Gutmann 
and Thompson’s deliberative democracy, is the importing of substantive liberal 
content into the theory. This is achieved in two different ways. Firstly, Gaus identifies 
those liberal principles that are so intimately bound up with public justification that 
they are justified merely as a consequence of the public justification itself.  
 
The corollary of requiring the public justification of socially significant decisions is 
that those decisions that are not justified should not be imposed on people (excepting, 
of course, through the operation of the adjudicative process). This implies a liberal 
principle of toleration, since public action that affects others cannot be taken without 
first going through the process of justifying that action to them.134 Toleration, in this 
form, “is a minimal but fundamental requirement that we not impose upon others 
without justification”.135 In addition, free speech is fundamental to public 
justification, and, in particular, to the publicity requirement of victorious 
justification.136 This reflects a commitment to public reason, and the free and genuine 
action of those who participate in it. It is not surprising that these liberal conditions of 
public justification are required, given that justification as a standard of legitimacy is 
a liberal idea. The values of toleration and free speech, then, are as valid as the 
process of public justification itself. The only concern is that they are given no more 
extensive meaning than is implied by public justification, so that, for example, 
toleration means nothing more than the absence of public action undertaken without 
an appropriate justificatory basis.  
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The second way in which Gaus incorporates substantive liberal values relates to his 
comment above, that there is an abstract rational consensus as to core liberal beliefs. 
For this reason there is a set of abstract liberal principles that are mandated by the 
action of public justification, and, in particular, by his mechanism of immunity. If 
many attempts have been made to publicly justify a particular belief or set of beliefs, 
and this has failed, then this is good evidence that the attempt is unlikely to ever 
succeed, and that citizens should rightly be held immune to such attempts.137 The 
example he offers is of the failed attempts to apply religious doctrine on others during 
the politics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and of the practical US 
expression of this failure, the prohibition on Congress abridging freedom of 
expression or religion in the first amendment to the US Constitution.138 He also makes 
something of pluralism here, arguing that the fact that many believe in a plurality of 
views of the good life means that attempts to justify a single such view will 
necessarily fail.139 He labels it a defeater doctrine, in that even though it may not be 
conclusively justified, it will serve to defeat alternative arguments. Gaus carries the 
idea of immunity into a conception of privacy that prohibits the public justification of 
beliefs that are based on reasons of a personal moral dislike for an activity, 
disapproval or offence.140 Such reasons would always be defeated by  
people who did not share that dislike or that sensibility, including the participants 
themselves.  
 
Gaus goes on to discuss the basic interests which, liberalism would tend to suggest, 
should be protected. These include, in the words of Locke, “life, liberty, health and 
indolence of body; and the possessions of outward things, such as money, lands, 
houses, furniture and the like”.141 The basic liberties are the subject of hypothetical 
contractual arguments such that all rational people would accept norms in favour of 
their protection. Gaus argues that this has particular meaning in a justificatory 
framework: 
 
Although social contract theorists have often relied on some form of actual consent to justify 
public enforcement of these norms, it should be manifest that, according to justificatory 
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liberalism, hypothetical contractual arguments are genuinely justificatory. When the 
hypothetical contractualist argues that all rational individuals would consent to norms 
protecting these interests, it is being claimed that we all have conclusive reasons to adopt 
these norms.142 
 
This means that hypothetical agreement translates into a conclusive justification, since 
all have reason to agree with it regardless of their own set of beliefs and values. The 
nature of the hypothetical agreement about these basic liberal norms is that they are 
preferable to a non-protectionist state of nature.143 
 
This justification of the inclusion of substantive liberal content is both novel and 
ingenious. It consists of two conceptions: immunity and conclusive justification. The 
immunity argument is that those justificatory claims that depend on the acceptance of 
a single religion or way of life, or on particular moral sensibilities, will necessarily be 
defeated by the beliefs of others. This result depends on the nature of the claims 
involved: claims based on a contested religion, a contested way of life, or on moral 
sensibilities that cannot be shared by the subjects of the justification, will not be 
sufficiently justifiable to them, as such arguments would be contrary to their honestly 
and rightly held beliefs and reasons. In other words, it is the personal and contingent 
nature of the reasons behind the justification that means that they will necessarily be 
defeated in a social context.  
 
This is an elegant philosophical justification for the liberal principles of freedom of 
religion, the freedom from interference based on moral offence or dissatisfaction, and 
a pared-back neutrality based on pluralism. These ideas are derived convincingly from 
public justification. The chief concern about the approach of immunities and defeater 
doctrines, is that they may apply to a broader group of beliefs than Gaus anticipates. If 
the only requirement is that a contrary doctrine is openly justified by another person, 
then the list of immunities should be quite long.  
 
An initial possibility would be to extend Gaus’ idea of pluralism as a defeater doctrine 
from reflecting plural ways of life, to a thoroughgoing value-pluralism. If it is an 
openly justified belief of some citizen or group of citizens that moral value is by 
nature plural and incommensurable, then any public justification will be unable to 
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promote any particular moral value. The scope of such defeater doctrines turns out to 
be so broad that it is easy to envisage the possibility of conflicting defeater doctrines: 
value-monism, as an openly justified belief, would act to prevent a belief based on 
pluralism from ever being publicly justifiable.  
 
This approach seems to suggest an unattractive position whereby any possible 
justification is defeated by another openly justified belief. This would create a 
stalemate in public reason, and one that an umpire could not deal with, since this 
umpire is only supposed to deal with the inconclusive result of the undefeated but not 
victorious justification. The problem here is that in a diverse society any justification 
is likely to be defeated in some way by at least one other person, and the liberal 
freedoms are no exception to this. Gaus’ attempt to derive some liberal content from 
public justification seems to suffer from the lack of liberal restrictions on valid 
beliefs. There does seem to be a real and substantive link between public justification 
and restrictions based on beliefs that are individual and necessarily not shared. But, 
using an effectively unanimous standard of defeat within a diverse population means 
that this effect would spread much wider than Gaus would anticipate or accept.  
 
The second approach to incorporating liberal principles is through conclusive 
justification. Gaus argues that the basic liberal core of liberal principles of protection 
would be chosen by everyone, rather than facing the non-protection of a state of 
nature. Again, this argument is a clever attempt at drawing substantive liberal content 
from principles of public justification. There is certainly power to the idea of the 
rational choice of protection over vulnerability, but this is protection in its most 
abstract form. Gaus appeals to the common liberal core, through which the exercise of 
personal reason takes particular form.144 The main concern here is whether this 
abstract ideal of protection is in fact necessarily liberal. Some forms of protection 
seem fundamental, but the possible conceptions of this protection are diverse, and 
may encompass ideas that are not recognisably liberal. This turns on the forms of 
protection that might be rationally conceived by someone in the situation of 
hypothetical consent. The issue is whether the rationality of such an individual 
constrains them to a liberal account of protectionism. Gaus may argue that it does, and 
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he may be right, but, even then, the liberal content would have only the most abstract 
form, and would not act as a substantial constraint on future public justification. 
 
Gaus’ arguments from public justification to liberal content are interesting and 
potentially important, but have not drawn the critical attention they deserve. The 
attempt to derive a basic, abstract set of liberal rights from a system of public 
justification is a significant undertaking, especially since Gaus relies on an abstract 
and universal liberal core of values. Ultimately, however, they face problems that 
Gaus does not deal with, and which require further explanation or substantial 
reformulation.  
 
This derivation of substantive liberal content amounts to the most embedded of the 
three layers of justification that make up Justificatory Liberalism. The next concerns 
Gaus’ conception of public justification. As Mark Evans points out, public reason 
theorist Fred D'Agostino has allowed that the actual process of justification is itself 
contestable: 
 
Liberals have rendered it into a variety of conceptions which are not all compatible with each 
other, and for which no authoritative method of ranking exists. D'Agostino contends that 
conceptions of public justification diverge on whether they argue (i) for a deep consensus on 
principles between citizens, or a convergence in practice from diverse viewpoints; (ii) that X 
is legitimate if it is reasonable to accept it, or that it is not reasonable to reject it; (iii) that X is 
legitimate because it advances people's desires or that they believe it to be right; (iv) that X is 
to be justified to actual agents or their 'ideal', hypothetical representatives; (v) that justification 
reflects mutual advantages – a compromise of each relevant individual's interests – or 
judgments of the common good from a shared standpoint; (vi) that X requires justification 
before implementation or that justification is obtained if it is reasonable to assume it will be 
publicly accepted; (vii) that justification requires interaction (argument, bargaining) between 
the parties involved or no interaction (in which people reach their conclusions separately).145 
 
This shows substantial diversity among possible liberal conceptions of public 
justification. Gaus’ task, then, is to justify his particular conception as valid. Much of 
this is achieved by founding this conception on his epistemological account of 
justification, and this is one of the strengths of Justificatory Liberalism: that public 
justification is not merely the product of a philosophical or moral account of the 
requirements of legitimacy, but, rather, reflects an accurate model of the way we 
validly hold beliefs, and the way that different beliefs are genuinely justifiable to us. 
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The main goal of Justificatory Liberalism is to avoid these issues of contestability by 
offering an epistemologically realistic basis for justification.  
 
This approach leaves Gaus open to objections against particular aspects of his 
epistemology, as well as for the parts of his account of legitimacy. Both Gaus' 
justificatory epistemology and his attempts to derive liberal principles from it face 
significant challenges, but are interesting and potentially valuable moves in liberal 
theory. Overall, Gaus’ approach is a robust attempt to justify aspects of his model of 
justification.  
 
The final, and most general level of justification that Gaus, and, in fact, all liberal 
public reason theories must face, is in asserting the central moral importance of public 
justification to liberalism. One of the first and most significant statements of this 
nature was made by Jeremy Waldron in his seminal article ‘Theoretical Foundations 
of Liberalism.’ His central thesis is that  
 
liberals are committed to a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the 
agency of individual men and women, and that these commitments generate a requirement 
that all aspects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made 
acceptable to every last individual.146 
 
He goes on to comment that this view will not be recognisable to every liberal, but 
that it does underpin much of what it means to be liberal, and does reflect one 
perspective of liberalism.147 He characterises that part of liberalism that is represented 
by the public justification requirement, as including those conceptions that base 
political legitimacy on the consent of the citizens, and that encompass contract 
arguments.148 These theories, he argues, face several difficulties, including the 
impossibility of complete agreement, unreasonably withheld consent, and mistaken 
and unreasonably held beliefs. This leads the liberal to search not for accord, but for 
an approach to justifying their beliefs to all.149 
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This shift from actual consent to liberal justification, Waldron recognises, faces 
difficulties. Such a liberal system is sensitive to the irreducible pluralism and diversity 
in society, and can base political discussion on a common commitment to some ideal 
of the good life.150 But this does not take into account the potential for deep difference 
that overwhelms even the abstract liberal conceptions of life, and of illiberal views of 
life. The liberal, Waldron argues, must limit liberalism to those with existing liberal 
beliefs.151 This means that the resulting liberal politics is not neutral as to liberal 
beliefs. 
 
Waldron's perspective on liberalism is one that is broadly concerned with justifying 
social policies to all individuals. He does acknowledge, however, the inherent 
difficulty with justifying this system of justification itself, except to those who are 
already liberal and already broadly accept the content of such a system. Although he 
asserts public justification as a central conception of liberalism, he does not view the 
resulting liberalism as universally valid, but, rather, contingent on existing liberal 
beliefs. 
 
Gaus also argues in favour of the centrality of public justification to liberalism. He 
borrows an example from Stanley Benn, where one person, Alan, splits pebbles on a 
public beach and another, Betty, seeing the act taking place, takes measures to prevent 
it continuing. Gaus asserts that this example demonstrates the quintessential liberal 
claim “that there is a basic asymmetry between you acting and another interfering 
with your actions”.152 The nature of this asymmetry is that Betty must justify her 
actions in interfering with Alan’s behaviour, yet Alan is under no obligation to justify 
his actions to her.  
 
Benn’s point is not simply that Alan and Betty may see the world this way, but it is almost 
impossible for them (and us) not to see social relations as being governed by this principle of 
non-interference.… Betty is setting about thwarting his agency without being able to give him 
any good reason; she is trying to undermine Alan’s ability to decide what he will do. As do 
we, Alan sees an important asymmetry between himself and others in deciding what he will 
do: unless good reason can be provided to the contrary he is the one who makes decisions 
about what he will do. It takes a special case for Betty to interfere. As John Stuart Mill said, 
‘[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’.153  
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Gaus argues that in this situation Alan should, by default, have the right to act. Betty 
can only overcome that right if she has good reason. This pattern of personal choice 
over one’s personal actions in the absence of contrary public justification is, Gaus 
argues, at the very heart of the liberal ideal. Allowing interference without the 
possibility of this justification would undermine individual agency and arouse 
legitimate feelings of resentment or indignation.  
 
There is a basic problem with this claim. It is not that the pattern of interference is 
misapplied, but, rather, how this interference is recognised, and, in particular, how it 
is distinguished from personal, protected action. In the above example Alan desires to 
split pebbles on a public beach, and Betty desires that he should not. It seems obvious 
that Alan is acting within a personal domain, which should draw the protection of 
Gaus’ liberal presumption, and it is equally clear that Betty is attempting to interfere 
in the actions of another. A closer look suggests that this situation may not be so 
obvious: Alan wants to act in a way that seems to negatively affect Betty, since she 
sees some reason to prevent it; and Betty wants to act in a way that negatively affects 
Alan, since he wants to continue.  
 
The basis for Gaus’ analysis of this example is that Alan’s action is protected. The 
reasoning behind this seems to depend on the fact that it is an inconsequential act that 
is an expression of Alan’s choice and his agency, and is a physical act of his own 
person.154 This does not seem as necessarily inconsequential as Gaus suggests: Betty 
has been driven for some unspecified reason to act to physically prevent it continuing. 
It may be that she is morally indignant that Alan should undertake such a pastime – 
this is a strange justification, but hers is a strange action. Whatever the reason it is 
possible that the continuation of the activity would cause Betty some form of harm.  
 
If it is accepted that Alan’s action is not necessarily inconsequential, then it is difficult 
to see the logical distinction between his act and Betty’s. The physical action taken to 
prevent Alan from continuing is an expression of her choice and agency in the same 
way that Alan’s act is an expression of his. It is certainly a personal physical act, over 
which she should be sovereign, and, so, it seems that there is no good reason to deny 




her the liberal protection that is afforded to Alan. If this is the case, then, this example 
becomes much less straightforward, in that Betty’s action is both an interference that 
requires justification and a liberty that is presumptively protected, and that she is 
under no obligation to justify.  
 
This result would apply to many other situations. If Alan reacts to Betty’s action, for 
example, by struggling free from her grip, then this would be both a protected and an 
interfering action, as would any subsequent physical response from Betty. In fact 
every interfering action is also a protected action. This seeming contradiction might 
be overcome by saying that the requirement to justify interference rebuts the liberal 
presumption, but this raises an even more disturbing possibility: that Alan’s action of 
splitting the pebbles amounts to an interference on Betty. It is possible to imagine that 
Betty suffered some harm as a result of Alan’s splitting of pebbles. That harm would 
seem inconsequential, but it is no more so than the harm caused by her action against 
Alan. If there is some harm involved, there seems no obvious and logical way to 
distinguish it from the harm then suffered by Alan, and, so, Betty would be entitled to 
some sort of justification according to Gaus’ formula. This result would be entirely 
unacceptable to Gaus, as it paints his liberal principles as requiring a complex and 
cumbersome web of harm and justification. 
 
Gaus might respond to this argument by claiming that Alan does not actually harm 
Betty, or that any harm suffered is not of the relevant kind, so that his action does not 
interfere with any protected liberty. The possibility of harm, in the sense of having a 
significant negative effect on Betty, is real, and would make sense of her behaviour. 
This harm could take many forms, but the most reasonable in the unusual set of 
circumstances is a sense of indignation. Gaus might argue that this does not constitute 
the kind of harm that could amount to an interference, and it is correct that there is a 
trend in liberal theory to exclude such moralism-like harms. Yet this would require 
that Gaus actually offer an idea of what amounts to interference and what does not.  
 
The point is that Gaus’ example is supposed to show one person carrying out an 
inconsequential act and another person interfering with that act. By paring back this 
interaction, the quintessence of liberalism should be revealed. Further examination, 
however, suggests that the conceptions of protection and interference are not easily 
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understood or applied, even in the most basic example, and this raises questions about 
such a one-sided situation. In fact, it is possible that the liberal asymmetry Gaus 
identifies is actually a consequence of a misshapen circumstance. The difficulty with 
his approach is that the conceptions of protection and interference are so broad as to 
apply to almost any situation, so that, in any social interaction where actions affect 
others, every action is both protected and is an interference. Gaus’ example relies on 
an inconsequential action on one part and a motiveless response on the other, 
expressed as a direct physical harm. Instead of distilling a social situation into pure 
liberal rights, it serves only to codify an unreal situation for general use. Gaus seems 
to rely more on the liberal intuitions of the reader to make the link between this 
situation and general social life, than on the effective characterisation of the liberal 
conceptions involved.  
 
 
4.4 Public reason in liberalism  
 
Public justification is an important post-communitarian thread of contemporary liberal 
theory, but it is not the only thread; it does not, by itself, express what is fundamental 
in liberal theory, nor does it offer an obvious and universal justification for a public 
reason liberalism. Both Gaus and Waldron do, however, elucidate the reasons why 
such forms of liberalism are so compelling: They require social principles and forms 
to be justifiable to each person, and, in this way, public justification liberalism taps 
into the powerful liberal and moral ideals of consent and respect. However, as both 
Gaus and Waldron admit, actual consensus is not a realistic or even a desirable goal. 
A conception of public justification must respond to this in a sensible way, while 
retaining as much moral content as possible. 
 
A liberal theory of public justification draws on the deep and rich moral sources of 
consent and respect, yet must assert itself as the proper or fundamental expression of 
liberalism, or as the best system of social organisation. This burden can be obscured 
by the centrality of justification to such theories. All moral and political theories face 
justificatory burdens; the requirement of giving reasons or a rational explanation for a 
particular approach is fundamental. Public justification differs in that it implies that 
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this justification is or could be made to each person on their own terms, giving 
reasons that they would accept, and that this is carried out or confirmed through an 
actual public, political procedure.  
 
This could be contrasted with A Theory of Justice. There, the basis for justification in 
the broadest sense is also agreement or consent, in the form of a reflective 
equilibrium, but this differs in that the agreement is reached through personal 
reflection rather than a public process of dialogue. It is based on going through a 
particular theoretical and rational exploration of the original position, rather than 
justifying according to existing beliefs, mitigated by the limitations placed on, or 
virtues required of, those who engage in the public process. Because both approaches 
depend on agreement, and, so, on intuition based justifications, there are substantial 
similarities between them. They differ in that A Theory is contemplative and 
theoretically structured, where public justification is based on discourse and 
justification by good reasons.  
 
The contrast is greater between political justification and a non-intuitive political 
theory, such as in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. With the latter, justification is through 
a legitimacy standard based on a declared set of natural rights. There, the justification 
is not supposed to reflect individual beliefs at all. As such, coercive political rules, 
such as are in a libertarian theory, are applied despite their disagreement with personal 
beliefs or intuitions. This process of justification is quite different in terms of a greater 
theoretical content, and is not explicitly public.  
 
From these comparisons it is clear that public reason offers a different and potentially 
powerful justification. It draws on the values of consent and respect, and incorporates 
a diversity of beliefs within a single unified political system. In this way public reason 
is better equipped than the systems, outlined in, either, A Theory of Justice, or, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, to deal with moral complexity and contestability. While 
accepting that beliefs are plural and that actual agreement is difficult to achieve, 
public justification allows a standard by which consensual or quasi-consensual 
decisions can be reached, or at least provide an acceptable basis for a democratic 
result. Also, by applying some useful distinction between the public and the private, 
such that some aspects of belief are consigned to the private, some of this difference 
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can be overcome. In this way, public justification allows some contestability and 
complexity to be dealt with within the domain of the political, that is, when removed 
from its theoretical structure. It also benefits from the virtues of a discourse-based 
approach to morality, although the effect of these differs with different theorists. 
Finally, the approach allows a theory to be silent on substantive political principles, 
and allows, instead, a particular society to choose from a plurality of alternatives 
depending on particular circumstances and beliefs. In this way, the difficulty of 
deriving substantive principles from universal theoretical structures without 
incorporating a theorist’s particular beliefs is diminished. 
 
However, public justification also faces a number of challenges. As is evident when 
considering the arguments of Waldron and Gaus, the idea of public justification is not 
self-justifying and, instead, must form part of an underlying theoretical justificatory 
structure. This reliance on theory is not contrary to public justification per se, but a 
theory of public justification needs to explain the moral role of dialogue and intuition 
within the theory, and also to relate this to the analytical theorising. Since these all 
form necessary parts of such a theory, and, yet, in some sense, compete in founding 
substantive principles, it is important that their relationship is understood. Gutmann 
and Thompson, for example, clearly prefer a system whereby a close analysis of 
intuitive liberal values informs democratic deliberation. Theorist Stephen Macedo 
places public justification in a representative role: 
 
mediating, in effect, between philosophy and the citizenry (representing philosophy to citizens 
and citizens to philosophy). The public conception avoids excessively subtle and complex 
forms of reasoning.… Public justification respects the “constraints of simplicity and 
availability of information,” moderating the aims of philosophy so as to ensure the wide 
accessibility of the relevant forms of reasoning and evidence.155 
 
This does not necessarily mean a dumbing-down of public discussion to the point 
where the complexity of the subject matter involved is not adequately reflected. It 
does recognise, however, that public justification means justification on the terms of 
the public, and, so, would exclude some of the rarefied arguments of the academic 
philosopher. This downplaying of philosophy in determining substantive moral and 
political issues is important and needs to be supported within a theory of public 
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justification, whether by arguments of subjectivism, scepticism, the power of public 
dialogue, or in some other way. 
 
In this way, liberal public justification faces the full justificatory burden, as does any 
moral or political theory. In addition, there are two more practical problems. The first 
relates to agreement: there is a fundamental tension in public justification theories 
between the values of consent and respect on which they are based, and the context of 
persistent disagreement in which they operate. Consent and respect, in this context, 
imply that individuals are accepted in whatever beliefs they hold, and are in 
substantive agreement with each political outcome. But, actual consensus is unlikely 
to ever result on this level, especially in the context of an irreducible plurality of 
beliefs.  
 
Any liberal theory of political justification, then, must have a conception of 
justification that allows continuing disagreement while still meeting, in some sense, 
the standards of consent and respect. This conception must be sufficient to ensure the 
level of agreement that is aimed at can be achieved. This usually means incorporating 
an understanding of reasonableness that limits political consideration. Such an 
inclusion is important in order to exclude those who have fundamental differences in 
beliefs, such as the deeply illiberal. That this skews political justification is a simple 
fact of such theories, and encourages contextualised justifications based on, at the 
very least, a desire to co-operate in the political domain.156  
 
The second practical difficulty in liberal public justification theories lies in actually 
incorporating substantive liberal content, or in ensuring that basically liberal results 
would come from the process of public justification. Some basic liberal values, such 
as the right to free thought and speech, and to be free from certain types of 
discrimination, will be included as being necessary to public justification itself. Other 
liberal content, however, is much more difficult to incorporate. This can be seen 
clearly in Gutmann and Thompson’s strained attempts at justifying principles of 
liberty and opportunity as being necessary to deliberation; in Rawls’ attempt to justify 
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the original position as the most reasonable political conception; and, in Gaus’ 
arguments as to conclusive liberal justifications.  
 
This difficulty concerns the potential for conflict between substantive liberal 
principles and the undetermined and open nature of the process of political 
justification. The latter is supposed to be attuned to the beliefs of particular people, 
and, as such, should offer no guarantee that liberal outcomes will be reached. This 
puts liberal public justification theorists in the position of placing liberal restrictions 
on the political process (similar to Gutmann and Thompson), assuming a pre-existing 
liberal or democratic culture (Rawls and Waldron), or arguing that the process of 
justification itself would naturally lead to liberal results (Gaus). Of these, the most 
plausible is the contextual approach as employed by Rawls; but, this approach 
justifies public justification only to those who are already predisposed to accept it, and 
suffers some of the problems that go along with a contextual justification. 
 
At the most general level, public justification resembles pluralism, in that both seek to 
derive a liberal system out of conditions of diversity or difference. The basis for each 
is to develop a plausible conception of social difference, be it value pluralism or 
reasonable disagreement, and embed it into a general liberal system. This in itself 
resembles Rawls’ earlier subordination of differing conceptions of the good to the 
right. Each of these systems faces a strong justificatory burden that cannot be satisfied 
simply by the plausibility of the difference it contains. This entails that the nature of 
the difference is such that it does not overwhelm any attempts to place it within a 
singular system, so that the system itself can be justified in the face of the persistent 
and irreducible nature of the difference.  
 
As was explored in the chapter on A Theory, the distinction between the right and the 
good is not itself adequate to support such an approach: rational disagreement is not 
confined simply to conceptions of the good, as the criticism of Rawls’ theory shows; 
and, the two are not so distinct as to justify Rawls’ assignation of priority to the 
relationship between them. Theories of pluralism or public justification that adopt this 
distinction will always suffer from this weakness. Equally fraught is the 
thoroughgoing approach that sees pluralism as the central fact of moral reality. Any 
theory based on this conception will face difficulty in being able to define a unified 
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system that could overcome this fundamental pluralism: the fact of pluralism is itself 
singular, but a political and moral theory cannot be derived wholly from this fact.  
 
Theories of public justification (and political liberalism) approach this problem by 
being concerned with the actual social fact of disagreement, and by operating through 
a public and political process. This allows the embedding of a social and public 
difference into a theoretical system, and, so, permits a sensible distinction on those 
grounds. This is an attractive approach in that the division between the social and the 
theoretical is real and readily recognisable. The difficulty is that, because the theories 
are necessarily intuition-based, the political is not capable of being separated from the 
philosophical in this way, and, so, the required distinction between philosophical 
theorising and public reasoning breaks down. This leads to internal inconsistency, and 
the difficulty of justifying theoretical systems as wholes.  
 
These attempts by pluralism, and by political liberalism and public justification 
theory, are essentially to incorporate fundamental contestability and complexity into 
political theory in the form of embedded conceptions of difference. None of these 
have been successful in creating a morally meaningful and coherent theory of justice, 
for the general reason that none has been able to restrict difference to within a 





1. Liberal theory and group rights 
 
1.1 The multicultural movement 
 
Multiculturalism as a political ideology originates from the 1960s, and in its most 
extreme form  
 
expresses a reservoir of alienation against the cultures, ethnicities, religions and mores of 
Europe and of peoples who derive their origins from Europe … while championing the 
perspectives and ways of life of non-European peoples.1 
 
The subjects of this alienation are those who are not, or who do not identify with, the 
Euro-central perspective and, instead, who embody some aspect of separation from 
this norm. A consequence of the multicultural movement is that  
 
previously excluded groups are no longer willing to be silenced or marginalized, or to be 
defined as ‘deviant’ simply because they differ in race, culture, gender, ability or sexual 
orientation from the so-called ‘normal’ citizen. They demand a more inclusive conception of 
citizenship which recognizes (rather than stigmatizes) their identities, and which 
accommodates (rather than excludes) their differences.2 
 
These demands for multiculturalism have had a major impact on liberal theory from 
the late 1980s. The first expression of this impact viewed multiculturalism as a 
particular expression of the communitarian critique of liberalism.3 One of the 
communitarian criticisms concerns the liberal assumption of the autonomous and 
unencumbered self, free to choose and pursue its own conception of the good life. 
Multiculturalism represents a challenge to this idea in that it implies a conception of 
the self that is dependant on and expressed through a particular culture, and suggests 
that the liberal self is, in fact, a western self, whether in the details of construction or 
through the way it is assumed to act. 
                                                
1
 D D Murphey, ‘“Multiculturalism” and the West’ (2005) 30(2) Journal of Social, Political, and 
Economic Studies 203, p203. 
2
 W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn., 2002), p327. 
3
 Ibid, pp336-337. 
 288 
 
The second, and more significant, impact consists of the acknowledgment of the 
importance of multiculturalism to liberal theory, and the attempt to incorporate into 
liberalism some conception of multicultural or group rights. Contemporaneous with 
many of the developments discussed in the previous two chapters has been attempts to 
develop a liberalism consistent with the real-world fact of multiculturalism, and, so, a 
more realistic and culturally richer system, able to incorporate these rights. This 
liberal attempt at internalising multiculturalism has led the prominent multicultural 
liberal theorist Will Kymlicka to comment that the “overwhelming majority of 
debates about multiculturalism are not debates between a liberal majority and 
communitarian minorities, but debates amongst liberals about the meaning of 
liberalism”.4  
 
This incorporation is interesting and relevant in a number of ways. In terms of the two 
previous chapters, multiculturalism offers an alternative and potentially 
complementary perspective on difference, so that multicultural liberalism represents a 
new attempt at a liberalism that is derived from, or that at least has to deal with, 
fundamental variations in beliefs and values. How this difference is embedded within 
a liberal theory, and how this differs from the previous approaches, is important, as 
are the particular justificatory challenges that such a theory faces.  
 
There have been a number of different approaches to this problem. In particular, some 
thinkers attempt to simply incorporate group rights seamlessly into a clearly liberal 
framework, while others reshape liberalism itself in order to cohere with multicultural 
ideas. Both of these approaches offer a potentially important development of liberal 
theory as a response to difference. 
 
 
1.2 The politics of recognition 
 
Charles Taylor’s essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1994), represents the first steps 
towards a theory of multicultural liberalism, and reveals some of the challenges 
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involved.5 Despite being recognised as a communitarian thinker, Taylor presents a 
distinctively liberal approach, albeit one strongly linked to the ideas of recognition 
and identity. 
 
For Taylor, multiculturalism is founded on the more general demand for the social 
recognition of one’s identity, meaning their self-conception. A failure to offer this 
recognition amounts to a real and, in fact, major harm. 
 
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning 
or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can 
be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being.6 
 
In this way, society can, independent of any particular human rights it recognises, 
inflict harm on groups of people by failing to recognise those groups’ identities as 
distinct from their own. This harm can amount to a “grievous wound”, such that due 
recognition is a “vital human need”.7 The importance of recognition is heightened in 
modern times, Taylor argues, because of our understanding of an individualised 
identity that is inward-looking and subjective.8 
  
By attaching to it such social importance, Taylor creates a conception of recognition 
that is highly relevant to matters of justice. In explicating this idea, he draws a 
distinction between the ideal of equal recognition and the universal theories of equal 
dignity. The latter refer to the earlier liberal theories of justice that are supposedly 
universal, and that prescribe for every person a standard bundle of rights.9 By 
contrast, equal recognition represents a politics of difference; it acknowledges 
distinctness between people, and rallies against any homogenisation and assimilation. 
The former is based on an idea of equal respect for all and, in particular, Taylor 
argues, on a universal human potential. The politics of difference, however, looks not 
to potential but to actuality, and seeks protection for what individuals and cultures 
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have actually achieved.10 This leads to a necessary conflict between the two 
approaches. 
 
For one, the principle if equal respect requires that we treat people in a difference-blind 
fashion.… For the other, we have to recognize and even foster particularity. The reproach the 
first makes to the second is just that it violates the principle of nondiscrimination. The 
reproach the second makes to the first is that it negates identity by forcing people into a 
homogeneous mold that is untrue to them.11 
 
Taylor goes on to explain how this mould is not neutral between different people and 
different groups of people, but may favour one hegemonic group. In this way, a 
seemingly liberal approach has the potential to be discriminatory.12  
 
Taylor responds to the tension between these approaches by moving away from the 
idea of liberal neutrality, and, instead, allows that a liberal state can aim at a particular 
set of collective goals. Such a state remains liberal when these goals respect the 
diversity of citizens, particularly those who are not members of the group amongst 
whom the goals are shared.13 For a particular ethnic minority this may mean 
recognising a substantial set of specific, group-based rights, but these would not 
negate or alter basic individual rights. 14 
 
There would be no question of cultural differences determining the application of habeas 
corpus, for example. But [models of liberal society based on the politics of difference] 
distinguish these fundamental rights from the broad range of immunities and presumptions of 
uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review. They are willing 
to weigh the importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favour of the latter. They 
are thus in the end not procedural models of liberalism, but are grounded very much on 
judgments about what makes a good life – judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an 
important place.15 
 
This means that Taylor does not construct a particular justified liberal system. His 
explanation extends only to a basic description of the interaction between culture-
based and individual rights: that fundamental individual rights will prevail, but that 
group rights could trump lesser or secondary individual rights when the needs of the 
particular culture outweigh the value of these rights. In this situation, the weight given 
to these group rights must be informed by the needs of recognising the identity the 
culture offers.  
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Not all minority cultures, Taylor admits, would be able to be accommodated by this 
distinctively liberal regime, and, so, the challenge is to deal with diversity while 
remaining essentially liberal.16 This should be met by employing a presumption that 
all cultures are owed equal respect. This is not to say that all cultures are equally 
worthy, but that “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some 
considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings”.17 
It is difficult to find a clear foundation for this presumption, but the mere success of 
such a culture, Taylor suggests, implies something that is worthy of admiration, and 
that it would be arrogance to claim otherwise.18 
 
Despite failing to offer a substantive theoretical structure, Taylor’s work indicates 
some key issues for liberal theories that seek to incorporate multiculturalism. 
Probably the most significant of these is the tension between individual and group 
rights. The liberal preference for rights that are universal and, so, reflect a credo of 
equal respect and equal treatment, does not sit well with the recognition of rights that 
apply to a particular cultural group. For this reason, the initial task of any 
multicultural liberalism is to explain why and how individual rights are not adequate. 
For Taylor, this is because such rights do not fully recognise the identities of minority 
cultures and, instead, reflect a system biased in favour of the dominant culture.  
 
Chandran Kukathas, himself a libertarian theorist, disagrees with this position. He 
argues that liberalism should resist any minority claims for recognition, and that 
individual rights are sufficient to ensure that all are treated fairly.19 
 
The reason why liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism is that liberalism is 
itself, fundamentally, a theory of multiculturalism. This is because liberalism is essentially a 
theory about pluralism; and multiculturalism is, in the end, a species of pluralism. Liberalism 
is one of the modern world’s responses – indeed its most plausible response – to the fact of 
moral, religious, and cultural diversity. Its response has been to say that diversity should be 
accommodated, and differences tolerated; that a more complete social unity, marked by a 
uniform and common culture that integrates and harmonizes the interests of individual and 
community, is unattainable and undesirable; that division, conflict and competition will 
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always be present in human society, and the task of political institutions is to palliate a 
condition they cannot cure.20 
 
Kukathas argues that a liberal system of individual rights is adequate to deal with 
issues of cultural pluralism, just as it deals fairly with other forms of pluralism; that 
the purpose of liberalism is to provide equal rights that allow each person to have a 
fair call on society’s goods regardless of their personal beliefs, or the general 
acceptance of their cultural practices. On this view of liberalism, group recognition is 
unnecessary at best. At worst, it means the illegitimate promotion of a particular 
cultural group to the detriment of others, and has the potential to descend into “the 
politics of interest group conflict”.21 Kukathas offers, instead, the view of a liberalism 
that can embrace a wide range of cultures, excluding only those that are irreducibly 
collective or illiberal.22 This is characterised by the spirit of neutrality, which is 
accepting of these different ways of life, and by entrenched rights of free 
association.23 
 
Taylor and Kukathas offer two quite different accounts of the proper liberal response 
to cultural pluralism. The essential difference between them seems to stem from the 
view each holds as to the power of liberal neutrality to accommodate cultural 
difference. Taylor holds that liberal conceptions of neutrality and equality are 
culturally biased, and that the recognition of cultural identities requires specific group 
rights. To Kukathas, liberal neutrality and individual rights, while not perfect, amount 
to the best response to cultural pluralism. 
 
Determining which approach is correct requires a deeper examination of the meaning 
of liberal multiculturalism, but this difference does raise two issues. The first is 
whether difference-blind liberalism really contains cultural bias. Earlier discussion of 
neutrality- and equality-based liberalism identified the presence of bias, but in relation 
to the particular theorist rather than an entire culture. This does suggest that liberal 
theory cannot achieve a political and moral structure without implicit assumptions as 
to value. Many, more recent, theories of liberalism are contextually justified, and 
depend upon specifically western social conditions. Here, it seems, the bias is 
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explicitly culturally identified, albeit the conditions are usually expressed in broad 
terms. If this bias is unavoidable in liberal theory, then multicultural liberalism seems 
meaningful as an expression of the idea that it may be culturally founded. In 
determining how liberalism is best able to respond, some account of the nature of 
liberal cultural bias, more extensive than Taylor’s, will be required.  
 
The second issue raised relates to the nature of multiculturalism itself. As Kukathas 
suggests, multiculturalism is a form of pluralism. As such, he argues that it should be 
treated like any other source of difference within a society. Multicultural liberalism 
contends, in contrast, that cultural pluralism is a special form of pluralism that 
requires that particular measures be incorporated into liberal systems. This is not quite 
the case with Taylor, who is concerned with misrecognition generally, whether for 
reason of cultural or other difference. Generally speaking, however, multicultural 
recognition needs to offer an account of the nature of cultural difference, and the 
corresponding shortcomings of difference-blind liberalism, in order to justify a 
particularly multicultural conception of liberalism.  
 
 
2. Multicultural Citizenship 
 
2.1 Group rights as liberal rights 
 
Taylor’s essay on multiculturalism does not amount to a settled and justified theory, 
but, rather, offers some of the reasoning that informs the need for a liberal theory that 
incorporates multicultural concerns. He envisages a liberalism that is sensitive to the 
recognition of people’s identities, but one that does not override other fundamental 
liberal concerns, and, instead, is weighed against secondary rights. Will Kymlicka 
takes on the similar task of incorporating multiculturalism into existing liberal ideals, 
and his book, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995), 
probably represents the best-constructed and most complete attempt at this 
approach.24 
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The central theme of Multicultural Citizenship is that rights that properly belong to 
minority groups, or members of minority groups, are not adequately expressed by the 
traditional set of human rights; and that, what is required, instead, is a system that 
recognises certain group rights, but that does not do so at the expense of its liberal 
core.25 Kymlicka undertakes this task by, firstly, identifying two common types of 
minority groups and the group rights that they might attract and, then, by justifying 
the operation of these rights within a liberal structure, in a way that is consistent with 
individual rights. 
 
Kymlicka labels the two types of minority groups as ethnic and national minorities. A 
national minority pertains to a “historical community, more or less institutionally 
complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and 
culture” within a state.26 This includes various indigenous peoples, as well as other 
settled nation-like communities (e.g. Quebecois in Canada). Ethnic minorities are 
established as a result of the voluntary immigration of members of a cultural group 
into a state. Traditionally, this was characterised by assimilationist policies on the part 
of the state, but, more recently, a more tolerant and pluralist approach has been 
adopted.27 
 
Kymlicka also identifies three types of group rights that can legitimately be claimed 
by such minorities. The first relate only to national minorities and encompass the 
rights of self-government.28 These usually involve “devolving political power to a 
political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and 
substantially corresponding to their historical homeland and territory”.29 The second 
type are polyethnic rights, and, so, are relevant to ethnic minorities. These include the 
funding of cultural practice and the promotion of cultural expression.30 Finally, 
special representation rights are appropriate to both types of minority, and involve the 
reserving of some legislative membership for the representatives of particular 
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minority groups.31 These are, Kymlicka argues, the basic mechanisms by which a 
minority can be accommodated within a liberal state, and are currently used 
throughout the democratic world.32 Kymlicka justifies the recognition of these rights 
within a liberal framework in two complementary ways. He argues, firstly, that 
culture is fundamental to the liberal freedom to choose the way one desires to live; 
and, secondly, that any liberal system is implicitly biased against minority cultures. In 
this way, both freedom and equality must be sensitive to culture in order that fair 
results are reached. 
 
A societal culture, Kymlicka states, is one that “provides its members with 
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and 
private spheres”.33 Such cultures, he argues, are fundamental to individual choice in 
that they provide options as to how to live, and make those options meaningful.34 
They operate as the subject and as the context of choice, and language is an important 
aspect of the latter. 
 
Whether or not a course of action has any significance for us depends on whether, and how, 
our language renders vivid to us the point of that activity. And the way in which our language 
renders vivid these activities is shaped by our history, our ‘traditions and conventions’. 
Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent judgements 
about how to lead our lives. In this sense our culture not only provides options, it also 
‘provides the spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable.’35 
 
Kymlicka sets as a precondition to the meaningful exercise of our freedom to choose 
how to live, the adherence to a societal culture. It is not simply the case, however, that 
a minority member can switch to a majority culture. Rather, the pull of one’s own 
culture is strong, and any attempt to impose an alternative strongly resisted.36  
 
Kymlicka concludes from this that individual freedom requires access to one’s own 
societal culture.37 This access is guaranteed by the rights of self-government enjoyed 
by national minorities under his theory, who are then able to manage the access to and 
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development of the societal culture. There are two points that Kymlicka makes to 
clarify this result. The first is that the promotion of a particular culture does not 
interfere with a person’s right to choose. This is because 
 
[t]he freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go beyond 
one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within one’s societal 
culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of a culture 
are most worth developing, and which are without value.38 
 
Kymlicka argues that an increase in the sensitivity to culture does not mean dulling 
the sensitivity to freedom, and that, on reflection, a focus on culture is fundamental to, 
and can enhance, freedom. The second point is that this approach does not prescribe 
cultural isolation. Having access to one’s minority societal culture does not prohibit or 
prevent cultural interaction and intermingling. Even in the case of a national minority, 
there will generally be interaction between small self-governing minorities and their 
majority counterparts.39 
 
Kymlicka’s second argument in favour of group rights stems from the same assertion 
of liberal cultural bias that is central to Taylor’s essay. 
 
Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays and state symbols 
unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of 
particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural 
identities, and thereby disadvantages others.40 
 
In this way, Kymlicka argues, one societal culture is preferred by the state over 
another. This means that adequate access to one’s culture requires redressing the 
balance, and specifically acknowledging and promoting other cultures. He expresses 
this argument in terms of a conception of equality for individuals: that the equal 
treatment and respect of all people requires group-specific rights that act to correct for 
the inevitable cultural bias of the state. It is significant not only that he taps into such 
a fundamental liberal concern as equality, but also that he justifies group rights on an 
individual basis – not because of the rights or interests of an ethnic or national group, 
but, rather, those of its members.  
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Kymlicka contrasts this approach with the more traditional liberal position that he 
labels benign neglect.41 He argues that despite the attraction of this position, equality 
and fair treatment sometimes require that a cultural perspective be adopted, and that 
corrective group rights be employed.42 As to the proper effect of these measures, 
Kymlicka asserts that “we should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the 
opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture”.43 This equality argument 
applies also to ethnic groups, but in a different way. Because immigration is 
undertaken with the acceptance of the need to integrate, to some extent, into the new 
culture, arguments as to cultural bias are less relevant.44 Instead, equal concern 
requires that ‘good cultural membership’ be promoted to the immigrants, which 
involves “enabling integration, by providing language training and fighting patterns of 
discrimination and prejudice”.45 In doing so, the majority should attempt to 
accommodate the minority culture. As the earlier point about switching cultures 
infers, integration can be neither automatic nor total.46 
 
Kymlicka offers three additional arguments to buttress his justification of group 
rights, but none of these are as significant as the argument from equality and cultural 
bias. These concern, firstly, the significance of historical agreements as to the sharing 
of national and cultural rights, as are present in some countries where western 
settlement has affected established indigenous groups.47 The second asserts the value 
of cultural diversity. Like the arguments in favour of value diversity canvassed in the 
chapter on pluralism, this has some potential value but is not well-developed. 
Kymlicka asserts that intercultural diversity “contributes to the richness of people’s 
lives”.48 He goes on to examine the quasi-aesthetic and practical advantages of such 
diversity, but concludes that it is not an effective argument, since diversity cannot 
distinguish between chosen and enforced difference.49  
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Finally, Kymlicka argues that one of the functions of states is to protect the societal 
culture of its members, and that the national minority situation is analogous to the 
state system. Consequently, national minorities should have powers of cultural 
protection.50 This argument concludes Kymlicka’s justification for group-specific 
rights. Primarily this is undertaken through asserting the fundamental importance of 
culture to individual choice and action, and that any fair and realistic conception of 
equality must be conscious of cultural bias inherent in political practice. This 
prescribes, depending on the particular circumstances, various self-government rights 
for national minorities, and rights of fair integration and reasonable accommodation 
for ethnic minorities. Kymlicka completes his theory of multicultural citizenship with 
two further points. The first sets out how the rights of self-government granted to 
national minorities relate to individual liberal rights, and the second responds to a 
criticism of multicultural liberalism, that it would undermine the unity and stability of 
a society.  
 
The self-government rights of national minorities imply the power of such a group to 
guide the lives of its members. Kymlicka uses a distinction between external 
protections and internal restrictions to mediate the interaction between group and 
individual rights. Internal restrictions refer to limitations placed on individual action 
through national minority government. Liberalism suggests that these should not limit 
the basic rights afforded to individual members of the group, but Kymlicka argues 
that liberal states should not impose forcibly rules on minorities, except in extreme 
circumstances.51 
 
Conversely, external protections represent the limitation of the power of the cultural 
majority over the minority group. A group’s claim for external protection will be 
legitimate insofar as these encourage equality between adherents to the minority and 
majority cultures, “rectifying disadvantages or vulnerabilities suffered by the 
members of a particular group”.52 In this way, Kymlicka argues that a national 
minority is able to avoid the influence of the majority population so long as this 
reflects an underlying equality of treatment and respect for the members of both 
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groups. In practice this will mean that the minority is able to avoid the culturally 
homogenising power of the majority, to the extent that its members are inclined to 
retain their own culture. However, the minority will not be able to impose its own 
culture on unwilling recipients, as this would undermine their individual liberties. The 
resulting system, whereby a national minority has the capacity to protect its culture, 
subject to basic human rights, Kymlicka describes as “impeccably liberal”.53 
 
Finally, Kymlicka confronts the argument that such group rights would undermine the 
unity of a liberal society. He argues that, in relation to ethnic minorities, this is an 
overstated threat: immigrant populations have generally demonstrated a willingness to 
integrate, and rights which recognise this, while prescribing reasonable 
accommodation of the minority, will not weaken the social fabric. 
 
To be sure, [immigrants] want the mainstream institutions in their society to be reformed, so 
as to accommodate their cultural differences, and to recognize the value of their cultural 
heritage. But the desire for such polyethnic rights is a desire for inclusion which is consistent 
with participation in, and commitment to, the mainstream institutions that underlie social 
unity.54 
 
Conversely, the rights of self-government that attach to national minorities do imply a 
weakening of the bonds of the broader society. This is a significant concern, 
Kymlicka argues; but, the refusal of such rights to a national minority may well 
alienate them further and deepen the desire for formal separation.55 Ultimately, 
solidarity in a multinational state is achieved not by forced integration or the 
imposition of one group’s culture on another, but by the accommodation of minority 
groups and identities by the majority.56 The result is a state that is recognisably 
liberal, but that is sensitive to different cultural perspectives, and deals fairly with 
minority groups through an appropriate set of group rights. 
 
 
2.2 Culture and multiculturalism 
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The nature of Kymlicka’s theory is of culture-based additions to a non-cultural liberal 
framework: group rights are recognised as appropriate for some minorities for reasons 
that are not normally discussed in liberal theory, and that do not undermine its basic 
ideas. Like Taylor, Kymlicka is concerned with adjusting liberalism to take account of 
hitherto unregarded cultural concerns. The basic theme of such a project is that 
liberalism fails to account adequately for the cultural differences that are normal for 
contemporary western states. As is discussed above, in order to be effective, the 
theory must explain the nature of this failure and the difference in treatment of 
minorities that this implies. 
 
The basis for this argument in Multicultural Citizenship is set out by Kymlicka in two 
parts: firstly, in the relationship between societal culture and freedom; and, secondly, 
in the liberal bias in favour of the majority, and the implications of this on equal 
respect and treatment. These considerations, he argues, favour a particular set of 
group-specific rights. At the heart of Kymlicka’s account are conceptions of culture 
and multiculturalism. The relevant expression of the former is a societal culture that 
informs all aspects of a person’s life. This has been criticised by a number of writers 
as being ‘monolithic’ and ‘totalistic’.57 Kymlicka perceives culture to be relatively 
fixed, inescapable, complete and all-encompassing. This picture seems inaccurate, 
especially with regards to so-called national minorities that have suffered a history of 
marginalisation at the hands of the majority.58 It seems, also, to ignore the less-
pernicious dynamic interplay between majority and minority cultures, and both intra-
cultural diversity and cultural transformativity.  
 
The way that Kymlicka conceives culture has significant consequences for his theory. 
As Christian Joppke has noted, there is  
 
a tension in Kymlicka’s concept of culture between being either too thick or too thin: ‘too 
thick’ for giving a realistic account of the relationship between liberal states and culture; ‘too 
thin’ for justifying any minority rights at all, particularly for immigrants.59  
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This passage suggests that Kymlicka is caught in a difficult position: if culture is, as 
he seems to assert, conceived thickly, then the portrayal of (national) multiculturalism 
will be unrealistic; it will anticipate a separate and complete minority culture that 
resists, not only, the urge to integrate, but, also, the necessity of being liberal. The 
alternative, Joppke argues, is of a thin culture whereby a minority culture would 
readily give way to both majority and liberal demands. 
 
Kymlicka’s response to this difficulty is to apply a thick societal culture to national 
minority groups, while arguing that ethnic minorities lack the “‘institutional cement’ 
needed to form or maintain a distinct societal culture”.60 In this way, he can 
realistically maintain that national minorities can support self-government rights, 
while arguing that this would be inappropriate for immigrant communities. This is a 
clever move, and, with it, the criticism of societal culture collapses into what is 
probably the most persistently criticised aspect of Kymlicka’s theory, namely the 
distinction between national and ethnic minorities.  
 
However, Kukathas criticises this view of multiculturalism as being unrealistic, and 
the two groups as being, upon examination, somewhat indistinct. He identifies the 
voluntariness of being part of a minority as being the key point of distinction between 
the two groups, which seems an accurate portrayal of Kymlicka’s account. Kukathas 
argues that this is not always the case in real life: many migrant populations are 
involuntarily so, and many indigenous peoples have the ability, at low cost, to exit 
their communities “and live as (cosmopolitan) members of the wider society.”61 He 
concludes that  
 
national minorities and ethnic groups are not easily distinguishable – particularly if 
voluntariness of membership in the community or wider society is the yardstick. The effluxion 
of time increases the difficulty, as groups mingle, grow or contract; and as migrant generations 
find their ancestry more in the land of their birth than the homelands of their grandparents.62 
 
In this way, Kukathas attempts to undermine the basis of Kymlicka’s justification of 
group rights, namely that there are two different and distinct types of minority groups 
that draw different expressions of group-recognition, and instead declares “the 
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complexity and fluidity of cultural diversity”.63 The criticism here is of the 
simplification, not of the idea of culture, but of the distinction between national and 
ethnic minorities. 
 
This is not entirely fair to Kymlicka. In a reply to similar arguments, he points out that 
national and ethnic minorities together are not intended to exhaust the possible forms 
of minority cultures, but rather to be two distinct categories that are “the most 
common, the most successful, and the most relevant for future-oriented decisions”.64 
Creating an approach relevant to these minorities would lead, Kymlicka suggests, to 
being able to deal with more difficult intermediate positions.65 This argument is an 
effective defence to the assertion that there are minority populations that do not fit 
easily into either definition, or that have the characteristics of both.  
 
It would not, however, be adequate as a defence to the assertion that multiculturalism 
involves an inherent complexity of historical and cultural interaction that belies such a 
simple classification. Bernard Yack states that “Kymlicka’s self-government rights 
cannot be granted to all legitimate claimants because the twisted history that has 
governed the distribution of land and population over the ages has hopelessly 
entangled their claims”. 66 Yack implies that, in real-life cases, the definition of a 
national minority, as occupying a distinct territorial, linguistic and cultural homeland, 
will often (even, usually) not be met. This would only be exacerbated by the 
monolithic conception of societal culture that is required for a group to be a national 
minority.  
 
Kymlicka does undertake a simplification of culture and the forms of multiculturalism 
– the basis for national minorities depending on societal culture, and, for ethnic 
minorities, the voluntariness of minority membership. Any political theory based on 
an actual political movement as widespread and significant as that of multiculturalism 
will be forced to deal with the variation and complexity of particular historical 
situations. Whether Kymlicka’s description is so simplified as to present a distorted 
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and impoverished conception of multiculturalism, on which no general conception of 
group rights can be validly founded, remains to at issue. On theoretical terms, what is 
important is not that Kymlicka sets out a structure that could cover most 
circumstances of multiculturalism, but, rather, that he succeeds in showing a basis for 
a liberalism that is culturally sensitive. What is important is how Kymlicka’s 
conceptions of culture and multiculturalism form part of, and, yet, potentially 
discredit, his justification of group rights. In assessing this justification, the effect of 
these simplifications should become clearer.  
 
 
2.3 Societal culture and liberal freedom  
 
The first part of Kymlicka’s justification of multicultural rights stems from his 
conception of societal culture, and is primarily aimed at justifying rights of self-
government for national minorities. It rests on the assertion that access to one’s 
societal culture is necessary for exercising liberal autonomy. The link between culture 
and choice is certainly deep and rich, but this result depends both on a strong view of 
culture, and on the importance of autonomy. Kymlicka clearly favours an autonomy-
based liberalism. In fact, Multicultural Citizenship has been criticised for giving 
autonomy too central a role, and, so, being based on a cultural value that would not 
necessarily be acceptable to other cultures.67 This latter point is an expression of the 
more general tension in multicultural liberal theory between particular cultures and 
approaches to liberalism, and will be addressed below. Although some questions 
remain about the content of Kymlicka’s liberalism, his use of autonomy is so widely 
recognisable by liberals that it retains much of its power. 
 
An argument often made against this justification of self-government rights, is that for 
the purpose of promoting autonomy, any societal culture will do; in other words, that 
autonomy would be satisfied by minority groups taking on the majority culture.68 
Because culture is valuable relative to autonomy, Kymlicka’s approach certainly 
seems susceptible to this idea. The problem with this is that, as Kymlicka states, 
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people are attached to their culture, and it is very difficult to change.69 National 
minority groups, therefore, cannot be expected simply to switch culture in order to 
enjoy personal autonomy.  
 
This is a successful defence of the suggestion, but it does not sit easily with the 
position in relation to immigrant communities. These groups, Kymlicka opines, 
should integrate into the majority culture. The different approach, he would argue, 
depends on the immigrants’ willingness to integrate, as well as the fact that immigrant 
cultures are not societal cultures, as he understands them. What is disconcerting about 
the different results for national and ethnic minorities is that the former are predicated 
on the complete incapacity to shift cultures, and the latter on the ready ability to do so. 
This stark difference betrays Kymlicka’s reliance on extreme and unrealistic minority 
categories. It is quite possible that immigrants tend to be more accepting of 
integration than indigenous populations, but the earlier criticisms suggest two distinct 
categories. In fact, as Joppke, Yack and others suggest, real political situations present 
much greater variation: where immigrants are unwilling to integrate, and, where 
indigenous groups do not possess the institutions and separation a societal culture 
requires. These are not, it is suggested, exceptions to Kymlicka’s basic categories, but, 
rather, bespeak the complexity and variation in actual minority situations that defy 
this sort of concrete classification. If this is right, then Kymlicka’s conception of 
separate polyethnic and self-government rights is not a common and useful 
framework, but, rather, a theoretical overstepping. 
 
This criticism undermines the autonomy argument for group rights, on the grounds 
that this is based on an unrealistic picture of both societal culture and a national 
minority. Contrary to Kymlicka’s assertions, it is quite possible that intercultural 
relations mean that the national minority group engages substantially and 
meaningfully in the majority culture; that they have no developed and separate 
cultural institutions; or, even, that the minority culture has ceased to have meaning as 
a separate culture. These possibilities weaken the reasoning between national minority 
status and self-government rights, and makes one wonder if the paradigmatic national 
minority exists at all. 
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Even if Kymlicka’s self-government rights may not be generally applicable to 
national minorities in western countries, it may still have power as a theoretical 
argument. The issue, then, is how liberalism should treat this extreme example: the 
institutionally complete, physically separate, culturally and linguistically distinct 
community, found within a liberal state. Pre-multicultural forms of liberalism would 
suggest, simply, that the individual rights of the group members should be recognised. 
Kymlicka argues that this is inadequate, and that some rights of self-government 
should be granted, so as to perpetuate the separate culture. This, he argues, is 
necessary since their culture is fundamental to their choice. It is clear that this line of 
reasoning requires one more step, because applying the rules and principles of the 
liberal state would not permit adequate access to, or the “full and free development 
of”, their culture.70 Practical realities aside, the success of Kymlicka’s argument 
depends on him giving an account of how liberalism fails to meet these demands, and 
the effect of this on the ability of the individuals involved to exercise real autonomy. 
Kymlicka’s monolithic conception of societal culture is also relevant here: it may be 
sufficient for autonomy that such people enjoy a mixed culture, or that such 
communities have a control over their cultures to an extent that falls short of self-
government. These matters seem bound up with Kymlicka’s assertion of the cultural 
bias of liberalism, used in relation to the equality justification of group rights. These 
matters will be explored in the next section. Overall there does seem to be a potential 
link between group rights and liberal autonomy, but this is not adequately and 
generally explained by Kymlicka, and may not apply automatically to any actual 
examples of multicultural states. 
 
 
2.4 Minority self-government and individual rights 
 
If a liberal theory does grant to a national minority rights of self government, then the 
issue is raised of how those rights interact with the liberal rights recognised generally 
by the majoritarian state. In other words: how do culture and liberalism fit together in 
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relation to national minorities, the first of Kymlicka’s two paradigms of liberal 
multiculturalism?  
 
For Kymlicka these rights of self-government amount to external protections of the 
group’s societal culture, and are supposed to be justified by the arguments from 
autonomy and equality. The relationship between these protections and the rules 
imposed by the group on its members is difficult. These rules can, potentially, limit 
the liberal freedoms that, as citizens, its members would otherwise enjoy. Kymlicka’s 
position in relation to these so-called internal restrictions is not straightforward and, to 
properly understand it, requires the separation of two questions: 
 
(1) what sorts of minority claims are consistent with liberal principles? (2) should liberals 
impose their views on minorities which do not accept some or all of these liberal principles? 
The first is a question of identifying a defensible liberal theory of minority rights; the second is 
the question of imposing a liberal theory.71 
 
Answering the first of these, Kymlicka argues, involves identifying an appropriate and 
recognisable conception of liberalism – in his case, an autonomy-based liberalism. 
Any internal restrictions of national minorities would be contrary to such a 
conception, in that they restrict the individual autonomy of those involved; but, this 
does not mean that such restrictions should be prohibited. To the contrary, Kymlicka 
claims that, despite being clearly illiberal, these should be permitted in a self-
governing minority unless they amount to a “gross and systematic violation of human 
rights, such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions”.72  
 
The reasoning behind this liberal restraint forms a crucial part of Multicultural 
Citizenship. Although it is not set out systematically, a number of different arguments 
are present in the text. Kymlicka suggests, firstly, that the liberal majority may not 
have the proper authority to intervene and reinstate the rights.73 It is not entirely clear 
what is meant by this, but it probably refers to the limited moral authority of the 
majority given the bias of liberalism and the respect owed the separate culture. 
Kymlicka follows this up by referring to the intuition that liberal rights should not be 
imposed on separate countries.74 This is an interesting claim, and he seems to explain 
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it by asserting the claim of the minority to self-government, and that the imposition of 
liberal rights may be seen as aggression.75 He also argues that such attempts may 
backfire, and that liberalism only really works when its beliefs are internalised by the 
nation’s citizens.76  
 
These explanations are not without value, but they do not seem to establish sufficient 
grounds on which to base a central liberal principle of non-interference. The 
minority’s perception and understanding of any imposition of liberal rights seem to be 
merely peripheral factors. This conception also suffers from Kymlicka’s definition of 
societal culture: in such cases, the oppressed members of the minority may well reject 
this illiberal oppression. The picture of a single, total social culture offers no guidance 
as to what should happen when liberal beliefs are internalised by some of the minority 
nation’s citizens. In addition, Kymlicka does not seem to allow that these internal 
restrictions actually diminish autonomy, so that the instrumental value of the societal 
culture is undermined by its illiberal content. This is a natural argument to make, and 
yet is potentially fatal to Kymlicka’s assertion of the value of rights of self-
government to national minorities. 
 
There is some value to Kymlicka’s claim that simply imposing the political beliefs of 
a liberal majority on a separate minority culture can lead to greater harm than the 
approach of non-interference. However, this is inadequately explained in 
Multicultural Citizenship. In addition, it is expressed in a way that is inconsistent with 
its broader, autonomy-based structure. The incoherence of Kymlicka’s argument for 
internal restrictions of self-governing national minorities is reflected in a number of 
basic and telling criticisms. For example, it has been criticised for: encouraging 
minority cultural homogenisation, despite this being contrary to the theory’s most 
basic themes;77 similarly, denying minority cultural development and evolution;78 and, 
also, allowing interference, without clear reason, in the case of extremely illiberal 
forms of internal restriction.79 Each of these criticisms comments on a cultural 
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2.5 Culture and Equality 
 
If Kymlicka’s project in Multicultural Citizenship is to attach cultural-based group 
rights onto a still-functioning liberal system, then an interesting contrast is provided 
by Brian Barry’s book, Culture and Equality (2001).80 The latter is a wholesale 
criticism of projects of multicultural liberalism from the perspective of an egalitarian 
liberalism in the mould of the early Rawls. If Kymlicka’s purpose is to align 
multicultural rights with a base system of liberalism, then Barry’s response is that the 
result conflicts with and destroys the liberal essence that it is meant to preserve. His 
general position provides an interesting counterpoint to difference-based liberalism, as 
does his denial that liberalism is culturally biased, and that equality necessitates a 
culturally sensitive approach. He also sets out, in a compelling way, how liberalism 
should treat illiberal minorities. 
 
The core of liberal systems, Barry insists, is a conception of citizenship that admits 
one status of citizen.81 All societies feature difference and conflict, but this conception 
is best suited to minimising the effect of conflict, and to treating citizens fairly.82 Such 
an approach does not ignore or marginalise culture, but, rather, treats it as one aspect 
of difference that individual liberal rights are best at dealing with. To work towards 
the promotion and retention of one’s minority culture is, he argues, an entirely 
legitimate purpose, provided that it is achieved without breaching the rights of 
others.83 This purpose is not a legitimate end of political theory in itself, rather, it is 
the object which an individual or group of individuals pursue.  
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In this way, Barry encapsulates what Kymlicka calls the ‘benign neglect’ approach of 
liberalism. He asserts that liberalism does recognise fully the value of association, but 
that this does not imply the need for group rights: 
 
It is true that liberal individualism has the implication that a group has no value over and 
above its value to its members… but this is quite compatible with a full recognition of the role 
played in our well-being by the communities and associations to which we belong.84 
 
To Barry, then, group and cultural affiliations are appropriately dealt with by a 
difference-blind form of liberalism that champions the individual right to belong to a 
group, rather than a group’s right to exist and to be promoted to individuals. This 
approach implies a different relationship between the liberal state and illiberal group 
than is anticipated by Kymlicka. Surprisingly enough, Barry allows that minority 
groups can be illiberal: 
 
It is not part of liberalism, as I understand it, to insist that every group must conform to liberal 
principles in its internal structure. It is a belief that liberalism is committed to this procrustean 
approach to groups that gives rise to the widely held view that we need some sort of escape-
clause to accommodate diversity.… Liberal principles themselves demand that groups should 
have the utmost freedom to handle their affairs in accordance with the wishes of their 
members.85  
 
This illiberalism in national minorities, and in any social groups, is permissible in this 
difference-blind form of liberalism, so long as its members consent to it. Genuine 
consent depends on the availability of low-cost exit options.86  
 
In general, this argument holds together much more robustly than that of Kymlicka 
and the instrumental value of culture to autonomy. A difference-blind liberalism that 
is based on consent and individual rights could readily permit group influence over 
individuals provided they consent. It is easy to imagine this rule applying to 
institutional associations that are clearly voluntarily accepted, such as the joining of a 
political party or a service association. It is another thing, however, to apply it to 
cultural groups. Firstly, the choice to accept or reject a culture has an extremely broad 
effect, potentially, and may include, not only the engagement in certain practices, 
rituals and institutions, but, also, effective familial membership, geographical 
location, and, even, moral beliefs. It is hard to justify illiberal restrictions based on 
consent to a much broader package of items.  
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In addition, even accepting that such a group is a minority and that there is a freedom 
to integrate into the majority population, as Kymlicka points out, culture is of 
foundational importance to choice. In other words, the consent on which Barry relies 
may be in some significant way the product of the culture that is being consented to. 
Even this position is not sufficiently sophisticated to accurately portray the nature of 
belonging to a minority culture. Intracultural diversity, intercultural intermingling, 
and the possibility of internal dissent, all challenge Kymlicka’s picture of a minority 
culture. This does not mean a reversion to Barry’s implicit conception of voluntary 
cultural attachment, as Kymlicka’s analysis is not without basis; but, it means that 
neither Barry’s nor Kymlicka’s conception is sufficient as a foundation on which to 
fully explicate personal attachment to culture. In relation to minority cultures, as 
attractive and achievable as Barry’s difference-blind position appears, it seems to be 
undermined by the underlying fiction of cultural consent. 
 
To Barry’s credit he accepts the difficulty of his position, and he frames the consent 
basis to culture to mean that 
 
if you remain in some association that you have the power to leave, that establishes a 
presumption that the perceived benefits of staying are greater than the benefits of the most 
attractive alternative.… If… your staying means that you are passing up at least one 
reasonable eligible alternative, that is a much sounder basis for inferring that the association is 
not treating you so badly.87 
 
What Barry seems to ultimately claim is that the right of free association means that 
members of minority cultures are able to choose, either, to avail themselves of that 
culture, or, to exit, and integrate into the majority culture. This freedom, which is 
afforded to all citizens, is sufficient to ensure both that a valuable culture can survive 
and that a disliked culture will be forced to adapt or be destroyed. This ‘democratic’ 
approach to cultural adaptation and survival is attractive in that a culture depends 
essentially on the will of its members, and also because, unlike that of Kymlicka, can 
incorporate intermingling and dissent. However, even this weak presumption that 
members are not being treated so badly does not answer the suggestion that cultural 
consent is not morally meaningful in the same way that consent of the membership of 
a particular social association or institution is.  
                                                
87




2.6 Liberal bias and equal treatment 
 
Kymlicka’s second argument in favour of multicultural rights rests on the idea that 
liberalism is biased in favour of majority cultures, and that equal treatment requires 
that this bias is acknowledged and corrected for. Barry opposes this idea completely, 
and argues, instead, that some such bias is necessarily a part of any political or moral 
theory: 
 
The lesson commonly drawn by multiculturalists is that ‘liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim 
complete cultural neutrality’. This is a lazy response because no attempt is made to specify 
what ‘complete cultural neutrality’ might look like or explain why it should ever have been 
supposed that liberalism is committed to it. The evidence against liberalism having this 
property appears to consists in nothing except its incompatibility with some other (obviously 
incompatible) beliefs.… It would seem that for liberalism – or any other doctrine for that 
matter – to be culturally neutral, there would have to be no existing… world view with which 
it conflicts. Since this is manifestly absurd, the assertion that liberalism is not culturally 
neutral asserts something that could not conceivably be denied.88 
 
The value of liberalism, Barry continues, is not that it is neutral in this way, but, 
rather, that it is fair: that it recognises significant social groups; that it is even-handed 
in their treatment; and, that it offers the same general rights of association to all 
members of a society.89 
 
In this passage, Barry invokes Taylor’s claim that “liberalism can’t and shouldn’t 
claim complete cultural neutrality”. The point that Taylor makes is that, contra the 
difference-blind approach, liberalism is not compatible with all cultures, but, rather, 
expresses one range of cultures. The example he offers concerns how cultures that do 
not accept a separation between church and state would be excluded from or 
marginalized by typical western liberal democracies.90 Elsewhere he argues that 
difference-blind liberalism can force people into a mould that reflects the hegemonic 
culture, and wonders if expressions of difference-blind liberalism are just “a 
particularism masquerading as the universal”.91  
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Barry replies that it is no surprise that a positive political theory conflicts with some 
particular beliefs, and that liberalism is the best of such theories in that it is fair and 
even-handed towards any such belief. This appears to deflate Taylor’s accusation of 
liberalism, that it is cannot be completely neutral: clearly it will be contrary to those 
beliefs that are illiberal. Difference-blind liberalism would still permit these beliefs to 
be promoted as part of a minority culture, so long as they are consented to by its 
members. This appears to be an effective defence by Barry to counter Taylor’s 
assertion about the beliefs liberalism excludes. The latter’s argument, as to the 
cultural mould that is implied in theoretical liberalism, seems closer to the mark in 
that it suggests that liberalism applies an arbitrary standard, and puts a cultural 
perspective on communitarian arguments about implicit conceptions of the person. 
However, Taylor does not present the full reasoning behind this argument. 
 
Kymlicka takes a different approach to asserting the cultural bias of difference-blind 
liberalism in that he describes the particular political mechanisms by which a majority 
necessarily imposes its culture on a minority. These, he categorises into three groups: 
decisions on official languages, political boundaries and the division of powers. The 
decision as to whether public education will be offered in a minority language, for 
example, will be important to the continuation of that language, and to the practice of 
that culture as a whole.92 He asserts similar claims about the drawing of political 
boundaries within a state, and the distribution of legislative power. 
 
The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, and reflects a shallow understanding of the 
relationship between nations and states. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, 
and the division of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societal culture, or 
deciding which groups will form a majority in political units that control culture-affecting 
decisions regarding language, education and immigration.93 
 
The crux of Kymlicka’s argument is not that difference-blind liberalism favours some 
practices over others, or in other words, liberal practices over the illiberal. Rather, it is 
that many fundamental political decisions necessarily favour one culture over another 
in a way that is completely arbitrary when viewed from a liberal perspective. In other 
words, difference-blind liberalism is not really difference-blind – decisions that 
appear to treat each person on an individual basis are in fact loaded with cultural 
content, and this cannot be any other way. The kind of cultural neutrality that 
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liberalism cannot achieve, then, is not the complete neutrality between cultures, but a 
neutrality already informed by liberal conceptions and contours. 
 
Barry does not deal with these arguments directly. He does, however, address 
minority language availability, and seems to conclude that public education should 
normally be carried out in the majority language, as learning the minority language 
alone may disadvantage a person in their ability to fit into mainstream life, and 
learning it as a second language would mean giving up the opportunity to learn a 
potentially more valuable foreign language.94  
 
The difference between these approaches seems to rest on an attitude towards and 
value of culture, and its relationship to language. Kymlicka links the retention of the 
minority language to retention of the minority culture, and argues that equal treatment 
may require the promotion of the language through public education. Barry takes a 
less reverential view of the minority language and culture, and argues that promoting 
the former may exclude some from access to the mainstream culture. Applying his 
earlier logic, if individuals do choose to learn the language, then they are free to do so, 
and this indicates its benefit to them; but if not, then the state should not promote it, 
and individuals should be free to exit the minority culture and integrate into the 
majority.  
 
The problem with this argument is that Barry treats the majority culture as some kind 
of default, by virtue of is central political and economic presence. In effect, Barry is 
not really denying the de facto cultural bias of liberalism, rather, he is justifying it in 
favour of the majority culture, because that culture is already central to the state. 
Ultimately, his arguments depend upon the legitimacy of leaving an individual to 
decide that being attached to a minority culture is too much of a disadvantage relative 
to the benefits of being able to engage completely in the political and economic 
mainstream. This, he would argue, is not really a bias, but, rather, a social and 
practical reality refracted by individual consent.  
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Kymlicka would respond that this and other political decisions do not treat the 
minority culture fairly, as they ignore its claims to occupy some of this political 
centrality. Ultimately, the liberal expression of the goals of these minority cultures is 
to undermine this view of the majority culture as the default, and to assert themselves 
as viable and continuing. This does not mean that they aspire to take over from the 
majority culture, or to compete with it as an alternative, but, rather, they aspire to have 
a real and viable presence within the society as a whole, however this manifests, and 
to not be excluded from achieving this simply because the majority is the easier and 
most practical subject of political decisions. In this way, Kymlicka’s assertion as to 
the political cultural bias of liberal states is well-founded. This does not necessary 
mean that the full compliment of group rights should be available to every minority, 
but it does at least provide a positive theoretical basis for a culture-sensitive 
liberalism.  
 
The final criticism of multiculturalism from Culture and Equality to be examined here 
relates to the interaction between a minority culture and general society. This point is 
important to multicultural liberalism as a practical political approach, but, here, can be 
considered on more principled terms. Barry makes the general point that identifying 
some practice or behaviour as part of one’s culture does not amount to a sufficient 
justification. Various cultures contain strands that are extremely harmful to others.95 
Culture should not be the excuse for such actions. 
 
If there are sound reasons against doing something, these cannot be trumped by saying – even 
if it is true – that doing it is a part of your culture. The fact that you (or your ancestors) have 
been doing something for a long time does nothing in itself to justify your continuing to do 
it.96 
 
A difficult part of multicultural liberalism is that the promotion of culture can include 
the protection of particular cultural practices that are harmful or destructive. One form 
of these are the internal restrictions already discussed. But, the focus here is more on 
particular patterns of behaviour that are harmful to those who are not adherents to that 
culture; in other words, where there is conflict between liberalism and culture, or at a 
social level, between minority and majority cultures. Barry would admit individuals 
the freedom to pursue whatever conception of the good they choose, which would 
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include allowing cultural practices. If such practices breach the freedoms of others, 
however, he would argue that liberal principles should prevail, as “[c]ompromise over 
liberal principles is not, and cannot be, a liberal value”.97  
 
The general approach taken by Kymlicka and other multicultural liberals is that 
neither majority values nor minority practices will automatically prevail, but that a 
contextual examination of the issue should occur. This typically involves the 
weighing up of the proposed activity, and, in particular, its cultural importance, along 
with the significance of the imposition that this activity places on others.  
 
 
2.7 Liberalism and multiculturalism 
 
Exploring the work of Taylor and Kymlicka offers a basis for a multicultural form of 
liberalism. Such a liberalism would allow group rights as exceptions to the normal 
difference-blind approach, and, so, would be culture-sensitive in such a way as not to 
destroy the underlying liberal structure. Three bases can be discerned for this from the 
two theorists. Taylor’s focus is on the harm of misrecognition that applies to 
culturally informed identities, and corrects for the cultural assumptions that underlie 
any particular liberal conception. Kymlicka’s first justification of group rights 
depends on the instrumental importance of culture to the exercise of autonomy, but is 
not adequately explained and suffers both from a monolithic definition of culture and 
difficulties in relying on autonomy as the source of cultural value.  
 
The most fully explained argument, and best candidate as a source for group rights, is 
Kymlicka’s suggestion that equality requires culturally-differential treatment. This 
depends on the assertion that difference-blind liberalism is biased in favour of the 
majority culture in a significant and morally arbitrary way. This turns out to be a 
difficult task, as the attractions of Barry’s conception of a liberalism based on 
individual-rights are considerable. They suggest that it is best to treat the majority 
culture as the standard, and to leave the minority culture to flourish or to die on its 
own virtues. This ignores, however, that these virtues will always be subject to the 
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majority culture as the baseline for social interaction. This is not to say that there is no 
practical or moral value to having a majority culture, or that the mere fact of one 
implies injustice, but, rather, that minority cultures face a system that works from 
assumptions that can amount to significant and morally arbitrary barriers to its 
continuation, and that disadvantage its members. 
 
Barry’s general approach is based on a model of culture as choice: that each member 
of a cultural minority is free to either adhere to or reject their culture. This means that 
the value of culture is entirely internalised and, so, expressed by the freedom of 
association, which is uniformly recognised. This approach does not seem to capture 
the relationship between individuals and culture, its weight, meaning and the nature of 
the attachment.  
 
This should not take away from the important practical concerns that are raised by 
Barry in Culture and Equality. Barry identifies that there are real and potentially 
substantial costs to deviations from the difference-blind approach. There is the 
potential for group rights to protect conservative and illegitimate elements of minority 
cultures, and generally to reduce a singular conception of citizenship to a politics of 
culture. On theoretical grounds, however, there is a valid basis for a liberalism that is 
sensitive to its own cultural effects. In examining Kymlicka’s framework for group 
rights, there are two persistent concerns central to any similar form of multicultural 
liberalism. They relate, firstly, to the conception of culture that powers the theory, 
and, secondly, the account of liberal cultural bias that justifies culture-specific rights.  
 
The works of Taylor, Kymlicka and even Barry seem to depend on grossly simplified 
conceptions of culture. This is most obvious for Kymlicka, where a totalistic approach 
to culture, specifically in regard to national minorities, is employed. His account 
ignores the diversity present within a culture, including cultural disagreement and 
dissent; and the cultural intermingling between minority and majority culture, and 
between different minority cultures. In addition, all of the theorists gloss over other 
less obvious cultural complexities, such as the relationship between a particular 
culture and its adherents, which describes the person’s cultural attachment. Also 
included are the methods by which a culture sustains itself, the power relationships 
internal to a culture, and the culture’s attitude to and method of self-transformation. 
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Each of these is potentially relevant to how a liberal theory should incorporate culture, 
and how a state should treat particular cultures, but Kymlicka addresses none of 
these.98 He is no doubt aware of these difficulties, but is interested in starting from 
straightforward yet common multicultural situations. This is undermined, since his 
conception of culture is simplified to the point where the theory itself seems 
practically unusable.  
 
It is a necessary part of a project of multicultural liberalism that common patterns of 
culture and cultural situation are applied in order to be able to theorise in a meaningful 
way. It is also important, however, that the theory be sufficiently representative of the 
diversities that are present in social reality; the whole point of this area is to recognise 
that an accepted mode of thought may hide cultural bias and, so, may make an 
assumption of singularity that is not justified in the theory itself. It seems, then, that 
multicultural liberalism requires a more complex conception of culture than is used by 
Kymlicka. Such a conception would play a key role in elucidating cultural difference 
and, in particular, in distinguishing between intracultural pluralism and cultural 
pluralism, so as to explicate liberalism’s potentially differential response to both. 
 
The second issue raised by Kymlicka’s multiculturalism relates to the cultural bias he 
identifies in liberal theory. His general approach is to assert the importance of group 
rights that are new to liberal theory, in order to respond to concerns that are similarly 
new. As such, his identification of cultural bias concerns political decisions that are 
not normally the concerns of liberal theory: public languages, political boundaries and 
the division of powers. In this way, Kymlicka’s group rights are able to attach 
relatively easily to a base liberal theory without undermining that theory generally. 
However, it is possible that, if liberal bias applies to these political decisions, then it 
also applies to other more obviously liberal issues. This result, however, would bring 
the entire scheme of liberal theory into question.  
 
In the first three substantive chapters, one of the primary criticisms of liberal theory 
focused on a form of bias: that the various approaches did not by themselves 
adequately justify their particular substantive prescriptions, and that, instead, many of 
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the points made by the theorists remain the subject of rational contestability. This led 
to interpretations, conceptions and structures that appear plausible, but that, in fact, 
reflect the personal approach of particular theorists. Multicultural liberalism raises the 
possibility that there could be a cultural aspect to this bias, so that these systems 
reflect particular cultural views, or that the substantive principles are unfair to some 
cultures.  
 
This issue has led to liberal theories that are founded on difference, be it some form of 
pluralism or reasonable disagreement, and that employ less strident justificatory 
strategies. In particular, contextual approaches have been employed by various 
theories in order to achieve some form of justification. In this way, autonomy, 
pluralism, reasonableness, and even adherence to liberalism itself have been 
suggested as effective limits on liberal justification.99 These assumptions may be 
important to building a relatively coherent liberal system, but, as this exploration of 
multiculturalism has shown, the level of intra and intercultural diversity makes 
identifying society-wide social patterns very difficult. This is especially the case in 
relation to a value that is supposed to be paramount, such as autonomy. This is not to 
say that contextual approaches are not possible, but that, when they specify contingent 
social patterns, they need to be aware of the relevance of cultural pluralism.  
 
Overall, if multicultural liberalism is to be based on a view of liberal cultural bias, 
then this view must be fully explored, and its limits must fit with the structure of the 
liberal content of the theory. What is disconcerting about Kymlicka’s approach is that 
he limits cultural bias to just a few political decisions, all of which are not significant 
to normal liberal theories, and he never addresses whether this bias extends to the 
more basic liberal ideals. This is understandable, since a positive result would 
undermine Kymlicka’s liberal structure, one that is augmented by a few group rights. 
 
 
3. Multiculturalism beyond liberalism
 
 
3.1 Demands for recognition 
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The remainder of this chapter will examine approaches to multiculturalism that 
respond to these two issues, and employ conceptions of culture and bias that are more 
developed than those used by Kymlicka. The first of these concerns James Tully’s 
book Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (1995).100 In many 
ways, his project is an extension of that of Taylor, and his basic aim is to sketch out 
an approach that can deal with the “multiplicity of demands for recognition at the 
same time”.101  
 
Tully’s approach is not purely one of liberalism, and, instead, is based on a broader 
view of constitutionalism that incorporates, at the very least, liberalism, nationalism 
and communitarianism. A complete political approach is sensitive not only to cultural 
diversity, Taylor argues, but also to the diversity of traditions within political theory. 
It is important, then, for each of these three traditions to be part of a constitutional 
dialogue; any approach short of this would be poorer for it.102 As such, Tully argues 
that Kymlicka’s work is valuable, but that it fails to question the value of liberalism as 
the ‘sovereign’ political tradition.103 Despite these doubts as to the overarching value 
of liberal theory, Tully’s work is interesting in that it is at least partially bound to the 
liberal viewpoint, and in that it presents an extended conception of culture and 
cultural diversity, and of bias, and derives from them a positive substantive approach 
to cultural recognition.  
 
Tully asserts that the ‘billiard-ball’ view of culture, as being bounded, separate and 
internally uniform, has given way to a more detailed and more complex conception, 
driven in part by actual demands for recognition. 
 
Not only do the cultures overlap geographically and come in a variety of types. Cultures are 
also densely interdependent in their formation and identity. They exist in complex historical 
processes of interaction with other cultures. The modern age is intercultural rather than 
multicultural. The interaction and entanglement of cultures has been further heightened by the 
massive migrations of this century. Cultural diversity is not a phenomenon of exotic and 
incommensurable others in distant lands and at different stages of historical development, as 
the old conception of culture made it appear. No. It is here and now in every society. Citizens 
are members of more than one dynamic culture and the experience of ‘crossing’ cultures is 
normal activity.… Finally cultures are not internally homogeneous. They are continuously 
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contested, imagined and reimagined, transformed and negotiated, both by their members and 
through their interactions with others…. Cultural diversity is a tangled labyrinth of 
intertwining cultural differences and similarities, not a panopticon of fixed, independent and 
incommensurable worldviews in which we are either prisoners or cosmopolitan spectators in 
the central tower.104 
 
For Tully, this means that cultures are overlapping, interactive and internally 
negotiated. The basic ideas that are encompassed by these points emphasise that: 
contemporary culture does not exist on its own, but, rather, is in a permanent state of 
interaction with other cultures, such that a culture’s meaning is, at least partially, 
expressed by those relationships; people can belong to multiple cultures, and, by 
inference, people can relate and attach differently to particular cultures; and finally, 
cultures are themselves diverse and are continually being reinterpreted.  
 
Tully also identifies that a consequence of this conception is that “the experience of 
cultural difference is internal to culture”.105 Instead of having a fixed cultural identity, 
and treating those outside of this as the other, our cultural identities are shifting such 
that otherness is internal to our cultures and ourselves. Tully grants that this point is 
difficult; and, he refers to postmodern philosopher Jacques Derrida’s idea that a 
culture should not be identical to itself, meaning that it should not be able to identify 
itself.106  
  
This statement is difficult, and does more than just recognise that a culture is or 
should be diverse. Rather, it seems to assert that a contemporary culture, by virtue of 
the overlap and interaction between cultures, and its internal diversity, cannot operate 
as a totality, and, instead, internalises a sense of self-limitation and a necessary 
reference to the other. In other words, the nature of culture incorporates cultural 
difference. This result is important for Tully because it means that the intercultural 
dialogue that he prescribes is rendered possible by virtue of the fact that each person’s 
identity and self understanding already incorporates a form of cultural dialogue.  
 
Next, Tully explores the history of constitutional thought. He examines in detail many 
of the sources of this constitutionalism, and finds that the dominant thread presents an 
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approach that “was designed to exclude or assimilate cultural diversity and justify 
uniformity”.107 This is manifested in the language that is used by constitutionalism. 
 
[T]he language of modern constitutionalism that has been forged in constitutional theory and 
practice over that last three hundred years is a partial forgery. While masquerading as 
universal it is imperial in three respects: in serving to justify European imperialism, imperial 
rule of former colonies over Indigenous peoples, and cultural imperialism over the diverse 
citizens of contemporary societies. When members of the authoritative schools today write 
about constitutionalism, whether they claim to be universal, historical or transcendental, they 
do so within the conventions of universality, history and transcendence of this captivating map 
of mankind. They (and this often includes myself) think that they are tracing the contours of 
humanity’s constitutions, yet they are merely tracing round the ‘splendorous’ frame through 
which they look at them.108 
 
Tully posits that constitutionalism has suffered from the error of uniformity, and, so, 
is effectively biased against cultural diversity. It is from the perspective of this 
uniformity that modern society appears a ‘strange multiplicity’.109 Liberalism, being 
one contemporary tradition of constitutionalism, suffers also from this bias, and it is 
certainly possible to see, in the work of Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin, the perspective 
of universality that Tully registers. This view of bias is much broader than that of 
Kymlicka, in that it applies not to a few political decisions, but rather to the nature of 
the way in which political decisions generally are thought about and made. It paints a 
picture of liberal theory being caught up in uniformity and universality that is an 
expression of the imperial modes of western thought and culture. 
 
It is interesting that Tully makes the link between imperialism and uniformity, in the 
liberal sense of difference-blindness. It is a natural enough step to take, since such 
imperialism implies asserting authority over and integrating foreign populations. The 
difference-blindness of liberalism, however, is sincerely believed by its adherents to 
be a tool that empowers and offers liberty to individual members of a society, rather 
than coercing them into cultural agreement; and that this form of liberalism 
champions the right to decide how one should live. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to remark on this historical truth and the significance of Tully’s account of 
constitutionalism, and its ultimate influence on liberalism, but it does offer an 
explanation of the failings of early contemporary liberalism: it works from the 
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perspective of universally correct liberal principles; and, it accepts what could be 
described as the myth of the fairness of uniformity.  
 
Without an examination of Tully’s historical account of constitutionalism, it is 
difficult to accept fully his conclusions. From a theoretical perspective, however, 
Kymlicka’s work shows how uniformity in liberal approach can disadvantage 
minority cultures. Tully’s assertion that this is potentially endemic to liberalism 
makes sense in that Kymlicka’s account of this bias seems unduly restricted. In 
addition, it is certainly the case that earlier contemporary liberal theories did not 
achieve the universality to which they aspired.  
 
If this assertion of general bias is valid, then liberalism is left in a difficult position, in 
that it undermines the application of uniform rights. It effectively brings into sharp 
focus the tension between culture and the aspirations of liberalism to provide a 
culture-indifferent and yet fair system of political and social organisation. In defence 
of liberalism, Tully’s account is most germane to those earlier forms that have already 
been the subject of similar communitarian criticisms. Later developments in liberal 
theory have set difference as the central liberal concern. Whether they are able to 
incorporate or, otherwise, deal with cultural difference is the challenge that Tully’s 
account of constitutionalism sets.  
 
Because Strange Multiplicity is ultimately a positive theory, Tully himself must deal 
with cultural diversity. His approach is avowedly constitutional rather than liberal, yet 
it contains some points relevant to a culturally-sensitive liberalism. The political goal 
of Tully’s work is to achieve a fair dialogue between different cultures. 
 
A constitution should be seen as a form of activity, an intercultural dialogue in which the 
culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on their 
forms of association over time in accordance with the three conventions of mutual recognition, 
consent and cultural continuity.110 
 
Much like liberal theories of public reason, Tully focuses on the value of a dialogue in 
mediating cultural diversity. As with those approaches, conditions of ‘reasonableness’ 
are required as the basis from which to interact fairly with one another. The three 
conditions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity, combined with the 
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further idea of cultural respect, ensure that all parties engage in these dialogues with 
an attitude that promotes cultural sensitivity.111  
 
The resulting process aims not at consensus or some universal goal, as “the world of 
constitutionalism is not a universe, but a multiverse”.112 Despite this, the result is just 
because it incorporates the three traditions of constitutionalism on one hand, and 
cultural diversity on the other. He explains this in relation to the distinction between 
just and mediated peace: 
 
A just peace is a constitutional settlement in accordance with the comprehensive theory of 
justice.… [T]his is the most destructive illusion of our age. The just peace of the theorists and 
dogmatists is neither justice nor peace. It is always a limited and partial description of justice 
which, when imposed, galls the necks of others and leads to discords. On the contrary, a 
mediated peace is a just peace: just because it is a constitutional settlement in accord with the 
three conventions of justice and peaceful because the constitution is accommodated to the 
diverse necks of those who agree with it.113 
 
The proper nature of Tully’s justice, then, is that it incorporates a balanced dialogue 
between the traditions of political theory, and between the cultures that inhabit a 
particular society. It is because these sets of beliefs have developed and survived that 
respecting them is just. Their value rests in the adherence of individuals who, by 
virtue of their place in the modern world, have some capacity for shifting their 
cultural identity. It is significant, then, that Tully’s position is not culturally 
conservative: within each individual, and the system of dialogue that implies 
diversity, is the power for social criticism and dissent.114  
 
Tully strengthens this conception of justice with a discussion of the intrinsic value of 
diversity. He quotes favourably from essayist Octavio Paz: 
 
What sets worlds in motion is the interplay of differences, their attractions and repulsions. Life 
is plurality, death is uniformity. By suppressing differences and peculiarities, by eliminating 
different civilizations and cultures, progress weakens life and favours death. The ideal of a 
single civilization for everyone, implicit in the cult of progress of technique, impoverishes and 
mutilates us. Every view of the world that becomes extinct, every culture that disappears, 
diminishes a possibility.115 
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This is an interesting view of diversity, and goes further than any of the liberal 
accounts already discussed. It suggests that all world views are inherently valuable on 
the basis of their difference from other views. This paints rather an extreme picture of 
diversity that does not accord with the rest of Tully’s theory. Paz’s antipathy to the 
extinction of cultures, for example, does not quite fit with Tully’s belief in dissent and 
cultural transformation. Tully seems much more comfortable with the idea that a 
culture, or an old form of a culture, might give way to the new, and that this process is 
part of healthy social criticism. Also, Paz’s view implies that the ideal is to maximise 
diversity, so that there is the greatest possible number of cultures, each with different 
belief systems, values and languages. In contrast, Tully’s view is that there should be 
a dialogue between those cultures and traditions that do exist.  
 
Despite the positive way in which Tully quotes Paz, it seems that their views of 
diversity are quite different: Tully wants to argue in favour of the diversity of those 
cultures and traditions that are already adhered to, whereas for Paz, the value is in the 
diversity itself. Ultimately, Tully’s justice is based on respecting the adherence to a 
set of beliefs, more than the diversity of including as many views as possible in a 
dialogue. He is concerned with the necessity of a dialogue between those systems that 
enjoy significant adherence.  
 
 
3.2 Cultural understandings of culture 
 
Strange Multiplicity is interesting because it offers a more developed account of 
culture, which is then used to support a theory of multicultural justice. The basis of 
this theory is that it respects cultures by prescribing that they engage in a fair 
dialogue. This empowerment of cultures is informed by the innate capacity for 
cultural criticism and dissent. Because this is not simply a liberal theory, it is not 
necessary to examine this prescriptive structure in close detail, but Tully’s account of 
culture and its role within the theory remains important.  
 
Colin Perrin has criticised Tully’s account of culture for being so concerned with the 
cultural multiplicity to which each person is subject that he loses connection with any 
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meaningful conception of cultural attachment: when intracultural diversity and 
dissent, and intercultural dialogue are the central ideas of culture, there is the risk of 
forgetting his original point, that individuals and groups demand cultural 
recognition.116 It is a valid point that Tully should not lose sight of the value and 
meaning of cultural attachment, especially relating to groups that resemble 
Kymlicka’s national minorities.  
 
A more general and more rigorous commentary on Tully’s conception of culture has 
been undertaken by David Scott. He notes that Tully historicises the ideas and 
language of political philosophy, and attempts to look beyond the historically 
contingent tendency to universal, uniform and assimilationist thought. Scott argues 
that Tully’s approach to culture is quite different, and is naïve and blindly accepting 
by comparison.117 
 
Where in the old days… political philosophy depended upon a false… conception of culture, 
now thanks to recent hard-won developments in anthropology there is a new and correct 
conception that will at once free political philosophy of its prejudices and enable it to more 
adequately reformulate the problem of constitutionalism. This story has about it a curiously 
just-so character.118 
 
Scott asserts that culture is potentially as historically contingent as constitutionalism. 
He goes on to sketch the possible development of culture, and, in particular, identifies 
it as the concept by which western peoples distinguish themselves from the non-
European other.119 This concept developed to replace alternative now-defunct points 
of distinction, such as the absence of reason, and race. Culture amounts to the 
twentieth century’s account of otherness.120 
 
Scott suggests that the understanding from which Tully borrows is of culture as 
constructed meaning, that it is, by nature, antifoundational and is accessible only from 
an interpretive framework.121 Cultures, in terms of this view, are not tethered to a 
particular world view or understanding; rather, they are created dynamically by group 
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behaviour, and are understood as such, only from the cultural perspective of the 
spectator.  
 
Scott makes these claims not so as to refute Tully’s conception of culture, but, rather, 
to insist that this perspective should be reflected in his theory, just as the historicism 
of constitutionalism is reflected.122 For Strange Multiplicity, and for multicultural 
liberalism generally, Scott’s suggestion is disconcerting. It means that culture is the 
contingent output of an evolution of ideas, and, so, even if rendered complexly will 
always be open to change and to rational contest. This does not deny culture any 
meaningful content, but does at least make its content variable and uncertain. 
 
One possible response to Scott’s argument would be to say that all theoretical 
conceptions are the result of a historical evolution. This does not, in itself, make them 
wrong, and the fact of development in a particular direction actually suggests the 
value of the result, perhaps not as the final word on the subject, but at least as the 
most appropriate prima facie approach to take. This argument is undermined by the 
diversity of ideas: the fact that contestability, in a living theoretical area, will usually 
mean contested, so that a single result is not always available.  
 
In relation to Tully’s general scheme, the overriding value is that of adherence: that a 
tradition or culture that is commonly adhered to is deserving of consideration and 
expression within a political intercultural dialogue. His view of liberalism is as a 
tradition that deserves considerable political focus because of its popularity. This is an 
interesting account, but one that fails to ask why liberalism is adhered to in this way, 
and, so, to relate a conception of tradition to moral and theoretical value. 
 
 
3.3 Rethinking Multiculturalism 
 
Bikhu Parekh, in his book Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory (2000), attempts to use multiculturalism as the perspective from 
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which to move beyond liberalism.123 This move takes multiculturalism one step 
further than does Kymlicka’s position, in that Parekh is willing for multicultural 
insights to trump liberal values. Parekh works, ultimately, from a view of a shared 
humanity that is mediated by culture.124 This view implies the cultural basis of 
liberalism as a particular doctrine, espousing a particular view of human nature and 
society. The best response to the fact of cultural pluralism, he argues, is not to create a 
liberal theory of multiculturalism, as  
 
such a theory cannot provide an intellectually coherent and morally acceptable theoretical 
basis of multicultural society. We need to rise to a higher level of philosophical abstraction. 
And since we cannot transcend and locate ourselves in a realm beyond liberal and nonliberal 
cultures, such a basis is to be found in an institutionalised dialogue between them.125 
 
While liberalism may be a popular doctrine, it is not in itself sufficient for a full 
theory of societal justice. To go beyond the liberal ideals requires the positive 
engagement with other, non-liberal cultures, by way of an institutionalised dialogue.  
 
Kymlicka goes on to criticise liberal approaches to multiculturalism. He notes 
specifically that Kymlicka’s work is deficient in not presenting a suitable conception 
of the value of cultural diversity.126 He also criticises contemporary liberal theorists 
generally on three grounds: that they are too committed to the transcultural view of 
people, and fail to recognise fully their cultural embeddedness; that they absolutise 
liberalism, and subordinate non-liberal ways of life; and, that they generally treat non-
liberals badly.127 
 
Parekh’s approach, in contrast, champions diversity and intercultural dialogue, and is 
based on the conception of a pluralist universalism. He identifies three layers to our 
identities, namely our human, cultural and individual natures.128 He argues that, in 
moral theory, neither monism nor relativism is suitable in acknowledging the 
complexities of our identities, as monism ignores the role of culture in mediating our 
                                                
123
 B C Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000). 
124
 Ibid, p11. 
125
 Ibid, p14. 
126
 Ibid, p108. 
127
 Ibid, pp109-111. 
128
 Ibid, p123. 
 328 
shared humanity, and relativism ignores the shared humanity that underlies our 
constructed cultures.129 
 
For Parekh, the approach that makes the most sense is a minimum universalism, 
which reflects the dual roles of humanity and culture. Such an approach tends to 
ignore the conflict between minimum universal values. So, the best form of this 
universalism is one that incorporates a pluralist and dialectical viewpoint; in other 
words, one that accepts a plurality of expressions of universal values, and employs a 
dialogue to deal with and overcome this.130 
 
Since we are culturally embedded and prone to universalizing our own values, we need the 
dialogue to counter this tendency and help us rise to the required level of intellectual 
abstraction. The dialogue also brings together different historical perspectives experiences and 
cultural sensibilities, and ensures that we appreciate human beings in all their richness and that 
the values we arrive at are as genuinely universal as is humanly possible.131 
 
As with Tully, Parekh uses dialogue as the central mechanism by which cultural 
pluralism is accommodated. For Tully, dialogue is the means for respecting fairly the 
popular cultures and traditions, and, so, achieving a richer and more valuable result 
than any one culture could offer. Parekh is more obviously focussed on the power of 
dialogue, not to meld different beliefs, but to attain a moral result that is as universal 
as possible. In this way, his is the clearest adoption of Habermas’ ideas of dialogical 
morality.  
 
It is important to consider exactly what Parekh understands culture to mean. He 
begins in much the same way as Kymlicka, by describing the embeddedness of 
individuals in their cultural beliefs, and how the latter offer both context and meaning 
to individual action. 
 
Culture is a historically created system of meaning and significance or, what comes to the 
same thing, a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings 
understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives. It is a way of both 
understanding and organizing human life.132 
 
As would be expected, Parekh develops this conception of culture further, to go 
beyond Kymlicka’s idea of societal culture. He emphasises, firstly, that cultural 
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belonging is not homogeneous, and, secondly, that cultural identity is “complex and 
diffused, [and] cannot be summed up in a neat set of propositions”.133 Both this 
complexity and internal variation are essential to an understanding of culture.  
 
Because of the complexity of culture, every citizen must practice selectivity in 
determining which aspects to adopt.134 From this point, Parekh goes on to describe the 
cultural nomad, who owes loyalty to no particular culture but picks and chooses 
between beliefs and practices. Parekh warns that, although such an approach can be 
innovative, there is the risk that the nomad loses their self-identity and social 
understanding.135 Parekh seems to accept here that there is a diversity of approaches 
to cultural attachment. This idea gives way to a cultural view of cultural attachment, 
whereby the way in which individuals link to culture is itself mediated by that culture. 
One particular culture, for example, might encourage a degree of cultural nomadism, 
while another expects total, unquestioning faith. This is a further complexity that 
should be acknowledged by a conception of culture.  
 
Next, Parekh notes the interdependence between culture and society: culture both 
influences and is influenced by the circumstances and institutions of a society.136 In 
particular, the economic and political patterns of society attempt to legitimise 
themselves through influencing the cultural and moral perspective of citizens. This 
perspective is typically challenged by the marginalised or oppressed.137 In this way, 
Parekh goes one step further than other theorists, and actually incorporates a culture’s 
internal power structure into his conception of culture, and identifies culture as a tool 
of oppression.  
 
Finally, Parekh emphasises the importance of cultural interaction. He paints a picture 
of unavoidable mutual cultural influence that is significant for all cultures, and that is 
only increasing in the context of globalisation.138 He adds a pointed critique of 
western cultural influence, arguing that the west’s interactions with other cultures 
“occur under grossly unequal conditions, and those at the receiving end often find it 
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difficult to make autonomous choices”.139 He also warns against the dangers of the 
uncritical adoption of western norms.  
 
As with Tully’s, this view of culture is certainly more compelling than that of 
Kymlicka. Both Parekh and Tully offer valuable perspectives on our cultural and 
multicultural lives. However, they differ in significant ways: for Tully, all people are 
cultural nomads, adhering to multiple cultures simultaneously. Whoever is correct, 
Parekh manages, unlike Tully, to hold onto the basic idea of individuals embedded in 
culture. His overall conception is of the robustness of particular cultures and their 
hold on individuals; this differs from Tully’s conception of the necessary fusion and 
intermingling of cultures in the lives of each person.  
 
The next part of Parekh’s theory concerns the value of diversity, a point on which he 
considers liberal theory to be deficient. He advances a number of potentially valuable 
arguments in favour of diversity, including the argument that it is important to the 
exercise of freedom. His main argument for diversity is expressed in terms of the 
effect of exposure to other cultures:  
 
Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and 
neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it might be, no culture embodies 
all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different 
cultures thus correct and compliment each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought and 
alert each other to new forms of human fulfilment. The value of other cultures is independent 
of whether or not they are options for us.… By cherishing such commendable values and 
sensibilities as harmony with nature, a sense of ecological balance, contentment, innocence 
and simplicity, which our way of life has to sacrifice in order to obtain its characteristic form 
of excellence, it both reminds us of our limitations and reassures us that the values are not lost 
altogether. Its inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally, stretches out 
imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our categories of thought.140 
 
So, to Parekh, the value of diversity comes from reminding a culture that there are 
other, valid perspectives and methods of human flourishing. This point has the effect 
of expanding one’s horizons so-to-speak, offering new ideas and sensibilities; but, it 
also keeps us culturally self-aware by suggesting the limitations of our own 
perspectives and beliefs. Quite clearly, then, the relevance of diversity for Parekh, 
relates to the effect of each culture having access to and experience of others. 
 
                                                
139
 Ibid, p164. 
140
 Ibid, p167. 
 331 
Much of the remainder of Rethinking Multiculturalism is aimed at building a 
conception of the properly multicultural society. Such a society, according to Parekh, 
would be “stable, cohesive, vibrant and at ease with itself”.141 The basis for this result 
depends on the closely related features of a shared culture, a national identity and a 
fair dialogue. Firstly, the shared culture is necessary to the functioning of a society, 
but, of course, must encompass a plurality of different cultures. This culture “forms 
the basis of a shared way of life, and underpins and gives the state moral and 
emotional roots”.142 It develops from the interaction of the different cultures in 
dialogue, and encompasses the values of fair multicultural interaction.143 
 
This shared culture is underpinned by a national identity, which specifies the self-
understanding of the society as a political community. This identity assists individuals 
in accepting themselves as part of the multicultural community.144 However, it must 
be simple and thin in order to prevent it from causing conflict and overwhelming the 
cultural identities of its members.145 He recognises that the formation of such an 
identity is not an easy process, but that this can be directed by the values of an open 
multiculturalism and a respect for minority cultures.146  
 
Parekh also discusses in some detail the workings of an effective dialogue. 
Intercultural dialogue should involve, Parekh argues, recognising the fundamental 
rights of all who participate, and involve each group accepting others as ‘equal 
conversational partners’.147 It succeeds only if “the participants enjoy a broad equality 
of self-confidence, economic and political power, and access to public space”.148 
These conditions imply the confident attachment of individuals both to their own 
cultures, and to societal multicultural beliefs. It is the presence of these overlapping 
attachments, as held by participants in the dialogue that offers the best chance for a 
mutually positive outcome that reflects Parekh’s stable, cohesive and vibrant society. 
 
                                                
141
 Ibid, p236. 
142
 Ibid, p224. 
143
 Ibid, pp219-224. 
144
 Ibid, p230. 
145
 Ibid, p231. 
146
 Ibid, pp235-236. 
147
 Ibid, pp208, 337.  
148
 Ibid, p337. 
 332 
Finally, Parekh makes a significant contribution to the discussion of multicultural 
equality. With Kymlicka and Tully, he asserts that equality should not be grounded in 
uniformity. Equality, Parekh asserts, should be built on the interplay of uniformity and 
difference that characterises humans.149  
 
Equality involves equal freedom or opportunity to be different, and treating human beings 
equally requires us to take into account both their similarities and differences. When the latter 
are not relevant, equality entails uniform or identical treatment; when they are, it requires 
different treatment.150  
 
In this way, Parekh deftly retains uniform treatment, except when differences require 
otherwise. The concern with allowing this differential treatment, he comments, is to 
ensure that it does not mean discrimination or privilege.151 In order to reduce the 
possibility of this, he sets out a process by which these issues of equal treatment 
should be dealt with as part of an intercultural dialogue. At the heart of this approach 
is the idea that, when minority practices offend the public values of the majority, the 
minority should explore the meaning and value of the practice, and attempt to defend 
it to the majority.152 The majority is then able to disallow the practice should it inhibit, 
in a relevant sense, their way of life.153 Although Parekh’s description of this process 
is quite bare, it does offer a firm and cogent account of the accommodation of 
minority practices, and is much more developed than that of Kymlicka or Tully. 
 
 
3.4 Multicultural attitudes to liberalism 
 
Parekh’s conception of multiculturalism is attractive in that it adopts a realistic 
conception of culture and champions the power of intercultural dialogue, not merely 
as a modus vivendi between conflicting groups, but in order to assist society in 
moving towards universally accepted values and principles. Towards liberalism he 
displays a quiet appreciation, tempered by a number of substantial criticisms. Like 
Tully, he views liberalism as a substantive doctrine; but one that has its limitations.154 
As a theory, liberalism tends to be absolutised, and to marginalise non-liberals. 
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Although he does not explicitly accuse liberal theory of cultural bias, he treats it as a 
part of western political culture, and implies that its marginalising effect is 
particularly relevant for non-western minority groups.  
 
In terms of the analysis of earlier chapters, Parekh seems to view liberal theory as 
operating in a contestable space, and criticises its assertion of universality, and, 
consequently, its exclusion of those who do not fit within its confines. This seems a 
reasonable view of the early contemporary liberal theory, one that is conscious of the 
subordination of non-liberals: that their beliefs are reduced to operation in the private 
sphere, or within the realm of personal conceptions of the good. These non-liberals 
are marginalised because, although they have significant freedom within which to 
determine their own beliefs and follow their own practices, these beliefs are 
embedded in a liberal system over which they have no control. In addition, as the 
arguments of Kymlicka and Tully suggest, this system is itself biased in favour of the 
liberal majority. This seems to accord with Parekh’s view of the political structure of 
liberal theory.  
 
Parekh’s reaction to the limitations of liberalism is to argue that we should adopt an 
inclusive dialogue that encompasses not only liberal but other beliefs, and that reaches 
towards universal moral values.  
 
The dialogically constituted multicultural society both retains the truth of liberalism and goes 
beyond it. It is committed to both liberalism and multiculturalism, privileges neither, and 
moderates the logic of one by that of the other. It neither confines multiculturalism within the 
limits set by liberalism and suppresses or marginalizes nonliberal values and cultures, nor 
confines liberalism within the limits of multiculturalism and emasculates its critical and 
emancipatory thrust.155 
 
Parekh views the dialogue in a multicultural society as involving and reconciling 
liberalism and multiculturalism. This can be contrasted with the work of Kymlicka, 
where multicultural issues are grafted onto a liberal structure. For Parekh, both are 
necessary parts of the overall dialogical process. Overall, Parekh’s organising idea is 
of a dialogue underpinned by both his meta-ethical conception of approaching 
universal values through dialogue, and the moral value of culture and cultural 
diversity.  
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Kymlicka criticises Parekh’s view of liberalism. He argues, firstly, that many of the 
minorities that western societies deal with are themselves liberal, and, secondly, that 
in these cases there is not the same need for a dialogue that looks beyond 
liberalism.156 He goes on to say that, even in relation to non-liberal groups, Parekh’s 
conception of dialogue is itself recognisably liberal. He identifies the ground rules that 
a liberal conception of dialogue would include, such as equal participation, free 
speech and democratic representation, and argues that Parekh’s ground rules are 
essentially similar. 
 
He rejects any attempt by non-liberal groups to exclude some people from participating in the 
public debate (e.g. women, blacks or heretics); he rejects any attempt to assert that one group 
has the natural or divine authority to rule over others (i.e. he requires that authorities have the 
consent of the people they claim to speak for); he rejects attempts to insulate any group’s 
claims from contestation or criticism. His account of these ground-rules is rather sketchy, but 
it seems to me to be eminently liberal in its basic inspiration.… Indeed, much of his account of 
the ground-rules of dialogue seems to be taken almost verbatim from liberal accounts of 
public dialogue.157 
 
Parekh replies to this argument directly, stating that, although there are some common 
features, essentially, his conception of dialogue is different from that of liberalism. 
 
My approach involves empowerment of weaker groups and voices, a heterogeneous public, a 
public debate that allows for a multiplicity of voices, and a view of public reason that is 
subject to constant contestation and refinement. My view does not require citizens to abstract 
away their cultural and other identities as a condition of citizenship.158 
 
The distinction the Parekh draws between his conception of dialogue and liberalism is 
that the former is more open and inclusive and more identity-sensitive, and the 
outcome of public reason is dynamic and continually transformable.  
 
This latter claim may differ from earlier liberal approaches, but theories of public 
reason are, for the most part, similarly dynamic. The other differences are potentially 
valid, in that Parekh’s approach may actually succeed in including more non-liberal 
ideas. Whether the approaches of Kymlicka and Parekh are essentially different or 
not, there is a more fundamental problem for him. What Kymlicka’s analysis shows is 
that Parekh’s dialogue, whatever its underlying values and justification, amounts to a 
substantive doctrine in much the same way as liberalism. It involves a substantial set 
of pre-conditions and moral ground rules, which include a set of universal individual 
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rights, and a broad conception of equality.159 It implies a conception of the person, 
particularly in relation to their culture, and a conception of the just society, as well as 
the correcting of its moral assumptions about the relationship between dialogue and 
universal values.  
 
It is also clear that Parekh’s approach implies a substantive political culture. This 
culture amounts to a dialogical political ethic to which all cultural groups must 
subscribe in order to be involved fully in the political decision-making process. 
Parekh argues that dialogue will result in a thin societal culture and identity, but that 
the success of this dialogue, itself, depends on a particular political culture. This 
culture is, by design, multicultural, and as thin as possible, but it is still a uniform, 
universal culture; in this sense, moral multiculturalism necessarily collapses into a 
form of monoculturalism. 
 
Not only is there substantive overlap between Parekh’s multicultural dialogue and 
corresponding liberal approaches, there are also strong structural similarities. Parekh’s 
approach recognises substantial personal (and group) freedom, which is expressed 
through their role in a fair and equal dialogue. Those who are non-dialogical in this 
sense are marginalised in exactly the same way that he criticises liberalism for 
marginalising the non-liberal. Those people are free to express their beliefs within the 
context of a dialogue, and to benefit from whatever freedom and advantages they can 
secure through that process; but, they are not capable of questioning and reversing the 
process itself, just as non-liberals are not capable of having their non-liberal 
preferences used to undermine the underlying liberal approach.  
 
Parekh may argue that the very rules of dialogue are subject to change and alteration. 
In the above passage, he states that public reason is dynamic, but this probably refers 
only to the structure and substance of the public reason. Even if he were to assert that 
the rules of the dialogue are changeable, as does Gaus of his public justification, this 
would apply only minimally to some of the conditions. In other words, it can mean 
changing some of what is meant by fair and equal dialogue, but cannot change the fact 
that fair and equal dialogue is the appropriate political approach.  
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In that liberalism and Parekh’s dialogical approach both encourage freedom and 
pluralism within specifically set boundaries, both face the burden of justifying their 
specific boundaries. In this, Parekh’s attitude towards his conception of public 
multicultural dialogue seems to be that it is the best approach for modern western 
liberal and multicultural societies. This means that it is supposed to apply not only to 
liberal majorities, but also to non-liberal and non-dialogical minorities. Non-dialogical 
groups would include not simply those who are positively antithetical to conversation 
and co-operation, but, also, those that reject Parekh’s conceptions of individual 
equality, respect and political access.  
 
There seem to be both structural and substantive similarities between liberalism and 
Parekh’s theory. The rationale for Parekh’s dialogue depends on a conception of 
multicultural inclusion, and on, both, the relationship between individuals and culture, 
and, the value of diversity. Each of these elements might reasonably be described as 
liberal, in that each involves respect, and the presumption that freedom should extend 
to personal beliefs and choices. Parekh’s focus does differ from that of Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism, and Gaus’ public dialogue, by virtue of being more willing to treat 
groups as valid political units; but, this does not prevent his theory from being 
essentially liberal. On this view, what Parekh’s approach offers liberal theory is a 
focus on cultural inclusion and respect as the central liberal concerns, so that, in actual 
political interaction, cultural arguments are capable of being treated on the same level 
as difference-blind liberal doctrine. 
 
In order to justify this approach, Parekh would need to recognise explicitly its two 
levels, and to distinguish between the underlying liberal (or dialogical) values, and the 
liberal substance of political dialogue. Parekh fails to explain why these values are not 
subject to the same criticisms he levels against doctrinal liberalism. From the 
perspective of moral theory, he fails to explain why these underlying values are 
presented by him through theory, and are not subject to dialogical justification. 
Ultimately, it seems that Parekh’s approach contains exactly those problems that he 
rightly attributes to liberalism, and, so, although it develops liberal theory in relation 
to multiculturalism in an interesting and potentially meaningful way, it fails to solve 






Multicultural demands present an important challenge to liberal theory. The substance 
of this challenge is that individual pluralism is of a different kind than cultural 
pluralism, such that the latter cannot be adequately accommodated by difference-blind 
theories that prescribe universal individual rights. The basis for this difference is in 
the fundamental importance of culture to our identities and selves; at the most basic 
level, the central Rawlsian freedom to choose one’s conception of the good does not 
take into account the dependence of this conception on culture. Instead, the 
recognition of minority cultures within a liberal society requires, it is argued, culture-
sensitive principles that reflect the preference of liberal rights for one cultural group 
over another. 
 
Multiculturalism, then, is unique among the perspectives on liberalism discussed here 
in that it opens liberalism to rights that are differentiated between peoples within a 
society. This move is opposed by those liberals who fear that group rights would 
undermine the impartiality of difference-blind liberalism and open liberal politics up 
to group-focussed arguments, based on interest rather than justice. This reticence is 
probably reflected in Kymlicka’s attempts to graft a particular set of multicultural 
rights onto a liberal framework. In contrast, Tully and Parekh are more willing to 
explicitly reject accepted forms of liberalism as being universal, and, instead, to treat 
liberalism as one cultural part of a dialogue of cultures and, so, as one doctrine, to be 
respected by virtue of its advantages and its popularity, among many others.  
 
Each of these approaches faces a number of difficulties. Firstly, the theories, by virtue 
of reflecting an actual political movement, need to be able to encompass the many 
circumstances of multiculturalism in western countries; but, more importantly, from a 
theoretical standpoint, the overall conception of culture itself must not only reflect this 
diversity, but, also, must express culture as a different, special kind of pluralism. This 
task involves: expressing an understanding of culture that includes its constitutive 
value to individual identities; while, at the same time, allowing for the necessary 
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diversity and dissent internal to a culture, the diversity of forms of cultural 
attachment, the dynamics of cultural development, and the interactive, interdependent 
relationships between cultures. To the difficulty of this project must be added, Scott’s 
suggestion that culture itself is a historically-situated idea, so that, even the 
universality of culture is questionable. Overall, none of the surveyed theories manages 
to incorporate all of these elements in a meaningful way, although Parekh’s 
conception of individuals mediated by culture is probably the closest to the mark.  
 
The next challenge that these theories face is the inevitable tension between culture 
and justice. In an explicitly liberal theory such as Kymlicka’s, this manifests most 
obviously in the case of illiberal national minorities. In this case, there is a conflict 
between a culturally conservative approach, which would dictate that the liberal 
majority allow the minority to continue in their illiberal ways, and the liberal values to 
which the majority subscribe. To favour the former would be to allow merely cultural 
values to override liberal values, while to enforce a liberal approach would be to 
impose majority ideals on a culturally distinct minority. Neither is very attractive: the 
former suggests that liberalism is simply the conventional expression of western 
political history, and is not relevant for non-westerners; the latter asserts the more 
universal character of liberal values, which undermines the very nature of cultural 
pluralism. Kymlicka attempts to find a middle-ground between the two. He 
distinguishes between identifying a valid theory of multiculturalism and imposing it 
on minorities, and argues that the latter should not occur unless the minority breach of 
human rights is extreme. This argument is thoroughly unconvincing, and seems to 
emphasise the difficulty involved, rather than take any positive step towards 
answering it.  
 
It might be expected that Parekh and Tully would respond to this challenge much 
more effectively, given that their approaches both imply a willingness to favour 
multicultural over liberal values. In fact, both face similar difficulties to Kymlicka, as 
both depend on particular universal theories of multicultural justice. Both champion 
those cultural beliefs that are adhered to by minorities, while also promoting universal 
values that are multicultural and/or liberal. While it might be argued that there is a 
natural affinity between minority cultures and multiculturalism, this is no more than 
the affinity between autonomous individuals and liberal toleration. The point is that 
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minority groups may not agree with or adopt a particular conception of 
multiculturalism, or even the meaning of, or need for, multiculturalism itself. The 
potential for conflict between cultural values and multicultural values, then, 
undermines their theories in the same kind of way as the conflict between culture and 
liberalism undermines Kymlicka’s. And, even if it is argued that minority cultures 
would tend to prefer a more culturally-sensitive and less difference-blind approach, 
this rests on group interests rather than the needs of justice, and involves satisfying 
minorities only to the extent that it takes away from majorities. It also ignores the 
diversity of both minority and majority cultures.  
 
The final challenge to multicultural liberalism is closely linked to this conflict, and 
entails effectively conceiving of the cultural bias of liberal theory. The earlier chapters 
found, implicit in liberal theory, a source of bias, namely the assertion of particular 
and plausible ideas and values within a diverse and contestable space. 
Multiculturalism views liberal bias from the perspective of culture, and finds it, not 
only in some of the assertions of theorists, but, also, in the very way that liberalism 
operates within the political domain. Kymlicka suggests this in relation to a number of 
political decisions that had previously not been the concern of liberalism, and, so, 
furthers his project of adding group rights to an otherwise untouched liberal 
framework. Tully and Parekh take this bias further, and label all of liberalism as being 
doctrinal and questionable. 
 
Ultimately, this is the greatest multicultural challenge and contribution to liberal 
theory: that aspects of the theory itself, conceptions, assumptions, values and 
principles are potentially culturally biased. In this way, multiculturalism opens 
liberalism up to a particular expression of moral uncertainty, namely that moral 
conclusions are the result of cultural circumstances. This sets a substantial burden on 
liberal justification, given that the nature and extent of this bias is expressed only in 
the most general terms, and the means for correcting for it are difficult to conceive. 
The one obvious response to this difficulty is to employ a justification that is 
culturally contextual, but any conception of culture would undermine such an attempt. 
Multiculturalism itself renders a culturally-based justification only partially useful, 
and the internal diversity of cultures suggests that it would be difficult to apply such a 
justification to the entirety of a culture. In this way, the nature of the difference 
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implied by multiculturalism undermines a justification based on some common, albeit 
contextual, element.  
 
The responses of Parekh and Tully to this problem are to use as their central focus a 
conception of multicultural society. This conception, itself limited to modern western 
states, leads to their respective ideals of intercultural dialogue, which share much with 
liberal conceptions of public reason and deliberative democracy. These dialogues 
involve interaction between cultures, and between liberalism and other moral and 
political beliefs. Despite liberalism’s role as a subject in the dialogue, the conditions 
and values that underlie dialogue itself are, in many ways, recognisably liberal, albeit 
from a multicultural perspective. It turns out, then, that, although the dialogical 
interaction between liberal and other theories within a multicultural system is 
interesting, what is perhaps more interesting is the interaction between liberal and 
multicultural values that underlie that dialogue. This is most obvious for Parekh, who 
explicitly rejects the universality of liberalism, but builds his approach on an 
unquestioned application of a conception of multicultural liberalism, or perhaps, 
liberal multiculturalism.  
 
The attempt at devising a conception of justice that transcends cultural differences, by 
being centrally focussed on the fact of cultural pluralism, and by being substantively 
respectful of and open to various cultural expressions, is undermined by the particular 
moral values and approaches that express this focus. As with pluralism, the fact of 
multiculturalism does not seem to necessarily imply liberal multiculturalism. The 
latter amounts to simply one possible response to the former, albeit one that is 
sensitive to the need to respect individuals and cultural groups, and that focuses on co-
operation and mutual recognition. 
 
The perspective of multiculturalism offers a deeper view of this idea. For the 
dialogical approaches of Tully and Parekh to be successful, the cultural groups 
involved have to adopt particular cultural beliefs about political interaction and 
intercultural dialogue. Much like the reasonableness requirement of public reason and 
political liberalism theory, neither Parekh’s nor Tully’s dialogues function unless 
those groups involved value highly multiculturalism and cultural diversity, and are 
willing to interact on a co-operative basis. It could be argued that these beliefs 
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themselves form part of the theory’s justificatory context, and that, once they are 
admitted, the intercultural dialogue becomes the best possible moral and political 
approach in the circumstances. This move would certainly make a successful 
transcultural justification possible, but it entails a move that contravenes the essence 
of multicultural demands; it involves imposing a particular set of cultural beliefs on 
minority cultures. Not only must all cultures accept the relevant liberal-multicultural 
values, but they must hold them as being morally or, at the very least, politically, 
fundamental.  
 
This amounts to a form of cultural homogenisation that seems biased like any other, 
regardless of the fact that it is based on ideas of multiculturalism. It might be argued 
that this bias corrects for or balances other biases inherent in political activity. This 
may be correct; however, this entails imposing cultural and moral content on the basis 
of justice, which merely emphasises the tension between culture and justice discussed 
above. It is difficult to see why this multicultural/liberal approach should direct 
cultural belief and political justice when liberal values on their own are consigned to 
the status of contestable doctrine.  
 
Overall, multiculturalism has influenced liberal theory: by adding a cultural 
dimension to its operation and, also, in alerting the theorist to the operation of cultural 
and liberal bias. In this way, multicultural theory can be seen as a strategy for 
overcoming the moral uncertainty expressed in cultural difference. This shift in the 
aims of liberal theory is unable to reach a transcultural perspective, and, instead, 
amounts to an ethic of cultural sensitivity, embedded in multicultural liberal theory, 
public political culture, and intercultural political dialogue. What remains is an 
unresolved tension between liberalism as a western cultural tradition, and 





1. Rorty’s postmodern liberalism  
 
Multicultural theory accuses liberalism of cultural bias, and prescribes a more 
inclusive liberal public dialogue between majority and minority cultures. 
Postmodernism also accuses liberal theory of bias, and, like multiculturalism, it 
emphasises generally the historical and cultural location of liberal theory within the 
western tradition of political theory and action. Unlike multicultural demands, the 
basis for a postmodern critique of liberalism extends to a close examination of 
theoretical methods, and, so, envisages a liberal bias that extends beyond culture to 
the most basic features of theory itself.  
 
Postmodernism has been described as involving incredulity towards the “supposedly 
transcendent and universal truths that underpin western civilization”.1 More than this, 
postmodern theorists tend to subscribe to beliefs and approaches that might be 
described as being radically sceptical, and they are often labelled as relativists, 
subjectivists or emotivists. An examination of postmodern approaches to liberalism is 
potentially interesting in that such approaches would tend to take moral uncertainty as 
their starting-point, and, presumably, would be in a strong position to build a 
liberalism that responds well to this uncertainty. The difference between postmodern 
and other liberal theorists is that the former interact with this uncertainty in an 
immediate and self-conscious way.  
 
As suggested in the introductory chapter, there are two general difficulties with a 
thoroughly morally sceptical liberal theory. The first is that this scepticism is 
potentially self-refuting, in that a statement undermining absolute claim, seems itself 
to be an absolute statement, and, so, is subject to the same argument. The second is 
that a theory that prescribes positive liberal values is seemingly at odds with the 
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incredulity towards any universal moral judgment. A theory of postmodern liberalism 
must overcome both of these obstacles in order to be valid as a response to 
uncertainty.  
 
The primary attempt at building a postmodern form of liberalism is to be found in the 
work of philosopher Richard Rorty. His book, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
published in 1989, attempts to apply, to the liberal realm, his criticisms of the idea 
that knowledge is “a matter of mental or linguistic representation of reality”.2 He 
expands his views in subsequent essays, collectively published in Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth in 1991, and also in a later collection, Philosophy and Social 
Hope (1999).3 These works develop various aspects of a relatively consistent view of 
the nature of philosophy and the value of liberalism.  
 
 
1.1 Contingency and reality  
 
Perhaps the most significant idea that Rorty uses to describe people and their 
relationship to the world in which they live is that of contingency. Keith Topper has 
described Rorty’s conception of contingency, broadly speaking, as embodying the 
idea that things might have been otherwise, as opposed to being “necessary, essential, 
intrinsic, or unconditional”.4  
 
These latter terms… are themselves tightly intertwined with notions of a common “human 
nature,” a telos, a divine order or some other principle of legitimacy that is privileged 
precisely because its status is independent of our particular historical location and social 
practices.5 
 
Rorty’s philosophy, then, is based on a retreat from the necessary or essential 
character of reality, of people, beliefs, and ideas. Instead, he emphasises the 
dependence on geographic, social and linguistic location. Topper notes that this 
means the championing of “novelty, innovation, originality, and creativity”, but, at the 
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same time, “chance, luck, accident, randomness, and fortuitousness”.6 As contingency 
is one of the central concepts used by Rorty, these ideas are values that are woven 
through much of his theory.  
 
Rorty’s first use of this contingency is in explaining the nature of the relationship 
between people and the physical world, and, so, the meaning of our understanding of 
reality. He describes his position as being anti-representational, meaning that our 
linguistic descriptions of the world do not in any way amount to accurate 
representations of it, and that any view contrary to this is pointless.7 In this way, truth 
is made and not found, and, so, is subject to the contingencies of the constructed:8  
 
Since truth is the property of sentences, since sentences are dependant for their existence upon 
vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths. For as long as 
we think that “the world” names something we ought to respect as well as cope with, 
something personlike in that it has a preferred description of itself, we shall insist that any 
philosophical account of truth save the “intuition” that truth is “out there.” This institution 
amounts to the vague sense that it would be hybris on our part to abandon the traditional 
language of “respect for fact” and “objectivity” – that it would be risky, and blasphemous, not 
to see the scientist (or the philosopher, or the poet, or somebody) as having a priestly function, 
as putting us in touch with a realm which transcends the human.9 
 
So, for Rorty, there is no priestly and privileged connection between our descriptions 
of reality and reality itself. This idea renders truth, as expressed by language, as 
constructed out of whatever vocabularies we happen to exercise. This anti-
representational approach applies the contingency of both language and truth, and 
holds that our expressions about reality offer no inkling of a real world above and 
beyond those expressions themselves. In this way Rorty claims to de-divinise the 
world – to deny its transcendent and absolute character and, instead, to locate it 
relative to those who are describing it.10  
 
It might be argued in response to Rorty’s anti-representationalism that some 
descriptions, such as the existence of a physical object, or a particular physical law, 
actually reflect reality. He replies to this position by arguing that the contingency of 
constructed truth applies to physics just as it does to astrology or literary criticism, 
and that what appears as hard fact is actually “simply the hardness of the previous 
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agreements within a community about the consequences of a certain event”.11 What, if 
anything, distinguishes physics and literary criticism, then, is the firmness with which 
the relevant communities determine “who loses and who wins”.12 The virtue of 
scientists, Rorty suggests, lies not in an assertion to truth, but in the success of the 
institutions to which they adhere and the “unforced agreement” that results.13 
 
What is important for Rorty is not just the contingency of our descriptions of reality, 
but to show a relationship between contingency and pragmatism, the latter being one 
of his central substantive principles. People are not conceived of as being in a free-
floating and reality-less state, but, rather, with respect to their performance within an 
environment. In this way, linguistically-expressed beliefs define not what reality is, 
but how people interact with their environments.14  
 
Pragmatists hope to break with … the Cartesian-Lockean picture of a mind seeking to get in 
touch with a reality outside itself. So they start with a Darwinian account of human beings as 
animals doing their best to cope with the environment – doing their best to develop tools 
which enable them to enjoy more pleasure and less pain. Words are among the tools which 
these clever animals have developed.15 
 
So, for Rorty, the constructedness of belief-statements is not meaningless, but, rather, 
allows people to interact effectively with their environments. On this view, it does not 
matter whether these beliefs represent the world accurately. What is important is that 
they allow us to accomplish particular tasks, or, generally, to lead good lives.16 In this 
context, the truth of a belief means simply that “no alternative belief is, as far as we 
know, a better habit of acting”.17 
 
Rorty goes on to characterise the human mind as being a web of these beliefs and 
desires, from which there is no distinct self.18 The self, then, has no unchanging 
centre, but, rather, is made up of our beliefs and desires “in continual interaction, 
redistributing truth-values among statements”.19 This means that there is no common 
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human nature and, so, just like the world, the self is de-divinised, and treated as the 
accidental result of contingent construction.20 
 
 
1.2 Postmodernism and theory 
 
 
Because of his claims as to the contingency of belief, and his rejection of any method 
aimed at universal results, Rorty is often denounced as a relativist.21 It is true that he 
views language and belief only as pragmatic customs, and argues that there is no 
external context-independent viewpoint from which to perceive them. Yet, he both 
rejects the relativist label, and declares the “need to avoid relativism” to be “an 
expression of the need to preserve certain habits of contemporary European life”.22 
Thus, he reduces this criticism, and, by inference, western attempts at moral 
universalism, to a misleading or even underhanded statement on the importance of 
retaining certain contingent western values. He later expresses the western ideal of a 
universal truth rather more charitably as expressing, in a misleading way, the hope 
that “the human race as a whole should gradually come together in a global 
community… which incorporates most of the thick morality of the European 
industrialized democracies”.23 Rorty’s message here is expressed in the same terms as 
before; it is just that, here, he agrees with the corresponding pragmatic instinct, 
namely to broaden the moral community. 
 
Rorty does not identify himself as a relativist, and finds the distinction between the 
absolute and the relative to be clumsy. He argues that, along with the philosophical 
distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity, and between facts and values, the 
distinction between the absolute and the relative should be discarded and replaced by 
a new vocabulary.24 This leads Rorty to characterise pragmatists like himself as anti-
dualists, unwilling to accept a particular group of dualities that pervade western 
philosophy and common sense.25  
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Without the possibility of a standpoint that is external to any moral community, Rorty 
must employ an approach to theory and justification that amounts to a redescription of 
universalist approaches. His interpretation of current practice is that knowledge and 
truth represent common agreement within a particular linguistic community.26 
Similarly, approaches to justification reflect familiar procedures accepted within a 
particular field.27 He suggests that there is no method of ultimate justification to 
which we can appeal, and that theory is simply another text and, so, cannot claim a 
privileged status.28  It is this theoretical landscape in which Rorty is tasked to justify, 
or at least to explain, liberalism. It is characterised by the contingency of belief and of 
self; by the inescapable contextual essence of ideas and thought. In it, all reference is 
made to individual’s webs of beliefs, and to the social and linguistic communities of 
these individuals. Their habits and customs are the only perspective from which moral 
theories can be judged. Congruent with these ideas, Rorty describes philosophy as “an 
aid to creating ourselves”, rather than knowing ourselves; and morality as a “new and 
controversial custom”.29  
 
This is not to deny that theory or morality cannot improve society, for such a claim 
would imply the relativist idea that all communities’ values and beliefs are equal. This 
evaluation, Rorty argues, is impossible since it implies a perspective beyond 
context.30 Instead, the point is to accept that philosophy occurs within a particular 
tradition, and not to attempt to theorise from a perspective beyond that tradition.31 
This does not prevent people from adhering strongly to moral values, or from holding 
beliefs that they consider are worth dying for.32 However, it does imply a highly 
contextualised approach, where the subject of philosophy is as contingent as Rorty 
finds language or the self.  
 
 
1.3 Contingency and liberalism 
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Within this framework of contextuality, Rorty is tasked with promoting a conception 
of liberalism. The issue is how this promotion can take place given his objection to 
the aspiration to universality, and even to the idea that philosophy is conventional and 
cannot transcend linguistic communities. Rorty’s approach to liberalism eschews 
justification, in favour of a process of redescription. The latter is undertaken in order 
to “reformulate the hopes of liberal society in a nonrationalist and nonuniversalist 
way”.33 This process involves replacing conceptions of rationality and truth with ideas 
of metaphor and self-creation, and, so, creating a liberal culture that is de-divinised 
and that responds to the internal needs of its society, rather than to external ideals 
such as holiness or reason.34 For this reason, liberalism needs no philosophical 
justification at all, although philosophy and theory can be used to build a theory of 
social justice that accords with accepted beliefs and institutions.35 
 
It is clear, then, that Rorty is not attempting a “transcendental deduction of democratic 
politics from anitrepresentationalism premises”.36 Nor does a commitment to 
pragmatism entail a similar commitment to liberalism.37 Instead, he hints that political 
theory “should view itself as [offering] suggestions for future action emerging out of 
recent historical experience, rather than [as] attempting to legitimate the outcome of 
that experience by reference to something ahistorical”.38 These ideas confirm the 
radically contingent nature of any attempt at liberal theory, and raise obvious 
challenges for a person such as Rorty who seeks to argue in favour of liberalism; as, 
without a transcontextual criterion or viewpoint, it is difficult to see what form these 
arguments can take or how powerful they can be. In order to explore these issues, the 
substance of Rorty’s liberal theory needs to be examined. 
 
At the centre of Rorty’s liberalism is the separation between the personal desire for 
self-creation, and the public need for solidarity, defined as Judith Shklar’s liberal ideal 
of the avoidance of cruelty.39 Rorty’s liberalism is the embodiment of the idea that 
                                                
33
 Ibid, p44. 
34
 Ibid, pp44-45. 
35
 Rorty, op cit, above note 11, p178. 
36
 Ibid, p15. 
37
 Rorty, op cit, above note 15, p271. 
38
 Ibid, p272. 
39
 Ibid, pxv. 
 349
these two values are “equally valid, yet forever incommensurable”.40 This means they 
cannot be effectively combined, nor can one be found to be morally prior to the other. 
These two values, the relationship between them, and the society that results from the 
equal respect of both, make up the substance of Rorty’s liberalism. 
 
Self-creation in Rorty’s theory is intimately connected with being an ironist. Such a 
person has personal doubts about their own fundamental beliefs and justifications, 
recognises that these doubts cannot be removed simply by applying their current 
vocabulary, and does not believe their vocabulary to be any better a reflection of 
reality than that of anyone else.41 In other words, they accept the contingency of 
themselves, their cultures and societies, and their beliefs. By virtue of these beliefs, an 
ironist is in the best position to engage in a process of autonomous self-creation, with 
the aim of making “the best selves for ourselves that we can”.42  
 
In this way, Rorty champions the idea of continual self-redescription, but a 
redescription that is free of the metaphysical urge to theorise; this is a process that 
self-consciously originates within a particular tradition, or within the intersection of a 
number of traditions, but that attempts to push at the boundaries of the vocabularies 
these traditions offer.43 This self-conscious self-creation, he argues, characterises the 
citizens of a liberal utopia founded on the acceptance of contingency.44 Importantly, it 
requires some basic personal freedoms. 
 
The social glue holding together the ideal liberal society… consists in little more than a 
consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody have a chance at self-
creation to the best of his or her abilities, and that the goal requires, besides peace and wealth, 
the standard “bourgeois freedoms.” This… would be a conviction based on nothing more 
profound than the historical facts which suggest that without the protection of something like 
the institutions of bourgeois liberal society, people will be less able to work out their private 
salvations, create their private self-images, reweave their webs of belief and desire in the light 
of whatever new people and books they happen to encounter.45 
 
The demands of self-creation, Rorty argues, imply the ‘standard bourgeois freedoms’ 
and institutions. He asserts that the normative underpinnings of liberal society need 
consist of no more than the belief that all should be afforded the opportunity for self-
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creation. This actual, contingent belief acts as the link between self-creation and a set 
of individual liberties.  
 
The other part of Rorty’s conception of liberalism is expressed by the need for 
solidarity, or the fundamental importance of avoiding cruelty within a society. He 
expresses explicitly the idea that there is no non-neutral theoretical justification for 
the idea that cruelty is the worst thing that can happen in society.46 Yet, he argues that 
there is, at the most basic level, a solidarity between people that expresses a common 
humanity, and withstands the limitations implied by contingency.47 This solidarity 
does not function universally, but, rather, depends on the beliefs of individuals and 
groups, and, in particular, on how the potential subject of solidarity is perceived by 
the person or group.48 
 
So, the relationship of solidarity between two people or groups depends on the 
contingent beliefs of those groups. Moral progress, then, is achieved by the increasing 
of feelings of solidarity. 
 
But that solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all 
human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more traditional 
differences… as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation.49 
 
It is this increased solidarity, and the corresponding decrease in pain and humiliation, 
that should be the proper goal of a liberal society. This is based on the recognition, not 
of a common humanity, but of the effect of cruelty that is common between people 
regardless of differences in belief. 
 
A system that treats equally the demands for autonomous self-creation, and for 
solidarity expressed as the avoidance of cruelty, would satisfy Rorty’s conception of a 
just and liberal society. This society would feature both the basic liberal freedoms and 
the active minimisation of cruelty. These values would be pursued in the public realm 
“by persuasion rather than force, by reform rather than revolution, by the free and 
open encounters of present linguistic and other practices with suggestions for other 
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practices”.50 Rorty argues that, given the choice between a liberal society that satisfies 
these conditions, and an illiberal society, no-one who has experienced both would 
choose the latter.51 Such a liberal society, Rorty argues, is likely to result in an 
increase in human happiness.52 To pursue these ends, on pragmatic grounds, is for 




2. Analysis  
 
2.1 Theory and contingency 
 
The structure of Rorty’s account of liberalism is founded on the general application of 
the postmodern ideal of contingency, and, so, on the relegation of moral values and 
theory to the realm of custom, rather than to that of universal truth. His conception of 
liberalism itself comprises two parts: self-creation as ironism, and solidarity as the 
liberal avoidance of cruelty and humiliation. These two aspects are supposed to 
represent the primary values of the private and public areas of our lives respectively, 
and are to be treated as equal and incommensurable within a liberal system. As such, 
they represent a liberal utopia that is epitomised by the liberal ironist, who is 
autonomous, and yet conscious of contingency in his or her personal life, and, who, in 
the public domain is an ardent supporter of a politics characterised by the liberal 
avoidance of cruelty.  
 
Given Rorty’s postmodern and pragmatist viewpoint, and his renouncement of theory 
and justification, it is not clear the grounds on which he promotes this liberal utopia, 
or what this explanation requires. His approach is not entirely distinct from 
contemporary liberal theory, and has similarities to both value pluralism and political 
liberalism: the former, in the focus on the historicity and cultural location of political 
theory and belief, and the pluralisation of moral value; and the latter, in the 
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subordination of philosophy to the political.54 Yet, Rorty sets aside the need for 
justification in a fundamental way. Without the requirements of justification and 
theory it is not obvious what he is attempting to achieve, in setting out, in a seemingly 
theoretical way, a structure that is supposed to represent a liberal utopia.  
 
According to Rorty’s account of our contingent reality, morality is founded entirely 
on custom. This means that moral theory cannot recognise any moral truth, but rather 
is part of the process of the construction of that truth. On this view, theory is one 
among many texts, characterised by the focus on ideas rather than events or people.55 
Theory that is self-consciously contingent, then, discards the search for proper 
foundations and, instead, acts as a tool to modify or develop its subject. The method 
by which this is achieved is through the redescription of the subject’s vocabulary.56 
This allows shifts in individual belief, since this is expressed in and mediated by 
language. In this way, Rorty’s objections do not deny completely the role of 
philosophy and justification, but, rather, deny that they can be used in a foundational 
way in order to reveal true and universal principles. 
 
One way of formulating the pragmatist position is to say that the pragmatist recognises 
relations of justification holding between beliefs and desires, and relations of causation 
holding between these beliefs and desires and other items in the universe, but no relations of 
representation. Beliefs do not represent nonbeliefs.57 
 
It is wrong, then, to criticise Rorty for using theory to promote liberalism, without 
examining the substance of that theory. The latter should be recognised, consistent 
with the remainder of Rorty’s ideas, as attempting a non-foundational redescription of 
liberalism that does not represent, but, rather, reinterprets and recontextualises a 
liberal reality.  
 
An important and fundamental criticism remains about Rorty’s general theory: given 
that Rorty has characterised theory as being contingent in this way, it is necessary for 
him to explain why his assertions of contingency are not themselves contingent. This 
represents the first challenge of sceptical theory, that the assertion of scepticism is 
self-refuting, since it is itself a universal and, so, non-sceptical claim.  
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This is potentially damaging to Rorty’s approach. Either, the assertion of contingency 
is itself subject to that contingency, or, it stands above and transcends it. Neither 
possibility seems coherent with Rorty’s account of theory and reality. The first means 
that contingency is not universal and is itself limited to a particular (postmodern and 
pragmatic) tradition. This in itself implies a higher level contingency that the idea of 
contingency denies, and would offer no reason for preferring contingency to some 
other approach. The second is no less troublesome, for the truth of contingency seems 
to belie the consequences of that truth, that there is no truth except what is constructed 
by us in order to deal with our environment. This makes the assertion of truth exactly 
the kind of statement that Rorty denies that other philosophers and theorists can make.  
 
This is further explicated by Peter Lom’s criticism that Rorty’s contingency is itself a 
metaphysical position.  
 
Rorty would like to remain agnostic on metaphysical questions.… However, he departs from 
this neutrality on this question of truth in claiming that the ironist is dedicated to two other 
premises: she is a “nominalist and a historicist.”… These… two premises are in tension with 
[ironist doubt] for they are not subjected to question; moreover, they themselves point to 
particular metaphysical positions. Historicism and materialism are accompanied by the 
metaphysical assumption that morality is not underwritten by the nature of the cosmos, that 
man is entirely alone.58 
 
Lom suggests that Rorty’s attitude of ironism, the awareness of pervasive 
contingency, includes “assumptions that reveal themselves to be based on undefended 
and seemingly unexamined premises”.59 The general point is that, not only is there a 
logical inconsistency inherent in the assertion of contingency, but that, Rorty’s 
conception of contingency rests on particular contestable and, so, contingent, 
metaphysical assumptions. Both points, together, suggest that Rorty’s assertion of 
contingency is no less constructed and flawed as any other piece of purportedly 
transcendent philosophy.  
 
Rorty’s likely response to this claim can be pieced together from parts of his 
explanation of contingency. He states that  
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[t]o say that we should drop the idea of truth as out there waiting to be discovered is not to say 
that we have discovered that, out there, there is no truth. It is to say that our purposes would 
best be served by ceasing to see the truth as a deep matter.… “The nature of truth” is an 
unprofitable topic… [b]ut this claim about relative profitability, in turn, is just the 
recommendation that we in fact say little about these topics, and see how we get on.60 
 
He says elsewhere, when responding to the claim of being a relativist that 
 
the pragmatist is not holding a positive theory which says that something is relative to 
something else. He is, instead, making the purely negative point that we should drop the 
traditional distinction between knowledge and opinion, construed as the distinction between 
truth as correspondence to reality and truth as a commendatory term for well-justified 
beliefs.61 
 
And, in discussing the relationship between postmodernism and relativism, Rorty 
explains that: 
 
Relativism certainly is self-refuting, but there is a difference between saying that every 
community is as good as every other and saying that we have to work out from the networks 
we are, from the communities with which we presently identify. Postmodernism is no more 
relativistic than Hilary Putnam’s suggestion that we stop trying for a “God’s-eye view” and 
realize that “We can only hope to produce a more rational conception of rationality or a better 
conception of morality if we operate from within our tradition.”62 
 
These passages, together, suggest a number of points about Rorty’s conception of 
contingency. The first is that it is not a positive assertion of truth, but, rather, a 
negative ideal: a dropping of the approaches of other theorists for reason of their 
contingency. This suggests that contingency may itself be viewed as being a self-
consciously contingent response to the philosophical tradition of universality.  
 
The above objection to the idea of admitting the contingency of contingency is that it 
implies a higher-level contingency that is itself a positive truth claim. The first of the 
passages above suggests that the higher level principle is in fact pragmatic in nature. 
In other words, we should adopt a contingent attitude towards philosophy and theory 
because it is the most profitable and useful in our situation, which would include that 
other philosophical approaches, particularly universal approaches to morality, have 
proven to be unconvincing and unhelpful. Thus, contingency is the best approach to 
take in the situation in which we find ourselves. This seems to be the most faithful 
portrayal of Rorty’s position, but, even these arguments cannot dull the claim that his 
contingency is self-refuting. The idea that his conception of contingency is a negative 
principle, enjoining us from engaging in universalist philosophy, must also be positive 
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in that it entails an attitude of ironism, and a working from our own tradition. In 
addition, the recognition of the contingent nature of contingency implies a higher-
level view of reality that incorporates both the possibility of contingency, and the 
value of pragmatism.  
 
It is almost as if Rorty imagines a reality of infinite possibility and plasticity, in which 
one can create without bound, and where the only criterion of the worth of that 
creation is its usefulness to its creator. In such a reality, given our western tradition 
and the moral and philosophical uncertainties that have evolved through and as a 
response to two and a half thousand years of concerted effort, the view of contingency 
seems, to Rorty at least, to offer the greatest real hope for agreement and happiness. 
This reality, however, is not what remains after all the false assertions of universality 
in theory and belief are removed. Rather, it is an imagining of Rorty that presupposes 
pragmatism and contains within it the seeds of contingency. In other words, it makes 
contestable metaphysical assumptions which, although they contain an intuitive 
plausibility as to how the most general level of reality might be, contravene the very 
process of paring back assertions of universality to an open core. This problem is 
contained entirely in the direction to stop looking for a God’s-eye view: either this 
suggestion is universal and, so, God-like, or it is not and, so, can offer no reason to do 
so. Rorty might appeal to pragmatism for such a reason; but then pragmatism, if it 
could, would take up the role of a God’s-eye view. 
 
This is a problem and one that it is difficult for Rorty to overcome without either 
changing his stance in relation to antirepresentation and truth, to allow contingency to 
correctly reflect reality, or reassessing the nature of his underlying view of 
pragmatism and contingency. Ultimately, the claims that contingency is negative and 
is not tethered to any deeper understanding of reality must fail, since Rorty’s approach 
clearly contains positive elements, and implies a deeper contingent-pragmatist 
structure. To his credit, Rorty recognises this in identifying the problem of ironist 
theory being “how to overcome authority without claiming authority”, his answer 
being to eschew theory altogether. This reply does not sit easily alongside a body of 
work that is as much theoretical and metaphysical as it is personal.63 
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2.2 Justification and liberalism
 
 
Regardless of this problem with Rorty’s underlying structure of contingency, his 
justification of a radically uncertain conception of liberalism remains interesting and 
important. According to his idea of the contingency of language and the liberal 
tradition, his approach amounts to a non-foundational redescription of liberalism. This 
means, he argues, that there is no non-circular or final justification of liberal 
solidarity, and that liberal democracy is not in need of a philosophical justification at 
all.64 This view this leaves Rorty with a problem, as expressed by Anthony Langlois: 
 
[I]f Rorty is to be taken seriously when he says that there is no reality beyond language… 
there is no reason why we should prefer Rorty’s story telling method of promoting the human 
rights culture over the reasoned exegesis of the foundationalist philosopher. Both can be said 
to be arguing for the same thing but using a different final vocabulary, and which one you opt 
for is no more than your personal preference.65 
 
This is an attack on Rorty’s framework of contingency, and, in particular, on the 
hidden assertion that a contingent viewpoint is the best approach in a contingent 
world. It implies that theory, despite some sense of conflict with Rorty’s view of the 
underlying ‘reality’ of contingency, might actually have an important role in society. 
This role would be expressed by its use in building an understanding of reality based 
on theoretical conventions and ideas. 
 
In relation to liberalism, Langlois argues that, without justification, there is no 
particular reason, beyond that of mere preference, to accept Rorty’s irony-solidarity 
conception. Rorty would probably largely agree with this, but would note that this 
preference is guided by all the moral custom and liberal political tradition of western 
beliefs. This would mean that the general preference for such a redescription of 
liberalism would have real moral force, and even truth, to it. Rorty’s justificatory 
burden, then, involves explaining why his redescription of liberalism is preferable to 
other vocabularies and descriptions, particularly those that involve a liberalism that is 
foundational and theoretical. This project can only be achieved, Rorty argues, from 
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the perspective of the particular tradition in question, namely the institutions, practice 
and thought of western liberalism. His project, then, is to justify his liberalism within 
this tradition. To achieve this he can invoke those western and liberal beliefs that he 
considers useful. Rorty, however, in justifying his liberalism, also seems to adopt a 
conception of humanity and solidarity that reaches beyond the beliefs of liberalism. 
The goal is to present a redescription that is accepted by virtue of it allowing people to 
better interact with their environment, meaning that it results in a better-ordered, 
happier society. 
 
That Rorty begins with a negative conception of contingency, that is radically open 
and does not discern between constructed truths, and ends up with a vision of liberal 
utopia, is surprising. Honglim Ryu recognises this in commenting that most 
postmodern thinkers believe ethics to be doomed:66 
 
The postmodern approach to ethics does not provide any determinate framework for deciding 
how to adjudicate conflicting ethical claims or how to link ethical unconditional affirmation of 
the emancipatory ideals, enlightened social criticism, and democratic accountability in 
determinate political terms.67 
 
Ryu argues that the conditions of postmodernism, in Rorty’s case of contingency, do 
not offer adequate means for justifying liberalism as being any more or less valuable 
than another political ideal. Ryu goes on to conclude that the ultimate problem with 
postmodern thinking is that it “cannot overcome and deconstruct itself because it does 
not specify its own historical and social background”.68 This seems to mean that 
postmodernism fails because it understands itself only in absolute and universal terms. 
As is suggested, postmodernism can never criticise itself on the same terms that it 
uses to criticise more obviously universalist theory. If contingency is seen as merely a 
product of a particular historical and social context, then it loses its power of critique 
against opposing beliefs. 
 
Ryu argues that this removes any possible framework for ethical judgment, and, so, 
undermines Rorty’s attempts at presenting a valid conception of liberalism. Norman 
Geras agrees with this conclusion. In his book, Solidarity in the Conversation of 
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Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty (1995), he argues that, 
with no truth, there is no justice.69 If there is no correspondence with reality, then 
redescription can achieve virtually anything.  
 
[I]f we take him at his word on the subject of incommensurable vocabularies or language 
games, of anything being able to be made to look good or bad by means of a redescription, it 
would seem to follow that we lack non-arbitrary ground for distinguishing between better 
views and worse ones.70 
 
Ryu and Geras agree that, if contingency is to be taken seriously then there is no 
perspective from which to view ethics. Rorty’s response to this might again be to 
concede the point, and confirm that he is not interested in attempting a non-circular or 
transcultural justification. However, these criticisms seem to go further, in that they 
question the approach that Rorty actually does take: to look for agreement within the 
context of a society or tradition, and to appeal to the standard of pragmatism.  
 
The first of these might be criticised on the grounds that the ideal of agreement within 
a tradition is an external and arbitrary standard, and, so, conveys no moral value in the 
context of a contingent reality. Rorty might reply that, since morality itself is made up 
of the customs and beliefs of that tradition, using agreement as a moral criterion 
amounts to applying a standard already part of the nature of morality. In this way, the 
general agreement to a moral redescription can act as the benchmark condition for an 
improvement in moral value. Examining the nature of this improvement requires 
looking at the use of pragmatism as part of the redescription’s justification.  
 
It is interesting that Rorty perceives morality in terms of a unity of agreement. Like 
most postmodernists, he strongly supports social criticism, but he sees the proper and 
natural end of such criticism to be the replacement of the current vocabulary implied 
by general agreement. Fellow postmodern thinker Steven Hendley has objected 
sternly to the tendency in Rorty’s work to assume the importance of a singular 
expression of morality and liberalism. Hendley argues that, 
 
[o]nce we are unable to take that universal identification with humanity for granted, we have 
lost the basis for taking ourselves for granted in any sense, no matter how finite. The issue of 
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who we are becomes subject to question in terms of multiple voices that may no longer be 
assumed to share a common interpretive horizon.71 
 
This leads Hendley to conclude that we should think of democracy as “an inherently 
multiple and contested process”.72 In other words, it is wrong for Rorty to conceive of 
the public justification of a moral redescription simply in terms of replacing one 
agreement on a set of principles with another; such a view obscures the plurality of 
voices within a society. Rorty might respond that he is talking of redescriptions within 
a particular group or tradition, rather than a society, but this is not sufficient in that he 
gives no account of how a plurality of groups and group beliefs are to be 
accommodated within a society, and he offers no account of the diversity internal to a 
group or tradition. Normally, a postmodern thinker would be expected to champion 
such diversity of belief, but this seems to be absent in Rorty’s account of agreement.  
 
The other aspect of the justification of redescriptions concerns the criterion of 
pragmatism. According to Rorty, individuals and groups determine contingent moral 
content in order that they should interact with their environment in the most effective 
way. Geras argues that this standard is defective in two ways: 
 
First… there is a plurality of different purposes against which to estimate whether or not any 
theory, belief or language game helps us to cope. Second, even for some one given purpose, it 
would not be credible in view of the rest of what he thinks for him to offer coping in or toward 
that purpose as a logically basic, would-be objective datum. What counts as coping or 
working, as instrumental success, must be also for its part subject to interpretation, to belief-
laden, language-governed understanding.73 
 
Geras argues here that the idea of pragmatism, of interacting with one’s environment 
in the most useful way, is too general to be given any substantive moral direction: it 
offers no direction on what a particular belief must be useful for, and how its 
usefulness is to be understood and interpreted.  
 
Either, Rorty would need to set out a more specific set of rules by which his 
conception of pragmatism could be usefully applied, or, individuals would have to 
inform the pragmatist approach with their own existing beliefs. The former is 
unattractive in that it would make it clear that there are substantive external (and 
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universal) principles being applied in the justification of redescriptions. The latter is 
equally problematic in that it means that the operation of pragmatism itself is 
contingent. This goes against Rorty’s manifest intention that pragmatism is to ground 
and direct the use and evolution of contingent beliefs. Rorty seems in a bind here. He 
attempts to apply a broad, generally acceptable, idea in pragmatism, but it seems 
either to be a universal, external value applied to justify beliefs, or so general to have 
no meaning on its own. Generally, some form of justification of Rorty’s non-
foundational redescription of liberalism is necessary. However, his seems to 
incorporate potentially contestable conceptions: not just of contingency generally, but 
of the societal agreement on pragmatic grounds that implicitly underlies the 
redescription. The latter seems strangely singular and unable to be determined in a 
meaningful way, so that, even if the contingency of liberalism were accepted, the 
value of any particular redescription would be unknowable.  
 
This analysis of Rorty’s approach to liberal justification begins to reveal a tension 
between his two most fundamental conceptions, namely contingency and pragmatism. 
With contingency, all beliefs are simply linguistic expressions that attach to other 
nodes in the web of beliefs and desires that comprise our selves. With contingency 
alone, Rorty could only conclude that any assertion of moral truth or value is flawed 
and that there is no criterion by which to choose and judge a belief other than from the 
perspective of our existing beliefs and desires. Contingency, viewed at the most 
fundamental level, appears to be self-refuting, in that its universal and absolute 
consequences belie its own content. Pragmatism grounds contingency in our 
particular environment, and offers a positive understanding of the way we construct 
our beliefs. It offers a reason why people might choose a redescription of moral 
principles over the previously agreed description. Rorty uses this reasoning in order to 
justify particular redescriptions. This seems to require, either, that pragmatism be 
given more concrete meaning, which is contrary to contingency, or, that it becomes 
contingent itself and, so, offers no more direction than is offered by contingency. 
Within Rorty’s theory there is a curious tension between the postmodern ideal 
expressed by contingency, and the desire for a positive, agreed mode of a liberalism 
that is more than just accidental and arbitrarily justifiable. In the abstract sense, at 




2.3 Ironism and solidarity 
 
The final step in the analysis of Rorty’s postmodern project is to examine his 
conception of liberalism and its justification, with particular reference to the way that 
Rorty employs pragmatism as a justificatory device. His conception consists in the 
relationship between self-creation as ironism, and solidarity as the liberal avoidance 
of cruelty. This relationship is one of equality and incommensurability, and 
corresponds with the division between the private and the public. As has been 
evidenced by earlier chapters, most liberal theories tend to define a space within 
which individuals are free to determine their own way of living. For Rorty this space 
consists of the personal domain, and the nature of the freedom afforded corresponds 
with his conception of ironic self-creation. This approach involves the awareness of 
contingency, even in relation to one’s own beliefs and vocabularies, yet promotes the 
exercise of autonomy in choosing one’s own conception of how to live, and 
challenges the rules inherited from a group, culture or tradition. 
 
The most powerful criticism of this ideal comes from Honi Haber, who focuses on the 
fact that, as Rorty admits, this ironism would be the exclusive domain of the 
intellectual minority who are able to recreate themselves in this way.74 This would 
mean, she argues, the institutionalisation of the intellectual elite, and would have a 
number of disturbing consequences: 
 
Since the public rhetoric cannot be ironist, the youth will have to be brainwashed, the public 
sphere founded upon noble lies. At the level of the public, grand narratives are legitimate – 
even if false – for irony is ‘inherently a private matter’, a skill taught only in the school of the 
privileged elite.75 
 
The public consequences of this private elitism, Haber argues, are far from being 
liberal, and actually reflect Rorty’s personal view of intellectual self-creation. This 
portrayal of Rorty’s position is not entirely fair. He does admit that, in a liberal state, 
non-intellectuals would never be able to be fully-fledged ironists. Such people would, 
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however, intuitively adhere to some basic ironist beliefs: that social and historical 
context is always relevant, and that there is no intrinsic essence to belief.76  
 
This does not defend entirely the claim of elitism, and it raises the question of why 
ironism is the proper focus for a conception of personal freedom. Even if the 
contingency of reality were accepted, it does not automatically follow that personal 
freedom should mean ironic self-creation. A better conception might be of personal 
freedom as traditional freedom, which would place the focus on choosing from within 
the boundaries anticipated by the history and practices of society. In western society 
these boundaries would already be broad, and admit plural and highly varied 
approaches to life. This conception would not exclude radical ironism anyway; it 
would simply place such ironism on the periphery of the concerns of freedom, rather 
than at the centre. Ultimately, the power of ironic self-creation depends on the 
necessarily central importance of ironism.  
 
The second part of Rorty’s liberalism is solidarity, as the liberal avoidance of cruelty 
and humiliation. Rorty’s idea of solidarity as the central concern of the public domain 
is itself troublesome. The nature of the trouble is that the universality with which he 
views solidarity is seemingly at odds with the most basic ideas of contingency, and, in 
particular, with the lack of any conception of a common human nature. Rorty’s basis 
for this is the “claim that we have a moral obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with 
all other human beings”.77 This is not founded upon “the recognition of a core self, 
the human essence, in all human beings”, but, rather, as “the ability to see more and 
more traditional differences… as unimportant when compared with similarities with 
respect to pain and humiliation”.78 So, Rorty’s account of solidarity depends on being 
able to effectively argue that human nature is contingent and constructed, whereas 
human pain and suffering is universal. This is the basis on which morality is mere 
custom, but solidarity is of general human concern. This is exemplified by his claim 
that  
 
you cannot aim at ‘doing what is right’, because you will never know whether you have hit the 
mark. Long after you are dead, better informed and more sophisticated people may judge your 
action to have been a tragic mistake… But you can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and 
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even greater satisfaction of ever more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of 
something nonhuman luring human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting 
more and more human beings into our community – of taking the needs and interests and 
views of more and more diverse human beings into account.79 
 
For Rorty, the proper goal of moral custom is to be inclusive of various diverse 
people, to work to diminish the pain suffered by the included, and to satisfy their 
needs and desires as much as is possible. This claim, he implies, is not a moral or 
customary claim, but is beyond and should direct morality. It is a broadly pragmatic 
expression of how morality can promote the most effective interaction between 
people and their environment.  
 
Geras attacks this account of solidarity by invoking the tension between Rorty’s 
rejection of human nature and his universal conception of human pain: 
 
Is there not something rather implausible about insisting on the communal sources of strong 
solidarity, and insisting at the same time on the irrelevance of the idea of a common humanity 
to the goal of more expansive solidaristic relations?80 
 
In particular, Geras criticises Rorty’s account of us as coreless and contingent selves 
and, then, Rorty’s retraction of this account when he wants to draw some universal 
moral conclusions. This account, he claims, entails that  
 
we are asked to believe… that solidarity nourishes itself, receives its strength and vigour, from 
commonalities which are concrete, palpable, lived; and asked also to believe… that feelings of 
extensive mutual sympathy can be created amongst beings who, of almost infinite plasticity, 
may share with very large numbers of other such beings no common features at all.81 
 
Here Geras explicitly sets Rorty’s idea of the radical plasticity of the coreless self 
against the uniformity of pain, and the feelings of solidarity that this uniformity is 
supposed to be able to engender.  
 
Rorty’s account of solidarity is certainly ingenious: at its centre, solidarity is not 
moral in nature, but pragmatic. It comes not out of our moral intuitions, but, rather, 
the idea that the interaction of people with their environment is most successful when 
public action is taken according to rules that take the pain, desires and needs of others 
into account. On Rorty’s account, morality is the customary expression of this 
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principle, and philosophy may assist in effectively describing it; but, the pragmatic 
foundation of solidarity is beyond both of these social narratives.82  
 
The assertion that there is substantial pragmatic value to solidarity, such that the latter 
should direct a society’s public sphere, is extremely potent, and relies on the 
fundamental nature of pain and humiliation on one side, and the satisfaction of needs 
and desires on the other. But, it is far from being straightforward and unambiguous. 
The ideal of pragmatism is described above as being unworkably broad. Solidarity 
does represent a narrowing of this, but the result remains quite broad. The idea of 
inclusion is relatively definite, but the manner of reducing pain and increasing 
satisfaction is not determined. Presumably, these details would be determined by the 
particular vocabulary and description of solidarity constructed within a society, and 
the corresponding moral principles.  
 
There is certainly a general attraction to this conception of pragmatism, although 
Rorty’s approach suggests that we should be wary of this attraction since it is 
probably based on our customary moral intuitions. What, instead, is important is the 
necessary link between pragmatism in the public sphere and solidarity. The principle 
of inclusion does not seem to be clearly derived from pragmatism in the required way, 
in that an approach based on the concern for people in groups could be pragmatically 
superior depending on social or historical conditions, or existing political institutions 
or beliefs. Perhaps this inclusion depends on the conditions of modern western 
societies, namely the existing technologies available to public and political action, and 
the internal individual and group diversity. 
 
If inclusion shifts from being a universal aspect of solidarity, then what remains is the 
avoidance of pain and the promotion of satisfaction. Policies that best express these 
ideals, Rorty argues, allow people to interact most successfully with their 
environments. On such broad terms, one cannot help but agree, except perhaps to 
recognise that this implies a collectivist perspective that is not inherent in the 
pragmatism itself. It still seems hopelessly broad, however, and it is difficult to see 
how it could be used to justify positively one liberal description over another. Perhaps 
                                                
82
 Rorty, op cit, above note 2, p196. 
 365
this is Rorty’s point in saying that liberalism has no foundations and no non-circular 
justification, but, then, solidarity offers no reason to redescribe. Either, Rorty’s 
solidarity is a positive foundation for his description of liberalism, or, it has no role 
whatsoever in influencing social meaning; either, pain and suffering are 
understandable across individual and group contexts, or, they have whatever meaning 
a group gives to them. If there are no foundations and no non-circular justification to 
liberalism, then Rorty’s liberal ironism has no value in relation to solidarity. 
 
It is this lack of cohesion between solidarity and liberalism that is the greatest 
problem in Rorty’s liberal conception. He wants to use the general and pragmatic 
value of solidarity, but at the same time, keep liberalism contingent and untethered; 
however, he cannot quite manage to achieve both at once. The direction to give up 
“the philosophical search for commonality”, while, at the same time, “noticing the 
similarities” between ourselves and others, turns out to involve too much of a 
contradiction.83 It is this contradiction that underlies the observations of Geras, and 




2.4 Liberal ironism 
 
 
Despite this, Rorty’s particular redescription of liberalism is of interest, as what 
purports to be the best western expression of political solidarity. Rorty’s adoption of 
Shklar’s avoidance of cruelty formula has drawn considerable critical comment. It is 
clear that there are alternative, competing conceptions of liberalism, and that Rorty 
has accepted one as representing the best available description that accords with his 
central commitments to accepting contingency and pragmatism. This assertion has 
been criticised in a number of ways. 
 
Haber, for example, argues that the ideas of cruelty and humiliation are too broad, and 
omit much of what is actually moral. 
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Universal concepts, be they rationality or humiliation, have force only so long as what marks 
us out as being the individuals we are is ignored. They are all, I would argue, politically 
dangerous concepts in that their supposed neutrality always masks a particular, non-universal, 
particular agenda. This is clear in the case of Rorty who blithely defends the institutions of 
western democracies, even they entail oppression, on the grounds that such institutions lesson 
[sic] cruelty and suffering. This is, of course, a naïve view. Whether or not it lessens cruelty 
and suffering is a matter of how those terms are conceived, and if ironism and postmodernism 
politics has anything to teach us it is the infinite variety of such narrative constructions.84 
 
Haber criticises firstly the generality of cruelty and humiliation, in that by themselves, 
these are undefined and potentially obscure a more particular approach. Secondly, she 
infers the poverty of these ideas as expressing the whole of a theory of justice, and 
that it excludes such moral concerns as oppression. Both of these arguments carry 
some weight. Cruelty and humiliation, as used by Rorty, seem to possess little clear 
content. It does seem that he would want to give them something of their normal 
emotional meaning, and, so, distinguish them from other negative moral states such as 
oppression. In picking up on the latter point, Charles Anderson describes cruelty as an 
“extreme and spectacular case”, and argues that liberals must also be concerned with 
“the more workaday and prosaic virtues, with fair dealing and simple justice, with 
arbitrary and capricious authority wherever it exists”.85 It seems that Rorty is 
concerned with acts that are a deliberate affront to individuals’ interests and self-
conceptions, and that amount to abuses of power. These may be, as he claims, the 
worst things that we can do; but what these are supposed to mean, whether other 
values are promoted by liberalism, and what institutions are likely to result, are 
unclear from Rorty’s text. 
 
The final point about Rorty’s account of justice concerns the marriage of liberalism 
and ironism into a single conception. He conceives of liberalism and ironism as 
essential and incommensurable parts of the well-lived, moral life, and that they should 
have ascendancy in the public and private spheres respectively. The separation of a 
sphere that is open and expresses liberal freedom, from a sphere that expresses the 
commitment to liberalism, is a recurrent strategy in liberal theory. It has the effect of 
preventing the openness of liberalism from undermining the liberal message itself. 
Rawls’ conception of the priority of the right over the good, and, later, of the 
separation between public and private, are the best examples of this.  
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Both of these approaches are flawed. The separation of the right and the good, and the 
characterisation of the former as being moral, necessary and singular, and the latter as 
personal, contingent and plural, is doubtful, and brings into question much of the 
project of A Theory of Justice. The public/private division in Political Liberalism is 
more effective in that it does not attempt to make a fundamental distinction about the 
nature of human life and endeavour, but, rather, is supposed only to define a 
liberalism that is acceptable to those who are reasonable. This is an interesting and 
pragmatic approach that is criticised above for drawing too clear a distinction between 
the two, and for presenting the public realm as being too unified.86 
 
Rorty’s distinction between the public and the private, or between self-creation and 
liberalism, is also pragmatic, but in a different sense than that of Rawls’: it is 
supposed to reflect a redescription of human life that engenders the best and most 
effective lives. The standard here is not the acceptability of the resulting system to 
any person or group, but, rather, its pragmatic value. The earlier criticisms of this type 
of liberal approach suggest that this distinction should be closely examined to 
determine whether it can actually perform the role to which it has been assigned. This 
is reflected in the comment of Paul Forster: 
 
To say that public obligations have no automatic no necessary priority over private aspirations 
is not to say, as Rorty does, that they are incommensurable in principle, that they are 
necessarily opposed kinds of goods. Nor is it to say that there must always be a sharp 
distinction between a private ethic of self-creation and a public ethic of mutual 
accommodation. It is only by confusing the dichotomy between the public and the private with 
the philosophical distinction between the contingent and the necessary that Rorty can suggest 
that pragmatists are committed to the political thesis that conceptions of the good life have no 
place in politics and are to be consigned to private life.87 
 
The idea of the contingent and the necessary represents well Rawls’ distinction 
between the good and the right. Forster is arguing that, with his conception of the 
public and private spheres, Rorty perpetrates the same error, in that he draws too 
sharp a distinction between what is personal and non-moral on one hand, and what is 
moral and universal on the other; in other words, that the dualism of self-creation and 
liberal solidarity does not fully mirror the dualism of private and public. 
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This is reflected in Anderson’s criticism of the separation of public and private, and 
with it, “the separation of the spheres of rational criteria and subjective expression, 
knowledge and opinion, public responsibility and personal preference”.88 The 
absolute nature of this separation, Anderson argues, means that Rorty ignores the 
more naturally pragmatic position, that all action is intrinsically public.89 This 
“deprives life of most of its meaning”, by excluding the collaborative and common 
aspects of our personal lives.90 This does seem an effective indictment of Rorty’s 
limitation of self-creation to the private world. Haber sees this as reflecting “an 
unexamined, inherited understanding of human nature as competitive and self 
interested”.91 It is this conception that informs the need to limit ironic self-creation to 
the private sphere, as its influence on politics would be cruel and destructive.92  
 
Both of these accounts suggest that Rorty’s separation of the public and private 
suffers from the same problems as does Rawls’: that the structural separation implied 
is belied by the reality of those conceptions that are sought to be distinguished. Each 
of these distinctions informs a structure that allows liberalism to function. For this 
reason, it seems that Rorty’s cleaving between public and private does not match, in 
the meaningful way implied, the cleaving between self-creation and solidarity, and 
this undermines the conception of liberalism as expressing each in a way that reflects 





Like the liberal developments in the areas of pluralism, political liberalism, public 
reason and multiculturalism, Rorty’s postmodernism implies a position that is 
sensitive to the reasonable contestability of ideas. It is not concerned with the 
diversity of beliefs across a population, but, rather, the nature, substance and power of 
beliefs. Rorty asserts that beliefs are contingent, and not representative of reality.  
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As was suggested in the introductory chapter, an approach that expresses radical 
moral uncertainty has two problems: firstly, that the assertion of non-absoluteness is 
itself absolute and, so, is self refuting; and, secondly, that such uncertainty resists the 
distillation of our diverse circumstances and beliefs into a unified moral and political 
system. The first of these can be levelled squarely against Rorty’s conception of 
contingency. This asserts the radical contextual importance of our appreciation of 
reality, on theory, and on our desires and beliefs. It also means that there is no truth in 
the sense of representing the real or actual situation, and only that which is 
constructed out of our language, and used as a tool to enable use to deal better with 
our environment. It is difficult to see how Rorty can make the assertion of 
contingency without this itself being a constructed and non-foundational idea. The 
latter position is logically flawed, however, in that accepting the contingency of 
contingency implies a higher level, correct understanding of contingency. In addition, 
if contingency is itself contingent, there is no reason, intrinsic to contingency itself, 
for adopting it.  
 
Rorty attempts to overcome the second difficulty with a conception of pragmatism. 
This move tethers our beliefs to our environment according to a general ideal of 
allowing us to live well. There are two problems with such an approach: firstly, there 
is a tension between this tethering of our beliefs and our environment, and the idea 
that contingency means the non-representation of reality; and, secondly, that 
pragmatism as a criterion is too broad to have any useful meaning. In relation to the 
former problem, it seems that pragmatism might act to augment and strengthen the 
idea of contingency, so that beliefs would still be non-representational, but they would 
at least help us to live in the manner of an evolutionary development.93 In this way, 
our beliefs would be useful in relation to our environment, even if they could not 
represent the latter. The problem with this view is that pragmatism implies a 
relationship to our environment that contingency denies. In relation to contingency, 
for example, truth is remade into the expression of intersubjective agreement. This is 
inconsistent with the pragmatic view of truth as being those beliefs that allow us to 
interact with our environment in the most advantageous way.  
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The second problem with pragmatism is that it is not itself sufficiently meaningful to 
direct our understandings or our actions. In a broad sense, it is possible to see that 
having a belief system has general benefit, in allowing complex social structures. It is 
possible to see the benefits of a liberal system on this level; as being better for 
individuals than a non-liberal, authoritarian or state-of-nature society.94 This analysis, 
however, is insufficient to justify a particular conception of liberalism, or liberalism 
as against non-liberal or quasi-liberal systems that feature many of the same general 
benefits. In this sort of comparison, the general idea of pragmatism is too broad and 
too uncertain as a potential source of justification.  
 
It is true that this does not quite accord with Rorty’s own approach of redescription, 
whereby some beliefs and parts of vocabulary are reformed so as to improve an 
existing set of beliefs. In this situation, we would have our foundational and other 
beliefs to direct our judgment of a potential redescription, and, so, to inform the 
application of our pragmatism. The problem with this approach is that, by basing 
pragmatism on our existing beliefs, it begins to lose its meaning; it becomes 
embedded in our contingent viewpoint so that it promotes changes that allow us to 
live better in relation to our existing beliefs. This approach is a coherence conception 
of pragmatism, which presupposes that those beliefs that will be preferred will be 
those that cohere with our other beliefs. As such, it undermines the more general 
Darwinian view of pragmatism that Rorty asserts. 95  
 
This would make it difficult to endorse Rorty’s conception of justice as being the 
equal promotion of self-creation as ironism, and of solidarity as the liberal avoidance 
of cruelty and humiliation. Both of these conceptions carry some value, yet are 
narrow in their meaning: self-creation, and especially ironic self-creation, as an 
expression of personal freedom; and the avoidance of cruelty and suffering as an 
expression of solidarity. The more general difficulties with his theory leave little 
ground on which to justify these ideas, and there is no reason to think that they 
represent a favourable redescription of liberalism, or of justice. As many have 
commented, they seem more an expression of Rorty’s personal beliefs; the idea that 
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we would agree to them reflects his limited conception of what ‘we’, as citizens of 
western democracies, means.96 
 
This failure is unfortunate, as the idea of a radical contingency is quite compelling as 
an expression of moral uncertainty. Perhaps Rorty would do better to begin, not, from 
a universal theory of contingency, but, from contingency as a social fact, in other 
words, to work from the inside out. This would mean that the general theory would be 
the kind of non-foundational theory that Rorty suggests liberalism should be. This 
would make contingency, not a theory of reality and truth, but, rather, a theoretical 
representation of the social existence of doubt. With this approach, contingency 
ceases to be foundational, and takes on the central importance of a socially 
fundamental fact, as reasonable pluralism does for political liberalism, and persistent 
disagreement does for deliberative democracy. This would mean that contingency 
itself is not a truth, but is a reflection of how things seem to be in western societies. 
This entails a more tentative approach than Rorty allows, one more akin to doubt 
about the possibility of absolute truth, than to disbelief.  
 
Such an approach would overcome the argument that contingency is self-refuting, in 
that the assertion of contingency does not itself claim to be absolute. It would also 
allow the possibility of moral and liberal theory that would be justified by the 
interplay of socially accepted norms and criticisms, as well as textual and theoretical 
descriptions of these. This would, most likely, lead to a liberalism that is more openly 
conceived and more dialogical than Rorty allows. This approach would face two 
initial criticisms: that the assertion of contingency, by being non-foundational, 
represents a contestable view of reality, and offers no reason for its own acceptance; 
and, that such an approach is not prescriptive in any way, but, rather, describes the 
process by which moral beliefs and political practices change.  
 
Overall, Rorty’s project of developing a justification of a conception of liberalism that 
is successful, despite being non-theoretical and non-foundational, fails, in a way that 
corresponds to the second difficulty with sceptical theories, that of finding agreement 
in the context of uncertainty. To the extent that it draws substantive content from 
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pragmatism, it becomes foundational and universal; and, to the extent that it does not, 
it can be justified only by the agreement of western liberal citizens, who might as 
readily subscribe to some other liberal or political ideal. The possible reply, that such 
people should accept the contingent nature of reality as a fundamental part of their 
belief systems, is not justified by the idea of contingency itself. 
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9. FREEDOM AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
1. Contemporary liberal theory 
 
1.1 Approach of thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine contemporary liberal theory from the perspective 
of moral uncertainty. In order to explicate the requirements of this perspective, the 
introduction considered three significant approaches to moral theory that embody 
some form of moral scepticism or doubt. The ideas of Protagoras, Bertrand Russell 
and Jean-François Lyotard offer various expressions of this moral uncertainty. 
Despite the cursory way in which their different understandings of moral theory are 
presented, it is clear from them that moral uncertainty is a complex moral position 
that cannot be defined by one proposition or principle. The general themes that are 
taken from the work of these three philosophers are: firstly, a doubt as to the 
possibility of universally justifiable moral theories; secondly, the contestability of 
alternative and conflicting moral judgments, which the application of rational analysis 
cannot solve; thirdly, the inherent complexity of moral positions, which resists 
attempts to be reduced to a meaningful theoretical structure; and, finally, the 
contingency of moral positions, meaning their dependence on their socio-historical 
context, and on the personal beliefs of particular theorists.  
 
The approach of examining liberal theories from the perspective of this uncertainty 
requires that they are analysed in order to discern whether and how these particular 
arguments apply. In this way, the theories are implicitly viewed as responses to moral 
uncertainty; as attempts to accommodate or overcome these arguments. The approach 
I have often taken is to set out the justifications and structures of particular theories in 
their entirety, before examining them critically. This has the virtues of allowing the 
theories to be viewed as potentially coherent wholes, of allowing complex arguments 
that are relevant to multiple aspects of the theory to be presented, and of initially 
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taking a theory on its own terms. The idea here is that this process involves expressing 
and, in a sense, building a theory, so as to best reveal its strengths and weaknesses. In 
performing this task, the initial analysis focuses on the universal aims and 
justificatory strategy of particular theories, but also covers their substantive processes 
and prescriptive principles and institutions. The latter substantive aspect cannot be 
excluded from this analysis; although the aims and justifications of these theories are 
more directly relevant to issues of moral uncertainty, their substance and prescription 
are expressions of these justifications from which they cannot be meaningfully 
separated. They are also the locations of many of the problems of these theories, 
relative to moral uncertainty.   
 
Many contemporary liberal theories have been canvassed using this method. These 
theories, and the approach the thesis takes to organise them, fall into two separate 
periods, which could be labelled as early and post-communitarian. Early 
contemporary liberal theory is the subject of the first three substantive chapters. It 
includes Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, Nozick’s libertarian response in Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia, and the more egalitarian work that followed, from Dworkin and 
Ackerman. Here, the work of each thinker is considered in turn. For Rawls, Nozick 
and Ackerman, this task is structurally straightforward, as each has a single work that 
presents their conception of liberalism. In contrast, Dworkin’s theory is scattered 
among a number of essays. These have been approached chronologically, and some of 
the development in his thought has been considered. 
 
The post-communitarian period of contemporary liberal theory occurs later than the 
earlier period, beginning in the early-mid 1980s. This period is characterised by a 
shift in approach away from the earlier works: from the construction of liberal 
structures by hypothetical situations that pare away morally irrelevant or arbitrary 
details, to the examination of the nature of difference and belief within western 
societies. These changes reflect doubts about the earlier approach, many of which 
were prompted by the communitarian criticisms that were central to liberal political 
theory during the 1980s. These later theories are organised into groups of particular 
approaches. They cover conceptions of liberalism that hold various ideals or 
principles to be liberalism’s central concern, and deal with, pluralism, political 
liberalism, public reason, multiculturalism, and postmodernism.  
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The final task of this thesis, addressed in these concluding remarks, is to draw 
together the points learned about how various contemporary liberal theories respond 
to moral uncertainty, to find those approaches that represent potentially valuable 
liberal conceptions, and to anticipate possible future shifts that would achieve and 
develop this potential. 
 
 
1.2 Early contemporary liberal theory 
 
Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, shows considerable awareness of the challenges of 
moral uncertainty. This is suggested by the limitations imposed on its justificatory 
process, namely that his conception of justice as fairness is compared with a number 
of potential alternatives, rather than being presented as the best conception if justice. 
It is most obvious in relation to the method of justification itself. Rawls’ theory does 
not derive his two principles directly from human nature, or from any absolute 
conception of reality, but, rather, from the considered intuitions of his readers. The 
latter are supposed to consider the conditions of the original position and the two 
principles that result, and to find an equilibrium between their moral judgments of 
both.  
 
This idea holds considerable attraction, in the way it works from our own moral 
beliefs, yet attempts to meld these with a carefully structured theoretical system. This 
approach is engaging enough to overcome the criticism that intuitive beliefs do not 
accurately reflect objective moral value, and, so, cannot achieve the view from 
eternity for which he aims. Closer examination of the structure of the theory, 
however, reveals that Rawls’ reliance on reasonable and rational judgment is 
considerable, and means that, while Rawls has presented a plausible conception of 
justice, he has not acknowledged the plausibility of alternative positions and ideals. 
This is most obvious in relation to the derivation of the difference principle from the 
original position: commentators who are not as egalitarian as Rawls consistently show 




Another form of this plausible, but contestable, content concerns the conceptions of 
the person and of goods that are implied by the original position. These serve to 
inform Rawls’ theory with individualistic, humanistic and recognisably liberal 
meaning that is presupposed rather than justified. The presence of these forms of 
contestable content serves to undermine Rawls’ approach in that it implies a bias that 
undermines his justificatory aims.  
 
The organising principle that structures much of the content in A Theory is the priority 
of the right over the good. In order to justify this relationship, Rawls employs a 
contrast between liberty and right on one hand, and the desirability of increasing 
aggregate welfare on the other.1 This account oversimplifies and obscures our moral 
lives: its characterisation of the right as liberty and morality, and as being singular, 
universal, and rationally appreciable; and, its characterisation of the good as welfare 
and personally held conceptions of how to live, and as being diverse and morally 
secondary, is flawed. The weakness of this priority brings into question much of 
Rawls’ theory, from the exclusion of the knowledge of one’s conception of the good 
from the original position, to the priority of the liberty over the difference principle. A 
Theory of Justice is a theoretically ingenious attempt at justifying a liberal conception 
of justice, and its position at the forefront of recent liberal theory is undeniable. 
Despite this, its project is undermined by its plausible, but contested, content, and by 
the flawed conception of the right and the good. 
 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is known as Nozick’s libertarian response to Rawls’ 
egalitarianism, but the two share many structural elements. The most obvious is the 
hypothetical narrative Nozick employs to get from the state of nature to the minimal 
state, but not further. This approach, however, uses a legitimacy standard that 
expresses an approach quite different from that of Rawls. The natural rights that 
Nozick employs are not justified by reference to people’s considered moral 
judgments, but, rather, Nozick declares that they are universal and cannot be 
abrogated. He imagines that they stem from what makes humans lives morally 
meaningful, but his justificatory explanation of this is wholly inadequate. For this 
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reason, his theory fails to vindicate these rights as being morally incontestable, and 
ignores many of the potential complexities that exist in the moral sphere in which the 
rights operate. Despite the deftness with which Nozick builds the minimal state from 
the state of nature without breaching these natural rights, the system is undermined by 
the legitimacy of the rights themselves. 
 
A comparison of the approaches of Nozick and Rawls is a potentially fertile exercise. 
Although the two reach disparate distributional outcomes, their approaches have 
much in common. Both are based on deontological premises, so that each defines a set 
of rights that are morally prior to considerations of welfare. For Rawls, this is 
achieved through the original position, but, ultimately, this mirrors the priority of the 
right over the good. Nozick’s natural rights define this moral priority. Both of these 
approaches are plausible, and appeal to particular intuitions. However, the two 
represent clearly different liberal ideals, and this difference itself suggests a rational 
contestability that neither theory answers adequately.  
 
The work of both Dworkin and Ackerman represents a return to egalitarian 
conceptions of liberalism, although both take different approaches to that of Rawls. 
Dworkin identifies the core liberal value as being an equal concern and respect for all 
people. He argues that such equality should be as neutral between particular 
conceptions of the good as possible. He justifies this conception primarily by 
suggesting that it satisfies those features that we would expect would attach to the 
legitimate liberal core, namely that: it represents authentic liberal intuitions; it is 
sufficiently compete; it is distinct from other liberal conceptions; and, it is expressed 
in an abstract and general way.2 In the absence of a clear and realistic way of 
achieving a universally justifiable conception of liberalism, Dworkin settles for 
identifying in his conception those qualities that he would expect to find in the 
legitimate liberal core. This approach is more modest than those of Rawls and Nozick; 
it seems reasonable, although Dworkin would open himself up to criticisms of these 
virtues, and to accounts of different approaches that seem to satisfy them equally well. 
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Dworkin’s more significant contribution to liberal theory is in his attempts to 
characterise the social and institutional meaning of equal concern and respect. His 
inquiries lead him to reject welfare measures of income and, instead, to embrace 
resource equality. This equality is given substance from his hypothetical narrative of 
shipwreck victims, using the auction and insurance devices. The auction, and the 
requirement that the outcome satisfies the envy test, so that no person envies the 
bundle of any other person, is manifestly equal. The subsequent operation of the 
insurance market, however, never quite functions in the way that Dworkin intends. 
Instead, it seems that individuals would, conceivably, take out a different level of 
insurance than he suggests. The operation of the insurance market seems not to reflect 
adequately an outcome of equality in every situation. Dworkin imbues those acting in 
the hypothetical insurance market with impulses that they need not have necessarily. 
Furthermore, he fails to account for the full complexity of distributional 
circumstances, and what this demands of a complete conception of equality, as well as 
the complexity of moral principles that are potentially relevant to these diverse 
circumstances.  
 
Dworkin’s attempts spawned a substantial literature that aims at searching for a 
morally universal and complete expression of distributive equality. These embody 
approaches to and conceptions of equality that are varied and sophisticated. The brief 
discussion of these suggests, however, that none has managed to overcome the 
complexities of distributional moral concerns; and that, like Dworkin, none has 
managed to justify their own equality conception as being the true liberal core, the 
legitimate central concern of liberal theory.  
 
Like Dworkin, Ackerman is interested in the role of neutrality and equality in liberal 
theory, but his focus rests much more firmly on the former than the latter. He also 
employs a hypothetical narrative, focusing on a group of people reaching a new 
world; and, he is primarily concerned with the distributive outcome of the resulting 
dialogue. The key principle that directs that dialogue is of neutrality: that no-one can 
justify their claim to more than equality by reference to the superiority of their 
conception of the good, or of themselves. This limitation on dialogue, he argues, leads 
to the result that no person can validly claim more than anyone else. The neutrality 
principle is, in effect, Ackerman’s attempt to devise a rule that is morally valuable and 
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open, in the sense that it is not biased in favour of any person’s personal interests, and 
that leads to a definite distributive outcome.  
 
Ackerman, however, cannot achieve the neutral result for which he aims. The idea is 
that a distribution of resources is moral if it is insensitive to personal beliefs and 
goals, and, so, does not advantage or disadvantage any individual. This approach fails 
because Ackerman’s principle is not neutral in the way that he desires; rather, it works 
from the baseline of a material equality, which may, in many ways, be fair, but is not 
neutral in the way he desires. Neutrality offers no reason to prefer, in Dworkin’s 
terms, this form of resource equality to a utility-based measure of welfare equality. It 
seems that any expression of equality implies particular moral values, and that no 
particular, concrete expression can avoid the problem of contestability. Even if 
Ackerman’s expression of equality succeeds, it is questionable whether the focus of 
justice should be on justifying as neutral a particular material distribution. Such an 
approach excludes other potentially relevant liberal concerns, such as the Rawlsian 
focus on matters of liberty and the right.  
 
Ackerman’s final contribution to recent liberal theory concerns his approach to 
justification. Liberalism, he argues, does not stand on one universal foundation, but, 
rather, is reached by various paths in a philosophical debate. Each of these is strong 
enough to support an adherence to liberal ideas, but they are also complementary. 
They respond to issues surrounding the corrosiveness of power, the doubt as to the 
right and good, the need to respect individuals’ autonomous conceptions of the good, 
and the scepticism provoked by the attachment of moral meaning to our beliefs and 
desires. In many ways, Ackerman seems to bridge the early and the post-
communitarian liberal theory, and this is most obvious in relation to his promotion of 
dialogue, both as the subject and as the justification of liberal theory, and in his 
presentation of an argument for liberalism that is more open to difference. 
Unfortunately, this dialogical and multi-stranded approach to justifying liberalism is 
not supported by an adequate meta-ethical explanation of these plural paths to 
liberalism and the role of dialogue in reaching a true conception of justice.  
 
In general, these early contemporary liberal conceptions aim at universal 
justifications, but fail in that they build structures that contain, implicitly, the values 
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and ideals that they are attempting to justify. Each employ particular priorities or 
focuses that are mistakenly perceived to be of fundamental significance to justice. 
Rawls’ priority of the right over the good, Nozick’s natural rights, Dworkin’s equal 
concern and respect, and Ackerman’s neutrality principle are all engaging and 
plausible moral doctrines, but each presupposes what the respective thinkers should 
be justifying, and ignores the contestability and the complexity that characterises the 
domains in which they operate.  
 
 
1.3 Post-communitarian liberal theory 
 
Communitarians criticise the bias in liberal theory, expressed in implicit conceptions 
of the self or the good, and in the general enlightenment approach to moral theory. 
These criticisms were important to the development of liberalism, and engendered a 
number of shifts in approach. Perhaps the two most significant of these were, firstly, 
the move to treat difference within a society as being central to the justification of 
liberal theory and, secondly, the move to contextualise these justifications so that they 
are relevant to contemporary or western societies. Both of these can be seen as not 
just acknowledging moral contestability and complexity, but as finding, in some form 
of this uncertainty, the source of the power of liberalism. In other words, such theories 
seek to show that, for our western societies at least, the diversity of rationally 
irreducible thoughts and beliefs leads one to favour liberal values and institutions.  
 
The clearest expression of this effective reversal in liberal justification is to be found 
in those conceptions that place pluralism at the centre of the liberal matrix. The 
theories of Walzer and Raz represent the first moves towards this position. Walzer’s 
principle of the separation between spheres of justice turns out not to have the power 
that he ascribes to it, but his focus on the importance of the social understanding of 
goods, and the contextual nature of his justification, are both engaging moves in 
liberal theory. His use of social meaning draws the criticism that he is merely 
interested in what our beliefs and values are, rather than what the content of a 
conception of justice should be. This argument is not entirely effective, in the sense 
that Walzer is searching for an expression of justice that acknowledges and is 
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informed by the social context and meaning of those goods that are its subject. 
Despite this, he offers no adequate account of how justice is to be drawn out of this 
meaning, and his own attempts to do so seem to reflect his personal moral beliefs.  
 
Raz adopts a contextual account that identifies autonomy as the value of western 
society that is central to justice. He argues that the implementation of liberalism 
necessarily involves perfectionism, the promotion of a particular conception, or set of 
conceptions, of the good. This, however, does not mean that only some ways of life 
are permitted in a liberal society, but, rather, that certain repugnant ideals are 
excluded. This approach leaves open a space within which minimally liberal citizens 
can express a plurality of incommensurable forms of life. This acceptance of 
pluralism, of the inability to rationally determine between different conceptions of the 
good, sets the landscape within which individuals can exercise their autonomy. There 
are two principal problems with Raz’s approach: firstly, that this autonomy does not 
cohere logically with his perfectionist approach; and, secondly, that the central value 
of autonomy is justified only in a contextual way. Raz needs to make the value of 
autonomy, and the restrictive effect of his perfectionism on autonomy, cohere; if the 
former is central to justice, then the seeming priority of perfectionism needs to be 
explained.  
 
Contextual justifications represent an important post-communitarian approach to 
liberal justification. Theories, like that of Raz, that draw on a particular element of 
contemporary western society, need to offer a historical and sociological account of 
this element. This must be sufficient to ground its importance in the resulting theory. 
This sort of justificatory strategy is disconcerting in that it chooses a particular feature 
from the normative complexity of a diverse society. Raz’s approach of championing 
the western value of autonomy is subject to these criticisms, and, consequently, its 
place as the central liberal value seems contestable. A better approach to contextual 
justification is to identify, as the relevant feature of western society, a diversity and 
plurality of values. This is a feature of Gray’s post-liberalism, and has the advantage 
of reflecting, fairly, the normative complexity of western society.  
 
Gray’s justification of western liberalism rests on its promotion of diversity, and 
western freedoms and autonomy. Unfortunately, he offers no argument as to why the 
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fact of pluralism should mean the moral value of increasing diversity. Although 
diversity might indicate that legitimate pluralism has been allowed to develop, this 
does not mean that liberal states should actively promote diversity. In addition, the 
contention that western liberalism promotes western liberal freedoms holds little 
moral value, and seems only to express the idea that commonly held conceptions of 
justice should be relevant to the system of justice. As such, it suffers from many of the 
same contextuality issues as Raz’s autonomy. However, these issues are not as 
pronounced, since these values are secondary to pluralism in Gray’s system. 
 
Gray’s own thinking developed from the post-liberal position, on the grounds that 
such an approach does not fully express social pluralism, and, in fact, entails some 
liberal limitations on expressions of human flourishing. This idea mirrors the 
pluralism of Kekes, who argues that the overridingness of particular liberal values 
contradicts the full acceptance of the pluralism of values. His analysis is limited, in 
the sense that his focus is on the earlier liberal theories, which all tend to have 
substantive, singular focuses. He ignores, therefore, liberalism that is founded on 
social difference. He also fails to acknowledge the close affinity between liberalism 
and pluralism; that the freedoms that are central to liberalism allow and engender real 
value pluralism.  
 
This affinity forms the central argument of liberal pluralism. Galston conceives of a 
thoroughgoing value pluralism that defines the nature and shape of moral value. He 
then raises the presumption that, since coercion is contrary to the rational 
incommensurability of pluralism, the state should not interfere with an individual 
pursuing their own conception of human flourishing. This presumption, however, is 
not a general moral rule that can be drawn wholly from the recognition of pervasive 
value pluralism. Instead, it depends on assumptions about how this conception of 
pluralism is applied between individuals, and, also, on the presumption that this 
occurs in a conflict-free environment. Both of these points mean that something more 
than value pluralism is required in order to justify a general presumption against 
interference. This is a general problem of liberal pluralism, that the fact of pluralism, 
itself, does not necessarily imply a particular moral response. Instead, some other 
moral value, such as respect or autonomy, is required in order to get from pluralism to 
liberal principles. This result is not restricted to liberalism, but applies, also, to the 
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purportedly purer forms of ethical pluralism suggested by Kekes and the later Gray. 
The requirement of additional moral value presents a particular problem for Galston. 
This is because any additional moral content conflicts with the assertion of a 
fundamental incommensurability between moral positions. In other words, his 
presumption against a state imposing particular value judgments, seems to actually 
require such judgments as part of its justification.  
 
Pluralistic approaches to liberalism suffer from a major difficulty, namely, that of 
getting from a fundamental expression of irreducible difference, to a singular, definite 
conception of liberalism, in a way that is relevant across contemporary western 
society. In this way it, such attempts must face both the moral contestability implied 
by a particular account of pluralism, and the social and moral complexity that 
characterises a pluralistic society: the former suggests that, if values are plural and 
incommensurable, then liberal values should not be preferred; and the latter 
emphasises that difference is not easily reduced to unity. The various criticisms that 
stand against the above theories are, either, particular expressions of this general 
problem, or, are closely related to it.  
 
Political liberalism also works from the fact of pluralism, but operates in a different 
way. Its basis is the separation between the political and the personal, where liberal 
values are prominent in the domain of the former, and in the use of public reason to 
overcome disagreement in the political sphere. The point of Rawls’ political 
liberalism is to justify a liberal approach to those western people who are reasonable, 
in that they adhere to a democratic political culture, and are willing to co-operate with 
others in the political sphere. This means the setting aside, or, at least, the 
downplaying, of their personal comprehensive beliefs in order to achieve an effective 
political agreement. The power of this approach is expressed in the nature of its 
contextual justification. This is not limited to western societies, but, rather, to the 
reasonable members of these societies; in other words, to those who are already 
predisposed to western democracy and who desire political cooperation and 
effectiveness. This, however, should not be read to include only those who are already 
liberal; instead it includes those who hold various, divergent personal beliefs, 
providing that they also hold reasonable political beliefs, and are willing to accept that 
their personal beliefs will not direct their society’s political process. The power of 
 384
political liberalism, then, is the justification of liberalism to reasonable, democratic 
citizens.  
 
Rawls’ expression of this approach, however, does suffer from a number of 
difficulties. His rejection of philosophy and metaphysics is relevant in that he is 
presenting a theory that is based on a political pragmatism on the part of those who 
are willing to subscribe to it. This cannot, however, deny the importance of the 
theoretical nature of Rawls’ description of political liberalism, nor the relevance of 
the truth of its various assertions to its justification. This general point aside, Rawls’ 
system is based on the separation of the political and the comprehensive, and his 
conception of reasonableness. The former plays much the same role as does the 
priority of the right over the good in his earlier work: it separates the space within 
which we are free to adopt and act upon our own beliefs, from that which comprises 
and results in liberalism. The latter excludes from consideration those who do not 
meet its requirements. This is problematic for Rawls in that his project depends on the 
exclusion of those who do not agree with it, and a justification of this, as well as an 
explanation of how it would work in a diverse society. In addition, Rawls’ own 
conception is too strict in that it includes recognition of the ‘burdens of judgment’, 
which would effectively exclude many of those who should be an active part of the 
politically liberal state.  
 
Political liberalism attempts to overcome the bias implicit in earlier liberal theories by 
acknowledging it, and limiting its justification accordingly. There are doubts, 
however, as to whether an overlapping political consensus would actually result, and 
what value this would have, given the exclusion of the unreasonable. As with the 
distinction between the right and the good, Rawls assumes that there is enough in the 
meaning of the political to build an effective consensus, and that the conception of the 
reasonable is broad enough to make that consensus meaningful. Rawls’ approach 
seems to fail, in its characterisation of the political, and its definition of 
reasonableness, but the approach of political liberalism seems an engaging attempt at 
a contextual and pragmatic liberal justification.  
 
Larmore’s expression of political liberalism is itself interesting, particularly since he 
embraces moral theory, and actually founds his system on three sources of moral 
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complexity that are often ignored or downplayed. In relation to the substance of his 
theory, he more clearly identifies the values that underlie his justification of political 
liberalism than does Rawls. These include, in particular, rational dialogue and equal 
respect. He argues in favour of a conception of neutral political neutrality, but this 
depends heavily on the distinction between the right and the good, and on the 
retreating to neutral ground which, even if effective, could lead to disturbing results. 
Larmore’s focus on the values that draw political liberalism from reasonable 
pluralism helps to explicate the source of the substantive principles of the former. In 
this way, he opens political liberalism up to the claim of plural and contestable value, 
instead of relying on the claims of a common democratic culture.  
 
It is this contestability of the public domain that informs Gaus’ criticism of political 
liberalism, and his preference for placing public reason at liberalism’s core. It is in the 
face of persistent moral agreement, rather than as to conceptions of the good, that 
Gutmann and Thompson recommend an approach of public reason through 
deliberative democracy. They set out a process of political dialogue that engenders the 
working-through of moral disagreement. While more a theory of liberal democracy 
than of liberalism, their approach does raise a number of important issues with liberal 
conceptions of public reason: the tension between substantive liberal values, and the 
open content of the political dialogue; the difficult relationship between dialogue and 
political theory; and, the role and effect of the dialogical process.  
 
Gaus’ theory, in contrast, has a clearly liberal flavour. His central contention is that 
coercive state action is legitimate when it is justifiable to the person who is to be 
coerced. This does not mean that actual justification is required, but, rather, represents 
a complex epistemological standard by which a belief is superior to an existing belief 
for that person. This approach is supposed to reflect a liberal core, while allowing that 
liberalism can take on various political expressions. The problem with this process is 
that coercive moves lead to inconclusive justificatory outcomes. In many of these 
cases, a democratic umpire can be used to determine the outcome, but this approach 
seems to undermine the very concept of public justification. The underlying difficulty 
is that, in practical terms, political agreement is not a realistic outcome of public 
political reason. Particular limitations can be applied to minimise the disagreement, 
such as are used by Rawls and Gutmann and Thompson.  
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These, however, will never be able to remove disagreement completely, and are more 
in the nature of devices that focus the dialogue on particular issues and remove 
morally irrelevant concerns. This leaves the public reason theorist with an irreducible 
disagreement in the domain of the political, and it is at this point that democratic tools 
are often employed to break the deadlock. While public reason performs a very 
powerful role in shifting complexity and contestability from the theoretical to the 
political realm, public reason theories must be able to deal with this disagreement in a 
way that is itself moral, and is consistent with the remainder of the theory. This is one 
of the justificatory challenges of a public reason conception of liberalism, along with 
the requirements of showing that the particular approach to justification is morally 
legitimate, and that public justification itself is central to liberal justice. Gaus’ 
approach represents an enterprising attempt at satisfying these, but, ultimately, he fails 
to argue convincingly that his political process will reach outcomes that are morally 
valuable.  
 
Multicultural demands for recognition represent a significant challenge for liberal 
theory. They imply that its individualistic focus means that difference-blind liberalism 
is inadequate to deal with cultural minorities in a just way. The typical liberal defence 
to this claim is that the ability to deal with pluralism is an essential aspect of 
liberalism. Within a Rawlsian framework, an individual’s cultural adherence is 
expressed through their freedom to associate and to determine their own conception of 
the good. The multicultural reply is that this approach does not treat minority groups 
fairly, in that the decisions and assumptions that states make tend to favour the 
majority culture over the minority, especially given the nature of the relationship 
between individuals and their cultures. This argument is valid in that liberalism is 
expressed in particular political and institutional forms that tend to assume default 
membership in the majority culture. This point is deepened by the idea that liberal 
bias and contextual liberal justifications could both favour majority over minority 
cultures.  
 
The need of liberalism to incorporate multicultural values raises the difficulty of 
recognising rights that do not apply equally to every individual. Approaches to this 
can, either, append group rights to existing liberal structures, or, change the very 
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conception of liberalism to one that is more sensitive to cultural difference. 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship typifies the former approach. In it, he makes 
autonomy- and equality-based arguments for granting rights of fair accommodation to 
immigrant groups, and rights of self-government to national minorities. In relation to 
national minorities, he observes that one’s societal culture gives meaning to the 
exercise of autonomy, so that the adequate exercise of autonomy requires that the 
state maintain and promote such cultures. In addition, because of the cultural bias 
inherent in particular government decisions, equal treatment actually requires that 
minority cultures are treated differently than majorities. This approach raises two 
difficulties: firstly, that Kymlicka’s conception of societal culture is monolithic, and 
ignores the potentially plural nature of our cultural adherence, as well as the 
interactions and interdependence between cultures; and, secondly, that he restricts the 
operation of liberal cultural bias to a small number of government decisions, when it 
might apply to the operation of liberalism generally. Both of these raise doubts about 
the cogency of Kymlicka’s multicultural liberal structure.  
 
The theories of Tully and Parekh reach beyond normal liberal conceptions, and 
attempt to build a truly multicultural conception of justice. Both argue in favour of an 
intercultural dialogue that is political, and for a parallel dialogue between liberalism 
and other political values and traditions. For Tully, the history of constitutionalism 
shows a bias against diversity, especially cultural diversity. His response to this 
incorporates a complex conception of culture that emphasises internal diversity, and 
the interdependence of cultures. It is based on a respect for the success of a culture or 
tradition, in terms of the continued adherence of its members, and results in a system 
that promotes diversity and the acceptance of difference. The obvious problems with 
this result relate to: Tully’s definition of culture, which gives so central a place to 
cultural interaction that it loses sight of the strong relationship between individual and 
culture; and to, the difficult criticism concerning his failure to conceive of culture 
itself as being a culturally contingent notion.  
 
Parekh, in contrast, emphasises that there exists a shared humanity that is mediated by 
culture. As with Tully, he presents a complex conception of culture, which includes 
variations in the nature of cultural attachment. He also applies the value of diversity to 
justify the intercultural dialogue, and emphasises the importance of being reminded 
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that the approaches of others are as valid as one’s own. Parekh claims to move beyond 
liberalism, but the rules and principles that inform his dialogical approach seem 
remarkably liberal. In all, both of these theorists can be seen as endorsing a 
multicultural liberalism that does not simply hold liberal values as primary, but, 
rather, incorporates both liberal and multicultural concerns into their systems. The 
most significant contribution of multiculturalism to liberal theory is the realisation 
that there is a cultural dimension to liberalism: that particular liberal expressions of 
justice are founded on and informed by their cultural context; and, that difference-
blind liberalism is not adequate to ensure that liberalism treats equally the members of 
minority and majority cultures. Multicultural demands identify the cultural component 
of issues of moral contestability, and challenge theories that are implicitly unifying, or 
that depend on agreement within a society.  
 
The final form of liberalism relates to postmodernism. There are few postmodern 
attempts at liberalism, perhaps because of the reticence of postmodernists to engage in 
the promotion of substantive moral theories. This field is dominated by the work of 
Rorty, and his theory of ironic liberalism. Rorty declares the unavoidable contingency 
of self, of society and of truth. The latter, he argues, is not found and recognised, but 
is constructed out of the vocabulary of a particular linguistic community. Rorty’s 
liberalism is not derived directly from this contingency, but, rather, is non-
foundational. It is based on western moral and political values, and the pragmatic idea 
that people will adopt a description of liberalism that will allow them to interact with 
their environment in the most effective way. From these concerns, he devises a 
liberalism that represents equality between ironic self-creation in the private sphere, 
and the avoidance of cruelty and humiliation in the public, political sphere. As an 
explicitly sceptical liberalism, however, Rorty’s conception faces two difficulties: that 
the statement of contingency will be self-refuting, in the sense that it is itself non-
contingent; and that getting from contingency to a particular expression of liberalism 
will prove difficult. To the first difficulty, Rorty has no adequate response. His 
approach to the second is to eschew a direct link between contingency and liberalism; 
but, this makes it difficult for him to assert his conception of liberalism as being 
superior to any other. He relies on pragmatism and on the seeming universality of 
solidarity and ironism, but these seem to be both contrary to contingency, and too 




2. Responding to moral uncertainty 
These theories of liberal justice all seem to represent failures, in one form or another, 
as responses to moral uncertainty. In particular, their justifications seem inadequate to 
establish the distinctive value of a conception over its alternatives, and their 
conceptions do not seem to fully reflect the complexities of our moral and social lives. 
This is not to say that all are without value: they serve to deepen our understanding of 
liberal morality and of liberal political practice; they offer engaging conceptions and 
arguments as to what liberalism means and how it might be manifested; and, they 
present particular values and approaches that, by virtue of their expression, we might 
choose to adopt as our own beliefs. The point is that none of these liberal theories 
amounts to a conception of liberalism that we could recognise as being its best 
expression, and that none is successful in meeting its own aims. The task for this 
thesis is to look at some general ways in which these theories collectively respond to 
moral uncertainty, and, then, at possible future directions for liberal theory.  
 
 
2.1 Liberal duality 
 
 
Liberal theory functions by defining a liberal space, within which individuals are able 
to choose what to believe and how to live. Of course, any political theory necessarily 
defines freedom for its citizens, whether explicitly or implicitly, but the difference is 
that for liberalism this space is its central focus; it is central to liberalism that people 
enjoy a substantial freedom. No theory of liberalism, however, can allow people a 
total freedom of choice. Such an approach would, either, reflect a free-for-all similar 
to a state of nature, or, could contravene the limitations and conflicts inherent in any 
situation over which a conception of justice is to be imposed. Particular conceptions 
of liberalism are differentiated, not by the fact of liberal space, but, by the nature of 
that space. This nature is defined by the characteristics of the theory itself: its ideals, 
values and principles. These convey the nature of the freedom afforded to people, and 
its limitations. This means that, as has been suggested at several points in this thesis, 
liberalism is, in an important sense, both open and closed: open, with respect to the 
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freedom that it champions, and closed, in that this freedom implies particular ideals 
and, so, limitations on freedom. 
 
This suggests a fundamental conflict inherent in liberal theory, between its openness 
and closedness: between the idea of a legitimate diversity of beliefs, preferences and 
actions, and the agreement of beliefs required to justify the characteristics of a 
particular liberal conception. Rawls’ original approach to resolving this was to apply 
the fundamental moral distinction between the right and the good to reflect these 
different, open and closed, parts of liberalism. The system that this expresses reflects 
the essential beauty of liberalism: that we could all recognise our own conceptions of 
the good as being contestable, and, so, could agree to allow each of us to choose and 
live our own conceptions. The latter point informs the essence of the liberal meaning 
of the right: the rational agreement to allow diversity and freedom in relation to the 
good, which is itself moral and universal. Such a system, however, does not survive 
close scrutiny. The characterisation of the good as necessarily being morally inferior 
is not easily sustainable; and, the principle of the right is too broad to specify 
particular liberal principles, and so Rawls adds various moral ideas of equality and 
liberty. In doing so, Rawls ignores the moral contestability of many of these ideas, 
and assumes, mistakenly, that there would be agreement in the original position, and 
as to his proposed reflective equilibrium. More generally, his approach does not seem 
to reflect the complexity of moral issues of the right and the good. 
 
This pattern pervades much of contemporary liberal theory. The idea of ‘conceptions 
of the good’ itself is common, and indicates those sets of beliefs we hold that are 
accepted as being individual, contingent and contestable, in the manner of personal 
preferences rather than the recognition of universal truth. It is used to carve out an 
area of legitimate diversity, and, by definition, to separate it from the universality on 
which the theory itself is founded and justified. In terms of other early contemporary 
liberal theories, equality means that each person is given an equal opportunity to 
choose and pursue their own conception of the good, and neutrality means that the 
coercive action taken by states will not be sensitive to particular conceptions of the 
good. Both of these imply a respect for the choice of conception, but both can be 
criticised for requiring additional substantive and contestable moral content, and for 
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readily distinguishing these matters of the good from the moral matters that actually 
inform the particular conception of liberal justice.  
 
This analysis could also be applied to difference-based forms of liberalism. The shift 
in approach that is implied by this group of theories means that the difference itself 
tends to be conceived more generally than with the earlier approaches, and it takes on 
a new justificatory role, but the basic analysis is still relevant. For value pluralism, for 
example, the conception of pluralism defines the diversity, and the 
incommensurability between values makes this diversity legitimate. From the 
perspective of the duality between the openness and closedness of liberalism, this 
approach faces two problems: that the liberal structure is not necessarily implied by 
pluralism, and, instead, is merely one among many possible responses; and, that the 
values that underlie the particular response that the approach prescribes cannot easily 
be distinguished from those values that are the subject of the pluralism. 
 
Resolution of this tension demands that a liberal conception be justified on terms that 
are separate from the realm of legitimate diversity. Because liberalism of this form is 
moral in nature, justification requires the promotion of particular moral values. Even 
if these values are separated from the diversity, the fact of pervasive moral 
contestability means that there can be no single value or set of values that have 
sufficient content so as to necessarily define a particular conception of justice. This in 
itself suggests that moral beliefs should not be outside of the domain of legitimate 
diversity. In this way, the tension between the openness and closeness of liberal 
theory seems insoluble. 
 
 
2.2 Intuitions in liberal theory 
 
The role of our moral intuitions in liberal theory constitutes another general difficulty 
in relation to uncertainty. The nature of the problem concerns the moral meaning and 
value of incorporating these intuitions, and, in particular, of the potential conflict 
between our moral judgments and values, and the values that are proper to justice. 
Since Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, actual moral intuitions have played a key role in the 
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structures and justifications of liberal theories. This is explicit in the theories of Rawls 
and Dworkin, for whom authenticity, or reflecting commonly held intuitions, is key 
for the justification of their liberal conceptions. Later theories involve our moral 
intuitions in various ways. For Walzer, for example, intuitions form part of the social 
meaning that underlies goods, the subject of his justice. Raz’s approach is founded on 
the contextual social value of autonomy, which is itself a moral judgment. For some 
later theories, differences in intuitions are part of the diversity of western societies. 
This is most obviously true of value pluralism, but also applies to theories of 
deliberative democracy and justificatory liberalism. It is also true of Rorty, although 
the focus of his work is more on the contingent nature of morals, rather than on 
difference or diversity. 
 
For liberal theories that incorporate moral intuitions, it is important that the role of 
these is explained in a way that is compatible with our understanding of morality, and 
that coheres with their account of liberalism. One of the most engaging approaches is 
that of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium. What is interesting here is the interplay between 
our considered moral judgments and the conditions and outcome of the original 
position. Essentially, Rawls is directing his readers to consider, morally, his 
formulation of the original position, and he anticipates that they will reach a position 
of agreement with him. He does not just rely on existing belief about liberalism, but, 
rather, encourages close consideration of his liberal conception. Although he sets out 
a plausible and attractive system, he does not attain the intuitive agreement that he 
seeks. 
 
The approaches of those later theories that allow for a plurality of legitimate moral 
judgments, all tend to emphasise the importance of an actual political dialogue as part 
of their substantive liberal content. This makes sense, in that it is only dialogue that 
can account for a diversity of moral intuitions. This is true of both public reason 
theories, and of the multicultural approaches of Tully and Parekh. These theories have 
the virtue of being able to incorporate diverse moral judgments and, by implication, 
moral contestability, in an effective way. They then face the problems of justifying 
the process of political dialogue itself, since this depends on contestable moral values, 
and arriving at some meaningful result. In relation to the latter, Rawls’ political 
liberalism is the only approach that imagines that a consensus will result, and, even 
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with substantial restrictions he imposes on reasonableness, there is doubt as to 
whether this could actually be achieved.  
 
Overall, the role of intuitions in liberal theory is difficult. There is a sense in which 
they must form part of any reasonable attempt at liberal justification, since otherwise 
there seems no moral fixed-point or framework from which to view different 
approaches. The only alternative to this approach would be to attempt a justification 
based on values that are simply declared, such as with the natural rights of Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia. It is clear, however, that there is a substantial diversity of 
intuitions, and that any restrictions placed on these, so as to achieve moral agreement, 
would involve specific and contestable moral values. The theories that accept this 
diversity prescribe an open moral-political dialogue, which is useful in that it seems to 
relieve liberalism of a great deal of moral contestability and complexity. This 
approach, however, still faces the considerable problems relating to justification and 
the role of dialogue. A Habermasian approach to discourse ethics, whereby dialogue 
actually assists groups in reaching morally universal results, would mean that these 
two problems, in effect, cancel each other out. This is an attractive result, but depends 
on the meta-ethical assertion that genuine dialogue achieves morally universal results, 
which is contrary to the experience of persistent moral disagreement. None of the 
liberal theories canvassed make this argument, although some do suggest that 
dialogue has the positive effect, not just of expressing diverse beliefs, but of 
engendering a mutual understanding that is positive for justice, even if it does not 
amount to actual agreement. 
 
 
2.3 Biased conceptions of liberalism
 
 
The final point to be made about the general nature of the liberal response to moral 
uncertainty concerns the bias that pervades liberal conceptions of justice. The early 
contemporary theories seem to offer plausible, but, ultimately, biased, expressions of 
liberalism. Later theories suggest a more contextual bias, and multiculturalism, in 
particular, accuses liberalism of a bias related to western, cultural values. The nature 
of this bias is that a liberal conception, or its justification, contains moral content that 
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is not morally relevant, or does not reflect the moral power and value that is attributed 
to it. The above discussions on moral diversity and contestability suggest a general 
inability for liberal theory to reach a particular prescriptive result in a morally valid 
way. This is pronounced in relation to liberal theories that aspire to universality, but 
also applies to contextual justifications, since these are subject to criticisms from 
diversity. Implicit in this claim, and in this thesis generally, is the idea that a liberal 
theory needs to show universality or demonstrable power over alternative approaches, 
rather than just demonstrate some positive moral worth. This is consistent with the 
approaches and attitudes of the theories considered, even in relation to the 
justification of liberal redescription in the context of contingency.  
 
This seems to apply, then, to liberal theories generally, and reflects both of the general 
comments on liberalism as a response to uncertainty, above. Together, they suggest 
that liberal justification depends on moral assertions that are themselves part of a 
contestable and highly complex space. This applies, also, to conceptions of particular 
liberal ideals. Liberal expressions of equality or neutrality, for example, are 
themselves moral accounts and, so, are potentially complex. This suggests that no 
particular conception of equality or neutrality could be justified as being the best 
liberal conception, since they would rest on particular moral values, and need to be set 
out in a detailed way in order to be effective. 
 
These three points offer a picture of the nature of liberalism’s response to moral 
uncertainty. Together, they suggest that liberal theory is unable to justify itself in a 
general and compelling way, and, instead, is susceptible to the recognition of the 
contestability, complexity and contingency of our moral judgments, and our moral 
lives. This is not to deny that a morally correct position can exist, or that there is a 
conception of liberalism that represents the most morally valuable given the 
circumstances in which we find ourselves. Rather, it means that moral theory is not 
capable, in conjunction with our moral beliefs and intuitions, of reaching a 
recognisably moral, singular and complete conception of liberal justice. More than 
this, it suggests that the disagreement over such conceptions is not entirely the result 
of mistake or misjudgement, but, rather, reflects the inability to rationally determine 
between moral values, and to rationally reduce complex moral concerns to a 




3. Developing liberal theory 
 
 
3.1 The problem with liberal theory 
 
The central observation of this analysis, then, is of the persistent failure of 
contemporary liberal theory to respond adequately to arguments from moral 
uncertainty. This is despite a keen awareness of the nature of the arguments involved, 
and concerted attempts to overcome or, at least, to ameliorate their effects. The 
challenge of moral uncertainty concerns more than disagreement about the central 
liberal value, or the best characterisation of a liberal conception of justice, but rather 
affects its very structure and mode of justification. This would seem to suggest that 
contemporary liberal theory will inevitably struggle to make any claims that are 
morally valuable. But this conclusion is belied by enthusiasm and interest that the 
field generates, which is academic, but also moral. In relation to the latter, much of 
the substantive principles of the various liberal conceptions remain readily 
recognisable as positive expressions of morality and justice, and retain the power to 
challenge and inform sincerely held beliefs. This is the case despite the doubt shown 
about the theories’ central structural principles and justifications. This seemingly 
paradoxical relationship, between the failure of liberal theory from the perspective of 
moral uncertainty and its intact moral value, may seem initially to raise doubt about 
the value of either the perspective of moral uncertainty, or of the practice of liberal 
theory. But ultimately, I suggest, it points the way towards potential improvements in 
the latter; towards a conception of liberalism that both responds cogently to moral 




3.2 Liberal theory and value 
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The analysis set out in this thesis understands a conception of liberal theory to mean a 
detailed characterisation of justice and social organization that holds at its centre the 
idea of a necessary liberal space; a space within which people are free to act as they 
choose, and are free from state interference. The justification of any such conception 
requires some general reasoning and explanation for the nature and extent of that 
space. The characterisation of the central aspects of liberal conceptions as being 
freedom and justification has been recast as their openness and closedness, 
respectively. This approach emphasises one of the central themes of an uncertainty-
based appreciation of liberal theory: that liberal freedom is not at large, rather it is 
confined by principles and ideas that must be clearly defined, and that necessarily 
restrict other freedoms. The general and persistent problem of contemporary liberal 
theory is that there seems to be no universal value or values that can clearly define 
this liberal space; that any likely candidates are either morally contestable, or are 
expressed so broadly so as to be unable to justify definitely any one system. Even 
attempts at holding the pluralism or contingency of values as this central idea seem to 
rest on contestable grounds, and never achieve the universality of result that they 
assert.  
 
This analysis seems to leave liberal theory without an obvious foundation or source of 
value, which in turn leads to a questioning of the nature and merits of the Western 
predilection for liberalism. Without a clear theoretical answer, the search for the value 
of liberal theory naturally turns to the social and historical. Liberalism captures a 
general understanding of a Western set of political and moral beliefs and practices. 
Without an adequate theoretical foundation, liberal value can be founded on and 
expressed through this common Western understanding of and adherence to its 
conceptions and principles; and through the captivation of people by its expression as 
a political conception and a political philosophy.  
 
It is this real-world appreciation of liberalism that can be used to envisage a valid 
liberal response to moral uncertainty. Much of the analysis in this thesis, however, 
shows how it cannot be used as a source for liberal theory, in the sense that the latter 
is the fully-formed and natural expression of the former: there is no attempt here to 
derive some conception of liberalism directly and necessarily from Western belief. 
Such an approach would require the identification of a central value or set of values, 
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similar to the contextualised liberalisms of Raz or Gray. Nothing in our socio-
historical beliefs, however, is so strong and so singularly definite to qualify as such a 
value, to the exclusion of all others. What can be allowed, is that liberalism is central, 
and perhaps paradigmatic, to Western political belief and thought, and that its values 
are equally important in Western political practice, at least in relation to foundational 
matters. The relationship between the matrices of Western moral and political belief, 
and a particular expression of liberal theory, then, is not as between the pressing down 
of a plunger and the resulting explosion: it cannot be that obvious or that necessary. 
Instead, our belief is more like the terrain onto which a conception of liberalism can 
be mapped and built. Not just in the sense of being a flat piece of land, but as a large, 
complex and varied landscape, whose features and details influence the structure that 
can be build upon it. But while the structure must begin with and come from the 
terrain, it can take on forms that build onto it in various ways, and express various 
themes and modes of design. The terrain is still foundational, in the sense of being 
fundamental to the structure, but there is no sense of necessity in the relationship 
between it and a particular structure built upon it: the terrain might be said to have the 
potentiality for the structure, but the latter is not inherent in it. 
 
The point here is to develop the nature of liberal theory and justification, by 
recharacterising the relationship between theory and its foundation. Because that 
relationship is not a necessary one, this approach will not single out any particular 
liberal conception. Rather, it sets out a framework for liberal conceptions that build 
upon Western liberal, political and moral beliefs. This being the case, there is no 
claim that any resulting conception is correct, or represents the whole of justice; in the 
context of belief, it is not possible for one conception of liberalism, or even liberalism 
itself, to achieve this result; the design of a structure does not represent or capture the 
whole of its terrain, but rather it builds on it, borrowing from and using those features 
that suit it. Instead of incorporating our considered moral intuitions into a settled 
structure, this approach acknowledges their broader role in driving the content of 
liberal conceptions, but without assuming those intuitions are so well-defined and 
uniform as to necessarily indicate the correctness of one approach, or of the focussing 
on one value. This is a more cogent expression of the relationship between intuitions 
and theory, and describes why theory is never final, perfect or whole, and yet is 
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contingent and dynamic: because it is founded on a complex set of beliefs that are 
themselves contingent and dynamic.  
 
This is not to say that liberal belief is so open and complex as to be without any real 
content. In fact, it is described by a number of deep and rich values, which could be 
organised loosely into three categories: the avoidance of wrong, which usually means 
interference by the state, or of harm caused by the state or by other people; respect, 
which emphasises the value of each individual, and may mean a focus on equality, 
neutrality, or the power of consent; and the promotion of autonomy, which takes a 
more positive attitude to freedom, insisting on the space for the individual to create, or 
on self-determination. These values are overlapping, and can be mutually enforcing or 
potentially opposing. Often one of these will be used to justify another, and in the 
same way, much of contemporary liberal theory attempts to reduce these values to one 
central liberal concern. But all such attempts fail to recognise the contestability of the 
value involved, and the complexity of the relationship between the different values. 
So, although each such conception does convey something about Western 
understandings of liberalism, these values cannot in fact be reduced to a single 
concern or principle, if that is supposed to represent the whole of liberalism. Yet, 
particular liberal conceptions do utilise and are informed by the content of these 
liberal values. 
 
By denying universal justification, and by declaring belief to be the foundation of 
liberal conceptions, this approach might appear to reduce, or remove entirely, the 
power of theory. It is at least true that it changes the nature and role of liberal theory, 
which can no longer find or declare a singular truth about the meaning of liberalism, 
or its best expression. But, this is not to say that it is left without any comparative 
power. Liberal theory is still able to identify value, albeit within a plural and complex 
context; to challenge belief, and to structure intuitions and understandings in 
meaningful ways. This is not with final authority, and not as a process that overrides 
or transcends belief. In this framework, there is a complementary relationship 
between belief and theory (to this, the metaphor of terrain and structure cannot 
extend). Here, the power of theory is its ability to systematise, structure and arrange 
that belief, through reasoning and the tools of philosophy. Although theory retains this 
power, what changes is the meaning of this process. The role of theory within the 
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framework is to assist in the examination and the exploration of belief, and to 
challenge one’s beliefs or the beliefs of others. This challenge comes not simply 
because of verifiable mistakes of fact or logic, but because of the cogency and 
coherence of one’s beliefs, principles and intuitions, usually when confronted with 
alternative ideas; in other words, it can cause a person to shift from one set of beliefs 
to another, even though there is no universal or absolute reason for this. The 
individual who makes such a change does so because of his or her moral 
understanding and judgment. The role that theory plays in this process is not to reveal 
a truth, but rather to inform a judgment; to convince of some flaw or inferior quality; 
to persuade. In this way theory, in its relationship to belief, takes on the nature of 
rhetoric. It acts to affect actual belief, in the manner of persuasion; to encourage 
agreement rather than to assume it. And, their universal pretensions removed, this is 
an interesting way to view contemporary liberal theories: they propose and describe 
principles, reason back to various liberal and moral values from which the principles 
are derived, and reason forward to set out their valuable consequences. It is in this 
way that these works are recognisably liberal, moral and valuable, despite their 
questionable foundations.  
 
This does, in some sense, represent a reduction in the power of liberal theory: on this 
reading, theory no longer has the power to discern or declare the correct or best moral 
result. Instead, it acts only in relation to existing belief and ideas of liberal value. It 
does, however, retain the power to challenge and influence belief, and it retains its 
identity as theory; it is not reduced simply to that which persuades, but is instead that 
which persuades and affects moral belief in distinctly theoretical ways. Perhaps the 
central mode of this is to compare and draw patterns that represent belief in a 
consistent way. In describing rationally conceptions of belief, it tests and challenges 
particular intuitions, and intuitive responses to imagined circumstances. From this, 
liberal theory can structure and organise belief into general principles and 
conceptions. This allows liberal theory the power of being dynamic and imaginative, 
and locates power in the development of ideas over time, rather than simply finding 
its value in the imagined resemblance of a conception to the final liberal truth. This 
development, of course, does not necessarily signify improvement, and certainly does 
not mean moving towards an end position. Instead it is explained as reactive to shifts 
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in liberal beliefs and understandings, and as transformative, with the capacity to 
influence those beliefs and understandings.  
 
By this idea, liberal theory is limited by being unable to express the whole of 
liberalism, and by having to work in relation to social beliefs and understandings of 
liberal conceptions. But this approach also describes the importance of liberal 
thought, and especially those liberal conceptions that challenge and influence the 
beliefs of people, and the ideas of future theorists.  
 
 
3.3 A framework for liberal theories
 
 
What is set out here is a framework for liberal conceptions, each of which is tasked 
with taking from liberal beliefs and understanding, as well as the strands of liberal 
theory, and organising the result into a relatively cogent and coherent liberal 
conception. It is predicated on a strong relationship between liberal theory and belief, 
in particular on the rhetorical effect of liberal theory on personal moral and political 
belief. But this is not to say that within this framework the aim and measure of a 
liberal conception is its popularity, or that persuasion should be pursued for its own 
sake. Moral value is not inherent in belief in this way. This is another aspect of the 
relationship between liberal theory and belief. Just as there is no sense of necessity 
between the two in relation to liberal foundations, there is, similarly, no direct link in 
regard to moral value; it is not simply that something believed is necessarily morally 
better than its alternatives. It is rather that moral belief offers a context, not just for the 
content of a theory, but also for an understanding of its value. Since we cannot discern 
the correct or best liberal conception, we can at least be guided by our own considered 
beliefs, and our experience of differences in the beliefs held by others. To be clear, 
this does not mean that morality and moral theory is directed by anything as simple as 
mere preference. The latter suggests only the choice between alternatives, in 
accordance with desire. It ignores many of the complexities bound up with actual 
moral belief, and, in focussing simply on a person’s self-conceived interests, it 
divorces from morality much of its content. The conception suggested here, that moral 
belief offers a context or a landscape for moral value, is a more coherent and a richer 
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idea. It retains the distinctively and recognisably moral character of belief, and models 
the latter in a way that is recognisable and plausible.  
 
As has been explored in this thesis, there is considerable difficulty in incorporating 
moral intuitions into a liberal conception of justice. This is both because such 
intuitions are never uniform enough to discern a single liberal ideal, and because of 
the nagging sense of contingency that attaches to them. The first is of little concern 
here, since many liberal conceptions are permitted. The second remains, and with it 
the difficulty of drawing the link between what we do believe morally, and what we 
should believe, or what it is best to believe. The framework for liberal conceptions 
incorporates the central role of actual belief, certainly a view encouraged by the 
difficulty of engaging in theory whose value transcends belief. The separation 
between belief and moral value is significant: it leaves space for theory to be 
conceived of as rhetorical, yet still be theoretical, valuable and dynamic; it does mean, 
however, that that the nature and content of moral value is left disturbingly 
unspecified. In other words, that moral value cannot be drawn necessarily from belief 
leads to the conclusion that there is no definite and verifiable means of it being 
realised, and no viable test to tell when it has been. Difficult though this result is, it 
should be remembered that the system itself is built on the capacity of the real-world 
individual to recognise and evaluate moral content within their social and historical 
context. The moral value of liberalism will not be able to be established any more 
firmly than this, but, because liberal theory itself cannot, on the present argument, be 
correct or true, the power that general moral belief offers is sufficient for its intended 
purposes. 
 
Ultimately, the point of this section is to assert that this is a viable and desirable 
theoretical framework for liberal conceptions. Its value lies in it ridding liberal theory 
of false arguments of universality, and so allowing it to work plainly and directly 
towards more achievable ends. It retains the value of inquiry, of critical thinking, and 
of theoretical construction, but without much of the theoretical underpinnings and 
justifications, which are contestable and are contested. Such an approach does not 
admit the failure of liberal theory, but rather frees it from the need to apply 
incontrovertible reasoning and find universal principles of justice. Of course, the 
nature of thinking and theorising is to find similarities between various circumstances, 
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and to try and draw general rules from a variety of examples; but there is an important 
difference between drawing patterns in an admittedly contestable way within a 
complex context, and claiming for these patterns a universal grounding and a 
singularity of value.  
 
This framework is itself theoretical, and is already liberal, in that it works explicitly 
with liberalism. It already assumes ideas of democracy and individualism in the way 
that belief is incorporated with and reacts to theory. It also incorporates strongly the 
perspective of moral uncertainty that pervades much of the reasoning of this thesis, 
and, correspondingly, a sense of openness, and of non-predetermination. There is the 
risk of this framework itself being perceived as a liberal conception (of liberal 
conceptions). As such, it would resemble the dual-levelled structure already 
described: open to various liberal conceptions, but closed as a metaethical theory of 
liberal and moral value. This is not the intention. It is instead conceived as a 
framework that arises out of the present social and theoretical situation, and that 
makes no claims to universality itself. It does, however, claim value: to work with and 
promote liberalism in a way that is beneficial to its theory and practice. As such, it is 
inconsistent with but not contrary to alternative conceptions of liberal ethics, nor to 
non-liberal beliefs.  
 
 
3.4 Beyond the framework 
 
It is possible to look beyond this framework to more substantive liberal ideas. These 
are to some extent suggested by recent developments in liberal theory, and by the 
positive content of the framework itself, particularly by its attitude towards 
uncertainty and consequent openness. Any links between the framework and any such 
ideas might indicate some affinity, but not a necessity: the framework itself does not 
dictate all or part of any particular liberal conception. These comments, then, can also 
be taken to be part of a definite conception of liberal justice, and as such, operate 
within an explicitly contestable space. 
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The first of these relates to the role of political dialogue within this liberal framework. 
Such dialogue was found to be effective in relocating some of the complexity and 
contestability of the substance of liberal ideas away from the ambit of liberal theory. 
The framework of liberal conceptions is designed in response to this complexity and 
contestability, so it may seem less important that these are relocated elsewhere; 
because contestability is conceded and assumed at the theoretical level, there is less 
need for it to be moved to the practical. There is some merit to this observation but, in 
fact, the incorporation of belief, and its interaction with theory, already resembles a 
process of dialogue. This general form of dialogue involves a normative discussion on 
political and moral subjects, and informs and shapes our liberal beliefs. This means 
that dialogue forms part of the very process by which alternative liberal conceptions 
are chosen, and more generally, by which liberal values and ideas interact and take 
political form.  
 
Even though dialogue, broadly understood, functions to inform the theoretical 
interaction between conceptions of liberalism, this does not render structured political 
dialogue irrelevant as part of such a conception. The nature of such discussion, and of 
liberal belief generally, retains a high level of complexity and difference; in other 
words, the general dialogue that informs belief by no means assumes that there will be 
a clear winner. For that reason, a more structured and explicitly principled form of 
dialogue can form an important part of particular liberal conceptions, and would 
internalise some of that difference into the actual political workings of public 
discussion. This, of course, cannot amount to an argument that such an approach is 
the correct or best form of liberalism, but this functioning of dialogue, and its explicit 
incorporation of uncertainty and difference, would make it an attractive prospect. In 
addition, the relationship between belief and theory inherent in the framework already 
anticipates the importance of theory to dialogue: the rhetorical nature of theory makes 
it an important part of the interaction and exchange between parties engaged in 
discussion. This relieves some of the difficulties of public reason liberalism related to 
the separation and distinctiveness of dialogue and theory.  
 
Recognising the inevitability of disagreement in actual liberal discussion raises the 
issue of the diversity of moral and political belief. It is an obvious difficulty of the 
framework, since it depends on overall belief, that these are too diverse, too opposed, 
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to be reduced to a single conception. The suggested approach has been characterised 
by moral-liberal belief as being the terrain or landscape upon which substantive 
liberalisms are mapped. Inherent in this is an idea of belief as being complex and 
dynamic, diverse and divergent. The issue then is whether this terrain can realistically 
be said to ‘support’ any liberal structure, or instead, whether any such structure is so 
necessarily approximate and singular as to belie its terrain. Perhaps there is some truth 
to this, but at least this approach offers an understanding of morality that is more 
accepting of fundamental difference, and the related uncertainty, than any approach 
where liberalism is based on singular, universal ideas. A second response to this 
difficulty, less apologetic about the possibilities of liberal theory, would stress that 
belief is not freewheeling anyway; the necessary interaction and interdependence of 
belief, and the commonalities and agreements in relation to biological, cultural, 
linguistic and social contexts mean that a conception of belief simply as an unfettered 
diversity is not adequate. This is exploited by the framework in considering belief as 
offering value and power that is more than individual, but without the making either 
of the mistakes of arguing that a single approach can be distilled from this belief, or 
that the outcome is universally, or contextually, correct. 
 
This leads to the interesting point, that conceptions based on this framework are 
naturally majoritarian; they will tend to take most notice of the majority or dominant 
group or culture, especially with regard to foundational issues. Despite the denial that 
popularity is the indicator of moral value, it is true that the context of justice will be 
moulded to the weight of belief. In this way, the framework is, broadly speaking, 
democratic in nature, and potentially biased, in much the same way as was described 
by multicultural views of liberalism: matters of justice will tend to be expressed 
according to their common understandings. It is the nature of liberalism, however, to 
recognise the arbitrariness of this, and to respond to it in an appropriate way. This 
inequality or bias, the failure to offer those freedoms, goods and opportunities that are 
meaningful to their recipients, are liberal concerns, and need to find expression in 
liberal conceptions. The point is not to attempt to remove this bias, as ultimately 
liberalism must be manifested through some particular understanding. What is 
important is that liberalism, by its nature, will be interested to identify the injustice of 
this bias, and take steps to minimise it. This does not mean that the bias has no effect, 
any more that it means that the liberalism ceases to be majoritarian; rather, it raises an 
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issue to which the liberalism is likely to want to respond. In this way, the relationship 
between the centre of liberal and social belief, and the periphery, takes on a special 
importance for current and future liberalism, once the bias of particular liberal forms 
is admitted. 
 
The two preceding points imply also a conception of the relationship between self and 
society. With the increased culturally-focussed content of liberal theory, this 
relationship becomes more prominent. Implied in this is an account of diversity or 
pluralism in society. These conceptions have proved problematic, as ideas of culture 
and pluralism are complex. The account of society and self is itself contextual, in that 
different societies may embody different modes of this relationship. A traditional 
liberal account of the self tends to focus on its capacity for autonomy, in the sense of 
creating and defining one’s own identity, and for moral appreciation and judgment. 
Communitarian views of the self emphasise cultural attachment, and, in particular, the 
constitutive nature of culture. The significance of culture to our identities is also 
raised by pluralist and multicultural theorists, where the latter tend to envisage a 
complex account of culture that emphasises the potential to criticise, and to dissent 
from at least part of one’s culture; and differences in cultural attachment, as well as 
the importance of cultural interaction to both individual and culture.  
 
The relationship between the individual and their society and culture seems to map 
out a potentially complex structure of interdependence. A better descriptor may be 
one of mutual embeddedness: self is embedded in society in the sense that its culture 
and the linguistic community to which it belongs represents a background to its belief 
and understanding; the society is embedded in the self in that society or culture has no 
meaning or expression other than that afforded it by its individual members or 
adherents. The mutuality of this relationship means that neither self nor society is 
ascendant over the other: our cultures do not constitute entirely our selves to the 
extent that genuine self-creation is impossible; nor is our power of self-creation so 
complete that we can readily step beyond our social contexts, and rewrite ourselves 
from a transcendent viewpoint. In this way, both society and self are fundamental to 
justice, and neither represents the proper focus or end-point of moral analysis. 
Multiculturalism adds further complexity to this idea, in that it requires a separation 
between society and culture, but, this does not negate the central message. Rather, it 
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adds the further complexities of cultural plurality and interaction to an account of 
justice. 
 
This model of the relationship between society and self offers a broad understanding 
of a complex interdependence. It emphasises on one hand the learned and social 
nature of moral understanding, and the importance of normative socialisation, and on 
the other, the personal nature of moral understanding: that it is meaningful for an 
individual to make judgments independent of the judgments of others, and, so, to hold 
a particular position that is unpopular or unorthodox, and yet is not necessarily wrong. 
This model is useful as a part of a liberal conception, and it seems also to add to the 
framework of conceptions itself; in particular, it informs the understanding of liberal 
belief implicit in the framework, and affirms the separation of belief and moral value.  
 
One final point that will be made about the framework, and the possible expressions 
of liberal justice that might be built upon it, concerns the adherence to liberal ideals. 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism envisages persuading those reasonable democratic 
citizens to adopt public liberal practices, even if these differ from their private beliefs. 
As such, it offers a model of liberal adherence that is different from the picture of 
already-liberal Westerners accepting a particular liberal conception as best. Because 
the liberal framework does not insist on a singularity of approach as do more 
universal conceptions, it is quite possible to envisage a liberal expression that 
incorporates a variety of models of adherence to its liberal ideas. In terms of the 
rhetorical power of theory, this is mirrored by the idea that there can be a number of 
situations and ways or modes of being convinced by a theory, that are quite various in 
nature.  
 
This diversity in liberal adherence can be described by two examples, the first of 
which is the pragmatic liberal, who is similar to that found in Political Liberalism, 
and other public reason conceptions. Such people, by virtue of their citizenship in a 
Western society, have a basic moral appreciation of democratic beliefs and 
institutions, and have the general desire to enjoy the benefits of a co-operative and 
minimally restrictive political process, will willingly agree with and adhere to a 
liberal political dialogue. These people would need to accept that their personal 
beliefs would not find full expression in their society’s political processes. In addition 
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to the freedoms and opportunities that the citizens of such states enjoy, this 
engagement offers individuals and groups the chance to express their culture 
generally, and to influence political substance: the complexity and bias of particular 
political conceptions will be framed by the society and, in particular, by those 
engaging in the dialogue. Through this, individuals, groups and cultures can influence 
the way that particular issues are understood and treated within a society. 
 
The second example of liberal adherence might be described as the moral liberal, for 
whom liberalism is accepted as setting out an appropriate political and personal ethic. 
Such an adherent would be characterised, not as someone who pragmatically 
separates their political from their personal lives, but as someone who merges both 
based on their liberal ideals. This would entail adopting principles such as an 
openness towards and respect for others, and a powerful belief in the rights of people 
not to be interfered with or harmed. Finally, it might also suggest an ironism, whereby 
the liberal person recognises uncertainty, or the burdens of judgment, and 
incorporates this into their structure of beliefs. This example suggests a deeper 
coherence with and potential engagement in a liberal public culture and political 
dialogue, but, contained within it, is the belief of furthering the genuine inclusion of 
others in that process. It is this person who engages more readily with the liberal 
conceptions on which social institutions are founded, but also is ready to respect 
others whose relationship to these conceptions are less strongly forged.  
 
The idea of different structural forms of liberal inclusion has no parallel in 
contemporary liberal theory, but is a natural consequence of diversity and complexity. 
It allows liberalism to be seen as both political and ethical, and that these do not 
necessitate a conflict: a single Western society could readily incorporate both. These 
two examples are not meant to set up two paradigms of liberal adherence, but, rather, 
represent two focal points within a complex diversity; they are useful focal points to 
draw from because they represent imagined extremes. The result is a liberal theory 
that is inclusive and just, and is more easily applied once the universal aims of liberal 




3.5 Some objections 
 
This framework, and some of the subsequent ideas of an allied liberal conception, has 
not been presented as a positive structure to the same extent as those works that have 
been explored throughout this thesis. Despite this, these ideas have been informed by 
the shortcomings of liberal theory with regard to liberal uncertainty. For this reason, 
there is enough content here to at least sketch out how the framework could respond 
to many of the criticisms levelled at contemporary liberalism in this thesis.  
 
The central relationship of the liberal framework is between belief and theory. The 
former, it is asserted, amounts to a terrain or landscape onto which a liberal 
conception of justice can be mapped and built. The characterisation of belief as terrain 
is potentially problematic in two ways. Firstly, it makes liberal theory too reliant on 
what beliefs actually are. As was mentioned above, this result is disturbing, but is a 
valid approach given the exhaustion of other foundational approaches. It should also 
be remembered that this belief is the result of our moral capacities, and is the complex 
result of historical and social conditions, not to mention the relationship with moral 
and political theory. The second point is that if belief is merely the terrain, then it is 
uncertain how to get from that belief to a valid liberal conception. Of course, the idea 
is that there is no necessity in the relationship between belief and any particular 
conception; the reason for using the terrain-structure is to offer a ready understanding 
of this point. A conception arises from existing liberal belief and thought, but how this 
is constructed depends on the particular person or group who is engaging in the 
exercise. The mutuality of this account, the importance of both the foundational belief 
and the process of construction itself, is the essential feature of the relationship. These 
two difficulties, then, really the observations that it is problematic if theory is either 
too closely aligned to, or too independent from, belief, and do recognise genuine 
concerns about the approach. But the impetus for the liberal framework is from the 
difficulties moral uncertainty reveal about contemporary approaches to liberal theory. 
These would be difficult to overcome absolutely, and the framework presented here 
does not attempt this. Rather, it is supposed to represent a coherent response; one that 
sets out a plausible foundational structure that recognises the value of both belief and 
theory without finding moral ascendancy in either. It’s a necessary consequence of 
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this that there will be no single standard to apply to liberal theory, and no direct way 
of deriving liberal content from an agreed set of facts. 
 
Another criticism, and one that strikes at the heart of the framework and requires 
more elaboration, is its status as a two levelled liberal conception: that is open in 
relation to the liberal conceptions that it supports, and yet is closed according to the 
structure and content of the framework itself. Since this criticism has been made of 
various other conceptions, it is important for it to be answered here. In particular, the 
focus should be on the status of the framework itself: its justification and its 
potentially universal aims. My response is that the framework itself sets out a 
metaethical position that is not presumed to be universal, and that it contains 
substantive liberal content that is admitted to be clearly morally contestable. In 
relation to the first of these points, it presents a characterisation of the relationship 
between moral and political belief and liberal theory that is supposed to be 
fundamental, but is not supposed to exclude other possible characterisations, or 
positions that supplant this relationship with other systems or ideas.  
 
The framework, then, is intended as a positive model of the nature of liberal theory 
that incorporates content from social values and theory, and has an affinity with 
liberalism. It is admittedly contestable and is conceived as an expression of theory, 
rather than as revealing a truth beyond theory. Yet the need for the justification of this 
approach remains; there must be some process of reasoning by which it can be shown 
to be valuable. And this justification itself must not contravene its own principles and 
ideas. Just as a liberal conception, on this approach, is founded on and perceived 
according to liberal belief, this liberal framework is to be apprised by those theorists 
and commentators who work and interact within its scope. Its justification, then, rests 
on its coherence to other beliefs, and the appreciation of it as being valuable. In this 
way, the content of its justification is that it models liberal theory in a recognisable 
and a plausible way, and that it is a functional and useful framework out of which to 
conceive and present conceptions of liberal theory. In particular, it frees that theory 
from its universal foundations, without removing its nature or power as theory.  
 
This approach to justification, it will be noticed, implies at a level once removed, a 
model of by which such frameworks can be appreciated and judged. It might be 
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asserted that if the framework itself is contestable, then it is this level, the level of 
justification of such devices, that is universal and fixed. But the approach is 
admittedly non-foundational in that sense, meaning that just as it permits alternative 
approaches, it also permits alternative methods of judging such approaches. It does 
not present an unassailable foundational system, but rather an approach that is 
recognisable on its own terms, which are the terms of moral uncertainty. This 
approach is wholly contextual, but not so as to suffer from the same problem as some 
recent contextualised liberal theories, namely attempting to derive singularity from a 
diverse pluralism and difference of belief. The view of uncertainty that has prompted 
this approach would stress the difficulty of ever abstracting to a level beyond context 
to make an assertion of value. The approach itself, then, is a self-conscious expression 
of the limitations implied by this uncertainty, but ultimately does not comment on that 
nature or value of this outside of its own theoretical structure. The hope is that a 
movement in this direction might reflect a richer paradigm of liberal political theory; 
richer through being one that is admittedly linked to the context of its perception and 
understanding. 
 
The liberal framework responds well to these criticisms from uncertainty, as would be 
expected, since it is constructed as an appropriate response to the same. The point is 
that such an approach has considerable benefits beyond the nature of this response. Of 
course, there are other criticisms that might be levelled at it from outside this 
perspective. In particular, the approach would admit to being without the foundations 
that some would believe is necessary for a valid moral theory, and consequently, to its 
liberal content being underdefined. But it would make no apology for these 
shortcomings, since they are its explicit points of difference from much of 
contemporary liberal theory, and the features by which it claims value as a different 
approach. While it would admit these shortcomings, it also represents a challenge to 
these positions: that, if it is too theoretically open and permissive, then criticism on 
these grounds should identify how a more closed and definite approach to liberal 
theory might work, one that represents a plausible response to moral uncertainty.  
 
 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
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The essence of the approach to liberalism presented here relates liberal theory to 
belief without reducing theory to belief, retaining both the moral and theoretical 
characters of this liberalism. This is achieved in two ways. Firstly, by recharacterising 
the relationship between belief and theory, by applying the metaphor of terrain and 
structure. This is supposed to supplant the idea implicit in most contemporary forms 
of liberalism, as to the directness of the link between a liberal conception and its 
foundations. Secondly, the role of theory is recast from the revelation of truth to being 
rhetorical, and affecting belief. This adds to theory a flavour of persuasion that on 
most readings is not currently present, but that seems to assist in describing how 
theory actually interacts with its readers. This approach may mean that theory loses its 
sheen of absoluteness or universality, but it also means a more realistic conception of 
liberal theory, as a text with which its readers engage and interact. Of course, the 
rhetorical aspect of theory is not supposed to dictate its content and nature; more 
generally, the separation between belief and theory must be maintained for the 
approach tot be workable. The nature of this separation is one of the difficult aspects 
of the liberal framework, and has been explained here in only a cursory way. 
 
As well as the general approach, I suggested a number of more substantive liberal 
ideas. These are to a large extent suggested by the weight of recent liberal theory, and 
are informed by the framework itself. They concern the role of dialogue, 
majoritarianism and bias, the relationship between self and society, and variation in 
legitimate forms of liberal adherence to a conception. These ideas stem from values 
that are prominent in post-communitarian liberalism, namely difference and diversity, 
and conflict and coexistence. The substantive ideas also trade on the links between 
uncertainty and liberalism, and on the attitude of openness suggested by the 
framework. 
 
The idea of this framework is that by freeing liberal theory from the need to be 
derived from clear, albeit potentially contextual, foundations, and to assert a universal 
effect. This approach denies neither the moral value of liberalism, nor the importance 
of theory in structuring and explaining it. It is conceived as being useful for the 
current moment: that liberal theory has shifted to largely difference-based conception, 
while the uncertainty that this reflects is not mirrored by its approach to justification. 
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It is not fully expressed here and, of course, the point is that this might allow liberal 
theory to develop in a way that is not predicted or predictable. In the context of 
difference and disagreement, the power of liberalism is that it embraces other 
doctrines, yet does not pretend to be any less of a doctrine itself. As such, it should 
seek to be genuinely open, liberal and self-transforming. My contention is that this 
can be better achieved by it being self-consciously grounded in its own understanding, 
not as the whole of justice, or even as its best expression, but as an expression of 
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